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VOL. XVI.

Auberlen on the Divine Revelation.

EDINBURGH:
T. AND T. CLARK, 38, GEORGE STREET.
MDCCCLXVII.

THE DIVINE REVELATION:

AN ESSAY IN DEFENCE OF THE FAITH.

BY THE LATE

CARL AUGUST AUBERLEN, PH.D., D.D.,

PROFESSOR AT BASLE.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED

A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR.

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Translated from the German by

THE REV. A. B. PATON, B.A.,

PORTISHEAD, BRISTOL.

"The first sin is neglect of truth."—FRANZ VON BAADER.

EDINBURGH:

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DEDICATED,

WITH RESPECT AND AFFECTION,

TO THE

THEOLOGICAL FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BASLE,

AS AN EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE

FOR THE DEGREE OF D.D. CONFERRED AT THE CELEBRATION OF

THE FOURTH CENTENARY OF THE UNIVERSITY,

BY THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE,

ADDRESSED TO FOUR FRIENDS.

LOCAL circumstances led me some time ago to investigate anew the credibility of the Bible miracles. And thus, as the original plan extended after I took the matter in hand, this book originated. Placed before one of the most serious questions round which the great conflict of minds is now waging, and in connection with which the last alternative appears, I was filled with increasing joy and confidence as my work went on. While these, the matters of highest importance to our race, occupied my inmost thought and moved my deepest feeling, you, dear friends, were vividly present to my mind, and I determined to address my communications to you.

To you, before all, my dear M——, as one of my younger theological friends, would I dedicate these pages. You know that German theology, in its most important and influential representatives, has abandoned the position it once held, and no longer rejects miracles; but the tendency to deny them still exists in connection with science, especially that which relates to the Old Testament, and it prevails very widely in the literary world. In our Switzerland, on the other hand, a not inconsiderable portion of the clergy, which has recently established an organ again in the *Voices from the Reformed Church of Switzerland*, occupies essentially the position of Strauss and Baur. In your France, too, and in Holland, a tendency is developing, which, represented partly by able and earnest men, and to which you yourself are not a stranger, seeks to separate history and doctrine in Christianity, and in the latter further to divide

Metaphysics from Ethics: it would thus retain only those general moral and religious truths which do not in substance go beyond nature, reason, and conscience. We Germans, who recognise in this tendency a revival, animated and modified by a French *esprit*, of that which some time ago swayed so many minds among us, have to oppose it in every way, not only in the name of religion, but in the name of science. I shall rejoice if the following pages, though first and chiefly intended for German and Swiss readers, contribute in some degree to this end. The *Revue Theologique* of Scherer and Colain has noticed with a good deal of interest the treatise of my early departed friend Paret ("Paul and Jesus:" *Year-Books for German Theology*, 1858, i.). That treatise was composed in a similar method with the first part of my book. I hope, therefore, that my words also may find a friendly reception and attention in your quiet minister's home, and that not simply because of our personal relations.

You, dear L——, were the companion of my studies at Tübingen during the first years of my residence there. At that time the two great works of Strauss, the *Life of Christ* and the *Dogmatik*, had appeared. Feuerbach, with his work on the *Essence of Christianity*, and Bruno Bauer with his *Criticism of the Evangelical History*, were making some noise. We witnessed the appearance of the Year-Books, established first by Schwegler, now long things of the past, and also *Zeller's Theological Year-Book*. Bauer wrote then some of his most important critical works, such as the treatise on the Gospel of John, and the book on the Apostle Paul, which were so eagerly read by us. These men we revered as the pillars of modern culture and science, who represented the result of all previous development and progress. O how you and I revelled at that time in the gardens of philosophy and poetry! You were witness, however, how I was led back, among other things, mainly by Schleiermacher's mysticism, so full of life and spirit, to the sanctuary of religion, and learnt to sit again at the feet of the

Redeemer. You remember, perhaps, how Bischer's well-known inaugural address brought about a crisis in my mind; while the conviction was pressed home upon me, though not without a hard struggle, since I had to thank this very teacher for many things, that I dared not share in approval of one who could speak as he did. What further helped me most of all, was the idea, or rather the reality, of the new birth. I saw men before me, and had from a child seen such men, whom I was compelled to recognise as born again. A voice in my inmost soul said to me that I also must be born again. Then it followed there must be a Being above man, of whom man can be born again—a living God. Further, what the new birth is for the individual, Christ is for the entire race,—the living principle of the transformation from a fleshly to a spiritual life. I was thus led from the centre-point of my own life to the God who is above the world, and to the historical Christ, the crucified and risen. Then I learnt gradually to rise from the enchanted grounds of poetry and philosophy to the paradise of holy writ, and there found again the lost tree of life and knowledge. The help I derived from theosophy is worthy of grateful acknowledgment. It opened up to me a view of God and the world which was free and quickening, and not imposed by any mere external authority, and which fitted into the door of Scripture like a key. This science, though indeed it requires revision and inquiry, has been decried only through ignorance of its nature and value. I could to this day point out almost the very spot, in one of the walks at Tübingen, where a friend, in the last year of his course, once said to me, in the midst of a scientific conversation, "What! dare you, in the nineteenth century, defend the reality of miracles?" Now he himself believes in them. These questions have not such an immediate interest for you, in your calling as a jurist; yet I would invite you, just because you are a jurist, to take an interest in the following inquiries. You are accustomed to deal with acts and documents, and to determine with that conscientiousness which

I always so much respected in you, the value of facts. To my mind, you are the representative of historical research. With this feeling I should like to bring you to look at our biblical documents, and invite you to a strict and juridical examination of the sources of this history, so as to discover whether, in respect to the question which shall occupy us, we have a well-assured foundation of fact. I hope you will not only feel here a fresher air blow toward you than from the deeds I saw in your room, but that you will draw from them a purer and mightier inspiration than from Schiller or Goethe.

You, dear H——, I became acquainted with ten years later than the foregoing friend. At what a pace the race now moves! Times had quite altered, even then. In the place of Idealism and Pantheism, had come, as had been foreseen and foretold, Materialism and Atheism; and these have now in turn disappeared, if not from the minds of men, yet from the general attention and regard. At that time you pursued with the greatest success the study of natural science and medicine, at the chief medical universities. More than once you told me with sorrow, that most of the youth of your faculty had gone over to theoretic and practical Materialism. You yourself had a severe struggle to maintain, in the face of the commanding and almost universally prevailing influences of the study of the exact sciences. It has never been easy for you, on the one hand, to preserve, by unintermitted study of the Bible, the heritage of your pious home, and on the other, to keep yourself above the waves, throughout a course of earnest philosophic reading. I don't know what are your precise opinions concerning life and the world at this moment; but you will, I am sure, take it in a friendly spirit, when I hold out my hand to you in this way, and as far as I may, give you my views on the physical and metaphysical aspects of the question of miracles. I ask, at the same time, your judgment upon them, as I am not by profession a natural philosopher. Take my pages, at the same time, as a greeting from our Basle University, which

lately celebrated the jubilee of its 400th year, and was greatly favoured by such pleasing unanimity among all the faculties.

Lastly, I venture to lay the following pages before you also, my dear K——, who are engaged with the deepest questions in philosophy, and have so often revealed to my mind the true dignity of genuine science. The idea of history, in the highest sense of the word, you are striving to reach. Many things in the book will seem familiar to you, reminding you of conversations we have had, in forest and plain, as well as by the midnight lamp, and which I reckon among the most precious hours of my life. I lay these lines in your hand, with the earnest desire that you yourself may be able soon to present us with a better gift.

C. A. A.

BASLE, *January* 1861.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

MEMOIR, ... 17

INTRODUCTION, ... 29

PART FIRST—BIBLICAL.

I. The Pauline Epistles—

1. The Miraculous Gifts in the Apostolic Church, . . . 35
2. The Miracles of the Apostles (and Jesus), ... 38
3. The Conversion of Paul, and the Revelations he received, . 45
4. The Resurrection of Jesus, ... 56

II. The Gospels—

5. The Cause of the Condemnation of Jesus to Death—The Messiah, 68

III. The Old Testament—

6. Isaiah liii., ... 76
7. The Prophets, and the Revelations they received, . . . 91
8. Moses and Abraham, ... 123
9. The First Eleven Chapters of Genesis, ... 149

PART SECOND—HISTORICAL.

I. The Great Intellectual Conflict in the Christian World—

1. The Restoration of pure Christianity, and the Antichristian Opposition, ... 192
2. The Development of the opposing Principles in the History of the Church, ... 196

PAGE

II. The Elder Protestantism and Rationalism—

1. The Elder Protestantism, ... 202

a. The Material Principle, ... 205

(1.) Grace, ... 205

(2.) Sin, ... 221

b. The Formal Principle, ... 228.

(1.) The Use of Scripture, ... 229

(2.) The Doctrine of Inspiration, . . . 233

2. Rationalism, ... 248

a. Reason and Nature, ... 248

(1.) The Rationalistic-Humanistic Development in the different Departments, ... 248

(2.) Results, ... 260

b. The Criticism of the Bible, ... 266

(1.) The Criticism of Rationalistic Dogmatism in its different Phases, ... 270

(2.) Result, ... 295

III. The Defeat of Rationalism—

1. The Beginnings of it in the Eighteenth Century, . . 300

a. Spener and Pietism, ... 300

b. Bengel and his School, ... 308

c. Oetinger, Crusius, and others, ... 322

2. The Defeat of Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, . 350.

a. The Theology which originated with Schleiermacher, . 354

b. The Church and Biblical Parties, . . . 375

c. Philosophy and Theosophy, ... 399

NOTES, ... 417

INDEX, ... 431

MEMOIR.

KARL AUGUST AUBERLEN was born on November 19, 1824, at Fellbach, in Cannstatt, Würtemberg, where his father, a schoolmaster, is still living. He attended the village school there till his ninth year. If the old saying is true, *Pectus facit theologum*, then Auberlen is indebted for the foundation of his theological culture to his father, who conducted his education on Christian principles; to the Christian spirit of the church there, which is for the most part in thorough earnest about and with the truth; and lastly, to hallowed impressions from the early death of his mother. Thus there arose in the mind of the boy the wish to become a minister. In order to secure the preliminary preparation, he was sent to the neighbouring city of Esslingen, in 1833, to attend the Pädagogium. In the four years and a half which he spent there, besides acquiring the prescribed knowledge of language, he became fond of mathematics through the careful and stimulating instruction of one of the teachers, and showed considerable aptitude for the study. In 1837 he received the instruction previous to confirmation, and it was accompanied with inward blessing. He was confirmed by Dean Herwig In the same year he was received into the under theological seminary at Blaubeuren, and in autumn of 1841 into the upper one at Tübingen. In Blaubeuren, the moral earnestness of Professor Schmoller exercised a wholesome influence on the

character of the young Auberlen. In his linguistic studies he had a partiality for Hebrew, but was specially interested in the comparison of languages with one another. Among other subjects, history was his darling study. Aiming at the greatest possible universality of knowledge, philosophic thought was awakened, to which, with his friend Wagenmann, now professor at Göttingen, he gave himself especially during the last summer of his stay at the seminary. Besides this, he moved with great delight in the fair regions of German literature, especially the poetry of Goethe. The course of instruction in the seminary at Tübingen led to the continuance of these historical, philosophical, and literary studies. In philosophy, Pantheism was regarded at that time by the students, and by most of the professors, as the Alpha and Omega of wisdom. Hegel's system took hold of Auberlen's mind, chiefly because it seemed to be the historically necessary expression of all modern culture and opinion. "My ideal," he writes, "was that humanity of Goethe and Hegel, according to which I sought to unite the greatest universalism of knowledge and mental activity with personal and social culture. I studied belles lettres, æsthetics, and the history of art. I resumed my mathematical studies. A lecture which I heard on the history of States led me to think of attending a course on law." The note-books filled with extracts furnish a proof of his great industry. As he was about to enter on the study of theology, a great change gradually took place in his thoughts and aims. "I thank God," he writes, "that my mind was soon led from that diffused breadth into greater depth. The religious memories of early childhood never quite left me. They were kept alive by my constant connection with my home, and by association with friends from other lands; and I became more and more conscious that modern thought and the fundamental principles of Christianity were irreconcilable." In several of the professors his inquiring mind found useful guides. Through long years, Dr. Schmid, who will long be remembered by many natives of Würtemberg, had stood

alone as a witness for the truth; yet during the residence of Auberlen an important change took place, through the influence of Dr. Landerer, and more still through Dr. Tobias Beck. It is the last to whom Auberlen is most indebted, especially in respect to his relation to the Scriptures and the fundamental views of the kingdom of God. But the Spirit of God acted on him not only from without, but from within, exciting and leading him into the truth. "A voice in my inmost soul said that I must be born again. Then there must be a being higher than man, of whom he may be born anew—a living God. Further, what the second birth is for the individual, Christ is for all humanity. He is the living principle of the transformation of the fleshly nature into the spiritual. I was thus led back from the innermost point of my own life to the living God, the historical Christ, the crucified and risen." The inaugural address of Fr. Bischer, professor of æsthetics, did him good service. "This occasion, on which I felt compelled to take up a different position from the most of my friends, made the break with my own earlier opinions more distinct in my own mind." Theological study now became in increasing measure the study of his life.

Thus it came about, that when he left the university in the autumn of 1845, and began his ministry, he could proclaim the truths of the gospel from the heart. Nor was science forgotten then. "I read and studied with great eagerness Rothe's *Theological Ethics*, which, along with some other books, at that time fell into my hand. By its remarkable union of biblical truths with modern speculation, it had a very considerable influence on me." He was occupied specially at that time with the writings of his genial countryman, the prelate Oetinger, who had died eighty years before. Auberlen's whole thought on theology was placed on a new foundation through this great disciple of the great Bible student, Johann Albrecht Bengel. The ground Oetinger took was a real, and as far as possible, corporeal conception of divine and invisible things. The task which Oetinger set himself was, to seek out the fundamental ideas from which the holy

men of God started, the knowledge of which would be the key to open the Scriptures, as well as nature and history, to the knowledge of man. This, which Oetinger proposed for himself, supplied Auberlen also with a new impulse to a thorough study of the thoughts of the Bible. His first scientific work was the result of his reading of the numerous works of this theosophist. It was an *Exhibition of Oetinger's System*, and appeared in the year 1847, when our friend was twenty-three years of age.

The year 1846–47 he spent in travelling, for the purpose of education, through Germany, Belgium, and Holland. In May 1848 he was called to be vicar (curate) to the Rev. Wilhelm Hofacker of Stuttgart. This position was of great importance in connection with his practical education, and the general course of his life. A beginner could not have found a better instructor for the ministerial office than this eloquent, able, and pure-souled man, whose whole being lived in the divine truth. Hofacker was carried off by a nervous fever in his forty-third year, a few months after Auberlen began his labours. What was especially memorable in this man, was the way in which, like a true priest, he carried the Evangelical Church on his heart day and night during that troublous time (it was the year of revolutions, 1848).

In the spring of 1849, Auberlen returned to the theological seminary at Tübingen as Repetent (sub-tutor). "Here," he writes, "I was very anxious to exert a good influence on the youths, not only in scientific but in religious matters, so as to contribute my share to make them true evangelical theologians and pastors."

He took advantage repeatedly of the right of Repetents to deliver lectures. In the winter of 1849–50 he lectured on the method of theological study; in the summer of 1850, on the history of revelation. This was a direct preparation for the situation of professor of theology at Basle, to which he was afterwards called. Before he moved to Basle, however, he entered on the married life. His wife was Clara Mentzel,

daughter of Dr. Wolfgang Mentzel of Stuttgart. This marriage also was a result of his residence in the house of Wilhelm Hofacker; he found his bride there.

In Basle, especially since the founding of the Missionary Institute in 1816, the influence of Würtemberg has made itself felt in several ways. And though Auberlen found a soil here in many respects unlike that of his home; though his favourite study of the "last times" was not popular, nor the societies he organized, successful; and though frequently the indifference to these things seemed to him a crime, yet he could enter on this new turn of his life with the words of happy gratitude, "My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit doth rejoice in God my Saviour." And what must have quickened him ever afresh in his troubled moments, must have been the zealous, and at the same time free and peaceable way, in which the affairs of the kingdom of God were treated in Basle. He had received his invitation from a voluntary association, which had for its object the maintenance of pure doctrine at the university, either in concert with the official teachers, or, if necessary, in opposition to their lectures. The time when Auberlen was called was a period of restoration at this university. The proposal to abolish it had just been rejected by the Council, and in connection with this act a new love for it had been enkindled among the people.

In his inaugural address, which discussed the relation of recent theology to the Bible, he laid stress chiefly on the doctrine that the Scriptures were distinguished from all other books, as a natural product, that has grown up and become full of life by divine method, is from a product of human art; and that the position of the theologian must not be *above* the Scripture, nor *beside* it, but only *in* it, so that he becomes rooted in it, and through the Holy Spirit becomes one with its principles.

His work was crowned by God with rich blessing. His whole nature, manner, and speech had indeed something youthful about them, so much so that one of the Council of Education said, after the inaugural address, "He is a mere boy yet!" It

was the boy with the sling, however; and the students perceiving this, had great confidence in him. His word fell into good soil, and there is no doubt that many of his hearers will preserve a grateful recollection of him all their life long, and that many churches, especially in Switzerland, are sharing already, and will continue to share, in the blessing which the Lord gave by the word of the deceased to those who heard him. When he entered the pulpit, too, he was able to open his mouth with joy and boldness, and many a mind received his declaration of the glad tidings. He began his career as professor by lectures on the doctrines of John and Paul, and an exposition of the pastoral epistles. He soon invited the students also to a continuous reading of the prophetic scriptures of the Old Testament. In the third semester (session) he announced his Exposition of the book of Revelation, and a course on the book of Daniel. His interest in history had, since his study of Bengel and Oetinger, been concentrated on the progress of the kingdom of God. His attention was turned with special earnestness to the latest developments of this kingdom, which are to precede the end of the world. He manifested his reverence for the Old Testament, by giving special honour to the most disputed book of it—the prophet Daniel. With clear, open eye he carried on the inquiry into Daniel, and read at the same time, ever correcting his own earlier views or the received traditions, Zachariah, his cotemporary Haggai, and also the last herald of the future, Malachi. The fruit of these investigations was his comprehensive work on Daniel and the Revelation of John.[1] This work has won many friends for Auberlen wherever the German language is known, and far beyond these limits; in a very short time a second edition was called for. He published his ideas on the development of the whole kingdom of God, in a missionary discourse at Barmen in 1859. There are some excellent suggestive hints in it on the old dispensation, which

[1] Translated into English by Rev. Adolph Saphir. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

was an earthly kingdom, and on the new, which is the kingdom of heaven. The relation of the kingdom of God to the church, and of the church to the kingdom of the thousand years, is also clearly set forth. The views incidentally given of modern heathendom, church and state, progress and culture, are all calculated to be of great service.

From the many assaults made on this book, he resolved to carry still further the work of proof. He seemed then to take time to breathe and reflect. He resembled the disciples in the interval between the resurrection and the ascension. They could at one time look on and touch with their hands Him who, at another time, just when their hearts burned within them the most, left them alone, then appeared to them again with the brightness of the morning, and revealed to them His heart of love. But in that very revelation He rebuked them most, if they thought that they knew and possessed Him in the deepest sense.

Auberlen now became better known. He received a call to a vacant professorship at Königsberg, and another to Barmen as inspector of missions. He felt, however, that the roots of his life were sinking deeper and deeper in Basle. His relations extended, and the scope of his influence widened in the city, especially by public discourses on missions, and by Bible classes which he held in various family circles. His whole inward life was rising in the power both to give and receive. The ideality of youth bloomed again with new beauty, and the pinions of his mind stirred and spread for nobler flight. The discourses on Schleiermacher were an expression of this movement of his inner life. They were delivered in the hall before a mixed audience, and were immediately published by request. He had been moved to deliver these lectures by the two first volumes of Schleiermacher's correspondence, which had just appeared. This was the first public declaration of his relation to Schleiermacher. After the works which he had published, it was to be expected that he would be an

opponent; and he was so just as much in his general views as in his view of the Old Testament in particular. And while he had, in common with Schleiermacher, a true feeling for all that was truly human, he held the same ground with him as to mysticism. He gladly acknowledged, then, and afterwards in his history of revelation, the intellectual height, originality, and universality of the man who, it may be said, had discovered anew the nature of religion, had liberated theological science from the shackles of philosophy, had felt the true pulse, as it were, of "Christian life," and in the word "fellowship of life with God," had found for it the true and simplest expression.

He kept up frequent and earnest intercourse both with his Würtemberg friends and with the professors of the university, belonging to the faculties of philosophy, law, and medicine. His intercourse with a much respected medical friend drew his attention to the letters of Albrecht von Haller, the great naturalist, upon the most important truths of revelation. He afterward, as his colleague Hagenbach had done with the letters of Euler the mathematician, sent forth a new edition, with an introductory preface, in 1858. He took part also in the quiet work of the friends of Israel at Basle, and now and then undertook the instruction or special training of converts or inquirers.

At that time a religious crisis had come on in Basle. For a long time a disciple of Beck had attacked the Christian faith and the biblical documents in the most determined manner, both in a newspaper and in the meetings of the Council. Besides this, he challenged believers to public discussion. In the minds of several friends, the wish grew up that Auberlen would meet him. He did so. The opposition of the sceptic during the discussion turned on miracles. Auberlen's reply was founded on those apostolic epistles which are universally acknowledged to be genuine. He sought to establish what was disputed from what was acknowledged. He succeeded in doing what he wished, but came home from the disputation very much exhausted. It had brought many things, however, clearly into

the light, and he was strongly impelled to continue the work thus begun. Instead of devoting his summer holidays to rest, he threw himself with a consuming zeal into this work, and in a short time completed the first volume of his chief work, *The Divine Revelation: an Apologetic Essay* (1861). What he proposed in this work was substantially to show the history of the revelation God had given and superintended, to be *real* history, and then to show it to be *rational* history. He says himself concerning it, that he wished to invite the student of history to a severe and legally exact examination of the sources of the history, to discover whether there was or was not a well-assured foundation of fact. In opposition to historical philosophers, he undertook to demonstrate that the narrative of facts was clear and transparent, lighted up throughout by the pervading *idea*, that the positive was the ideal, that the actual, *i.e.* what had been accomplished by God, was rational; we should see not only the miracles in the law, but the law in miracles; in the law of biblical miracles, the divine ideas and laws of all historical life. The work is rich in profound observations on the Bible and on history. In the history of revelation he was chiefly occupied with the connection between divine acts, words, and powers, and with that between the Old and New Testament, which, since it has been supernaturally arranged, gives an explanation of the wonderful Messianic idea. The general aim of Auberlen's scientific labour was to trace the course of the divine revelation, the walk of God with humanity from the beginning of creation; to show the close articulate connection of the whole, which, having many members, is yet throughout swayed and animated by the unity of the same divine thought. He wished to exhibit the Scripture as the photograph of that method and course of revelation drawn by the Spirit for us. His equipment for such a task was very complete; he had great decision, united with a disposition to receive and gladly acknowledge every true discovery of science; a restless and wide-embracing spirit of inquiry; his eye and thought were free, he never forgot that

truth is one; he had a sound imagination, by which he could enter into the peculiarity of all that came before him in history, and a delicate and acute judgment. If he not seldom surprises us with a thought which shows the light of the divine idea that connects the single circumstances with the whole, and by means of the whole illuminates them, the cause of this is to be looked for in that simplicity of his nature, with which he let the words of the Lord, the prophets, and the apostles influence him. The words of Christ, "If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light," have been singularly illustrated in the whole scientific life of our friend. The language in which he clothed his thoughts also bore this character: noble simplicity with vivid clearness were its glory. Sometimes he compels us to follow the swift course of the thought; sometimes bids us go deeper and think the more, as the words flow quietly on.

Hitherto the Lord had granted him an experience of life almost without sorrow, even in his domestic life. He had five children, two of whom died very young; the other three, however, grew up prosperously. Exhausted by the excessive effort of his last work, toward the end of the vacation 1860 he sought recreation and strength by a visit to Stachelberg, in the Glarner country. A slight cold, however, confined him to bed soon after he went there; and though he began a new course of lectures in the following winter session, he never altogether recovered from this illness: his whole system was injuriously affected. He was obliged to spend the whole summer nearly at Euren. He was able to give lectures during the winter at his own house to a considerable number of students. He was greatly fatigued by them, however. His strength was fairly broken. Reading and writing, even speaking, became very difficult. But as the outward public life ceased, the inward became the more active. Many students came to read to him, and other acquaintances, and friends came to see him on appointed evenings of the week. These gatherings for reading and conversation—during which the invalid, exercising great

self-command, was cheerful and attentive, and often stimulated the others by some remark, or sometimes in lengthened converse forgot his weakness altogether—remain for those who shared in them a pattern of Christian patience, which could sacrifice what was most dear, and heartily thank God for one hour of peace and freedom from pain after days of suffering. How great the sacrifice he must have offered at that time, can only be known by those who know the joy of labour, but who, by the will of God, are kept from it.

He recovered better than could have been expected from an affection of the chest, which attacked him late the previous summer; but the fourth winter was, in the main, like the three foregoing ones. That cost him many a heart struggle. He had need of strong faith, to exhibit and feel entire resignation to the will of God. But his faith did not fail. And how mightily the Spirit carried on the good work begun in him to the end! With the first signs of the returning spring, he again became weaker. The affection of the chest had meanwhile advanced. For the last fourteen days of his life he was confined to bed. When his wife said to him, on 30th April, that the physician had spoken of his condition as being very critical, he was surprised, was quiet for a moment, then expressed his joy that the Lord had determined to call him home so soon. Two days before, he was able to attend to the arrangements necessary for the publication of the manuscript of a *Würtemberg* theologian who had died in early youth, eighty years before. The issue of these manuscripts was one of the last things he undertook, and he spent the peaceful hours he enjoyed during the winter on it. Of such hours, in which he could study, many were granted to him in the course of the winter. He had been able to dictate to his wife the beginning of the second volume of his *Divine Revelation*, so far that we are able to print them along with this.[1] His work now done, and knowing that his death was not far distant, he awaited with calm joy his entrance into eternity. His death-

[1] This fragment is not published with this translation.

bed was a living commentary on the words, "O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?" When, a few hours before his death, one observed that the disciples of Christ pass along the same way as Christ—first death and the grave, then the resurrection and ascension—and therefore they are not afraid of death and the grave, he answered, as well as the difficult breath allowed, "Of the fear of death, God be praised, I know nothing;" and added the last verse of Paul Gerhard's hymn, "If God be on my side, then let who will oppose:"

"My heart for gladness springs,
It cannot more be sad;
For very joy it laughs and sings,
Sees nought but sunshine glad.
The sun that glads mine eyes
Is Christ, the Lord I love;
I sing for joy of that which lies
Stored up for us above."[1]

Even the thought of his dear wife, and the three children, of whom the youngest, the little son, went to school on the day of his father's death, was not painful to him, for he knew the Father of the widow and orphan as his Father. On Monday the 2d May, shortly before noon, he gently fell asleep. He who "was dead, and is alive for evermore," writes the word of life deeply in the heart of his disciples. Thanks be to God, who giveth us the victory, through Jesus Christ our Lord! Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye stedfast, immoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, inasmuch as ye know that your labour is not in vain in the Lord.

[From a sketch of the life of the deceased, by Dr. W. Fr. Gess, and two articles in the *Hirtenstimmen*.—F. G.]

[1] The translation in *Lyra Germanica* by Susannah Winkworth.

INTRODUCTION.

ARE there any acts of God? Has God spoken? These are the questions which shall here engage our attention. When God speaks and acts, we call it revelation. For as a man in his actions and words reveals his inward being, so also God. Word and deed are the revelation of personal life. These expressions may be called anthropomorphic; but it lies in the very nature of the case, that God, to reveal Himself to men, anthropomorphizes Himself. The terms, works of God, word of God, have hence, and with right, passed into general use, and even into scientific language.

The question of revelation thus reduces itself at last to the other: Does a living God, a personal living God, exist? If there is such a God, He will act and speak. A mere distant, inactive, and speechless God would not be a living God; indeed, would be no God at all. The world would be to Him a limit.

From the very nature of divine words and works, it is evident that they could not proceed from the creature with his powers and means. If so, revelation would be a revelation of the world, not of God. If there is an actual revelation, it must be, according to the true idea of it, supernatural, miraculous. The question of revelation is connected with that of miracles. God, revelation, miracle, are nearly-related conceptions. As revelation points back to God as its invisible author, so it points forward to miracle as to its visible manifestation. We must therefore, first of all, consider this question.

The question of miracles, as already indicated, has two sides,

a historical and a metaphysical. The historical is: Have miracles actually happened? *i.e.* have they been credibly attested and handed down? The metaphysical is: Can miracles happen at all? Is not the very idea of miracles inconsistent with a right view of God and the world, and their relations to each other? Strauss, as is now pretty generally acknowledged, has confounded these two points of view, and has thereby considerably injured the scientific value of his book. When he can find nothing against the history, the knot is always cut by the metaphysical principle of the impossibility of miracles. We shall seek to avoid this error, and always keep the two questions distinct.

At the first glance, it might seem more in harmony with the nature of the subject, and with the laws of science, if we began with the question of the possibility of miracles, and then inquired into the reality of them. This is the way by which most of our opponents, as Strauss himself, have come to the rejection of miracles: they could not succeed in reconciling belief in miracles with their philosophic and pantheistic views. But precisely because these views, notwithstanding the pretence of freedom from such influence, clearly are presumptions, which are opposed by certain presumptions on our side, so it is manifestly more just to place this point in the *second* line, and to see whether the other does not furnish a common ground on which the discussion may be carried on.

In this mode of handling the subject we are quite following the spirit of the present day. Metaphysical theories are now comparatively little esteemed. People wish for something actual, for facts lying palpably and surely before their eyes. This tendency is not, indeed, altogether to be commended; on the contrary, the friend of true science will mourn the prevailing neglect of philosophy. Yet he may comfort himself with the thought that this state of things will come to an end as soon as a great philosopher arises, who shall comprehend the realities of being more truly and fully than the idealism of our

most recent systems has done. At present, however, it must appear a natural reaction against the arrogance of speculation and its methods—which, because one-sidedly constructive, have been actually destructive—that in all departments of science, especially in the investigation of nature and history, a tendency toward the actual and the real, a tendency to put the ideal in the background, is prevailing. We must learn, however, to determine not the facts according to our theories, but our theories according to the facts. Are these facts puzzling and full of mystery to us? What then? Are nature and the world of men about us without mysteries? No reasonable man will contradict the maxim of Bacon of Verulam: "Animus ad amplitudinem mysteriorum pro modulo suo dilatetur, non mysteria ad angustias animi constringantur."

We begin, therefore, with the investigation of the actual, and go first into the question, Whether miracles and supernatural revelations are handed down to us in such a way that unbiassed inquiry is compelled to recognise them as historical facts? But here a new difficulty at once appears. Our opponents do not acknowledge the genuineness of the biblical documents, and they question in particular the genuineness and credibility of all the New Testament historical books. Only the Epistle to the Romans, the Epistles to the Corinthians, the Epistle to the Galatians, and the Apocalypse, are accepted by the school of Baur as genuine records of apostolic Christianity. In the Old Testament, a part of Isaiah, with Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and most of the minor prophets, are undisputed.

We are very far from agreeing with this criticism, or acceding to its results, and call attention to the fact that it also, in spite of (in their view, indeed, *because* of it) all their pretension to purely historical investigation, starts from the assumption of the impossibility of miracles. In reference to the New Testament, Baur says: "The chief argument for the later origin of the Gospels is, that they, each one for itself, and still more all together, represent so much of the life of Christ in a way that

cannot possibly be true." Respecting the Old Testament, says Knobel, De Wette approving: "Wherever in the Hebrew history numerous myths and legends [*i.e.* miracles] are found—as, for example, in that of the Patriarchs, that of Moses, Balaam, Samson, Elijah, Elisha—we have accounts which were first drawn up a considerable time after the events. Where, on the contrary, the facts are given naturally—as, for example, in the books of Ezra, Nehemiah, 1 Maccabees—the composition of the histories was generally, if not always, cotemporary with the events, or followed soon after. This is a historical canon which cannot admit of a doubt." A disciple of the school of Baur has recently expressed this assumption in a very *naïve* way, if, indeed, he does not rather cunningly lay a net: "Strauss demands no more and no less than what is self-evidently a necessity of all scientific theology, viz. that the evangelical records should be treated on the same principles by which we determine every other history, that criticism and also biblical criticism should be free from prepossessions. Strauss demands a pure historical treatment of them, and nothing more. It is the elimination of the historical basis from the records which he regards as the task of criticism (?). He reckons, of course, in the freedom from prejudices which must distinguish the critic, that he should not set out with the belief in miracles. That which we regard in all other cases as an unmistakeable mark of the unhistoric, cannot in this one case surely be regarded as a proof of higher historical worth. However well metaphysics may have succeeded in proving the possibility of miracle, how can a historian in any one given instance be asked to decide for its reality?" The editor of the very magazine from which these extracts are taken pointedly adds: "Whether this principle is right, or whether, on the contrary, the biblical documents, as a special divine revelation, are to be measured by some other standard than other sources of history, is a question which, not historical, but theological and philosophical, science has to decide."[1]

[1] See Note A.

In order, however, to win a point from which to set out on our inquiry, we shall pass over to the position which our opponents hold, and demand nothing but the permission to argue according to the simple rules of logic, from those biblical documents which are *generally* acknowledged to be genuine. Nor shall we make any use of the Apocalypse for our purpose, and shall refer only to one point in the Gospels, which is in itself not miraculous, and lies beyond the range of critical controversies. From the Pauline epistles we shall pass through the Gospels back to the Old Testament, in order to argue there also, partly from those prophetical books admitted by nearly all to be genuine, and partly in a mode not affected by the results of criticism. We shall thus bring forward four of the epistles of Paul, four books from the Old Testament, and one point out of the history of Jesus; not as if these were all that might be named, but they are examples lying nearest to hand, and are at the same time more than mere examples, as they constitute the main elements of the divine revelation, and are well fitted to afford a glimpse into its nature and the course of its development.

If this historico-critical examination of the biblical documents should attest the reality of the divine revelations, we shall then, in a second part, seek to show the inner signification of these facts. At the outset of that part, the metaphysical question of the possibility of miracles will have to be discussed, *i.e.* it will have to be shown that a supernatural revelation is in no way inconsistent with right views of God and the world, and their reciprocal relations. Not only that, however; but as we come to see more clearly the nature and object of revelation, we shall be the more convinced of its necessity: we shall feel that revelation is the specific and indispensable means of leading humanity and the world to their true life, and their original divinely-ordained destiny. The reality of the revelation will thus at length become clear and intelligible to us, as we perceive the whole orderly and rational development of it to be the

realization of the divine idea, in which is disclosed the "hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our glory."

The positive facts whose historical verity has been shown in the first part, will therefore be seen in the second in their ideality and reasonableness. For divine revelation does not come to us as an external authority, which we are blindly to believe. Though supernaturally given, it is still not alien to our minds; but just as for our practical wants it is the true life, so for our understanding it is manifested as the true light, the highest truth and wisdom (John i. 4, xiv. 6; 1 Cor. i. 30; Col. ii. 2, 3). While we acknowledge and establish this, however, we shall defend revelation and its documents with all our energy against those assaults made, and still making, on them by those who hold views which may be called rationalistic in the widest sense of the word. Rightly to conduct the defence, it is needful thoroughly to comprehend the attack. We shall therefore have to place between the two parts of our work hitherto spoken of, a historical sketch of rationalism, in which we shall seek to illustrate this phenomenon in its historical connection, and to lay open its fundamental errors, also to estimate and exhibit its positive significance, and finally, to show how recent Christian science, while defeating rationalism, is pressing toward the acquisition of a more comprehensive and vital acquaintance with revelation.

The following work will therefore consist of three principal parts, of which, corresponding to systematic theology, the first will be biblical; the second, historical; the third, dogmatic. The first, the thesis; the second, the antithesis; the third, the synthesis.

PART FIRST—BIBLICAL.

I. THE PAULINE EPISTLES.

1. THE MIRACULOUS GIFTS IN THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH.

IT is clear that Paul (1 Cor. xii. 14) speaks at length of the *Charisms*, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as of a thing that prevailed widely in the Corinthian church. The actual existence of these gifts is a matter so well understood between the writer and his readers, that the only question is how they are to be viewed, and how they are to be exercised. Among these gifts, Paul mentions—to say nothing at present of prophesying, speaking with tongues, etc.—very explicitly, miracles. The expression δυνάμεις (1 Cor. xii. 10, 29) is well known to be the standing word for those extraordinary acts of power which we call miracles. They are called, in respect of their inner, divine origin, δυνάμεις (powers); in respect of their unusual character, whereby they awaken surprise and arrest attention, τέρατα (wonders); in respect of their signification, as confirming the authority or message of him who performs them, σημεῖα (signs). Over and above this, in both the places named, together with the general expression, a particular kind of miracle is named, which appears in the Gospels and the Acts also, as by far the largest class of New Testament miracles, viz. the gift of healing. There must thus have been in the Corinthian church special miraculous instances of healing, besides the other miracles. In the Epistle to the Romans the

gifts are named in a similar way to that in 1 Cor.; and among the gifts which to us now seem extraordinary, prophecy at least is named (Rom. xii. 4–8). In the Epistle to the Galatians (iii. 5), however, and therefore in the Galatian churches, we meet again with express mention of deeds of power.

We have here, then, a phenomenon before us mentioned in all the epistles which are acknowledged even by the most negative criticism, and which was spread in the churches of Asia Minor, Greece, and Rome. It is not the mention of mere isolated facts we have to do with, but the active life of the whole church rejoicing in the first fulness of spiritual gifts. For the charisms appear in the Epistles to the Romans and Corinthians in this light: the church is the body of Christ, in which every member has its special gift, and therefore also its special function, service, and activity for the good of the whole. The charisms are the appropriate life-functions of the community, so far as it is the church of the Spirit.

The application which Paul (Gal. iii. 5) makes of the fact of these gifts, and of these very miraculous powers, is closely connected with this view. The Galatians were in danger of falling from the gospel, and going back to the law; they were therefore in danger of apostasy from pure Christianity. In order to convince them of the truth of the latter, the apostle reminds them that through the preaching of the gospel they had received the Holy Ghost, and the power of working miracles. If they had not received these powers, if no miracles had taken place among them, how could Paul have ventured to argue in that way? Would not his argument for Christianity have been changed into an argument against it? Would not the Galatians simply have replied: If thou bringest no better proofs of Christianity than these untrue statements, then we will suffer no longer for it (ver. 4), but give it up, and the sooner the better? Here, however, an outward proof of the Spirit and of power—they are the same expressions—comes before us, which is just a continuation of the inner proof mentioned in

1 Cor. ii. 4. A believer in Scripture may smile, even when now-a-days (Strauss calls the witness of the Spirit the Achilles heel of Protestantism) the reality of the proof from the experience of the Spirit and power be disputed; and this other proof, precisely because an external one, has something much more striking and difficult to evade. For we are dealing with facts observable by the senses, with wonders of the Spirit and deeds of power which the first Christians themselves performed, and saw with their own eyes.

It is always a miracle when God makes a new beginning: the beginnings are miraculous. So also are the beginnings of the Christian church. In the New Testament, and therefore within the apostolic age itself, we can trace the gradual subsidence of the great overflow of miraculous gifts of the Spirit. The stream had begun even then to return to its ordinary channels. It is hardly accidental, that in the Epistle to the Romans, the latest of the four, no deeds of power or healings are mentioned; comp. Eph. iv. 4–12. In the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, the so-called pastoral epistles,—I am speaking now from my point of view, and am not afraid of putting, by the following remarks, a weapon into the hands of my opponents that may be used against the genuineness of the pastoral epistles; in reality, an interpolator would have much rather taken the earlier apostolic height and fulness for granted,—we see that Paul, in setting apart officers of the church, cannot reckon any longer upon the fulness of the Spirit which prevailed in Corinth when the gifts came of themselves to those in office (1 Cor. xii. 4, 5); but he is obliged to describe the necessary qualifications at length,—part of them, indeed, such as seem to us now self-evident (Tit. i. 5 ff.; 1 Tim. iii.). He speaks of a charism only in connection with his own son Timothy; but he had employed, or had not employed it, in such a way as that he had to be repeatedly exhorted not to neglect it, but to stir it up again into fresh fire and life (1 Tim. iv. 14; 2 Tim. i. 6). The pastoral epistles are the last testament of Paul the aged, who was soon

about to depart from this world, to the primitive church as it was passing from the period of miraculous power into the ordinary and abiding course of its history. After the Israelites had taken Jericho by a miracle, they had to subdue Ai with the weapons of ordinary human warfare; and the one is just as fully and as intentionally related in the book of Joshua as the other (Josh. vi. 8). Let this be noted in connection with the possible objection: Why has the inward proof of the presence of the Spirit and of power alone, and not also the outward, been transmitted to us in later days? It may serve also to silence and to correct those who would make out the gap between the present and the apostolical church to be greater than it really is. It is not thereby denied, however, that, in later periods of the church's history, and even down to our own day, there have been miraculous gifts; and just as little, that a much greater abundance of the Holy Spirit's blessing and gifts were greatly to be desired.

For our present controversy, this gradual disappearance of miracles is of no importance; for if only one miraculous fact were established, the miracle is essentially proved. The circumstance that the beginnings of the church are miraculous, and accompanied with miracles, permits and demands a reference also to that which was the real founding of the church—the history of Jesus. Were the first Christians equipped with miraculous powers? So, doubtless, was Christ. The more, as between them and Him comes one who likewise possessed miraculous power, and through whose preaching the powers of the Spirit and miracle were communicated to the Galatians and Corinthians.

II. THE MIRACLES OF THE APOSTLES (AND JESUS).

There was in the church at Corinth, a party which questioned the apostolical authority of Paul, and tried to turn the Christians there against him. In his defence against these opponents, he says, among other things (2 Cor. xii. 12), "Truly

the signs of an apostle were wrought among you in all patience, in signs, and wonders, and mighty deeds."

In a precisely similar way Paul speaks in Rom. xv. 18, 19; only that there he says, of his apostolical calling as a whole, what in 2 Cor. xii. 12 he says chiefly of his visit to Corinth. We shall lay less stress on this, however, as the genuineness of the two last chapters of the Romans is disputed by our opponents. It is at the same time to be observed, that even such unbiassed critics as De Wette, Reuss, and Ewald,[1] oppose the view of the Bauer school in respect to them.

The passage (Heb. ii. 4) must not be passed over without mention. In this passage the candid mind will perceive as strong a proof for the reality of miracles among the Jews and Jewish Christians, as that which is taken from the Epistles to the Galatians and Corinthians; for their existence among the Gentile Christians. The Epistle to the Hebrews was, as we know, much used by Clement of Rome before the end of the first century. It has thus the very oldest extra-biblical testimony in its favour. It speaks of Timothy as the friend of the author. It proceeds upon the supposition, to quote De Wette, that the temple was still standing, and the service going on, as it were, before their eyes. The almost universally received opinion, that it was written and sent to Palestine before the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, therefore seems the most natural one. This view explains also the peculiar complexion which, in addition to its characteristics as a treatise, distinguishes this epistle. If this is the case, and if the Epistle to the Hebrews was written long before the end of the first century, then it furnishes a very weighty testimony to the reality of miracles in Palestine.

They are employed in it, indeed, for the same object as that for which Paul (Gal. iii. 5) uses the mighty deeds of the Galatians, and his own, in 2 Cor. xii. 12. The Hebrews also were in danger of falling away from the gospel, and sinking again into

[1] See Note B.

Judaism. Our epistle strives to prevent this, and to that end reminds the Hebrews of the miracles that happened among them as a result of the Christian preaching. Nothing would have better served them as a justification, than if they had been in a position to charge the author of the epistle with falsehood. This kind of testimony to miracles in letters, in which the writer, addressing his readers, appeals to what they have in common experienced, and from that common knowledge argues against his readers, has great force and point. Such a testimony is far stronger than a simply historical statement.

Let it be considered still further, in what connection the miracles come before us in the Epistle to the Hebrews, as in the other passages. They are not looked upon as mere wonders and spectacles; but just as the three expressions for them already named, which stand all together in Heb. ii. 4 and 2 Cor. xii. 12, point backwards to the power of God, and forwards to the conscience and understanding of the eye-witnesses, whom they were to serve as sensible signs to awaken their faith, so the miracles are mentioned always in connection with the moral and religious life. As in 1 Cor. xii. and Gal. iii., so in Heb. ii. 4 and Rom. xv. 19 they are connected with the Holy Ghost; and this Holy Spirit, which is the originating principle of the "mighty deeds," is also the source of the new birth, the new and holy life. Indeed, this last is the first, and the principal matter. The deeds of the Spirit only accompany in order to confirm the words of the Spirit in preaching, the aim of which is the salvation of souls (Heb. ii. 3; Rom. xv. 18, 19); so Paul, too, in that wonderful and glorious chapter, 1 Cor. xiii., which stands so significantly between the two chapters which treat of gifts, sets charity above all miraculous powers and gifts. Miracles thus appear everywhere pervaded by a holy spirit, and as an element of the purest moral and religious life the world ever saw, and which is ever anew commending itself to the conscience of all men as the truest morality, giving most scope to the power of love and self-sacrifice.

Observe, further, how far-reaching this testimony of the Epistle to the Hebrews is. The preaching which the miracles confirm, was, according to ver. 3, twofold,—that of the Lord Himself, and that of those who heard Him, or disciples. A scholar of the apostles, such as Mark or Luke was—for so we must, according to ver. 3, regard the author—thus reminds his readers in Palestine of the manifold (*ποικίλαι*) miracles of Christ and His apostles which took place among them. We have here two things: 1. A witness for the miracles wrought by Christ, a confirmation of the gospels; 2. A testimony for those wrought by His disciples, the apostles to the Jews; and therefore also a confirmation of the Acts of the Apostles, which in several places refers to the outpouring of the Spirit (Acts ii. 1 ff., iv. 31, viii. 17, x. 44, xi. 15).

This passage has, then, an important connection with the words in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, to which we now return, and which is in several respects related to this passage in the Hebrews. In 2 Cor. xii. 12 also there are three principal expressions for miracles placed together; here the writer argues from knowledge common to him and his readers, against the latter; and here, too, the moral element of patience is put before mighty deeds. Does it not show, apart from other considerations, a rare greatness, elevation, and freedom of mind, that among the signs of an apostle Paul placed patience before miracles? And what patience, the firm endurance of suffering, signified with this man, any one may see for himself, who, turning over a few pages, will read 2 Cor. xi. 23, etc., or iv. 8, etc. The flashing jewels of the miracles are thus set in the tried gold of the virtue which gave its entire life for its convictions, and which died, not one, but a hundred deaths in the service of love. Which of our poets or philosophers has done so much for the truth?

It is further to be observed that the three terms which are placed together, and which in Heb. ii. 4 embrace all the miracles of Jesus and the twelve, here also lead us to infer a

rich abundance of mighty deeds in Corinth, which is the less surprising, as Paul, according to Acts xviii. 11–18, abode there more than a year and a half. In this there lies, as in Rom. xv. 18, 19, not only an entire confirmation and attestation of the other miracles which are reported of Paul in the second portion of the Acts; but we see, at the same time, that this book, which is silent about the Corinthian miracles of the apostles, leaves many such deeds unmentioned. We therefore cannot charge the New Testament historians with seeking wonders for mere display; but we may draw a conclusion as to the abundance of miracles in the earliest Christian times.

Great weight is to be laid also on the fact that Paul calls miracles the signs of an apostle. He declares his mighty deeds not simply as actual facts, but regards them as indispensable to his apostolic calling. He sees in them not only single facts which had occurred, though they might just as well not; but as he sees in the charisms the essential and natural outcome of the dwelling of the Spirit in the church, so he recognises in his miracles signs or marks which are inseparable from the very idea of an apostle. Paul cannot imagine an apostle without miracles. This passage, therefore, when closely looked at, is a declaration of equal universality with that in Rom. xv. 18, 19. It is even more so. For there is in it an unequivocal testimony to the fact that the other apostles were also workers of miracles. It thus stretches out the hand to the passage in Hebrews, and serves to confirm it very strongly, as well as the accounts of miracles in the first part of the Acts.

According to the foregoing, miracles are credibly reported as having occurred in Asia and Europe among the Jewish and Gentile Christian communities, wrought by the ordinary gifted Christians and by the apostles, by the twelve, and by Paul. The step from our first to the second point lies specially, however, in passing from the apostolic church to the apostles themselves, whom we found to be more richly endowed with "signs and wonders and mighty deeds" than the other Christians.

This is true of the apostles to the Jews and the apostle of the Gentiles in equal degree. From this point the inference that Jesus also exercised a miraculous power, would seem to have the highest probability in its favour. For it is a self-evident principle that the disciple is not above his master, and the servant is not greater than his lord. Paul's favourite name for himself is a servant of Christ, and he most frequently terms Christ the Lord (Rom. i. 1; Gal. i. 10). But the Epistle to the Hebrews saves us the trouble of making an inference, as it expressly speaks of the miracles of the Lord as facts.

Paret has observed that the Pauline epistles should have made a phenomenon like the *Life of Jesus* by Strauss, and many other works of the same sort which have since appeared, an impossibility. For what do those who deny miracles say of such passages as those quoted? They cannot attempt to apply their mythical explanation. That is only possible when a period lies between the thing reported and the report, so as to allow the formation of the myth. In these it is, however, facts which have happened and are still taking place which are treated of, which are spoken of to the eye-witnesses of them, and the denial of which would have been the interest of those very people against whom they are written. Paul stands here as witness to his own deeds. They who deny the miracles must therefore give up the mythical explanation, and fall back upon the natural, old rationalistic one; they must send the Apostle Paul to school with his more enlightened namesake at Heidelberg. He thinks that miracles have sprung out of a natural fact, and a supra-naturalistic judgment concerning it, which was formed even by those who were first associated with it; and he can therefore quite well allow that the accounts of the miracles are derived from eye-witnesses. Similarly our opponents will perhaps remind us, that in times of religious excitement generally all sorts of unusual things and miraculous self-deceptions come before us, which as a rule can be traced back to their natural cause when more narrowly looked into. They will perhaps

appeal also to the miracles in the Catholic Church, and such like, which we do not believe more than they. We shall, in accordance with the above-named principle, say to them in reply, that most of the Catholic miracles have been received as such altogether without proper criticism; that, however, there have been in all ages of the Christian church, and also in the heathen world, a number of phenomena which we not only do not give up to our opponents, but which we still hold against them with the words of Shakespeare:

> "There are more things in heaven and earth
> Than are dreamt of in our philosophy."

Our opponents lay us under obligation, however, inasmuch as they constantly remind us of the duty of more careful inquiry and investigation. But the severest criticism will always leave behind a not inconsiderable remainder of facts, especially in the region with which we are now most concerned, the biblical, where, in the Epistles to the Corinthians, etc., testimonies are at hand which are acknowledged even by our opponents. Should they say to us: There are no doubt certain facts which Paul and the first Christians regarded as miraculous, but they were deceived; all was connected with that fanatical movement which is evident in the charisms, *e.g.* the speaking with tongues,—we ask what kind of historical representation of the apostles, especially of Paul, results? He would then appear to be, at least in respect to the miracles wrought by others, a fanatic. When, however, he declares himself to be a worker of miracles, I do not know whether we have not got beyond the limit of possible self-deception. It is difficult to imagine how the apostles or the primitive church could be deceived in matters which they considered essential manifestations of church life and the apostolic office. This will be referred to again further on. Here let it be remembered, that no one has proved better than Strauss himself, how arbitrary, precarious, and unscientific such an explanation of miracles is, as soon as we come to details. There will then

remain no other way of getting out of the difficulty, than, according to the canon of Knobel and Bauer's school quoted above, to set aside the Epistles to the Corinthians also as not genuine.

III. THE CONVERSION OF PAUL, AND THE REVELATIONS HE RECEIVED.

The Acts of the Apostles has lately been the "most calumniated" book in all the New Testament. It is charged with intentional falsifying of facts, in order to favour certain opinions. There is really no ground for the charge. It is the same with this book as with the Gospels. An impartial historian, accustomed to examine and sift various authorities and sources of history, has no reason to complain of the difficulty of reconciling the different Gospels. On the contrary, he can only wonder how, with all minor deviations, they agree so well in substance, and what a harmonious and natural representation they furnish of the life of Jesus. So with the Acts, and the historical books which are parallel to it. This is here of the greater significance, as these parallel sources of our information are of quite a different character from the Acts themselves. They are letters, in which the events which are in the Acts related in detail, are spoken of only occasionally, and quite unsought. One may with confidence ask the question, whether there is an instance in all history of more entire agreement between the biography of a great man, written by a contemporary, and his letters, or a finer relationship of mutual confirmation and supplementing of each other, than that between the Acts of the Apostles and the epistles of Paul? These latter embrace and support in their rescuing arms this much disputed book, and, indeed, the entire essential contents of the New Testament revelation. We have found already, in 2 Cor. xii. 12, Rom. xv. 19, Heb. ii. 4, a general confirmation of the Acts, as far as the miracles recorded in them are concerned. A special example is furnished by the First Epistle to the Thessalonians among others. Against the genuineness of it there are, in truth, by

almost general consent, no reasons of weight. Baur, however, thinks he must reject it, because "it is nothing more than a very detailed account of the conversion of the Thessalonians, the course of which was previously known from the Acts." In a precisely similar manner, we find, in the Epistles to the Corinthians and Galatians, an account of the conversion of Paul, the history of which is found in the Acts also.

These remarks on the Acts of the Apostles, which are of importance in their bearing on our general object in this controversy, will be yet further confirmed in the course of our investigations. But for our immediate aim, we appeal not to this agreement between the Acts and the epistles, but exclusively to the epistles themselves. The question is, what Paul himself thought and testified concerning that which had made him a Christian and an apostle.

In the Epistle to the Galatians, Paul has to defend himself against certain Jewish adversaries who questioned his apostolical authority, and would grant him only the place of a disciple of the other apostles. They assigned him a position only in the second rank, as one who had no independent position or authority as a peer of the Jewish apostles. In his defence he brings forward, in the superscription to the epistle (i. 1), the divine origin of his apostleship: he is an apostle, not of man, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ, and God the Father, who raised Him from the dead. The mention of the resurrection of Christ in this connection can have no other meaning than that Paul knew he was called to be an apostle by the Christ who was raised from the dead, and whom he, on this account, also names before God the Father. The question, which has been answered in very different ways by commentators, why Paul here, at the outset, contrary to his usual custom, mentions the rising of Christ, is thus quite simply explained from the immediate context. He then goes on to speak more particularly of his apostolic calling in ver. 11, after the introduction to the Epistle. Not from human teaching, nor from the hands of man, but by

direct revelation from Jesus Christ, has he received the gospel (vers. 11, 12). To prove it, he reminds the Galatians of well-known facts (comp.: Ye have heard, ver. 13), of his former excessive zeal for the law, and his extraordinary and even violent hostility to the Christians (vers. 13, 14); and how, after his conversion and call to be the apostle to the heathen, which were not of men, which are "flesh and blood," he did not receive instruction even from the apostles (ver. 15 and foll.).

We see that Paul hastens forward to reach his chief thought, that he was not a mere disciple of the other apostles. Hence, he is not careful to go over again here the circumstances of his conversion; he assumes these are known, as he had doubtless communicated them orally to the Galatians before; he refers to it now only in a subordinate paragraph: "When it pleased God," etc. etc. (vers. 15, 16). He therefore does not touch further upon the external circumstances of it, but points out its inner significance: it is the revelation of the Son of God *in him*, without which, indeed, the merely outward revelation would have been void of effect. That it happened near Damascus, as is related in the Acts, comes out, however, in ver. 17, where, in the words, "I returned again to Damascus," as De Wette says, it is assumed as well known that that city was the place where his conversion occurred. As to the particular manner of it, we learn nothing more from the Epistle to the Galatians. We can only gather thus much from the contrast in vers. 13, 14, to vers. 15, 16, that it was a sudden change from the most extreme and active hatred against Christianity to the acknowledgment of Jesus as the Son of God, and to the preaching of the gospel. It is clear, however, from vers. 1 and 12, that the change rested on a supernatural revelation of Jesus Christ. For the revelation of Jesus Christ which is spoken of in ver. 12 can, of course, in no wise be limited to the event at Damascus. Paul speaks more generally, and declares that his gospel has come to him *in revelations:* that it is a supernatural revelation proceeding directly from Jesus Christ. The expression may thus

include a number of other revelations (see ii. 2), and actually does so, as we shall see; only that one he received at Damascus, which is spoken of (vers. 15–17) expressly, is specially included in it. That revelation, at all events, was a supernatural event, a miracle: whether it was a merely inward experience, or was at the same time something external, cannot be positively decided from the Epistle to the Galatians by itself. We will only lay our finger once more on ver. 1, where the apostle traces his apostolate to Christ as the risen One.

Two passages in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (xv. 8 and ix. 1) touch the Epistle to the Galatians at this point. In both passages Paul associates directly with his apostolate a visible manifestation of the risen Christ, which had been granted to him as well as to the other apostles. For the expression ὤφθη, xv. 8, which corresponds to ἑώρακα in ix. 1, naturally signifies a visible appearance in the case of Paul as much as in the case of the other apostles (vers. 5–7). The appearance of which Paul speaks is, however, to use De Wette's words again, unquestionably that related in Acts ix. For he describes himself, as compared with the other apostles—who were, so to speak, born in normal order—as one born out of due time; an expression which points to his "violent, and as it were unnatural call," by which the former persecutor became an apostle, but yet the least among the apostles, who was not properly deserving the name (ver. 8); comp. 1 Tim. i. 11–15. In the second of the places named also (1 Cor. ix. 1) Paul (according to the right reading of Griesbach, Lachmann, Tischendorf, etc., where the words Am I free? stand before Am I not an apostle?) connects his being an apostle and his having seen Jesus Christ directly with one another. There is probably a special reference to the heavenly light that appeared at Damascus, in 2 Cor. iv. 6, where the aorist ἔλαμψεν is to be noticed.

What we thus learn from Paul himself concerning his conversion, is the testimony, coinciding with the accounts in the Acts, that he was converted at Damascus through a super-

natural revelation, and more particularly through a visible manifestation, of the Son of God; and from being a fiery persecutor of Christianity, was transformed into a Christian and an apostle.

But the statements of Paul himself, concerning the revelations he received, are not yet exhausted. We have already observed that the words in Gal. i. 12, to the effect that he did not receive the gospel from man, but by revelation from Jesus Christ, includes a number of other revelations. For he does not appeal to the revelation of Christ merely to establish his doctrine as a whole, but speaks of special revelations with respect to particular points. The chapter which treats of marriage, 1 Cor. vii., is important in this connection; there he clearly distinguishes between the expression merely of his own opinion —the opinion, however, of one who had the Spirit of God—and that for which he has an express commission from the Lord (vers. 25, 40, comp. vers. 10, 12). If he generally means by this, as is probable, words spoken by Christ in the days of His flesh concerning marriage, as Matt. v. 32, Mark x. 11 ff., it would then have all the more significance that he calls the church regulations of the fourteenth chapter, which cannot be referred to any such expressions of Christ, also "commandments of the Lord" (1 Cor. xiv. 37). He thus considers the communications which he received from the ascended Saviour of equal authority, as words and commandments of the Lord, with His declarations uttered while He was on the earth. In the same sense he calls several doctrines which he teaches to the churches, mysteries,—an expression which means with Paul, as is well known, the, or *a* divine idea which is hidden from the natural understanding of man, and can only be known through revelation; see especially 1 Cor. ii. 7 ff. and Eph. iii. 3 ff. Among those passages are: Rom. xi. 25, 26, the doctrine of the future conversion of Israel; 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52, the doctrine of the change that will take place at the same time with the resurrection of the dead; 1 Thess. iv. 15, the corresponding doctrine of the resurrection and taking

up, which the apostle received "by the word of the Lord." There are thus, as lies in the very nature of the subjects, special eschatological points of doctrine upon which he received light through direct revelations. Compare also 1 Cor. xv. 3, xi. 23, which are most probably to be understood of supernatural revelations. The revelations, however, did not relate alone to doctrine and rules for the church, but also to the service of the apostle himself, *e.g.* to journeys, Gal. ii. 2. Compare Acts xvi. 6, 7, 9, where he was hindered by the Spirit from preaching in Asia, and going to Bithynia, and was called by a vision to go to Macedonia.

The event which happened at Damascus, then, is not an isolated one in the life of the Apostle Paul. Through it, on the contrary, was inaugurated a direct communication between Christ and him; so that later revelations served to confirm and further to develop that first one which was the foundation of all. Paul recounts before Festus and Agrippa (Acts xxvi. 16) how the Lord said to him at his conversion, "For I have appeared unto thee for this purpose, to make thee a minister and a witness both of these things which thou hast seen, and of those things in which I will appear unto thee;" thus promising him repeated heavenly manifestations, through which he should come to know that which he was to testify; and his epistles furnish abundant examples of the fulfilment of this promise. We are not, however, as is clear from the "last of all" (1 Cor. xv. 8), to think of the later revelations as having the same external character as the first. They belong rather to the region of the inner spiritual life; they are of the nature of visions. To this opinion, the remarkable and celebrated passage 2 Cor. xii. 1 ff. points, where Paul speaks of the visions and revelations of the Lord he had received. The closer analysis of this passage, however, is no part of our present task. We must call attention to one point more, viz. that a number of visions are spoken of as coming to the apostle, in the Acts also, partly by night in dreams (xvi. 9, xviii. 9, xxiii. 11, xxvii.

23), partly while he was awake and in prayer (ix. 11, 12, and especially xxii. 17–21). The Acts of the Apostles are therefore, from beginning to end, in entire harmony with the epistles of Paul in regard to this matter.

The twelve were not only chosen and called to the apostolate by the Lord Himself, but they were also prepared and instructed by Him. Paul claims the same for himself, and upon this rests his own distinct rank and dignity as an apostle. The Lord personally called him at Damascus, and personally instructed him in progressive and continuous revelations. From Him he received "his gospel;" therefore he announces it with such a fulness of joyful and assured conviction as the word of God (1 Thess. i. 5, ii. 13), that he can say in the most solemn manner: If an angel from heaven should preach another gospel, let him be accursed (Gal. i. 8, 9). The Lord, glorified in heaven, only did for Paul, what He, living upon the earth, did for the other apostles. Therein the peculiarity of his apostolate rests. He is pre-eminently the spiritual apostle, who, because he knew not Christ after the flesh, knows no man any more after the flesh, and is therefore sent not only to his brethren after the flesh, the Jews, but also to the Gentiles. He knew that through the death and resurrection of Christ the old separating limits of flesh and law were put out of the way, and that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself. The whole historical position and importance of the Apostle Paul, therefore, rest upon these actual facts and events.

What now should we say to all this, if Christ did not rise, and if Paul was deceived in thinking the risen Christ appeared to him and continuously revealed Himself to him? Before all we should say that then the conversion of Paul would be an enigma. Such a sudden and immense change must have had an extraordinary cause. The law of sufficient causes, well known to be one of the fundamental laws of logic, stands here firmly in the face of those who deny or do away with miracles. The power of this law will unfold itself in ever-increasing

degree against our opponents in the course of our inquiry. We see it still further here. One may appeal to analogous examples of sudden and complete inward changes, to explain the conversion of Paul. But these had their sufficient causes, which in Paul's case would be unknown to us, and concerning which he himself, which is the chief thing, had been completely mistaken. Self-deception would then be the basis of the whole of Christianity and the apostolate. This, which is the necessary result of the modern opinion, which denies revelation and miracle, Feuerbach most clearly states in his work on the essence of Christianity, and, with a frivolity that seems but too closely allied to such opinions, expatiates upon it. Christianity in his eyes is actually the illusion through which man ascribes to God and supernatural revelations what is all the while only his own nature, and proceeds from the depth of his own mind. Hence Feuerbach can no longer distinguish between religion and mere fancy. That, in truth, if miracles are denied, the whole revelation of the Old and New Testaments rests upon a series of self-deceptions and illusions, will appear frequently in the following pages. Paul first of all, to turn again to him, would thus sink down into the ranks of the fanatics who have pretended without right to receive supernatural, divine revelations. Even men of this sort have often exercised considerable influence on those about them, and perhaps have founded sects; but such *ignes fatui* have always disappeared again very soon, and those who were seduced by them have sunk into the swamp and come to a speedy end. In the case of Paul, on the contrary, it is not the conversion merely of a private man, nor even the hallucinations of the head of a sect, with which we have to do. Here a man stands before us, whose influence and work are wide as history itself, and the impression of them most profound and permanent.

Let us remember this man's intellectual power, his keen and genial dialectic: no one regards the Epistle to the Romans as the work of a mere enthusiast. On the other hand, we had

occasion to refer in a previous section to the unspeakable suffering of the apostle, and the patience he preserved throughout it all. To these he himself appeals, to meet the very same accusation made against him now. Even in his first epistle he has to defend himself against the suspicion of being a fanatic. With such thoughts the unbelieving Thessalonians sought to draw away their countrymen, who had believed through the preaching of Paul, from the apostle and from the gospel. In opposition to them he writes: "For yourselves, brethren, know our entrance in unto you, that it was not in vain (*οὐ μῦθοι καὶ λῆροι*, explains Œcumenius); but even after that we had suffered before, and were shamefully entreated, as ye know, at Philippi (Acts xvi. 12 ff.), we were bold in our God to speak unto you the gospel of God with much contention (Acts xvii. 5 ff.). For our exhortation was not of deceit (fanatical delusion), nor of uncleanness, nor in guile; but as we were allowed of God to be put in trust with the gospel, even so we speak: not as pleasing men, but God, who trieth our hearts" (1 Thess. ii. 1, 4). Holy simplicity and sobriety, confirmed by sevenfold trial in the fire of tribulation, is the impression which everything about Paul makes upon us. And his influence on others quite corresponds with this personal character. He could venture to utter these words, so simply grand: "By manifestation of the truth commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God" (2 Cor. iv. 2). That he did so, millions, who assuredly do not belong to the worst of our race, have testified during eighteen centuries since then.

These, however, are inward experiences, which cannot be demonstrated to any one, but to which we can read, at the same time, a certain assent in the hearts even of many, who as to the theoretical question would rather stand on the other side. We wish to speak, however, of the historical position of the apostle. And as to this, we do not say too much when we aver that the whole present extent and condition of the Christian world rests on Paul. He was the apostle of the Gentiles,

through whose labours Christianity planted its foot firmly in the Roman empire. From the Romans it came to the Germans. Paul, the Greco-Roman culture, and the migration of races,—these are the factors of our entire modern civilisation; but Christianity, spread through Paul, has been the inmost soul, the moving power of all. "If one should ask me," said Adolph Monod,[1] "what man I regarded as the greatest benefactor of his race, I should without hesitation say Paul. Like a spiritual Atlas, he bears the whole Gentile world on his own shoulders. No Paul in the world: who could reckon the immeasurable consequences of that, in the principles, the morals, the literature, the history, the whole development of the human race?" When in the sixteenth century the new age, in the narrower sense of the word, began, it was the spirit of Paul, waking up anew in Luther and the Reformers, which was manifestly the deepest element in the whole vast movement, round which in their wide results grouped themselves all the others,—the revival of classical studies, the invention of printing, ay, even the discovery of America, and the passage to the East Indies. A treatise might be written on the influence of the Epistle to the Romans, or even the short Epistle to the Galatians, on the general history of the world. Our own time and our most logical opponents have furnished us with a strong and quite peculiar proof of the power of this mighty mind. While the school of Baur wraps Jesus Christ in a misty cloud of myth, Paul is the transcendent light, to which they cling with a sort of enthusiasm, and to which they ascribe much which they have taken from the Lord of this faithful servant. Even they to some extent make Paul the founder of Christianity as a religion of the world. We must at least admit that this school is right in saying that, since Christ, no man has lived of more wide-reaching influence or of equal importance in the history of the world.

And this man has deceived himself, not on this or that particular point, but in that which he himself over and over

[1] See Note C.

again declares to be the very foundation and origin of his whole action, upon which his very existence as a Christian and apostle rests? Could that be regarded as a sufficient cause to account for such a vast historical effect? Could such a pure and plentiful stream flow from such a troubled and untrustworthy fountain?

If, however, Paul is right, much is gained for the idea and history of revelation. Revelation will then not be something that has flashed up from the mysterious divine depths of man's heart, nor merely an inward contact and elevation of the spirit of man by the Divine Spirit; but it will follow that there are objective, outward manifestations and acts of God from above, and other forms of revelation as well. The outward are only the first, and lay the foundation for others. As, in the case of Paul, the outward vision at Damascus preceded the inward revelations, and made them possible, so is it always in divine revelation. To use the words of Rothe,[1] manifestation goes before inspiration, theophany before prophecy, the appearing of Christ before the pouring out of His Spirit.

In this view, the testimony of Paul stretches back to the very beginning of the Old Testament. For we find in his case all essential forms of supernatural revelation are attested. The vision of Christ which he saw holds out the helping hand to all Bible records of God's appearing in the oldest times. If the miracles of Paul are historical, then we have no good reason to doubt those of Moses, Elijah, and Elisha; and his history and revelations throw their light back on those of the prophets. We shall also feel that it is beautifully appropriate, that the last revelations of God, those given to the apostle of the Gentiles, and on which the continuance of the church rests, should embrace and confirm all previous revelations.

[1] See Note D.

IV. THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS.

The conversion of Paul, and the intercourse which he testifies he had with his ascended Saviour, are facts in proof of the Lord's resurrection. The apostle, however, speaks expressly of this subject in 1 Cor. xv., where he argues against those who said there was no resurrection of the dead (ver. 12). As before in Thessalonica, so now in Corinth we find opponents of the truth, who are as like those of our day as any man resembles his brother. The apostle himself, therefore, in answering the former, has answered the latter too.

His argument in this instance is as logically exact as it is historically accurate and doctrinally important. With great simplicity and clearness, he carries the question (ver. 13) back to that of the rising of Christ from the dead, which is the beginning and foundation of the resurrection of others (ver. 20 ff.). He has wisely and purposely prepared for this from the very commencement of the chapter. He had reminded his readers of the great truths of the gospel, which, he says, "I preached unto you, which also ye have received, and wherein ye stand, by which also ye are saved" (vers. 1, 2). These fundamental truths, as taught by him and the other apostles, are no other than those of the death and resurrection of Christ (vers. 3, 4): "Whether it were I or they, so we preached, and so ye believed." The resurrection of Christ, however, he says, is attested by numerous eye-witnesses, the greater part of whom are still living, to whom the Lord appeared. Among them were Cephas and James, and the twelve, and lastly he, Paul himself (vers. 5–11). After the fact is thus so well confirmed, and brought to their recollection as the principal part of the Christian religion, the apostle shows still further the significance of the resurrection of the Lord (vers. 14–20): "And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God: because we have testified of God, that He raised up Christ; whom He

raised not up, if so be the dead rise not. For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised: and if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins. Then they also who are fallen asleep in Christ are perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable. But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first-fruits of them that slept."

These words should be heard when read aloud, and one needs only to hear them, for there resides in them a mighty power to convince, which has often been felt as they have been heard. When we hear it said now,[1] "Shall the appropriation of the riches of Christianity be actually dependent on the question whether Christ rose on the third day? Shall those be evil spoken of who speak of the resurrection in a spiritual sense?"—who does not see and feel that a most decisive answer is given in those words of the apostle? Baur says, "Christianity is to Paul what it is essentially in the great facts of the death and resurrection of Christ; his whole Christian consciousness seems to depend on them."[2]

We draw attention to the fact that Paul here also confirms the accounts both of the Acts and the Gospels. First, with respect to the great theme of apostolic preaching, the death and resurrection of Christ. Of these, Peter preaches on the day of Pentecost, Acts ii. 22; before the people, iii. 12 ff.; before the great council, iv. 10 ff.; before the Gentiles, x. 39 ff. The man who is to be chosen as successor of the betrayer and united with the eleven is to be a witness of the resurrection of Christ, i. 22. Jesus Himself called His disciples to be witnesses of His sufferings and His resurrection (Luke xxiv. 46–48). Thus, then, 1 Cor. xv. serves as a substantial confirmation of the Gospels and the Acts (i. 3), with respect to the appearances of our Lord after His resurrection. This is not the place to attempt the task of harmonizing the different accounts of these appearances with one another, though we do not think the task a very hard one.

[1] See Note E. [2] See Note F.

The great point here is, that Paul testifies in these documents to the reality of repeated appearances of Christ after He had risen, and appeals in support of his testimony to hundreds of living eye-witnesses, and also to that which he himself had seen. Even one of the school of Baur is compelled from this to admit, in a work[1] which is otherwise of an utterly destructive character: "It is one of the most certain facts in history, that Jesus, who was crucified, appeared in glory to His disciples, interpret the fact as we may, in this sense or the other, or even if we cannot comprehend it at all, and never will perfectly understand it." Besides this, it is to be remembered that Paul mentions other appearances of the Lord, in addition to those which are related in the Gospels,—those, namely, to James and more than five hundred brethren at once. From which we see again, that not nearly all the miracles which happened in the primitive Christian age are recorded in the historical books of the New Testament.

If now Christ did not rise from the dead, then Paul, the twelve, the more than five hundred, who doubtless comprehended almost the whole number of those who had believed through the earthly ministry of Christ, were deceived concerning the fact; and it is difficult to explain how so many good men, on so many different occasions, persisted in believing that they had seen a dead man alive again. That supposes a very unusual kind of fanatical movement indeed. The great change in the eleven disciples after the death of Jesus is also unexplained. It was, indeed, not nearly so great a change as the conversion of Paul, but it was parallel to it. It is no wonder, but only too natural, that the disciples of Jesus should have been amazed, crushed, driven back, and confounded with respect to their views of the Messiah, by the death of Christ (see Luke xxiv. 19–21). It is therefore not disputed by the most negative criticism. Yet soon after we see them as the boldest witnesses for Jesus and His resurrection, counting it an honour

[1] See Note G.

to suffer and even to die for His name's sake (Acts v. 41, xii. 2). The law of causality demands here, too, a sufficient reason or ground. Where is it?

Yet all these are secondary points, compared with the one great fact that the apostles proclaim not simply the fact of the resurrection of Jesus, but make this fact in its connection with His death, and its significance in that connection, as expounded above by Paul himself, the peculiar and exclusive subject of their proclamation. This the twelve did as much as Paul, and Paul as much as the twelve, and naturally. For Christianity is nothing else than the fact and the message, that in the death of Christ the sin of the world is expiated and taken away, and in His resurrection a new life of the Spirit and of glory is restored. Christ, the crucified and risen, is the foundation of the Christian church. If Christ is not risen, it is not this or that point in Christianity, but Christianity itself, that goes. It is not a mere representation we have, which was to vanish into the true idea; but we have a fact of which we may say, "If Christ is not risen, then is our preaching vain: our faith is also vain, we are still in our sins; yea, we are false witnesses for God."

We do not ask yet: What, with a dead Christ, becomes of Christ Himself? We ask only: What becomes of the apostles? For what is true of Paul, is true, as we now perfectly see, of all the others. What, then, can be made of Paul on this supposition? This is a question which should be answered not with sophistry and roundabout phrase, but with sound logic and a pure conscience. When Baur says,[1] "What the resurrection in itself is, lies outside of the domain of historical inquiry: historical inquiry has only to do with the fact that, for the faith of the disciples, the rising of Jesus became a thing of the greatest and most incontrovertible certainty," he brings out into the light the very point which must first of all be considered; but he does not seem to have any idea that the difficulty then is not removed, but in truth for him only begins.

[1] See Note H.

In what has been said already, the most important points to be noted in answering the question have been given. We have seen the origin and the nature of the apostolic activity of Paul, —the first, in the third; the second, in the second and fourth sections,—for his activity, like that of Christ, and like that of all men, had a twofold aspect—word and work (Rom. xv. 18; John xiv. 10, 11; Matt. iv. 23). All this was miraculous in the case of the apostle. The foundation of his apostolic work is the revelation of Jesus Christ (Gal. i. 12) at Damascus, and in later visions; the apostolic word is the preaching of the death and resurrection of the Lord, and the works which accompanied and attested it were the signs and wonders and mighty deeds. Miracle is therefore not something secondary and subordinate, which might be cut away, like some outgrowths or superfluous branches from a tree, but it is the very basis and essence of all: it is the root and sap of the tree. For us and the whole church the apostles are on that account the bearers and heralds of the divine revelation. Our opponents would set miracles aside, and would still talk of Paul and of apostles. In reality they cannot. The Paul we know of is the historical Paul, as he has drawn himself in his own acknowledged writings; theirs is an arbi trary creation of their fancy. He is like Samson, when shorn of his hair, to be handed over to the Philistines; he is like a Louis the Sixteenth, from whom all essential attributes of a king had been taken away, and who, as the natural consequence, was by and by utterly despised and set aside. The heroes and kings in the world of mind are brought down to the level of common life; and a double wrong is done them, for they believed themselves sustained and surrounded by miracles. They are therefore not only made common men like others, but enthusiasts, and fanatics, and—I will not repeat again the strong and pointed expression of the apostle himself.

We only require to think out these consequences, in order to see how untenable the whole of this view is. But this is just the thing that is not done. Our sceptics do not fail because they

think too much, but because they think too little. They cease to think too soon; they don't carry it out to the end, else they themselves would shrink in terror from the consequences which follow with logical necessity from their premises. For the most part, however, they content themselves with disposing of the records; and because that is done with undeniable ability, it has come to be said by many, that in these men the intellectual greatness has appeared, which is to give the solution of the enigma for the century. But what follows positively from this negation, they never seriously inquire. Such questions are hardly mooted at all, far less answered. Even the criticism of the school of Baur, which is so fond of being regarded as positive precisely in this matter, leaves the great question, In what light, then, do you regard Christ? almost untouched. They look always on those sides of the question which seem most agreeable to, and most to favour, their own view; they shut their eye to the others. To how much in the New Testament, both what is accepted and what is rejected, is this criticism quite blind! If it were not, quite another historical picture would result from the former, and the latter would not be called ungenuine. From this blindness, however, thoughts about the object come in place of the object itself, and no impartial, truly historical investigation of it is possible. The rationalistic, constructive idealism which forms the presumption of this whole mode of thought, goes into every single and apparently unimportant detail of their criticism. They explain the facts as they can or please, but never consider the consequences of denying their miraculous character. Schiller has described what ensued on the overthrow of the gods of Greece. Then there was no God in nature at all. It was a mere chaos. This is the result of the destructive criticism. God is banished from the world. But not only so. Those men who have from age to age been recognised as witnesses of the truth in the highest sense, can no longer be believed or trusted; for they were themselves deceived in reference to that very matter which

they always declared to be the most essential and important. The sun itself becomes a mere will-o'-the-wisp. These critics do not say as much as this. They still hold on to the church; they owe the best influences of their life to it, and many love it and serve it gladly. The heart will not follow the head. It forbids the reason from going on to the last consequences of their premises; and others, not perhaps the feeblest thinkers among them, it forbids only from expressing them. *Stet pro ratione voluntas.* In such cases, the wide field of sophistry and phraseology is entered. There is, we admit, a well-meant, one might almost say an honest sophistry; but there is also a sophistry that cannot be too strongly condemned. And as to the crafty and ambiguous phrases,—I would not give personal offence, but others as well as myself have felt themselves reminded of the poet's words:

"When ideas fail
At the right time, a *word* comes to their aid."

And we have thought of the *lucus a non lucendo* when we have heard: "Is it asked, Why do you not declare boldly that these accounts are unhistorical? Because, sir, we are too cautious to do that. The investigations are not yet complete."[1] So there is a pectoral theology among them too, though, looking down from the serene heights of the pure idea, they have so often ridiculed the "pectoral theologians." The only difference is just this, that while with them the understanding ceases where the heart begins, with us both go together. This arises from the fact that they reverse the order of the great principles of life. They set intelligent thinking first, as being the real and true nature of man: that is the oft-condemned one-sided intellectualism. Heart and conscience cannot be altogether got rid of, however; and so a little attention and weight are given to their claims, and strict thought is reined in before it has run to its proper goal. We have, on the other hand, since Schleiermacher, learnt again, even in this region to let empiricism precede theory, and to regard direct actual life, the experience of the heart and

[1] See Note I.

conscience, as first, so that knowledge grows from faith, and theory from empiricism. The true doctrine of knowledge for the world of sense is based on the principle, *Sensus præcedit intellectum;* for the world above sense, the analogous one, *Fides præcedit intellectum.* Alexander von Humboldt says: "The movement toward comprehension of the world-plan begins with the generalization of the particulars. With a knowledge of the conditions under which the physical changes take place, it leads to a thoughtful consideration of that which empiricism furnishes to us; but not to a view founded upon speculation and general development of thought, not to an absolute doctrine of unity apart from experience."[1] What the great naturalist lays down for the science of the world, that and nothing else we claim, *mutatis mutandis,* for the science of God and divine things. We feel that we, just as little as Humboldt, do this at the expense of science; on the contrary, like him, we do it in the interest of science rightly understood. At the same time, however, we gain a systematic entireness of view, in which life and knowledge, believing and thinking, are in harmony; while with our opponents the division between head and heart is made perpetual. Even Schleiermacher did not quite heal this division; for though, on the side of psychology and the theories of knowing, he broke through the barrier of intellectualism, on the metaphysical side he did not pass beyond that of Pantheism. Only a revision of their first principles, their whole metaphysical as well as psychological mode of thought, can help our opponents further on. The reasoning of the rationalists, we have said, is not carried out to its proper consequences. We now say inversely: it does not go back to first principles. Miracles are, as already remarked, creative beginnings. And beginnings which introduce anything really new are miracles, supernatural acts of God. If the actual history of Christianity, attested by generally recognised authorities, has been set aside in a way, the consequences of which they themselves shrink from ex-

[1] See Note K.

pressing, then the question ought to be considered with all earnestness: How is the rise of the Christian church, this vastest and at the same time most peculiar phenomenon of the world's history, specifically distinct from all other great events and things in history, to be accounted for? What is the origin of this church, which it cannot be denied is so rich in mysterious powers and experiences, in works which can be wrought through no other principle but that of love, in blessings for individuals and for whole peoples of the deepest and truest kind; this church, which to this day, in its most varied, ay, even relatively opposite forms, exerts an immense influence upon several hundred millions, and these the most highly cultured of men? What lies in the fact—which is apparently only outward, but which in reality places the whole of modern history under the leadership of the Nazarene—that we reckon the years from the birth of Christ? Whence comes it, that in the nineteenth century of the gospel, the Christian mode of reckoning time was introduced again, after it had been abolished, by the nation which professes to give the tone to all society? We come here again upon the law of causality. The greatest effect must have the greatest cause; the supernatural effect, a supernatural cause. The resurrection of Christ, and the new creation of the world which begins with it—that is a sufficient cause. But he who answers these questions with some dim hazy form, or with a vacant place in the history of the world, does not satisfy the demands of science or exact thought. There are indeed plenty of cases in which science must be contented with a *non liquet.* But it is quite a different thing, when the solution of historical problems lies before us in documents generally recognised and received. In this case we feel their answer is not appropriate, because they sacrifice facts to theories, which is not much better than if a man should persistently close his eyes, that he might be able to declare in full day, "It is dark, I cannot see." If such a mode of proceeding is called *par excellence* scientific, giving us to understand that no other

views deserve the name, a later time, which even now is dawning upon us, will decide otherwise. It will remember that the highest law of science is consistent thought, guided by first principles, and proceeding in proper sequences. It will appropriate to that which now claims the scientific character exclusively for itself a very different position.

The resurrection of Christ is a fact. It is the fixed point to which the threads of all apologetics will ever be attached. For this is the point at which the internal is connected vitally, organically, inseparably, with the external, the ideal with the positive, doctrine with history, religion and morals with metaphysics. The Risen One is essentially the man who has really attained his original ideal; in the spiritualized and transfigured Christ, the true ideal of humanity is absolutely realized. Therefore He is the crown of our race, the surety, who guarantees to men the realization of their ideal perfection, the light of the world, without which it abides in bondage to the gloomy power of sin and death (1 Cor. xv. 17, 18). With Him, the crown would be torn from the head of humanity. Would it have been better for men if they had continued lying in death?

The risen Lord is the quickening Spirit (2 Cor. iii. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 45). He gave His Spirit to His disciples; and, present in the church since Pentecost, this Spirit has come down upon us also. The risen Christ, the church, the new birth, are linked to one another as spiritual principle, spiritual community, spiritual life, or as the fountain, the well, and the drinking of living waters. There is thus between the Risen One and us, not only the outward connection formed by that history which is handed down from generation to generation; but it is maintained by that interior, spiritual, in the highest sense of the word, ideal connection, which is possible to us because, and only because, He is the risen one, the Spirit Himself. It is the nature of the Spirit to be light, which witnesses to itself, and through its simple, illuminating presence makes itself known as truth (2 Cor iv. 6; comp. 1 John v. 6). The Spirit is the unity of the positive, or

the real, and the ideal. The positive, therefore, because it is at the same time the ideal, does not enslave or limit, but its work is essentially to remove limits and give freedom. It is true what the apostle adds (2 Cor. iii. 17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." Similarly he connects, 1 Cor. ix. 1, the being free with seeing the risen Lord.

Therefore I say that apologetics will always have to start from the resurrection of Christ. For this is the task of all apologetic or philosophico-theological labours, to see the actual as it were transparent, as illuminated by the divine idea, the positive as ideal,—the real, that which is truly real, that which is effected by God, as rational, so that it may lose that external character in which it might seem to be foreign to our mind. In this view of the work we are at one with our opponents; only we perform it in a realistic and spiritual, and not in an idealistic and spiritualistic way, because experience shows that idealism always degenerates into materialism.

We shall now indicate shortly the most important consequences flowing from the fact of the resurrection. First, for the person and life of Christ Himself. He is historically proved by it to be the personal miracle. We shall find it quite natural that a miraculous beginning should be placed by the side of the miraculous end (1 Cor. xv. 47; comp. Gal. iv. 4), and that between this beginning and end lies a great abundance of miracles. The awakening of Jesus from the dead is the great miracle, which contains and carries those mighty deeds performed by Him and recorded in the Gospels, as also those which were done in His name (Rom. xv. 18, 19; Heb. ii. 4; 2 Cor. xii. 12), and those also which are mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles (see especially iii. 6, 15, etc.). In short, Christ is by His resurrection declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness: in Him the world is fully overcome, and God is glorified. From this, too, the existence of a living and life-giving God is proved. From ignorance of the power of

God, Paul and Jesus in common explain the denial of a resurrection (1 Cor. xv. 34; Matt. xxii. 29).

Further, the principle of a new life for all mankind and the world is implied in the resurrection of Christ: it is the ethico-metaphysical, the mental and physical principle of the world's true renewal. Pantheism, too, is proved to be wrong; for the resurrection shows that the history of the world is not merely an endless advance under the present conditions of being, but is a successive transfiguration through divine acts, in which the evil is overcome and the good is completely victorious in a new world of glory. It is proved, to quote the words of Rothe, that "Christianity, and precisely the primitive Christianity in its supernatural character, strictly understood, is something more than a mere religion, even though a perfect and absolute religion: that it is a new life of men, entire and full; an entirely new history of our race; in fact, a new period in the course of creation; and that the Redeemer is no mere clericus or preacher, but a High Priest and King."[1] It is exactly this which Paul himself in our main passage concludes from the resurrection (1 Cor. xv. 20, etc., 45, etc.).

As it points forward to the end of all things, so it also points backward to the beginning. It is not without purpose that Paul, in this very chapter and the passages quoted, places Adam and Christ together in contrast. As death is abolished, it is manifest it was not to continue, and therefore also shown not to be the original and necessary state of things. Man could not have proceeded from the hands of God with the seeds of death in his heart. With much significance Paul therefore says (ver. 21), "By man came death, and by man also the resurrection from the dead." Death is thus set forth as the wages of sin (Rom. v. 12, vi. 23). The resurrection of the second Adam points to the condition of the first Adam in Paradise; the image of God, restored in Christ, points back to that given to man at first (2 Cor. iv. 4; Gen. i. 27). The

[1] See Note L.

original divine rank and dignity of our race is thus rescued; and all that was promised in the types and prophecies of the Old Testament between the first and second Adam, about the destruction of death, have received complete confirmation and fulfilment. The promise of the seed of the woman which should bruise the head of the serpent (Gen. iii. 15); of the path of life on which the righteous, having overcome death and the grave, should march to the fulness of joy and unending pleasures at God's right hand (Ps. xvi. 10, 11); of the swallowing up of death in victory (Isa. xxv. 8); of the servant of God, who, after His soul had been made an offering for sin, should prolong His days, and see the work of God prospering in His hands (Isa. liii. 10),—all are fulfilled. The truth of prophecy is confirmed by the fulfilment of it, and the Old Testament is confirmed by the New. Not without reason, therefore, does Paul make the essence of the evangelical message to be this, "that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and that He rose again the third day according to the Scriptures" (1 Cor. xv. 3, 4).

II. THE GOSPELS.

V. THE CAUSE OF THE CONDEMNATION OF JESUS TO DEATH—THE MESSIAH.

THE regressive method of our inquiry has led us from the apostolic church to the apostles, and from them to our Lord Himself. We have found that He is proved by His resurrection to be the Son of God, and have seen that Heb. ii. 3, 4, and 1 Cor. xv. 5, etc., directly confirm the gospel narratives. This, of course, furnishes beforehand a favourable view of the Gospels as historic documents, yet does not exclude the freest critical investigation of their origin. But this inquiry has long ago come up out

of the gloomy depth of mere negation, and seems to be moving toward a position more favourable to the credibility of the Gospels. Even within the school of Baur itself, the former extreme views of the three synoptical Gospels have been greatly modified. Their strong point now, in regard to the Gospels, is the Gospel of John. They say it is not genuine or authentic. With respect to it, Baur has indisputably rendered us great service. He has helped very considerably to a knowledge of its unity and design, and has for ever disposed of those hypotheses which broke it up into several parts. The New Testament science altogether is indebted to the ability and acuteness of Baur for many discoveries and suggestions of permanent worth. He is greatly mistaken, however, in thinking that he has proved the book to be, to use the words of Hase,[1] "a romance of the Logos, composed in the second half of the first century, out of the materials of the synoptical Gospels." So far is this from being the case, that critics so free from partiality as Bleek, Reuss, Ewald, etc.,[2] have all condemned the attempt to question the genuineness of it. The same critics admit the genuineness of Luke also. As to Mark, opinions are most divided on the question—which, however, only remotely touches his credibility—whether he is the earliest or the latest of the synoptical writers, or whether he holds a different position from either. That an Aramaic gospel is the basis of Matthew, seems now as good as universally acknowledged.

At the same time, we hold that the task of investigation of the Gospels is not nearly exhausted when this is done. It will rather only begin when this merely external and literary criticism, which is negative or indifferent toward the contents is yet more completely answered, and the study of their contents, spirit, and plan is entered upon with free ardour and affection. For our present object, however, it is enough to have shown that we could not have been charged with uncritical conduct, if we had employed the Gospels as histories credible in all important matters they contain—histories that have come

[1] See Note M. [2] See Note N.

with new authority out of the fire of the freest criticism. But we do not insist upon this here. We shall argue again from the standpoint of our opponents, and examine only one point in the life of Jesus which is in no way supernatural. Not as a worker of miracles, but as one charged with evil, as He hangs upon the cross and stands before His judges, He will be the subject of our thought.

This one point will give us the proof that, in this central point of all divine revelations, in Jesus Himself, doctrine and history, morality and metaphysics, can least of all be separated. The books which are regarded with most disfavour now, as Daniel and the Apocalypse, have not a greater abundance of miracles and references to the other world than the Gospels. And the words of Jesus, which they are so anxious to retain while excluding the miracles, teem with testimonies to the supernatural character of His person, as to other supernatural realities. To us all this is natural, just because we see in Jesus Christ the central point of all divine revelations. It would surprise us if it were otherwise; but to our opponents this must cause unconquerable difficulties. We give examples. The very Sermon on the Mount, which, because of its simple morality, has become a sort of rationalist Bible, confirms the Old Testament in every iota; speaks of the hearing of prayer, of future reward in heaven, of hell and its fire, of the coming again of Jesus as Lord to receive the earth for His inheritance, of the passing away of heaven and earth, etc. The central mysteries of Christian doctrine—the Trinity, and atonement by the blood of Christ—rest upon the words instituting the two sacraments, which, as the words of Jesus' last testament, have doubtless been recorded with special care. The doctrine of the pre-existence of Jesus has its foundation in the intercessory prayer; that of the divinity and personality of the Holy Ghost, in the farewell discourses recorded in John, in connection with that prayer. In the farewell words in Matthew, there is the doctrine of the last judgment. In the life of Jesus, voices from

heaven occur three times; and the devil, as well as the angels, appears as a person. No one has so much to do as our Lord with those that were possessed, and with demons. His teaching likewise gives us the greatest number of hints on the state after death, the angelic world, and the kingdom of darkness. What an arbitrary, unhistorical, unscientific mutilation of the Gospels they are guilty of, who pass over all these!

No man of any note denies that Jesus of Nazareth lived and died; nor that He died on the cross. For this is attested most explicitly by Paul, who lays great and solemn emphasis on the divine foolishness of the cross (1 Cor. i. 17, etc., ii. 7; Gal. iii. 13, vi. 14). Crucifixion[1] was no Jewish, but a heathen punishment. Cicero calls it, *crudelissimum teterrimumque supplicium;* Horace, *servile supplicium;* Livy calls the cross, *infelix lignum, infelix arbor.* It was the most degrading death, and could not be inflicted on Roman citizens—only on slaves and the vilest criminals, as highway robbers, murderers, and rebels. It is admitted by all, that Jesus was held guilty only of the last of these. It is known further, that it was customary to give the condemned, when they were led to the place of execution, a white tablet, on which their crime was written; and it was either carried before them, or hung round their own neck. It accords, therefore, with the general custom, when such a tablet is spoken of in connection with the crucifixion of Jesus; and the inscription on it—Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews—confirms the inference we have drawn from the death by crucifixion, that Jesus was condemned to death as a raiser of sedition. As King of the Jews, He was held to be a rebel against the Roman emperor. King of the Jews, however, is only the general expression, understood even among the heathen for the Israelitic idea, Messias or Christ (Mark xv. 32). It is well known that Messianic expectations were current among the Jewish people. It is confirmed also by Tacitus (*Hist.* v. 13), by Suetonius (*Vespas.* iv.), who both record the opinion, that

[1] See Note O.

about that time men from Judea would become masters of the world. Tacitus says, several have had the conviction that this is written in the ancient books of the priests. Suetonius mentions it as an old and standing opinion, which was spread throughout the whole East. It is quite credible, especially after such testimonies, that the rulers of the Jewish nation were not pleased to see the inscription "King of the Jews" above one dying on the cross; and therefore asked Pilate to write up instead, "He said, I am the King of the Jews." By doing so, they expressly demonstrate—what we must have gathered from the inscription itself—that Jesus declared Himself to be the Messiah. Without such a claim on His part, Pilate could not have passed sentence of death. All that is written of the mockery of those who stood near is connected with this. Jesus is reviled not only by the high priests, scribes, and rulers, but also by the people, the soldiers, and even one of the malefactors who were crucified with Him, as King of the Jews, Messias, Son of God, who, now convicted and condemned, was in their judgment the opposite of all that He had given Himself out to be. When the high priests, according to the three synoptical Gospels, say, He saved others, why does he not save himself? they, the principal enemies of Jesus, become witnesses, not only that He claimed to be the Messias, but also, quite involuntarily, that He had performed miracles of saving mercy. And when, under all these circumstances, and especially under the impression of the quiet patience of Jesus, and His words, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do!"—never on earth was a word spoken before, which breathes such a lofty nobleness of soul, and such utterly unselfish love—the faith of the penitent malefactor grew to maturity, and expressed itself in the words, "Lord, remember me when Thou comest into Thy kingdom," we perceive in this, too, a proof that, with the Crucified, all centred in and moved round His Messianic kingdom.

That Jesus believed Himself to be the Messias, and declared it—that the Son of man and kingdom of God, two expressions

for the Messias and His kingdom, taken from Daniel (Dan. vii. 13, ii. 44), were fundamental ideas of the teaching of Jesus—is not denied even by such men as Baur and Strauss. If He without right gave Himself out to be the Messias, as the high priests and rulers said, then He must have been condemned by the Jewish court as a blasphemer, as the heathen one had condemned him for sedition. Therefore no objection can be raised against the historical representation of His trial before the Sanhedrim; and Strauss expressly acknowledges this in connection with the words of the high priest and Jesus, on which the matter depends.[1] The words run thus: "The high priest said unto Him, I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be Christ, the Son of God. Jesus saith unto him, Thou hast said. Nevertheless I say unto you, Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven" (Matt. xxvi. 63, 64).

Jesus here, upon oath, declares Himself to be the Messias, the Son of God, and Son of man, as He makes reference to two principal Messianic passages in the Old Testament, Ps. cx. 1 and Dan. vii. 13, etc. This is not the place to enter further into the dogmatic development of these fundamental ideas; but, at all events, we do not put too much into them, when we say with Beck,[2] "Jesus not only professes before His judges to be the Christ and Son of God in a general sense, but in such a sense as could be true of no man or angel. He avows Himself the possessor of the divine power, who is appointed Judge of the world, and their Judge; and they would from that time receive visible signs of it. The very same day, the day of His death, revealed such signs, and still more the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost, and the mighty deeds of His apostles up to the destruction of Jerusalem. But they will not reflect on His words; they will not take time to prove and judge; they never ask, 'Is the solemn assurance of such a man truth or perjury?'"

[1] See Note P.

[2] See Note Q.

"We will ask this, and we will remember, too, that this is no secondary matter, but a declaration which involves the very essence and heart of the testimony of Jesus to Himself, and of His own self-consciousness, and for which He with full knowledge sacrificed His life. "There is here an alternative, an either—or. Either the high priest was right, when he, feigning the greatest horror, rent his clothes, and, without inquiring whether Jesus really was what He had said, with angry determination proceeded on the belief: He is not, and cannot be so. Caiaphas would be right: if Jesus were not in truth the Son of God, co-regent with God, and judge of the world, but had only made Himself so, it was the most flagrant and impious assault upon the majesty of God that insane arrogance had ever attempted. The high priest would be right much more than the indifferent and half-hearted, who will allow Jesus to have been a good man, but who do not believe in His relation to the Father, in His eternal rule in heaven, and His judgment of the world according to His own word. Either, therefore, this frightful result; or Jesus is right, and will maintain the right to all eternity—that is, He is what He says."[1]

In the first case, Bruno Bauer would be right also, when, in the preface to his *Criticism of the Evangelical Narrative of the Synoptic Gospels*, he says, "In no section of the Gospels, not even the smallest, are there wanting views which violate, offend, and arouse human nature and feeling. ONE is placed in presence of the universal wickedness and stupidity; by that ONE must nature be abused, history and human relations be despised and ridiculed. . . . We cannot but be greatly surprised that men have been reading the Gospels for eighteen hundred years, and yet never so as to discover their secret. Has humanity had to be tormented through a space of so many centuries with such things as these?" And Strauss would be right in the words, which are more inane and foolish than they are wicked and blasphemous, which he uttered on the occasion of

[1] See Note R.

the Schiller festival, warning against deifying men: "We can further aver, that no one of us has ever thought, or will think, either of denying to the old Captain Schiller the fatherhood of his son, in favour of a higher being, or of attributing to the prescriptions which he wrote as regimental surgeon a power to raise from the dead, or of employing the circumstance, that a mystery hangs over the burial of the poet until this day, to spread the idea that he with a living body has been raised into heavenly regions." And that friend would be right who wrote to Strauss in the words which he quotes: "What is the whole of theology and the church, but confusion, untruth, and opposition to nature? I long for the wholesome food of the ancient classic authors and history. I will be a heathen with my whole soul; for here at least is truth, nature, and greatness."

Whoever will consider the logical result to which the premises of the rationalists lead—and it is well that there are some among themselves who do it—will agree that Bischer is right when he says, "It is said there must be some mode of reconciling the opposing principles. For it is known to every educated man, that we by no means teach the simple identity of the single existence with the absolute spirit, but much more that in our opinion the idea exhausts itself in no single being, no nation, no period of history; and therefore every individual and finite being must confess the absolute infinitely above them. But this by no means leads to an understanding with the opposite views; for they separate this infinite from the world in a way which they themselves regard as the true way of conceiving the idea of the divine personality, but which we look upon as a confusion and obscuring of it. There is therefore, in principle, no reconciliation possible."[1]

[1] See Note S.

III. THE OLD TESTAMENT.

VI. ISAIAH LIII.

By declaring Himself to be the Messiah, Jesus brought His whole work and character into the closest connection with the Old Testament. The subject itself thus leads step by step further backward on the path we are pursuing. It is unhistorical to believe—as, for example, Lutz still does in his *Biblical Dogmatic*—that Jesus thought Himself first of all and independently the Son of God, and that afterwards, when He came out into His public life, He added this "consideration" for the Old Testament idea to suit the people. On the contrary, the Old Testament, together with the theocratic institutions as they came before Him at home and among the people,—Sabbath, feasts, temple sacrifices, etc.,—were an essential means of developing the inner spiritual dower of His nature, and raising it to full, clear consciousness, and to perfect freedom of action. It was in the temple at Jerusalem, and in conversation with the Jewish teachers, that the consciousness of the Divine Sonship first dawned upon the boy of twelve years of age, and a first word concerning it was spoken which was not understood even by His parents; it was the earnest representative of the old covenant, John the Baptist, by whom He was set apart to His office, the fulfilment of all righteousness that was required by the law and the prophets—(comp. Matt. v. 17–20); and they were words from the foundation book of the Old Testament with which He drove the tempter from the field. From the Old Testament He took the deeply significant designation of Himself, Son of man; the promised Messianic kingdom formed the chief subject of His preaching; He declared the fulfilment of the law and the prophets to be the chief end of His coming. In the Gospel of John, too, "the Jews" are represented as so hostile and so guilty just because they do not believe their own

Moses, because they do not rightly examine their own Scriptures, which testify of Him, and which cannot be broken. Finally, they are words of Scripture in which Jesus couches that confession and declaration of Himself for which He lays down His life. That the "Scriptures may be fulfilled" is the sure anchor of His soul, and the shining light to His feet, on the gloomy path that leads Him to death. Hence we find words from the Psalms in His heart and mouth on the cross itself; in a quotation from the Psalms He expresses the lowest depth of His suffering; and, again, with words from the Psalms, uttered with a loud voice, He passes away from the world. And in the forty days after His resurrection, it was His main business to open up the Scriptures to the disciples, teaching them to see His death and resurrection in the light of the written word as a sacred necessity, and to show them how that all must be fulfilled that was written in the Law, and the Prophets, and Psalms (Luke xxiv. 25, etc., 44, etc.). These Messianic instructions culminated in the farewell conversation before the ascension into heaven, the starting-point and subject of which were the kingdom of heaven (Acts i. 3–6, etc.). In this way Jesus took His departure from the earth. We cannot be surprised, therefore, to find that the principal points in the preaching of the gospel by the Apostle of the Gentiles—the death and resurrection of Christ—are based by him too upon the Scriptures.

From all this it follows that Christian theology, if it is not to remain far below the height on which the Master and His apostles stand, must consider the whole Old Testament—comprising Law, Prophets, and Hagiographs, which are introduced and described by the Psalms—with reference to the Messias. It must be done, of course, as with everything that has life, in organic method, that is, as having many members and various stages, and with sometimes a direct or sometimes an indirect reference. This is the spirit of the Old Testament itself. The earlier stages are arranged teleologically, with reference to the highest stage, and all preparation and prophecy with reference

to fulfilment. Therefore this mode of view will be seen with increasing clearness to be the really scientific one, which regards not the mere letter, but the spirit also; which, however, does not thoughtlessly pass over the letter, but remembers that the word of which it treats is the unity of the letter and the spirit. A genuine historical, genetic view, as free as it is true, of the revelations of the old covenant, will be reached by this method. Many still unsolved questions in Old Testament exegesis, history, and theology, await the investigations of our science.

After having thus indicated our view of the Old Testament, we come again to those who take a different view, who partly, as Schleiermacher himself, either fail to see or undervalue the historical connection of the Old and New Testaments, or who admit no supernatural revelations in the Old Testament at all. We meet them first of all with the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, which appears to be with both parties an instance in point, and is doubtless of the very highest importance. This chapter had indisputably great importance and weight in the mind of Jesus Himself, for He quotes from it on the last evening of His life, and refers the quoted passage to Himself (Luke xxiii. 37); and it is frequently cited elsewhere in the New Testament, and applied to our Lord (Matt. viii. 17; John xii. 38; Acts viii. 32, etc.; 1 Pet. ii. 22, etc.; 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4 is referred also to this chapter, and, as we shall see, not incorrectly). The church also has always recognised this chapter as one of its crown jewels.

The earlier apologists were in the habit of proving the divinity of Christianity mainly from miracles and prophecy. This method has been in later times acknowledged to be too external; and it has become necessary, from the character of the assaults on Christianity, not so much to find proofs *from* the miracles, as *for* them. But it has been made clear in the first section, on the Epistles, that the proof for the miracles becomes at the same time a direct proof from miracles, as it compels us to go back to a supernatural, divine causality. The argument from miracles thus remains substantially in all its strength.

The same may be said of the argument from prophecy, which we here refer to by way of example. Indeed, this latter is still more striking than the former; for in it the revelation, and so the miracle in the widest sense of the word, the *miraculum scientiæ*, consists in the words fixed in writing, which lies before the eyes of us all, while a past act, however well attested, does not so manifestly repel doubt. Miracle, in the narrower sense, has from its very nature an apologetic value, mainly for the then present and for cotemporaries (Matt. xi. 4–6; Ex. iv. 1–9); prophecy for the future, and those who come after (John xiii. 19, xiv. 29, xvi. 1, 4; Matt. xiii. 17; 1 Pet. i. 10–12).

After that the lowly and despised appearance and the severe sufferings of the Servant of Jehovah have been described, the principal passage in Isa. liii. runs thus: Ver. 4. "Surely (says the repentant Israel) He hath borne *our* griefs, and carried our sorrows: yet we did esteem Him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. 5. But He was wounded for our transgressions, He was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon Him; and with His stripes we are healed. 6. All we, like sheep, have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all. (God speaks): 7. He was oppressed; but He humbled Himself, and opened not His mouth. He was led as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so He openeth not His mouth. 8. He was taken from prison and judgment: and who shall declare His generation? for He was cut off out of the land of the living: for the transgression of my people was He stricken. 9. And they made His grave with the wicked; but He was with the rich in His death, because He had done no violence, neither was any deceit in His mouth. 10. Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise Him; He hath put Him to grief: when He hath made His soul an offering for sin, He shall see His seed, He shall prolong His days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in His hands. 11. He shall see of the travail of His soul, and shall be satisfied: by His knowledge

shall my righteous Servant justify many; and He shall bear their iniquities. 12. Therefore will I divide Him a portion with the great, and He shall divide the spoil with the strong; because He hath poured out His soul unto death, and was numbered with transgressors, while He bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors."

There are differences of opinion with respect to the genuineness of this passage, as well as the meaning of particular parts and the whole. But the critical question does not fall to be considered at all in connection with our object. We do not propose to argue from particular parts of it: we can allow that there is an element of truth in the interpretations that are not directly Messianic, while they do not, on the other hand, in reality call in question at least the indirect reference to Christ. While Hitzig naïvely remarks that, above all, the character of prophecy stands in opposition to the Messianic explanations, Knobel says, "These theocratic hopes, with the subtraction of the earthly and political elements, have been doubtless fulfilled in the appearing and work of Christ." These expositors understand by the servant of Jehovah in the so-called deutero-Isaiah (Isa. xl.–lxvi.), partly the people of Israel, in the general sense (Hitzig); or the true ideal Israel, the better part of the people (Ewald, Maurer); partly the prophetic office (Gesenius, De Wette); and partly combining these two views, the theocratic kernel of the theocracy to which the priests and prophets in an especial sense belonged (Knobel). They cannot deny—what is clear enough—that this picture in the fifty-third chapter refers to a particular individual person. "With the very utmost vividness," says Ewald, "the prophet develops the idea of the servant of the Lord: he becomes for him, as it were, a single living person, with personal feeling, knowing himself, and speaking of himself, just as wisdom is hypostasized in Proverbs (ch. viii.). Nowhere is the servant regarded so decidedly as a historical person, as a single person belonging to the past, as in the fifty-third chapter. The belief of later times, that the historical Messiah was to be found here,

was certainly not far-fetched."[1] The Servant of Jehovah, we also maintain, is the Prophet, the Great Prophet of the world, in whom Israel's calling and destiny are fulfilled. Historically, this prophet appeared in the person of Jesus of Nazareth.

After the royal house of David, with which the promise of the Messiah had been associated in earlier times, had proved itself, even in the person of the good Hezekiah, unable to bear the test, so that the Babylonian captivity had to be predicted of him (Isa. xxxix.), the hope of redemption could no longer centre mainly in the king; there remained, therefore, only the prophets as the true custodiers of God's truth, the Israel in Israel. The vocation of Israel throughout, even in its rejection, is to be the servant of Jehovah (Isa. xli. 8, 9), *i.e.* to accomplish His will, and to bear His law to the nations of the earth. A prophet who in his own person represents all Israel fulfils the vocation, just as the mighty Cyrus, who was also anointed of Jehovah and was raised up and sent by Him (xli. 2, etc., xlv. 1), in his person represents the power of the world. While Cyrus executes the judgment of the Lord among the heathen by the power of the sword, and tramples upon princes and nations as upon clay (xli. 25), the servant of the Lord announces with calm gentleness, not breaking the bruised reed, nor quenching the smoking flax, the law and truth of God to the heathen (xlii. 1). But this Servant of the Lord, who is thus distinguished from the people, has a work to do in connection with the erring children of Israel as well as among the heathen. As He is set for a light to the Gentiles, so, too, is He as a covenant to the people of the covenant. He is appointed as personal bearer and mediator of the covenant (xlii. 6). His work in Israel is, however, at first in vain; so that He has to turn to the heathen: He is despised and scorned by His own people (xlix. 1, etc.); and notwithstanding all His fidelity in service as a prophet, is maltreated and cast out (l. 4, etc.). However, after He has obtained great success and high honour

[1] See Note T.

among the heathen (xlix. 6, etc., lii. 13, etc.), Israel will come at length to a right mind, and experience a season of grace and salvation, in which the Servant of the Lord will in very fact become the mediator of the covenant (xlix. 8, etc.). Then the people first perceive the sufferings of the Servant of God in their true light, as is expressed in ch. liii.

Here the great and new thought appears, that the undeserved sufferings of the Servant are vicarious and expiatory, and His death a sacrificial offering for the people. The work of a prophet by itself does not suffice. There must be, in addition, the priestly atonement, in which the Lord's Servant gives His soul an offering for sin. Though the people scorn and reject Him, He does not cast them off; but by His patient suffering makes atonement for their sin. Thus is the hurt of the people healed, and the pleasure of the Lord fulfilled. Now, therefore, the Servant begins to be glorified for this meritorious service. Even His grave, which they had intended should be with the transgressors, is in reality with the rich; but what is of much greater moment, after His death He will have length of days, and then first He will properly do the work of God, by leading many, who will be related to Him as His spiritual seed (comp. the expression "servants of Jehovah," liv. 17, lxiii. 17, lxv. 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, lxvi. 14), to righteousness, seeing that He has taken away their sin. But yet more, He who is slain as a malefactor, will be numbered among the mighty of the earth, and become the ruler of the world, as a reward for His death. The despised Prophet is raised to kingly honours, because of His sacrifice of Himself. The prediction of a king here reappears (comp. xlix. 8), and it is then (lv. 3, 4) expressly combined with the Davidic promise.

Whether this chapter was written in the time of the Babylonian captivity, or under Hezekiah, it was in existence more than 500 years before Christ. It is a fact, just as much as the Reformation or the phenomena of electricity. Let us stand before this fact, and consider it well, and think rationally concerning it!

Many centuries before Christ's death and resurrection a prediction is uttered, which not only foretold these events down to the minutest detail, but expounds their significance in such a way as afterwards apostles, church fathers, reformers, only did. It is well known that the church has found its feeling concerning the nature and power of the death of Christ nowhere so clearly expressed as in these words. It is not so well known, but it is very instructive, that Jews, when this passage has been read to them by missionaries, have often passionately asserted that it could not be in the Old Testament, but must have been interpolated by the Christians. If, now, the resurrection of Christ is a fact, if His death and resurrection are *the* central facts of history which we have seen them to be, and if Jesus was justified in declaring Himself to be the Messiah, and His entire work to be the fulfilment of the law and the prophets, it will then seem perfectly natural and becoming that the preparatory revelation should foreshadow and foretell these particular facts in the fullest and exactest manner; and we see that Jesus and Paul were specially careful to demonstrate the divine necessity of these fundamental facts from the prophetic word of the Old Testament (Luke xxiv. 25–27, 44–46; 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4). For the highest is ever to the natural understanding the darkest. It was the greatest stumbling-block to the disciples of Jesus, which up to the end of His life they were not able to get over (comp. Matt. xvi. 15–25, Luke xviii. 31–34), that the anointed Servant of God, the bearer of a perfect life, the possessor of divine power, should suffer and die: the cross of Christ was, and is, to the Jews a stumbling-block, to the Greeks foolishness (1 Cor. i. 20). And equally so is the resurrection—a life, a full and real life and reign after death—a thing perfectly incomprehensible by the natural mind, which Jewish Sadducees, Athenian philosophers, and some in the trading city of Corinth, have from of old denied (Matt. xxii. 23, etc.; Acts xvii. 18, 32; 1 Cor. xv. 12). We therefore understand and thankfully admire the pedagogic wisdom and fatherly providence of God, which has

graven and sealed the cross and resurrection so securely in the Old and New Testaments.

We thus get these two principles already named from the fifty-third of Isaiah.[1] There is a connection between the Old and New Testaments of superhuman arrangement—the connection between prediction and fulfilment. The Old and New Testaments form one organic whole, of which one part carries, presupposes, and proves the other.[2] There is therefore in the Old Testament also a supernatural revelation. It is only from this that the idea of a Messiah can be explained at all. No heathen people has ever produced such an idea. The best men among the Greeks and Romans, a Cato or Tacitus, had pain, despair, and anger in their hearts at the decline of their nation and the eclipse of its glory, but they had no hope. The heathen have no hope, because they are without God in the world (1 Thess. iv. 13; Eph. ii. 12). The divine paradox, however, that the Messiah, the deliverer of the world, should Himself have no helper, but should ignominiously die, and then after His death should first and properly accomplish His work, entirely and directly explains and illustrates the words: "That which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, which it hath not entered the heart of man to conceive, God has revealed unto us by His Spirit." In this connection, it is worthy of remark that the prophecy of the fifty-third chapter, which at all events was not uttered *post eventum*, is not less special and miraculous than, *e.g.*, the mention of Cyrus by name. In this way, for him who will think logically, one, if not the main, objection to the genuineness of Isa. xl.–lxvi. is set aside. This chapter thus serves also as a shield to other special predictions.

The supernatural character of our prediction, however, by no means precludes the employment of medial instruments and previous preparatory steps. All that God does in the world is as much instrumental as it is directly divine. So also here. It is in harmony with the regressive course of our inquiry, to pause

[1] See Note U.

[2] See Note X.

a moment here and indicate what the predictions of the suffering and sacrificial death of the Servant of Jehovah in the Old Testament history and revelation presuppose. By this means we shall arrive at a fuller and clearer understanding of them, and shall see that it is a light which throws its rays not only forward into the New Testament, but also backward into the Old.

That it is the prophet, and no longer the king, that is the type of Messiah, is explained, as already hinted, from the relation of Isaiah to Hezekiah, described in Isa. xxxvi.–xxxix. These historical chapters of this carefully arranged book are placed in this position very significantly. They form, on one hand, a suitable close to the earlier predictions; and, on the other hand, especially ch. xxxix., the historical introduction to the following. So long as Hezekiah gave ear to the word of Isaiah, so long as king and prophet were one (xxxvii. 2, etc., xxxviii. 4, etc.), all went well. But when Hezekiah, though he had experienced the miraculous help of Jehovah for the city and kingdom, as well as for his own life, boasted before the Babylonian ambassadors of his treasures and his arms, and so of his worldly power, instead of glorying in his God, Isaiah was compelled to announce to him the captivity (ch. xxxix.). Then the prophet withdrew from public life, on which he had entered in the reign of Ahaz and Hezekiah (ch. vii.). He had seen the destruction of Samaria, and the leading away captive of the ten tribes into Assyria; Jerusalem and Judah had been miraculously delivered from the Assyrians under Sennacherib; but now Isaiah knew that the southern kingdom also, that the temple and the house of David, should fall before the power of Babylon (comp. Mic. iii. 12, iv. 9, 10). That must have filled his soul with the deepest grief. Shall, then, the people of God utterly succumb to the heathen? Shall the work of God in the world utterly perish? To such anxious questions, which he, in the name of his people, and as their representative, brought before God, Isaiah received the divine answer in the predic-

tions (ch. xl.–lxvi.) which have been rightly called the evangel of the old covenant, and concerning which we now understand why they begin with the words, "Comfort ye, comfort ye my people!"

It is like the ways of God, to give consolation so early, so that they who believe in God and His cause might not be confounded, though from that time Judah moves unhaltingly to her end. Jesus said to His disciples, as He taught them to expect hatred of the world: "These things have I spoken to you, that ye might not be offended; so that when the time comes, ye might remember that I told you before." And in respect to His decease: "And now I have told you before it come to pass, that when it is come to pass, ye might believe" (John xvi. 1, 4, xiv. 29; comp. xiii. 19). Our prophet also lays repeated and special emphasis on this very thing, especially in the first part, which has reference to Cyrus (ch. xl.–xlviii.): "I declare new things, saith the Lord (xlii. 9); before they spring forth, I tell you of them." And xlviii. 5: "I have even from the beginning declared it unto thee; before it came to pass I showed it thee, lest thou shouldest say, Mine idol hath done them." Compare xli. 21, etc., and other passages. Rudolf Stier observes on this subject: "Our opponents strive in vain, consciously or unconsciously, either to weaken the force of these single predictions by false expositions, or to remove the whole of them out of the way: clear and impressive it stands written, that the prophet wished to foretell what he describes long before it happened. Precisely in this place, where the prophecy shines forth as it had never before done, is the appeal to this circumstance appropriate."

The comfort which Isaiah received for his people was, first of all, that a potentate, Cyrus, should arise who would destroy the power of Babylon, and deliver Israel from captivity. Israel, even in the period of judgment, is still Jehovah's chosen servant, and retains the work of bringing salvation to the other nations of the earth. But all this is only the outward restora-

tion: it is not the inner and essential; not the taking away of the faithlessness and sin, which had been the cause of the exile. This higher help could not come from without; it must spring up in the nation itself, so far as it is the servant of Jehovah. But where was that point in Israel from which true deliverance and redemption might proceed? where was the Israel in Israel? where was the true servant of Jehovah? It could not be in the royal house; for these predictions are received under the alarming impression, that his kingly honours would prove a snare even to Hezekiah. It was felt that there was need in this matter of more inward and spiritual means, than those over which the kingdom, as such, had command. The prophet is superior to the king, as representative of the things of God; his being is open to the Spirit of God; it is in the prophet that the Lord finds that servant whom He can make use of for the renewal and recovery of His people.

But Isaiah also knew well what the prophet might expect in his work from a stiffnecked and rebellious people, and from godless rulers. It is from his experience he speaks, when he calls the Servant of Jehovah (xlix. 7) the despised of man, the abhorred of the nation, which has become like the heathen, and which he calls ironically, in contrast with the "Servant of Jehovah," the "servant of rulers." Since the days of Elias, when the idolatrous Jezebel killed the prophets by hundreds (1 Kings xviii. 4, xix. 10), they had always endured persecution and scorn. Isaiah himself had been from the beginning called to serve among a people fast becoming fatally hardened in heart (vi. 9, etc.); and he afterward felt most severely the opposition of the people (xxx. 8, etc.). Under Ahaz, whom he had to oppose and rebuke so sternly, he was without doubt regarded with an evil eye by those in high place; perhaps even then he was suffering from outward oppression; and, as is well known, he died a martyr's death under Manasseh. Jeremiah had to suffer the severest trials to which a prophet was exposed, so that recently it has occurred to some to declare *him* to be the

servant of Jehovah; and he is doubtless one of the most distinguished forerunners and types of Christ.

That he who represents and maintains the cause of God in an ungodly world has to suffer from the world,—that persecution and ignominy are inseparable from the way of the servants of Jehovah,—had been already abundantly felt by David, and expressed in his psalms. Some of the psalms of David, describing his sufferings, and which we are accustomed with right to consider as typical and Messianic, form on this account the next stage previous to our prophecy; and the readiness of Isaiah to receive revelations of so high a nature, is to be explained from his acquaintance with them. The suffering of the righteous servant of God, who in a godless world, which is intent on persecuting him, sets his hope patiently upon the Lord, and at length receives His help, is described in the twenty-second Psalm, and also in the sixty-ninth and others. In the fortieth Psalm a new thought appears. It occurs to the sacred bard in a time of the greatest need, and he gives expression to it now in a "new song." The suffering of the righteous is here in a remarkable way connected with the idea of sacrifice; and it is shown, that the true sacrifice, well pleasing to God, consists in the self-sacrifice of man, in the full and willing consecration of himself to God (comp. Ps. li. 18, 19). In the sixteenth Psalm there comes out, in a not less surprising way, the clear assurance that death and the grave have no power over him who enjoys real communion with God; for such an one is upon the path of life which leads to pleasures for evermore at the right hand of God (comp. Ps. xlix. 16). Lastly, we may refer also to the direct Messianic Psalm, the 110th, in which the Messiah is regarded as a new Melchizedek, who unites in Himself the priesthood and kinghood, and who thus surpasses anything that was possible within the old covenant. In it the priesthood and kingly office could not be united in one person: the tribes of Judah and Levi were not one, but distinct (Heb. vii. 11–14).

These are some of the preparatory stages for this prophecy of Isaiah: we shall not further follow them, else it might be shown that Ps. xl. and li. themselves presuppose the firmly rooted existence of the service of offering in its different branches for centuries before (Ps. xl. 7); for, apart from this, the advance from external animal sacrifices to inward self-sacrifice of man himself could hardly have been made. In Deuteronomy, *e.g.*, we read indeed of circumcision of the heart (x. 16, xxx. 6), because the outward circumcision had been known since Abraham's time; but we do not hear yet of inward sacrifice.

The more carefully we compare these passages in the Psalter with this prophecy in Isaiah, the more evident it becomes to our eyes that there is a great advance over those earlier ones, and that we have a new revelation of a higher order before us. The four chief points with which we have to do here, and which constitute the real significance of this prediction, coincide with these four varieties of psalms. (1.) While David expressly and strongly acknowledges his sinfulness (Ps. lxix. 6, comp. xl. 13), the servant of Jehovah is, on the contrary, described as *sinless*, and so as the righteous one in the absolute sense (vers. 9, 11). For the words are not to be explained away and taken only in the relative sense, that he has committed no wrong worthy of death. It is only in perfect personal innocence that the possibility is given of appearing in order to make atonement for others. It is one of the elementary ideas of the offering, that it be without blemish. (2.) In Ps. xl. and li., the self-sacrifice of man is not yet said to be death as such, but the giving of the heart to God, the sacrifice of willing obedience (comp. 1 Sam. xv. 22). Hence nothing is yet said of an atoning virtue in this sacrifice. On the other hand, in Isaiah an *expiatory* sacrificial death is predicted of the Servant of Jehovah with the utmost distinctness. That is a great thought, especially as it is expressed by one who believed in the old covenant, in which human sacrifices were expressly forbidden.

(3.) In the sixteenth Psalm, the hope of deliverance from death and of future life is expressed, but in such a way that the question may always arise, whether it is not, as Hengstenberg thinks, deliverance from the danger of death that is meant. Of the Servant of Jehovah, on the other hand, life, satisfied being, working and ruling after death, are (vers. 10–12) clearly predicted as the reward of His sacrifice. This, too, goes far beyond the old covenant position; it stands on the level of the high Messianic promise (Isa. xxv. 8), "He will swallow up death in victory; and the Lord God will wipe away the tears from off all faces." (4.) The central idea, that the servant of Jehovah is a prophet, is not contained in the 110th Psalm, and the priest and king only appears in glory; comp. Heb. vii. But in Isa. liii. it is *the prophet* who comes at once as *priest* and *king;* and the way from the unobserved activity of the prophet is represented as leading to glory and dominion through the deepest humiliation and scorn of the atoning death. The priesthood is unquestionably included in ver. 10, the kinghood in ver. 12. The expressions and figures have an Old Testament character, and thus are true to nature and full of fresh poetic life; the thoughts are clear, and constitute the gospel, the New Testament in the Old. For one who in this way unites in himself the three theocratic offices is, as already said, the specific close of the old covenant. This is nowhere to be found but in Jesus Christ: in Him, however, in most perfect fulness.

Let us quote here the beautiful words of Nitzsch:[1] "In the prophets, the idea became very distinct, that there should be a man who would be religion itself; a servant of God, whose life should be a perfect living service, so that he can remit the sins of those who yield themselves at his appearing, and who believe in him. This servant, this perfect religion, they thought, must at some time come. And the suffering which he endured can be no common suffering for himself, but must be sacred, and for his brethren. God, who sent him into the

[1] See Note Y.

world, has appointed him for this end. This is the signification of the Old Testament for the Christian mind. We find foreshadowed and set forth in it the idea of the suffering servant of God, as well as that of the hero, the prince whose glory should be established and be seen by us."

Every rationalistic attempt to explain away and make void this chapter, falls to pieces on these points of view. Unbelief is here proved to be unreason. But if such a prediction can only be accounted for by a supernatural revelation, the prophets do not leave us in the dark as to how such revelations took place. As we now pass on to consider this subject, we observe, finally, that Isa. liii. stands by no means alone. We have selected it only as a striking instance. We name, in addition, Isa. xlix., where, with a clearness that stands alone in the Old Testament, and which reminds us of the eleventh chapter of Romans, the progress of the kingdom of God from Israel to the heathen and back again to Israel is predicted, and Isa. vii. 14, ix. 5, 6; Joel iii. 1, 2; Hos. iii. 4, 5; Mic. v. 1; Jer. xxxi. 31, etc.; Ezek. xxxvi. 25, etc.; Zech. iii. and vi. 13, etc.

VII. THE PROPHETS, AND THE REVELATIONS THEY RECEIVED.

We think rationally only when we do not think rationalistically. This is the conclusion from all that has been said in this work hitherto. For by the laws of logic we can explain the prediction lying before us as a fact, as we did the miracles, only by referring it to a cause that is higher than any created one—to an actual revelation from a living, personal God. This is in entire harmony with what the prophets themselves say of the way in which their predictions originated. The conclusion drawn from the effect to the cause is confirmed by the historical testimony to the latter itself.

Criticism has left us here, too, as already hinted in a former passage, a considerable number of written monuments unimpaired. It acknowledges the books of Joel, Amos, Hosea,

Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Haggai, Malachi, and also a great part of Isaiah and Zechariah: it admits they are the productions of the men whose names they bear. Certain parts of Isaiah, especially xl.–lxvi., are attributed to a later time, and the last chapters of Zechariah are ascribed to an earlier. Concerning the age of the book of Obadiah, opinions are very divided. Many critics set the composition of Jonah and Daniel in the period after the captivity. I have defended the genuineness of Daniel in a separate work; here I argue only from what is generally acknowledged.

The prophets call their productions visions, and wish them thereby to be understood as supernatural revelations (Isa. i. 1, ii. 1; Amos i. 1, vii. 1; Zech. ii. 1, 5, iii. 1; comp. 2 Cor. xii. 1). These are given in a variety of ways. The divine revelation here, as elsewhere, displays an abundance of form and degree. What is common to all, however, is, that the prophets, the latest as well as the earliest, all express the belief that it is the word of God which comes to them, and is spoken through them. This lies not only in the ever-recurring formulæ, "The word of the Lord came to (or through) Joel," etc. (Joel i. 1; Jer. i. 4, xi. 13; Ezek. i. 3; Zech. i. 1; Mal. i. 1); "Thus saith the Lord," "The word of Jehovah;" and in such solemn affirmations as, "For the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it" (Mic. iv. 4; Isa. i. 20, xxxiv. 16); but it is explicitly asserted also, as *e.g.* Hos. xii. 10, 11, "And I am the Lord thy God from the land of Egypt; I have also spoken by the prophets, and I have multiplied visions, and used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets;" Amos iii. 7, "Surely the Lord God will do nothing; but He revealeth His secret unto His servants the prophets."

Still more distinctly this fundamental consciousness of the true prophets comes out in their opposition to the false ones. Jeremiah says (xxix. 8, 9, comp. xxvii. 15), "For thus saith the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, Let not your prophets and your diviners, that be in the midst of you, deceive you; neither attend to your dreams which ye cause to be dreamed. For

they prophesy falsely unto you in my name: I have not sent them, saith the Lord." And xiv. 14, etc.: "Then the Lord said unto me, The prophets prophesy lies in my name: I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, neither spake unto them: they prophesy unto you a false vision, and divination, and a thing of nought, and the deceit of their heart. Therefore thus saith the Lord concerning the prophets that prophesy in my name, and I sent them not, yet they say, Sword and famine shall not be in this land; By sword and famine shall those prophets be consumed."

The prophets describe the divine revelation more particularly, in such a way that we cannot but recognise two things: 1. There are extraordinary manifestations, coming to them, as a rule, quite involuntarily, and which they relate simply as facts of their experience; 2. In the manner of these revelations, the character of the Old Testament, as distinct from the New, is very apparent and prominent. These two characteristics are a direct proof, in the matter itself, of the inner truth of that which the prophets declare. The Spirit of God does not dwell with man so calmly and peacefully as in New Testament times. The apostles, too, have indeed special visions and inspiration beyond the ordinary and permanent abiding of the Spirit with them, as we have already seen in the case of Paul; but they are not immediately uttered. They are put into dogmatic form, and taken up into the still, quiet stream of epistolary teaching. To this the Apocalypse is the only exception; but even it is not like the visions of the other prophets, and can be compared with none but Daniel. The prophets of the old covenant, in distinction from the apostles, speak while under direct inspiration; and hence, too, with a poetic power and impulse, in figures and similes, such as we saw in Hos. xii. 11. They describe the prophetic state, as if the human mind were powerfully, often even violently, moved and possessed by the divine. The revelation comes to them with such force, and though it takes place within them, in the soul, produces so deep an im-

pression of being from above, of being something supernatural, and that has not sprung up in themselves, that they often, instead of the expression "The Spirit of Jehovah," say, The hand of Jehovah, mightily pressing upon me from without, came upon me, took hold on me, fell upon me (Isa. viii. 11; Jer. xv. 17; Ezek. i. 3, iii. 22, xxxvii. 1, viii. 1, comp. xi. 5). The prophet, when the Spirit comes upon him, is suddenly transformed, becoming a different man (1 Sam. x. 6, comp. vers. 10–13). This may happen, to say nothing here of extra-biblical analogies, upon the lower stage of a sensuous ecstasy, if I may use the expression,—a paroxysm that is mainly brought about and expressed through the body, and which may be compared in some way to intoxication (Acts ii. 13; Eph. v. 18), as in the case of Saul and his messengers, when they wished to bring David from Samuel's school of the prophets (1 Sam. xix. 20–24). Then it is not the Spirit of Jehovah, as such, which is the efficient cause, but the Spirit of Elohim, which pervades all nature, and especially all animated beings, as the inward and animating force of them (comp. Gen. i. 2; Ps. civ. 30), and which can therefore, without difficulty, expand and strengthen in such an extraordinary degree the life of the soul, so far as it is subject to bodily conditions. The prophets proper, however, are conscious of being in the service of Jehovah, and the organs by which He reveals His will, and carries on the work of redemption in the world. So that here the Elohim-spirit, which produces in them also the ecstatic condition, has entered the service of a higher sphere, the kingdom of grace, and as the Spirit of Jehovah, reveals itself in declarations of what the "Lord Jehovah doeth." But the sudden and involuntary occupation of the mind is the same here also. Amos, because of his predictions of judgments against Jeroboam II., was accused by the priest Amaziah of being a rebel, and was ordered back to his own country, to Juda. He is able to reply to his enemy, that the persecutor and the rebellious have to do, not with him, but with Jehovah: he had originally felt no sign of prophetic gift or calling in himself,

nor had he attended a school of the prophets; he had been simply a herdsman: "Then the Lord took me as I followed the flock, and the Lord said unto me, Go, prophesy to my people Israel" (Amos vii. 10, etc.). That prophet in whom the distinction between the natural mind and will, and the supernatural calling, appears most sharply defined, and in whom it in fact rises to a decided opposition, is plainly Jeremiah. He has objections as early as his first call to the work (i. 6), which the Lord has to overcome. When, later, he fell into a conflict with Pashur, similar to that of Amos with Amaziah, and in consequence was cast into the stocks (ch. xx.), he curses the day of his birth (ver. 14, etc.). For the word of the Lord was made a reproach unto him, and a derision daily; it predicted nothing but violence and spoil. Some blame and accuse him; others, his friends, seek to entice him, and cause him to modify the strictness and severity of his language. But he says, "Thou, Lord, hast convinced me, and I was convinced; Thou art stronger than I, and hast prevailed. And I said, I will not make mention of Him, nor speak any more in His name. But His word was in my heart, as a burning fire shut up in my bones; and I was weary with forbearing, and could do it no longer."

Here we perceive also, that, with all the supernatural character of the prophetic call, and, indeed, with all the resistance of the natural man to the power of the Spirit which was upon them, the inspiration comes by no means unethically, or in a way destructive of human freedom or personality. Quite otherwise. The highest gifts of the human nature were thus only truly freed and unfolded. The prophets are at the same time poets and heroes of the first magnitude; they are not machines or slaves. Jeremiah does not say, Thou hast driven me; but, Thou hast convinced me. As in the intellectual field we see that each prophet evinces his own characteristics and those of his age, in sympathies, feelings, style, mode of representation, and use of figure, in notable difference from all the others; so

there is something analogous in the region of morals. Conscience and freedom are not overpowered by the mighty operation of the Divine Spirit; they are then first rightly exercised. It is then only they come rightly into play. It is here, as everywhere in the kingdom of God. With the greater gifts a higher task is imposed. To whom much is given, of him much shall be required. They had to subdue flesh and blood, to hold fast their faith in God in the teeth of an opposing world, to give up entirely their own wishes and thoughts, and be faithful and obedient even unto death. The extraordinary equipment by the Spirit both qualified for and bound them to extraordinary struggles. The prophets had sometimes to confront the entire nation and age in which they lived. "And Jehovah," writes Jeremiah (i. 9, etc., 18, etc.), "put forth His hand, and touched my mouth. And the Lord said unto me, Behold, I have put my words in thy mouth. See, I have this day set thee over the nations, and over the kingdoms, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy, and to throw down, to build, and to plant. For, behold, I have made thee this day a defenced city, and an iron pillar, and brazen walls against the whole land; against the kings of Judah, against the princes thereof, against the priests thereof, and against the people of the land. And they shall fight against thee, but they shall not prevail against thee; for I am with thee, saith the Lord, to deliver thee." Compare Isa. vi. 8, etc.; Ezek. ii. 3, etc., iii. 4, etc., 11, etc. The prophet is thus the representative of God on earth, whose word has creative power to destroy, as to build up the people of God and the secular kingdom. It is only by the actual strength of the living God that he can oppose the whole world: without the assurance of a direct divine commission, such a gigantic conflict, running counter to his own natural will and wishes, would be impossible. Here we come to the great conflicts of world-history, which are tragical in the highest sense of the word, when Jerusalem with her divinely instituted priesthood and king becomes the murderer of the prophets

(Matt. xxiii. 27). "Just in the same way," says J. P. Lange, "as every man by the will of God is a single individuality, so to each is a separate destiny assigned. It is the aim of each individual's lot and experience, to subdue his merely natural qualities, and to make a spiritual being of him, to lift him up in his isolated singleness, and incorporate him with humanity in general, and to mature and ripen his particular power and faculty given for the good of his species, by a subjection to it for a while. The richer, therefore, the individual life is, the more will it always have to suffer. The weight of his own lot will correspond to the weight of his individual nature. Hence Christ is the chosen and ordained of God before all other men on earth. Hence, too, is the heaviest and darkest lot reserved for the elect of the love of God." We see here, again, how the essence and history of prophecy are combined in that picture by Isaiah of the servant of God. But as this picture goes far beyond the bare idea of a tragical fate, and rises to that of an innocent and vicarious death, and also to the prediction of life and rule after death, it is evidently—this becomes still clearer here—a *divine* prophecy, which is higher than history. To this more general idea, however, there is added further that of patience, spoken of above. Paul names this as one of the signs of an apostle, in the same way that with the other apostles he speaks of the tribulation and sufferings "of Christ," through which we must enter into the kingdom of heaven.

We have by these observations disposed of a misunderstanding which is ever attached to supernaturalism, as if man's moral or intellectual nature were in some way injured or interfered with by it, while, in fact, it liberates and strengthens it. We turn again now to our subject, in connection with which our great aim is to bring out and establish the supernatural element. If *all* the prophets refer their entire predictions to divine revelation, so that we are led to think of inspirations repeated from time to time, the three major prophets inform us, in addition, of their first calling to the office by a vision which laid the foun-

dation of their life work. These three visions (Isa. vi.; Jer. i.; Ezek. i.–iii.) are just as distinct from each other as they are related: each carries, again, a perfectly original impression; and whoever reads them with open eye, each by itself, and then compares them together, will feel that here also there are intellectual facts and realities which speak for themselves, unusual as they may seem to us (especially some of those in Ezekiel) at the first or even the second glance. We have already repeatedly referred to the call of Jeremiah; we shall therefore now look a little more closely into Isa. vi. The circumstance that this chapter does not stand at the very beginning of the book, need not prevent us from regarding it as the inaugural vision of Isaiah. The prophet receives the painful commission (vers. 9, 10) to contribute by his labours to the complete hardening of the people. He cannot, however, begin his book with that, but must first of all show the grounds for this judgment (ch. i.–v.), and then modify it by promises.

Isaiah beholds the Lord seated upon a throne, high and lifted up, His train filling the temple. The seraphim who are round about Him, express the deep signification of this vision in the words: "Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts; the whole earth is full of His glory." As at Sinai, the pillars of the earth tremble, and smoke enveils the majestic sight. Isaiah feels most deeply the holiness and glory of God; he shrinks back, and in his inmost soul knows that the sinner must die in the presence of the thrice-holy One, just as the people at Sinai felt (Ex. xx. 18, 19). "Woe is me," he says, "for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts." But the sin of the prophet is purged away. One of the seraphim touches his lips with a live coal from the altar, with the words: "Lo, this hath touched thy lips; and thine iniquity is taken away, and thy sin is purged." Then Isaiah hears the voice of the Lord inquiring, "Whom shall I send, and who will go for us? Then said I, Here am I; send

me!" And then he receives his commission in more definite terms.

In connection with this simple but sublime incident, it is first of all to be noted, that the miraculous manifestation of God and the angels is united with the soundest religious and moral sentiments, words, and actions. We have here the very same elements upon which, to this hour, the inner life of every Christian rests: the holiness of God, the sin of man, the divine reconciliation. Every Christian feels himself related essentially to Isaiah, when he is conscious that the majesty of the holy God brings death to the sinner, and that only after being pardoned he can be an instrument in the hands of God; and when, after having received the atonement, he gives himself gladly and freely to the service of God. There is thus nothing here which is foreign or dark to us; it is flesh of our flesh, and spirit of our spirit. We see, too, how that the miracle does not disturb or violate the moral nature of man, but purifies, sanctifies, animates, and renews it. The law given at Sinai, by God manifesting Himself there, does not annul the law of conscience, but rather sets it up, and brings the ideal of his being, so broken and dimmed by the heathen apostasy, to the knowledge of man again, in the words, "Be ye holy, as I am holy;" so that he perceives what he ought to be and is not, what he is and ought not to be. This vision of the glory of the Lord, itself similar to that of Sinai, has a similar effect on Isaiah. While, however, the law is thus repeated, on the other hand, the doctrine of reconciling grace is foreshadowed in the cleansing from sin by the live coal from the altar. From this circumstance, it appears to us that there is an inward and vital connection between Isa. vi. and the Old Testament gospel, Isa. xl.–lxvi., and ch. liii. especially. The prophet, who at his first calling had received such a deep impression of his own sinfulness and the sinfulness of his people, must have been best prepared to believe that, for the healing of the hurt and woe of Israel, there was need of another and greater Prophet, who, sinless Himself, could take away the

sin of the people. And because Isaiah was called to make the heart of the unbelieving people gross, it must have been like a cheering light for him, to know that, after long hardness, Israel would at last come to the "Servant of Jehovah."

The three visions by which Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel were set apart, have this in common, that they all tell us of a miraculous act of God which happened to the prophet, and on which his whole work rested as its foundation. In the case of Isaiah, who, as a sinner, feels himself unequal to the prophetic work, the lips were consecrated by the live coal from the altar. Jeremiah, who replies to the call by holding up his youth, writes, in i. 9 (using the same expression as Isaiah): "And the Lord put forth his hand, and touched my mouth: and the Lord said unto me, Behold, I have put my words into thy mouth." Ezekiel, who beholds the Lord above the cherubim, as Isaiah the seraphim, received a roll written upon, within and without, with lamentations, mourning, and woe, which he had to eat (ii. 9–iii. 3). It was therefore, with all the three, a specific supernatural event which constituted them prophets. These things come to them in visions; they are therefore real divine operations, upon the conscious reception and knowledge of which the prophetic office rests.

Taking all the foregoing together, we get, keeping always in mind the difference already pointed out between the Old and New Testament stage of revelation, an idea of the prophet, in all respects like that which we get of the apostle from the Pauline epistles. He is called to service in the kingdom of God by an act of revelation, and is qualified for it by continued inward revelations. The consecration visions of the greater prophets correspond to Paul's experience on the way to Damascus, with this difference, that the first belong to the region of vision, the other to that of external fact. It could not be otherwise in the case of a persecutor and blasphemer. The single "oracles" of the prophets—to use, for once, the pagan expression, that I may take this opportunity of condemning its

application to the utterances of God in the Bible—correspond to the visions of the apostle. On the other side, we have found the prophetic office, not less than the apostolic, surrounded by the heaviest trials and conflicts, and by the "sufferings of Christ" (2 Cor. i. 5, etc.; Phil. iii. 10; 1 Pet. i. 11, iv. 13, v. 1; Rev. i. 9).

Now, whoever denies supernatural revelation, must charge the prophets also, as well as the apostles, with self-deception in the very matter which they hold and have declared to be the foundation of their whole work. Such an one comes thus, after what has been said, to this conclusion, that Christ, the prophets, and the apostles, were in the main but enthusiasts and dreamers. Feuerbach's conclusion comes out again always by a frightful necessity. If those who now believe in special revelations and predictions are held to be fools whose minds have become disordered, and their leading views to be "crass opinions which no reasonable man can adopt,"[1] the prophets and apostles may have indeed the difference of the times in which they lived in their favour; but, in fact, they too are hit by the same sentence, for they, as is allowed, had the same belief, and indeed claim such revelations as having come to themselves.

It is true, they generally shrink from this final conclusion, and have categories by which they seek to deal justly with the prophets, and to give them a higher value. In a certain sense, this is more possible in their case than in that of Paul, as in them they have mainly to do with inward occurrences, and their mode of speech is poetic. In the case of prophets one may speak of the awakening of the conscience, the inspiration of pious and patriotic sentiment, the power of anticipating future events, the illumination of the ideal consciousness, and the like. But in all such explanations we mistake the real point at issue. They might have been admissible if we had had only the reports of others concerning the prophets, which might have been declared in some way or other inaccurate and unreliable. But it is those who testify of themselves we have

[1] See Note Z.

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to do with; and the main part of the question lies not in the objective state of the case as such, but in the opinion and belief the prophets themselves had as to the ground and impelling force of their work. With them, the whole of it lay in the fact, that they were called and illumined by actual supernatural revelations of Jehovah. If any one had gone to them with such attempts at explanation as those above, they would have answered with Paul: "If thou art right, then we are of all men most miserable: we fight with beasts at Ephesus merely after the manner of men, and in vain stand we in jeopardy every hour, and die daily; yea, we are found false witnesses of God, and are in no way different from the false prophets, who prophesy in the name of Jehovah, though He hath not sent them, nor commanded them, nor spoken to them at all." With such words would the prophets have dismissed one who explained things in that way; and there would be nothing for him, but either to think of the prophets as is indicated above, or to acknowledge the reality of the revelations upon which their self-consciousness rests.

But the matter does not end here. We find, as was proved in the preceding section, actual prediction in the writings of the prophets. Now, if one does not admit a real revelation at all, of course no prediction can be admitted. They are got rid of either by exegesis, explaining away the sacred words and robbing them of meaning, or by criticism which ascribes the most specific predictions of the future to a later period, and declares them prophecies after the event. Thus the loftiest heights are laid level with the dust, and the jewels of brightest lustre torn from the crown, in order to bring the princes in the kingdom of mind a little nearer the common life of our day. Then is fulfilled in a different way the word of the prophet (Jer. ii. 13): "My people hath committed two evils: they have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters, and hewed them out cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water."

We have already said that the hope of Messiah, peculiar to

the Jews, especially in connection with its fulfilment by Jesus Christ, could only be explained by admitting a divine revelation. We may say the same of the knowledge of God manifest in the Old Testament, which is not less distinct from that of the heathen. For it is true here also, that without the Son they have not the Father. The divine knowledge of the prophets is so pure and high, that Christendom makes use of it for edification until this day, and feels that it is one with the later revelation. Even *Biedermann* writes,[1] though indeed in a different sense from us: "All that we of ourselves can attain to after the severest effort of thought, to express suitably the nature of the eternal, comes before us in the prophets in a form that cannot be surpassed, and as the result of immediate vision, and tells us what only the deepest thought can tell. Indeed, does more than tell it; impresses it on the soul in vivid representation, just as it stood before the soul of the prophet." Whence is it, that the noblest and most gifted men of other nations never rose to a knowledge of the living God?—that even a Socrates, who had his Dæmonion too, a Plato who perceived and laid hold of so much in connection with the idea of God, never could grasp it in its purity and entireness? Can true religion, then, be natural to a single people, and that a nation that was constantly sinking into the idolatry of other nations? Or, as Ernest Renan, of whom we have to speak further on, holds, is it peculiar to a family of nations—the Shemitic? Why is it, that the very first verse of Genesis draws an indestructible dividing line between the religion of the Bible and the whole of heathendom, the philosophical and Shemitic as well as the rest? The answer to these questions lies alone in the fact of the revelation.

We are thus, however, led back to the earlier Old Testament history; and we close this section by stating some inferences which follow from a consideration of the prophets, in regard to the stages of revelation which preceded them.

[1] See Note A 2.

First of all, we have shown, from the instances of the great apostle and the three greater prophets, how God called and formed His servants to be the organs for conveying His will to men. It is a distinct definite occurrence, a divine act, by which the Lord of heaven takes them into the service of His kingdom, and enters into an abiding covenant with them, which is made manifest in revelations ever and anon renewed. It is in the same way that the calling and life of the three men on whom the earlier condition of the Israelitic kingdom rests—Samuel, Moses, Abraham—are recorded.

It was Samuel who was the means of bringing about the highest state of things in Old Testament history, and who founded the power in Israel that influenced all the after-time. His inaugural vision in the tabernacle at Shiloh is recorded in 1 Sam. iii.; it is evidently expressly regarded in that light. This is shown especially by the close (vers. 20, 21): "And all Israel, from Dan even to Beersheba, knew that Samuel was established to be a prophet of the Lord. And the Lord appeared again in Shiloh; for the Lord revealed Himself to Samuel in Shiloh by the word of the Lord." Here also the new method of revelation is purposely indicated, which from that time was the customary one, namely, the "word of the Lord," that is, the inward converse with the prophet. Samuel is a prophet; and though before this there were single prophets (comp. Judg. iv. 4, vi. 8; 1 Sam. ii. 27), and the judges may be described as prophets of fact, yet it is Samuel who first opens the continuous line of prophets in the special sense of the word. Let the words, too, with which his consecration as prophet is introduced (1 Sam. iii. 1) be considered. They are not less characteristic than the rest: "And the word of the Lord was precious (scarce) in those days; there was no open vision." And observe, too (Judg. iv. 4, vi. 8), the incidental expressions added to the text: "a woman who was a prophetess," "a man who was a prophet." They seem to hint at the rarity of prophetic power.

The usual form of revelation before this was not inward, as with the prophets, but an outward theophany, or manifestation of God. This corresponds with the earlier stage to which revelation had then come, and which laid the foundation for the later; and we found something analogous and confirmatory in the appearance of Christ to Paul. The consecration visions of the prophets, especially those of Isaiah and Ezekiel, form a connecting link between the theophany and the inward communication, since they are accomplished by means of visions. Samuel's consecration, as is agreeable to its historic position, stands nearest the theophany (comp. 1 Sam. iii. 4, etc., 10). It is therefore not correct to call Moses simply a prophet, as Ewald and others have recently done. In so far as the prophet speaks for God, or is as the mouth of God (see Ex. vii. 1, iv. 16), Moses is called so; indeed, even Abraham, as the friend of God, is mentioned by this name (Deut. xviii. 18; Hos. xii. 14; Gen. xx. 7). But Moses is just as clearly distinct from all the other prophets, and placed above them, inasmuch as God revealed Himself to him not merely by vision and symbol, but conversed with him personally, mouth to mouth and face to face (Num. xii. 6–8; Deut. xxxiv. 10–12). The revelations which Moses received were thus imparted in a different way, as a rule, from those of the prophets, though doubtless the special laws rested upon prophetic conceptions in his case too (compare the expression "commandments of the Lord," 1 Cor. xiv. 37). It was in harmony with the task assigned to this great man, of laying a foundation for future divine work, that he should unite in himself all forms of revelation. But in that respect of which we are now chiefly speaking here, his calling, and the way he was led, were the same as those of the prophets. They were brought about through the appearing of God in the burning bush at Sinai; it is minutely recorded in Ex. iii. and iv., and is generally felt to be surprisingly analogous to the consecration visions of Isaiah and Jeremiah. From that time forth the intercourse of Moses with God continues.

It is the same in the case of Abraham, the progenitor of Israel, the father of the faithful. He, too, belongs to the theophanistic period. His call comes in Haran (Gen. xii. 1, etc.), where Jehovah sends the painful command, to leave his country and home, and go forth into an unknown land, which the Divine Guide would show him. This demand is all the harder, as it is not accompanied by any present advantage, but simply by a promise, which is in itself in the highest degree improbable. Abraham, however, has no objections to make, as Moses and Jeremiah have, but with all simplicity goes, and does "what Jehovah had said unto him;" and then Jehovah appears to him again in the land of Canaan from time to time. The majesty of the words of Jehovah on calling him, and also of the obedience of Abraham, have something in them that is altogether original, and could not be the work of an inventor. Both stand morally so high, and are so contrary to nature and natural understanding, and they have outwardly so little analogy with the calling of the prophets, that the mere existence of this narrative is a strong testimony to its truth, and against its fabrication at a later time. The essence of the matter, however, with which modern thought is offended, the miraculous, that a man should be taken out of the world, and those associations to which he was so closely and tenderly attached, and placed before it as a witness for God, by an act of God, is, in Abraham's case, in analogy with Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Paul. Therefore we say, that the course of this apostle and these prophets serves to confirm the miraculous history, and strengthen the older pillars of the house of God.

Not only by analogy, however, but by direct testimony, the prophets confirm the earlier history. We select only two instances related to the same men, or at least the same periods. God commands Jeremiah (xiv. 11) not to pray any more for Israel, and says (xv. 1), "Though Moses and Samuel stood before me, yet my mind could not be toward this people." In this short phrase, these two men are evidently thought of in

that connection with the history of the kingdom which was most specific, distinctive, and as it is described in the historical books. This is not the place to go more minutely into the history of Samuel, to show how the whole of his work and influence, in opposition to the dead legitimacy of the house of Eli the high priest, rested on his character and his personal relation to Jehovah. This is manifest in the fact, that he on one side is a prophet, of which mention has just been made; on the other, is an intercessor. As prophet, he comes before the people in the name of God; as intercessor, he comes before God in the name of the people. The word of God and prayer are correlates. Samuel was recognised by the people not simply as prophet (1 Sam. iii. 20), but also, on the ground of many actual occurrences, as intercessor (1 Sam. xii. 19, 23, comp. ver. 17, etc., vii. 5, 8, viii. 6, xv. 11). As to Moses, his whole position as founder of the old covenant, is that of a mediator between God and the people (Deut. v. 5). As such he came before "Jehovah his God" at a most critical moment, which Jeremiah doubtless has in his eye here, interceding with wonderful forgetfulness of self for Israel (Ex. xxxii. 10, etc., xxxi. etc.). But the prayer of Moses is often mentioned elsewhere, and in connection with the most decisive results: in connection with the plagues of Egypt (Ex. viii. 24, etc., ix. 27, etc., x. 17, etc.), the passage of the Red Sea (xiv. 15), the slaughter of the Amalekites in the neighbourhood of Sinai (xvii. 11, etc.), the punishment of the murmuring people at Taberah (Num. xi. 2), and other instances. We see, too, how deeply the picture of Moses and Samuel, with their wonderful power in prayer, was imprinted on the mind of the nation, from Ps. xcix. 6, where we read, "Moses and Aaron (leaders of the choir) among His priests, and Samuel (superintendent overseer, in front place) among those who call on His name: they called on the Lord, and He answered them." We thus are, unsought, permitted to behold, as it were looking into a most ancient temple, a living, personal intercourse with God and the

heavenly world, to which a whole nation points as the basis of its life.

Let it be permitted me to quote a passage from a much older prophet, which carries us back to a much earlier time. Hosea, in the twelfth chapter, complains of the sins of Ephraim and Judah (vers. 1–3), and calls the people to repentance (ver. 6). He made use of the names Israel and Jacob in vers. 1 and 3 for his purpose; and this gives occasion (vers. 4, 5) to go back to the great head of the people, whose life, as is expressed in his two names Jacob and Israel, is deeply concerned too with sin and conversion, so that in this he becomes a pattern to all his posterity. "He took his brother by the heel in the womb (ensnared him: see words "lies and deceit," vers. 1, 2; as to the matter itself, see Gen. xxv. 26, xxvii. 36, hence the name Jacob), but in the strength of his manhood he wrestled with God (Gen. xxxii. 28, in original ver. 29, hence Israel); he wrestled with the Angel, and prevailed (almost verbatim, as in Gen. xxxii. 29); he wept, and made supplication unto Him; he found Him in Bethel, and there He spake with us: Jehovah, the Lord of hosts; Jehovah, the Lord is His memorial." This short passage shows not only that that nocturnal contest of the patriarch had been, even in Hosea's time, long received as a fact, but also furnishes us with a key to the inner meaning, which throws a new light on the scene itself, and from that point throws its beams far beyond. Hosea teaches us to see in Jacob's wrestling the turning-point of his life—his conversion. This is not only in harmony with the narrative in Genesis, but the whole sketch of his life as contained in that chapter is here presupposed. A little further on (in ver. 13), other circumstances are quoted from it. But Hosea further perceives in that struggle by night a fact of ancient times, which was repeated, and ought to be repeated, in the life of the nation. That fact was the conquest of the impure original nature in that tearful and prayerful pleading with God, and being found of God in the long earnest conflict, in which God reveals

Himself as Jehovah. That is the very idea and history of Israel as distinct from the heathen; the individuality of Israel is thus spread abroad in the nationality, and in the Servant of Jehovah it appears again summed up and compacted in the individual (Isa. xlix. 3). Patriarchs and facts of ancient time, to which so great importance and significance are attached in Scripture,—think of Adam and his fall, of Noah and his sons with their curse and blessing, of David and his house, then of Christ and His body,—must be estimated by us, too, in a better way than is usual, if we wish to arrive at a truly scientific and organic view of humanity and its history. Modern thought fails to see the signification of personality and fact; sinks facts, ideas, and persons in masses; gives centres of life without a centre-point; loves the atomistic, hairsplitting, brainless mode of study, which takes the head from nations and men, and, like death, dissolves the unsouled body into dust. In contradistinction to all this, the prophets, as we see, were most profoundly convinced that the whole history of their nation rested on great persons, and their mysterious, miraculous communion with God. Concerning Abraham, see further, Isa. v. 2, where the idea of his whole history is expressed: "Look unto Abraham your father, and unto Sarah that bare you: for I alone called him, and blessed him, and increased him;" also xli. 8, 9.

It is not simply these or the other details out of the earlier history that are quoted as it were accidentally in the Psalms and Prophets; but there is before us a connected historical consciousness. The single occurrences are set into this larger relationship, and are regarded as necessary parts of the whole mass of fundamental facts—the roots and types of all the development of the nation. To these Israelitic principles, these beginnings, primal causes, and facts of the chosen people, belong also in an especial manner, with the calling and life of the patriarchs already spoken of, the great miracles on which the independent existence of the nation rests, the deliverance from

Egypt, the giving of the law, the journey through the desert, the entrance into Canaan. Not once only, but a hundred times, these wonders are echoed in the Psalms and Prophets. They are like the ancient rock-built and everlasting hills, overlooking all the land, to which they ever lifted up their eyes, and which are ever anew mirrored in the flowing stream of their poetic and prophetic literature. They were so well known to be the real foundation of the whole life of the people and kingdom, that the prophets, after they announced their destruction by divine judgment, from the first foretold the Messianic restoration as if it were to be brought about by the repetition of the ancient miracles. See Hos. ii. 14, etc., in original ver. 16, etc.; Isa. xi. 11, 15, etc.; Mic. ii. 13, vii. 15, etc.: "According to the days of thy coming out of the land of Egypt will I show unto thee marvellous things. The nations shall see it, and be confounded at all their might."

These constant citations and applications of the Israelitic history in the poetry and prophecy since David, presuppose two things. First, that history must have been quite well known to the whole nation. It must also have been precisely the same as has been handed down to us in the Pentateuch and the book of Joshua; for all the passages we have quoted, and numberless others, correspond with these authorities. Without such familiarity on the part of the people, these ever-recurring references could not have been understood. Israel lived and moved in its ancient history, which was held in perpetual remembrance by the yearly feasts, especially the passover and feast of tabernacles, and also by circumcision and the Sabbath; just as we Christians live in the facts of the history of Jesus, which become ever new to us through the sacraments and the greater festivals and Sunday gospels. Israel knew not God otherwise than as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, —as the Jehovah who, as the decalogue begins, had brought His people out of the land of Egypt, and out of the house of bondage; just as we know Him as the Father of our Lord Jesus

Christ. The great facts and different principal stages of the revelation appear in the name and title of God. It is not ideas, but facts, facts connected with revelations, on which the knowledge of God is based. The history, and the rich outward cultus so closely connected with it, and serving partly as an express memorial of it, were the great means of religious instruction to Israel. Hence the men of God in the Old and New Testament, in their words to the people, either for exhortation, defence, or instruction, usually strike into the historical path. The dealings of God with His people, and the relation of the people to God and His messengers, furnish their best examples. Thus Moses in Deuteronomy; Joshua, ch. xxiii. and xxiv.; Samuel, 1 Sam. xii. 6, etc.; Stephen, Acts vii.; Paul, Acts xiii. 16, etc.

This use of the early history by the poets and prophets implies, however, more than simple knowledge. It presupposes that which is expressed by David in the nineteenth Psalm, that men should be instructed, quickened, rejoiced, and enlightened by it. In this psalm, which draws a parallel between the revelation of God in nature and that in His word, the Elohistic and Jehovistic revelation, the law appears as a long-existing ordinance of God. We saw the same thing above in the fortieth Psalm. These views and references to the early history are frequent with David, as Ps. viii. is based on Gen. i., Ps. cx. 4 on Gen. xiv. 18–20. In Ps. xl. 8, the volume of the book is mentioned, by which we are to understand, from the connection with ver. 7, the Torah, in as far as it contained instructions concerning sacrifice and the various kinds of offerings. The fortieth Psalm shows how the Spirit had led David to understand the inner meaning of the law; the eighth and 110th how the Spirit had taught the prophetic import of the early history. And it is this we find throughout in the bards and prophets from that time forward. They not only know, but they clearly perceive the meaning of the history of revelation; they have an inward spiritual, and in this sense

philosophic or theosophic, understanding of it. What has been said of them in regard to the law, "that it was their calling to develop further the higher elements that lay hidden in it, and which lay indeed at the foundation of it,"[1] is true *mutatis mutandis* also of the other part of the Pentateuch—the historical. To them it became luminous and ideal, so that they found in it the divine ideas and laws of all history. They perceive not only the miracles in the law, but also the law in the miracles. On this account they were able to apply the early history to the present and the future of the kingdom of God with the greater force and vividness, and with a light that spread both backwards and forwards. All this was done, however, on the ground of pure history, and a strictly historical view of the facts. The idea does not tear asunder, but transfigures, explains, and illumines the history, and takes it as the grandest and highest, the priestly and kingly history of our race (Gen. xix. 5; 6).

The prophets, looking at the old revelation in the light of their new one, distinctly declare that they feel themselves standing in historical continuity with the earlier phases of revelation. Thus Hosea, in the passage already quoted, ch. xii., places the three great divisions of Old Testament revelation together—the patriarchal, Mosaic, and prophetic. After he has spoken in the way we have shown of Jacob-Israel (ver. 4, etc.), God, after a further condemnation of the sin of the people, reminds them what He on His side had done and is doing for them (ver. 9, etc.): "And I, that am the Lord thy God from the land of Egypt, yet make thee to dwell in tabernacles, as in the days of the solemn feasts. I have also spoken by the prophets; and I multiply visions, and use similitudes, by the ministry of the prophets." The prophetic revelations are thus placed by the side of the Mosaic, which are still held before the eye in the feasts, as a continuation of them; and similarly afterward (vers. 13, 14), the mention of the prophet Moses, who brought

[1] See Note B 2.

them out of the land of Egypt and preserved them, is connected with that of Jacob, who had to serve for a wife, and be a keeper of sheep.

It is true, that with all this, no documentary proof is furnished of the historical character of the single facts; but I think there is a proof of the reality of the entire history. For otherwise the entire belief of all Israel would then be as fantastic, as we have already seen that of the apostles, our Lord, and the prophets would be, if miracles and actual revelations are denied. On the contrary, the common belief of Israel is to be regarded as the true historic consciousness in the highest and sole sense of the word. According to a striking remark of Bunsen's, history was born in Israel, and in the night when they went forth out of Egypt. And if the opinion of Baumgarten be correct, that not Herodotus, but Moses, is the father of history,[1] this may be extended to Israel generally, in opposition to the heathen world. The Old Testament is, in fact, the most reliable source of extra-Israelitic history, in so far as it touches upon it. M. von Niebuhr, in characterizing the sources of the Assyrio-Babylonian history he had written, says: "The Old Testament alone is an exception to patriotic untruth; it never conceals or passes over a national reverse or error. Its truthfulness is the highest thing in history, even for him who does not believe in divine inspiration. At the same time, I must claim for the Old Testament the minutest accuracy as well as the utmost truthfulness of *all* our sources of history. This recognition has in our time become general; and those who do not go so far as to consider that the rejection of the books of the old covenant would be folly, yet admit that it would be a piece of antiquated bad taste."[2]

The poetic, didactic, and prophetic literature of the Old Testament bears a similar relation to the Pentateuch with that of a Pindar, Sophocles, Herodotus, Plato, to Homer and Hesiod in Greece, and that of the poetic-philosophic literature of our

[1] See Note C 2. [2] See Note D 2.

modern days to the Nibelungen, etc., among ourselves. There are two epochs in the history of literature which can be distinguished from one another in all the greater nations. They are those of objectivity and subjectivity, which in the region of the secular may be described as the heroic-epic and the lyrico-dramatic, and also the historico-philosophic. It is of the greatest importance to observe the different form of this common order of development among the Jews and the heathen, of whom the Greeks are the most important representatives. Among the latter the first epoch was that of the formation of the myth by the poets (by this we do not mean the actual origin of the mythology); the second made free use of the myths for purposes of poetry, as the tragedians, and then, with a growing spirit of philosophy, and above all, by an earnest, ethical criticism, demolished them. In the centuries immediately before Christ, classical and cultured heathendom was fully convinced of the untruth of the popular religion.

After Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Xenophanes had spoken against the gods and myths of Homer; after Socrates had drunk the poison-cup because of the introduction of new gods, it was Plato chiefly who brought that earnest moral criticism to bear on Homer and mythology. It will not be going out of our way, if we present here some of the principal passages of his *Republic*, where, treating of the education of the protectors and guides of the state, he comes to speak of these matters (we quote from Schleiermacher's translation): "We shall beg (it runs, p. 388) Homer and the other poets to picture the gods not mourning, and saying,

Woe is me, O unhappy mother of heroes!

And though they be gods, they should at least not venture to let the greatest of them appear in a way so unbecoming himself, as to say:

Ah! alas! I see with mine eyes yonder a friend beloved,
Hunted all round the walls, and my heart bleeds fast for his woe.

And:

> Ah! sad, sad for me, if fate commits Sarpedon beloved,
> To be tamed under the hand of Patroclus of Menœtius.

For if our youths listened attentively to such words, and did not laugh at them as utterly unworthy, it would not be likely that one who is but a man would regard such things as unworthy of himself, or think he ought to punish himself when it came into his mind to say or do such things; but then every one would, without being ashamed or restrained, make much complaining and lamenting over the most trifling things." And p. 390: "Do you think that it strengthens the self-control of a young man, to hear that Zeus, from the strength of mere carnal desire, frivolously forgets the whole of what he, alone wakeful, had determined upon, while the other gods and men slept, and is so beside himself at the sight of Hero, that he will not enter into the sleeping-chamber, but at once longs to be on the earth beside her, and says himself that he is more affected by desire for her than even before when they first saw each other, unknown to the loving parents? Or, further, how Ares and Aphrodite were seized by Hephæstus because of similar matters?" P. 391: "We will not have it believed or stated, that Theseus the son of Poseidon, and Peirithoos son of Zeus, were guilty of criminal plunder, nor that any other son of God or hero whatever has dared to practise what is ruthless and wicked, such as they now falsely attribute to them; but we will compel the poets to declare either that these are not the deeds of these men, or that they are not sons of God at all, and not have them saying both, attempting to persuade our youth that the gods can do any wickedness, or that heroes are in no respect better than men. For this is neither good nor true. We have shown that evil cannot arise from the gods, and such things are mischievous to the hearer. For every one will for himself think it a small thing to be bad, if he believes that even those who are of the genuine stock of the gods are doing and have done such things."

In a passage further on, p. 414, etc., Plato parodies and cari-

catures the formation of the myths with his fine irony: "'But how,' I continued, 'can we find redress for the innocent and useful deceptions (ψεῦδος), of which we said before, it is praiseworthy to persuade by deception, first the rulers themselves, if we can, but if not them, then at all events the rest of the city?' 'What is right, though?' he asked. 'Nothing new,' I said, 'but ancient Phœnician stories of things which happened often enough long ago, as the poets say and men believe, but in our time do not happen, and perhaps cannot happen: to make them credible, I say, demands many sorts of arts of persuasion.' 'How you turn and wind,' said he, 'and fear to come out with it!' 'And you will see,' said I, 'that I hesitate with good reason, when I have told you what it is.' Socrates then relates the myth of the formation and education of man under the earth, and of the nobler or baser metals which the creating God mixed up with the souls. Glaucon interrupts him with the remark, 'It cannot but be that you have long felt ashamed to teach this deception' (ψεῦδος, lie). 'That was very natural,' replies Socrates; 'but hear the rest of the legend' (μῦθος). When he came to the end, he asks, 'Dost thou know now of any way in which to make them believe this?' 'No way whatever, to make them believe it themselves; but their sons and their successors, and the rest of men of later times, may.' 'But,' I said, 'it would be a happy thing in addition, if they should take a deeper interest in the city and one another: for I think I understand pretty well what you mean. And let this go wherever tradition (φημη) will lead it.'"

The Pentateuch has been compared with the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. It has been called the theocratic epos of the Israelites, with symbolic fancies, juridic, etymological, didactic myths, imaginary predictions, etc.[1] The direct interference of the superior powers in the course of earthly history appears to be the same in the Mosaic as in the Homeric writings. If it was mythical in the one, why not also in the other? The divine manifestations and miracles in Israel thus came into a

See Note E 2.

magnificent analogy with the heathen legends of the gods; and the exceptional position of Israel, which was contrary to a rational view of things, ceased. The whole of antiquity now stood under a common twofold law, that all nations rise from a dim mythic age, and gradually come to genuine historical development and historical consciousness, and that mythology is essential to all religion. We can understand that such a view, so wide and comprehensive, would be imposing and misleading, and easily mistaken for the true historic method, which indeed it claims to be. It is, however, an opinion with which as much mischief was and is done, as with the watchwords reason, science, and the like. But this historic method has overlooked one thing, viz. the nature and spirit of the matter in hand. They have been so misled by the mere external similarity between the Mosaic and Homeric theophanies, between the Jewish and heathen traditions, usages, etc., as to miss altogether the peculiarities of Israel in religion and history, by which this people is so sharply distinguished from all others. To study and understand history aright, two things are needful. First, one must know the subject in its specific peculiarities on all sides; and then, second, consider its connection with all related subjects—with all that, looking either backward or forward, could in any way affect it. Thus only can it be understood as a link in the great chain of historical development. Instead of this, it has been for about a century thought quite historical in regard to theological matters, to set aside those two highest principles of historic study—to take away from biblical objects all that was specific, and then to set them in connection with heterogeneous things. The peculiarity of the Old Testament religion, by which it is distinguished, with all similarity in respect to form, from every variety of heathendom, is the holy spirit which breathes through it all, the moral purity and perfection, and the inner truth, of which the outward historical truth of it is the necessary correlate. This difference in the ground and nature of it

is so strikingly manifest in the difference in development, that this one circumstance should have put an end to these attempts to place the heathen on an equality with Israel, and to such language as is still used by Ewald, Knobel, and others, in reference to Old Testament mythology.

The first great epoch of the literature of the Hellenes is epic poetry, myth formation; the second expresses the full, clear belief, that the declarations of the first that had then passed into the popular religion were myths—that, in fact, they were deceptions and lies, unworthy of gods and men. If we had had a right to place the Pentateuch and the Iliad together as collections of myths, then we should have expected to find a similar judgment concerning the Mosaic myths in the second epoch of the literature of Israel, with that in the second Hellenic period concerning the Homeric. We find, however, exactly the opposite. With all joy and fervour, the poets, and seers, and wise men of the later period, who assuredly are not behind the corresponding Greek authors in power of mind, hold fast the historical truth of the so-called myths of the early time. David and the prophets think quite differently of Moses, from Plato of Homer. And with all reason. Plato himself would not have had a different opinion of Moses from theirs: of this there is evidence in his criticism of Homer. Many noble Greeks, too, afterward despairing of their own religion, did not therefore despair of that of the Jews, or even doubt it, but saved themselves by accepting it as proselytes. To Plato, the main objections to the myths were ethical, not metaphysical, as with modern critics of the Bible, who are so fond of comparing themselves with the Greek philosophers. Plato criticised not in the name of the (unillumined) reason, but in the name of conscience. His criticism is based on a deeper knowledge of the fundamental moral conceptions. Among the moderns it is inversely connected with a weakening of these conceptions, which either covers or moves far back the dividing line between good and evil, true and false, even in religion.

The soul of the Mosaic revelation is the Decalogue, which to this day is acknowledged by all civilised nations as the best summary of the moral law. And the narratives of the miracles do not hold a merely accidental connection with law and doctrine. All know, and every one feels, when he reads Ex. xix. and xx., how these wonders, which are among the most amazing, harmonize with the nature of the case. The circumstances of the giving of the law, and the law itself, are parts of one piece. The whole history of the Pentateuch, however—and this is the great matter—breathes, though these were at the same time only the "days of the flesh" of the human race, a high moral earnestness, a pure and holy spirit. While the better Greeks were obliged to keep their youth away from their myths, Christian nations, and the families that stand highest in morality, know till this hour no better means of moral and religious education than the sacred Scriptures, especially Genesis, the history of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, and Moses. As to the idea of God, nobody now troubles himself about Baal and Ashtaroth, Zeus and Apollo, except for scholastic and artistic purposes. But before Jehovah, before the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Christendom bows the knee, because He is the true God, and eternal life. In short, the fundamental defect of mythology, which caused its fall even in the mind of the heathen themselves, the separation of the religious and the moral, the historical (the idol-history) and the ideal, is avoided in the religion of the Bible from the very beginning. Therefore the idea, the ideal consciousness, as it gradually develops itself in the reason and conscience, does not tear up the history, but throws light on it, understands and takes hold of it as a living, real possession. Free subjectivity, as developed from the time of David and his lyrics, in distinction from the age of the law, consists not in doing away with the objectivity of the earlier revelation, but in making it its own, so that the outward becomes inward (comp. Ps. xix. and cxix.). Israel had thus, at the very height of its mental development,

just as free and certain a conviction of the historical character and of the truth of their religion, as the Greeks had of the unhistorical character and—I use the words of Plato—falsehood of theirs. While Plato, from reasons of conscience, rejected and ridiculed the myths of the religion of his country, the prophets say of theirs, with the apostles, "We have not followed cunningly devised fables." For where grace is the revelation of the condescending love of God, there is also truth, substantial reality, firm and well-assured fact. This is precisely the idea of the name JAHVEH (as the name Jehovah ought most probably to be pronounced; Ex. iii. 13, 14).

As truly as Jehovah is God and not an idol, so truly is His revelation history and not myth. Jahvehdom could not be true as religion, if it were not true as a history. God did appear. God has spoken. If that is not true, what is true in the Old Testament? What among the heathen is myth, is in Israel sacred history. The revelation, advancing step by step, of which each later stage is in conscious organic continuity with the earlier (compare, in addition to passages already named, Ex. iii. 6, Matt. v. 17, etc.), is the history of all histories, the great movement of the world-history, *the* history in the highest sense of the word. We have therefore called Israel the nation with true historic consciousness. For religion and history are most intimately connected with one another, and are united in the conception of revelation. The revelations of God must have been recognised by those who first received them as the facts of facts: they must have been impressed most deeply and powerfully on their mind, and then of themselves appeared as the one object which was worthy, as no other was, of the most faithful and careful transmission. Monuments of some sort were therefore established as memorials of the wonderful works of God, either in some ritual, or in stone, to attest them to posterity. These memorials are even yet sufficient to convince the honest inquirer (see Josh. iv. 9). There we have not things which are to be received first by the second generation, as Plato

says; but we read how Jehovah says of Abraham, "I have chosen him, that he may command his children and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the Lord" (Gen. xviii. 19); or how it is said at the institution of the passover, "And it shall come to pass, when your children shall say unto you, What mean ye by this service? that ye shall say, It is the sacrifice of the Lord's passover, who passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when He smote the Egyptians, and delivered our houses" (Ex. xii. 26, etc.); or how, at the setting up of the memorial after the passage of the Jordan, "When your children ask in time to come, saying, What mean ye by these stones? then ye shall answer them, That the waters of Jordan were cut off before the ark of the covenant of the Lord" (Josh. iv. 6, 7). And looking back, we find in the song of Moses (Deut. xxxii. 7): "Remember the days of old, consider the years of many generations: ask thy father, and he will show thee; thy elders, and they will tell thee." So it came to pass that, because Israel was conscious of having been entrusted, in the revelations God gave it, with the true blessing for all races of the world, and of possessing, as a priestly nation, the holy places and crown jewels of all mankind (Gen. xii. 3; Ex. xix. 5, 6; comp. Rom. iii. 2, ix. 4, 5; Heb. i. 1), there grew up in it a historical mind and feeling, an ability to appreciate and use what was recorded and transmitted, and a respect for facts, such as existed nowhere beside.

This characteristic still remains with this people down to our day. In Alexandria, indeed, the Jewish mind, from the influence of Hellenism, showed a tendency to allegorize the Old Testament history; but it was not this Alexandrian tendency, but that of Palestine, which was faithful to the Old Testament, which formed the ground on which the fulfilment of the revelation through Jesus Christ grew up. In Jesus and the apostles we find the religious historical sense, the idea of a history of revelation, as vigorous and free as in the prophets: to them, also, the Old Testament—what for us Christians is of the utmost moment

—is true and divine in its entire contents; with them, too, the Scripture cannot be broken; they do not feel that they are called to destroy, but to fulfil. But they look on the whole Old Testament as the prophets did on the Pentateuch. Evoking the spirit from the letter, they argue from it, and upon it, with a splendid boldness, that is not seldom surprising, that appears to respect the letter very little, but which brings out its true meaning for the first time, and refutes the Jewish and Judaistic interpretation of it. As examples: the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 21, etc.); the replies of Jesus to the Sadducees and Pharisees in His last days (Matt. xxii. 29–32, 41–45); the discourse of Stephen, with its extended, and as it were philosophical, view of the lives of the fathers; in Paul, Rom. iv. and ix., Gal. iii. and iv., 1 Cor. x. 1, etc., 2 Cor. iii. 7, etc., and other places; likewise Heb. vii. and xi. Before Christ, and alongside of this, there exists, indeed, a petty, external, literal bondage to tradition in the learning of the Pharisees, and, since that time, in the traditionalism of the rabbis and the Talmud, which constitutes the body of Judaism in the Christian era. Reformed Judaism and literary Judaism, with its criticism, practised partly in the most reckless way, and tearing all history to pieces, has in recent times set itself in opposition to the other tendency as the Sadducean extreme; a new proof of the old truth, that extremes meet. Men like Neander and Felix Mendelsohn Bartholdy have led many among us back to the sanctuary of history.

The continued existence of the Jewish people is, however, altogether one of the most surprising facts—one of the wonders of history. It leads us to refer the mental and physical life of this people to other than ordinary sources. No other nation has so tenaciously clung to its religion and nationality, and that too, singularly, almost without a community of language. Even the religions of India and China have undergone considerable alterations, through Buddhism and other influences. The great nations of antiquity that dwelt round about Palestine,

Egyptians and Phœnicians, Assyrians and Babylonians, Greeks and Romans, have all perished, though they were not, or scarcely ever, driven from their own countries. Israel has continued, though dispersed into the whole world. It stands before us still as the historical nation in a pre-eminent sense, indestructible witness to the oldest and most sacred history, —amid the changes in the other nations of the world, the guarantee of a great divine past, and a great divine future. We have said the church is a fact, which is a standing proof of the reality of the New Testament revelation. So, for that of the Old Testament, is this Israel dwelling in the cities of the world, yet not reckoned among the nations of the earth (Num. xxiii. 9); and which, spite of all its imperfection and error, should never be thought of by us otherwise than with honour and love. Along with these two communities of the Old and New Covenant, Islam, and indeed the whole history of the world, must testify to the truth of both Testaments. Without Judaism and Christianity, Islamism is not possible; and it expressly acknowledges the reality of their revelations. Negatively and positively, the biblical revelation is proved by history itself to be the history in history.

VIII. MOSES AND ABRAHAM.

The history of the children of Israel by Ewald, is now the principal work which goes upon the principle of setting aside all that is properly miraculous in the Old Testament narrative. Ewald has left far behind the depth of negation, as it was represented by Batke and other books, which went still further, but have now disappeared. He acknowledges the truth of biblical religion, and is filled with love and high enthusiasm for the Old Testament. He even strives to show that he accepts the idea of revelation, as far as it is possible consistently with his principles. By connecting our remarks on Moses and Abraham with this book of Ewald's, we shall have before us the most

prominent of our opponents, whose views Bunsen's *Bibelwerk* has also substantially adopted. We do this to gain a definite ground on which the controversy may be carried on; for the critical opinions concerning the Pentateuch are still widely divergent.

"Once in a dim and remote antiquity," says Ewald, ii. p. 24, etc., "there must have been an extraordinary and glorious period among the Hebrews, distinguished with a halo of the most wonderful powers, purposes, and activities. To this period, when at its height, with its well-known fame and sharply-defined demands, the whole people afterward continued to look back. The oldest songs of Canaan ring with the name of Sinai, as the august beginning of all the glory of the history of Jahve and His people (Judg. v. 4, etc.); to the distant Sinai Elijah flees, in the despair of his soul, as to the primeval hearth, and the last asylum of the sacred fire of Israel, there to wait for the voice and the light of Jahve (1 Kings xix. 8, etc.); and all the peculiar institutions of the people—indeed, the very existence and character of the community, with its spiritual truths and unusual aspirations—pointed back in the most emphatic way to a time in which had dwelt the power and the courage to institute such things, and establish them, so that they existed for many centuries. Assuredly we cannot think of this period, the results of which are so great, which gave to the nation all its glory and pride, and which determined its altogether peculiar character, and the direction of its action for many centuries—indeed, for the whole of antiquity—but as one of the most extraordinary kind. The great leader of that age, and the founder of that order, who was the originator of a development so rich in consequences, may indeed have disappeared ever more and more from the recollection of posterity, hidden behind his great work, and may for a long time have been known only to the few, because he had not put himself forward, but gave all the honour to his God; but it is certain, unless the very greatest thing in all history is to be ascribed to accident, that he was

one of the very greatest of men, and operated with wonderful powers and results." P. 32, etc.: "We must admit here one of the most wonderful of the powers of the mind: it spreads, indeed, through the whole of humanity as a possibility, but is manifest with especial force, truth, and permanence in the history of Israel; and in Israel it has produced so wide and historical an effect in no single prophet as in Moses." P. 33: "If religion is thinking and acting under an immediate certainty of God, *i.e.* His being, His eternal truths, and His purposes, it is clear that every one of its truths must seem to the man who lives under its influence to be a word of God Himself; and in uncertain, dark situations of life, everything it counsels and discloses will seem to be the direct counsel and revelation of God. The great eternal I, before which the human I is as nothing, and in which it must first find its rest and home, if it is not to perish—this infinite I becomes audible in the individual, and so fills and moves him. The individual, in this way, first finds the true end of all his indirect thinking and doing, *i.e.* his thinking and doing so far as they enter into the world: he receives light and joy, and that freedom which has the necessary limit within itself, and is hence at the same time modification and law to itself. As, however, religion (fear of God) may affect the individual in different degrees of light and strength, and as the whole series of the most diverse capabilities of the human spirit combine themselves with it in the individual in the most diverse ways, so may the capacity to communicate its utterances to others as clearly as they are in himself, be united with it in the individual in whom it is already strong. And if the divine I speaks so clearly and forcefully out of the human instrumentality to others, and seeks to lay hold of others, then in that man thus speaking, we have the revealer and interpreter of the divine mysteries, the prophet in the first and most general sense of that word." P. 32, *g.*: "The prophetic office first appears giving commands, announcing in the strictest form the divine mind and will, and limiting itself purely to

this announcement. The prophet then, indeed, speaks for his God, and is his interpreter. At the same time, he is as his legate and general in command on earth; and where the domain of the prophetic office is widest, its power either null or all-prevailing, it is also legislative, affecting the policy of the nation, giving form to the state. It is seen in the greatest strength and with vastest results in Moses, but in a similar way in all the greater prophets to Elias and Elisha, and even down to Joel. Afterward, however, it leaves off this first strictness of form."

Who would not rejoice to find that Moses and the Mosaic age, as far as they laid the foundation for the future, are here so well understood, and are studied with so much insight and enthusiasm? Ewald in this respect stands high above ERNEST RENAN, the distinguished scholar and able author, who believes that Monotheism is a peculiarity of the Shemitic races, but is not to be looked upon as any advantage to these peoples: it has rather made them incapable of true culture. "*We must acknowledge in it*," says Renan, concerning the Shemitic Monotheism, "*the result of a particular temperament. All idea of superiority and inferiority should be discarded. The Shemitic point of view is not the result of a superior intellectual constitution; it is the fruit of a constitution* SUI GENERIS, *which has its advantages and its disadvantages, but which in any case cannot have been the exclusive appanage of a single tribe*" (*the Israelites*). Apart from the fact, which has been ably established by DIESTEL, that Monotheism cannot be historically demonstrated as having been known among other tribes, which are also Shemitic, as the Moabites and Ammonites, Syrians and Arabians, Phœnicians and Babylonians, etc., there are two main considerations, which, looking at the matter in the most general way, contradict Renan's view: (1.) The Monotheism of the Israelites stands alone in history; and the other Shemitic tribes—even if, as among the Ariens (Gen. ix. 26, 27), there is a deeper trace of Monotheism discoverable—bear essentially the seal of

heathendom. Salvation has come, not from the Shemites, but from the Jews. (2.) Renan's depreciation of Monotheism is equally instructive; and the most general consideration of history should have kept him from it, to say nothing of the inner intellectual and moral value of Monotheism as compared with Polytheism. If the people of Israel did not and could not possess the elements of culture, art, science, and statesmanship, with the same fulness and independence that the classical nations did, yet their Monotheism is the principle and life of the whole culture of the last eighteen hundred years. In Renan we have only another new example, how utterly confused and blinded the religious and religious-philosophic judgment may be, even with the most learned. And yet an EDWARD SCHERER adopts these views.[1]

That Ewald, to return to him, regards Moses as a prophet, is, if not an exhaustive point of view, yet a right one, and from this starting-point, the highest possible. But this is just the very point from which Ewald, right so far, remains much below the biblical view. We have seen above the true idea of the prophet which the Old Testament gives. He is, of course, "the mouthpiece and the interpreter of the mysteries of God;" but it is on the ground of a true supernatural revelation and inspiration. Ewald, however, does not believe in anything of this kind. He does, indeed, bring the finite I into contact with the eternal I; but as there is, throughout, a want of definiteness in his theological conceptions, one does not exactly see here, whether under these two, the ideal and the empiric Ego of man, the "immediate" and the "mediate" consciousness, or the divine and human personality, are to be understood. In the one case it would be a pantheistic idea of the prophetic function, most resembling that of Schleiermacher; in the other, it would be essentially a deistic one. For it is not referred to an objective revelation, but to (subjective) religion. Religious truths "*appear to man* to be the word of God." They are not

[1] See Note F 2.

so in reality. Self-deception is thus part of this conception of the prophet: he ascribes to God what proceeds from the depths of his own religious being—from a "wonderful primeval energy of the Spirit pervading all humanity." Ewald thus expressly confirms here what we have already shown to be the necessary consequence of the modern conception of prophecy, which denies all actual revelation. It is that "original energy" which is revealed in the history of Israel. Therefore the Israelitic revelation is not specifically different from that of the heathen. It differs only in degree. The "original energy," as a possibility, is spread through the whole race; and in the history of Israel it only appeared with "unusual strength, truth, and permanence." Why in the history of Israel alone, and how from a mere difference in degree there could come the specific distinction between true religion and heathendom, God and the gods, the idols, which we have considered before, remains unexplained.

If now prophecy, which Ewald still recognises, does not rest upon actual supernatural revelation, then, naturally, he cannot fully admit the reality of the divine manifestations. There were not in the age of Moses, nor in any period of the Old Testament history, any real appearances of God or miraculous deeds. Let us see how Ewald expresses himself concerning two of the facts recorded, which in this connection are of the greatest importance, viz. the passage through the Red Sea, and the giving of the law at Sinai.

The account we have, he says, pp. 77, etc., of the destruction of the Egyptian host in the Red Sea, and the deliverance of Israel, is only too meagre and defective (for the narrative of it was composed much later, and from different sources); but the event itself stands fast in its historical certainty. "And here I do not hesitate to maintain with all earnestness, that this event, with which the history of Moses quickly reaches its highest point, has acquired its unequalled importance only in consequence of movements that occurred before, and still con-

tinued, and of effort and great activity of mind of the noblest sort. But for these it would have been passed over in history, and the memory of it would have been forgotten, as has been the case with hundreds of events similar in their outward circumstances. The most extraordinary efforts and noblest activities of mind striving after salvation, must have preceded the events, not simply on the part of Moses himself, but also on the part of the people who followed and bravely obeyed his voice, as it called them to their deliverance. This lies in the matter itself; and that which the present accounts tell of it must be only a feeble reminiscence of those days in which the great movement of mind began. How vigorously confidence will grow and spread, so soon as a favourable air allures to the light the seeds that have been already sown! The events of that time were nothing more than this favouring wind; but because it found the most precious and fruitful seeds already sown, it soon filled the great mass of the people with the most joyful confidence in the spiritual truths. And if a bloody victory can produce only mingled feelings, and may often only excite and feed the pride of the conqueror, that victory, gained by invisible weapons, must have drawn the minds of those delivered all the more powerfully to that which was purely heavenly, and would serve the more certainly to confirm the power of the invisible spiritual deliverer whom Moses declared. It is in reality only this view of the event which was deeply rooted in the mind of the people, and from which the descriptions we now possess have sprung."

We see that here also, as with the idea of prophecy, the aim of Ewald is with full purpose directed to the bringing of the central difficulty, the peculiar effecting cause, down from the divine to the human side. It is in the mind of Moses and the people that the new thought lay, which was only brought to light by the outward occurrences in nature. To this end the whole history is inverted. The outward fact, the appearance, stands; but the essence of it is the very opposite. The robe remains;

but it is another who wears it. According to the Bible, it is Jehovah who performs a miracle of deliverance, and by it purchased the people, whose minds were indeed moved and prepared by the former miracles, as an inheritance unto Himself. According to Ewald, it was the mind of the people of Israel which at this favourable opportunity developed the germ that already lay in it. Ewald cannot make the outward events in themselves of sufficiently small importance. In the Bible, on the contrary, it is the impression of the mighty divine act which was of decisive importance to the people, and brought them to believe in Jehovah and His servant Moses (Ex. xiv. 10–14, 30, 31). This Ewald himself admits; but he knows how to get out of it. The accounts say little of those "extraordinary strivings and noblest activities of the mind of Moses and the people," and lay still less stress on them; but they are only a "feeble reminiscence" of all the extraordinary and noble things which at that time were springing up, according to Ewald's supposition, in the mind of the Israelites. Inversely, the documents detail at length the triumph secured "as" by invisible weapons, and the deep impression of it upon the people; but in reality, "in the case of that most ancient event, more complete details are very defective." That is assuredly not historical or scientific treatment; it is purely arbitrary, making history out of one's own inventions. In addition to this, Ewald himself admits (p. 8): "The great song of Moses (Ex. xv.), in its whole present extent at least, has sprung from a period very little later than Moses, and in its ground and beginning probably originated directly from the fresh inspiration of the Mosaic time." Let one read this song. It is sung "to Jehovah." The people are filled with the thought of Him and His great act. This song of praise has been called rightly the marriage hymn of Israel: as the bride rejoices in the bridegroom, so does the people here in God. But according to Ewald's view, they ought, if they thought rightly of the matter, to have acknowledged the germs in their own minds as the great thing, and

have sung of them (in the manner of recent poets). Moses and Israel here again were practising self-deception, in referring to God what arose only in their own minds. This whole view rests upon a mistaken conception of religious life in its deepest grounds, and especially of the religion of the Old Testament. "Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto Thy name be all the glory." This is the true foundation word for Israel: all the faithful testify that it expresses the truth (Rom. iv. 20, 21; Heb. xi.). The action of man is indeed not to be excluded; yet in all religion God is the effective cause: God is the centre point, round which all the human moves. It cannot be otherwise indeed, if God is God, and man His creature. Therefore, in particular, the beginnings and foundations of true religion do not rest upon human, but upon divine productivity, and human receptivity. The divine productivity is seen in the supernatural revelation; the human receptivity in faith, which receives the revelation. At the beginnings, in the case of Abraham and in the Mosaic age, faith, which elsewhere rarely occurs in the Old Testament, is mentioned expressly (Gen. xv. 6; Ex. xiv. 31, iv. 31; comp. v. 1).

As to the giving of the Law at Sinai, "we cannot," says Ewald, p. 86, "regard the account of it which is known to the very earliest periods of Hebrew history otherwise than as derived from a genuine historical recollection; and we have also to believe further, that the halt at Sinai must have been of some considerable duration. But we have here, above all, to remember that the living God can come nearer to those who give themselves to His service, with every improvement in the law, and their obedience to it; for the very rise of an earnest and aspiring people to new and better arrangements of its life, is at the same time a rise toward Him who wishes effectively, even with men's freedom, such arrangements to prevail as are on a small scale like those by which the whole world is governed. And if a people solemnly, with sincere fear and trembling, binds itself to observe such regulations, then it has drawn

manifestly nearer the God who lives and works in them; and God —not the mere Creator of all men, but also that God who is now more distinctly revealed to the human mind, and doubly active in it, in knowledge, law, and duty—can thenceforward be nearer to such a fellowship with man, and lead them better than would otherwise be possible. If, now, God can come in any degree nearer in every law, that does not make an earlier condition worse, but improves it; and if He seeks for any truth whatsoever a dwelling among men, be it even only in something that is small, and in a single individual, how much nearer and more powerfully He will come from heaven to earth through such a law and life as that which, like the Mosaic at Sinai, proceeded from the purest aims and noblest aspiration of a young nation in the sunshine of a rare moment in the world's history! All this is to be regarded in this light, and, according to the higher view of human-divine things, cannot be conceived of differently. But let it be remembered, besides, that the historian knew how true all this is from abiding experience, that he himself with his people felt themselves at rest and at home in that religion which was first properly established at Sinai, and had since that time for a long period retained its happy influence in Palestine: then it is easy to see how he could give some external form to that inner necessary truth, and present it in the shape of a history. We see thus how he could relate that God came down on Sinai and proclaimed His words as Laws."

We do not fail to perceive that Ewald here also is careful to ascribe a divine truthfulness to the law, at least in the sense of his "as," and "as it were." But it is more manifest here than ever, that he traces the rise of the Old Testament religion in principle to the same source as the religions of the heathen: they and it are products of the national mind. He places on one line the legislation of Moses and the legislation of heathen, such as Solon or Lycurgus; though these neither claim for themselves such a promulgation, nor are they, in fact, so pure and holy. What the Old Testament describes as proceeding

from God, is here again derived from "the purest aspiration and the noblest upward movement of a young nation." This neither harmonizes with the history of Israel as we have it, nor with the true idea of the law. It is true, Israel binds itself freely to obey the law; but in the narrative it does so only under the mighty impressions of the divine manifestations, which are here denied. The natural bent of the youthful nation, apart from the revelation, came out visibly in the worship of the golden calf, and in the oft-repeated murmuring against Jehovah and Moses. So that we can most clearly see, that it would have of itself produced nothing but some form of heathen life and worship. From Moses to the last of the prophets, and into the New Testament age, Israel appears as a race, in its own nature, most opposed to God. It is really hard to comprehend how a man so well-versed in the Old Testament can think of the law as having proceeded from the pure and lofty aspiration of the people. We have already drawn attention to a misconception of the nature of true religion. This other opinion arises from not recognising the power of sin, from disregarding the gigantic conflict between the holy love of God and the unholy nature of the people, which is, in real truth, the very soul of the Old Testament. The idea of the law is rather this, that it stands with outward positive authority over the people, written on tables of stone, not on the fleshy tables of the heart. So far is the law of the old covenant from having come from the mind and aim of Israel, that a new and higher covenant is required to write it in their mind (Jer. xxxi. 31, etc.).

Precisely in the original, and therefore miraculous facts, the Old Testament and Ewald's history of Israel have, as we see, almost nothing more in common than the outward localities—the framework. The events themselves, and especially the reason and spirit of them, are different—indeed, contradictory: in the one it is God coming down, in the other the people "moving upward." All Israel is in error concerning the true foundation and nature of its history and religion; and that is,

again, a double mystery, because Ewald himself admits certain leading passages to be genuine writings of Moses, such as "the great words of the true gospel,"—so he well calls Ex. xix. 4–6, also xvi. 6, 7,—then the decalogue, the blessing (Num. vi. 24–26), and the words used at the moving and halting of the camp (Num. x. 35, etc., where everything is referred to God). Why do Ewald and so many with him involve themselves in all these difficulties and contradictions? Simply because they assume, and indeed quietly assume as a matter of course, that there can be no miracles, no divine acts, and divine manifestations. His God is no living God at all, but a dumb and inert God.

Here we may apply what we have said before on analogies in revelation. As actual miracles are historically attested in the New Testament, the possibility of miracles in the Old Testament cannot be denied. And if there is a God who works miracles, no creature can prescribe to Him how far He may go in His miracles. If the Old Testament miracles are more imposing in their external aspect, it furnishes no reason for their rejection to a clear and just thinker. This is true especially in regard to those miracles to which modern thought takes the strongest objection—the appearances of God, or theophanies, *e.g.* in the burning bush, in the tempest at Sinai, in the pillar of cloud and fire. Indeed, we have analogies confirmatory of these, not only in the theophanies in the visions of the greater prophets, but in the *Christophany* which was granted to Paul on the way to Damascus. If the objection to the outward facts must disappear before this fact, there is in it also an important aid to the understanding of the inward possibility of an appearance of God. Even in the Old Testament, as we shall see further on, the Son, the Logos, is the active agent in these divine appearances (comp. John xii. 41). Then, finally, this event in the experience of Paul gives us an important point of view for the historical position and signification of the theophanies. With Paul, the inspiration follows the external manifestation at Damascus, the inward illumination comes through continued com-

munion with the Lord in the spirit. Similarly we see, throughout the whole New Testament revelation, the inspiration follows the appearance of Christ: the giving of the Holy Ghost, and the action of the apostles, follow the visible revelation of the Son of God in the flesh. Men need the outward stimulus from above, to be able to receive the inward. In the Old Testament, the prophets, moved by the Holy Ghost, correspond to the apostles. How much more, at that lower stage of the world's history, the days of its fleshliness, was it needful that a period of manifestation, of outward visible signs, should precede inspiration!

If we look more closely into the accounts we have of the way in which God appeared, and of what He did, we must admit that it is all perfectly worthy of God, and quite in harmony with the nature and object of revelation at this stage of it. The idea of that period is, that Israel shall become an independent nation for God, and a kingdom of God, under the law of its heavenly King, Jehovah. To this end it must be brought out of bondage under the heathen, and from the chains by which it was bound in Egypt. Jehovah had to reveal Himself as the Lord ruling over all, who had power over all the forces of the world, of nature and of history. He appears thus alone as Jahve, which is the name of God peculiar to that time (Ex. iii. 13, etc., vi. 3), *i.e.* the Being whose existence is absolute and essential, as the absolute reality, as the rock of Israel, compared with whom the gods of the heathen and the whole world are nothing. He begins by revealing Himself as the Lord of nature in the Egyptian plagues, which summon to war against the greatest power in the world at the time, and in favour of Israel, the natural elements of that very country. He can turn the two constituents upon which national life properly depend—land and people—against one another. In the further course of matters, the two greatest phenomena of nature, sea and mountain, must obey His will, and bow before His glory! The sea divides; the mountain trembles. Both become the scenes of

the display of His righteous power. By the sea His might as judge is revealed upon His enemies; on the mountain, His might and authority as ruler and legislator for the people. Through the act of giving the law, Jehovah comes personally before the people as their King and Lord, in the fulness of His majesty. That they might be thrown upon Him, and not be at once engrossed again with worldly affairs, Israel is not led direct from Egypt to Canaan, but by long journeys through the desert, where the ordinary earthly life is stopped, and the people are alone with their God. He undertakes, as the wilderness is without food, and without a road (this simplest sign of human civilisation), to feed the people with manna, and to lead them by means of the pillar of cloud and fire, so that they may be pointed to Him directly, and accustomed to the thought of Him (comp. Ex. xvi. 4).

Thus everything here corresponds with the object in view. It is all easily understood, when the fundamental idea is rightly grasped. This relative perfection is at the same time also relative imperfection. It could not be otherwise in the historical development of revelation (Heb. viii. 7, etc.). Those occurrences are quite appropriate to the period, and the stage in the development. It had not then reached the New Testament point, nor even the prophetic, which even within the Old Testament age was possible; but it stood then at the legal, where the divine appears to man externally. God is present among His people, but, as the necessity of the sensuous childish race required, in the most external form: He does not dwell among men as a man: there is no inward leading of the community by the Holy Ghost, but an outward leading by a visible appearance in the heavens. And for these revelations to the people, God makes use of nature throughout (the plagues of Egypt, water from the rock, manna, quails, etc.); and where His personal revelation is in hand, He employs the elements (tempest on Sinai, pillars of cloud and fire). This is not only distinct from the theophanies of the patriarchs, because personal intercourse between

man and God was impossible with so large a crowd; but it is especially, in opposition to the heathen world, to accustom the mind of the Israelitish nation from the beginning not to deify the visible world, but to press through it to the living holy God, who has all the elements of nature at His disposal, as means whereby He may send His revelation. The wonder-working grace of God was thus daily visible throughout the whole march in the wilderness, on the earth by the manna, in heaven by the pillar of cloud and fire. God's condescension was completed, when miracles were connected with ordinary nature and human customs; manna is found on the promontory of Sinai, and it was common for bands on the march to have their signals of fire and smoke.

It is thus Jehovah, the supra-mundane God, on whose doing everything rests. The object sought throughout is that Israel should become His own; and this it is that constitutes the peculiarity of this people, and distinguishes them from the other nations of the earth. It is from this point clear upon what a mistaken and perverted view of the whole Mosaic age the doctrines of Ewald and the rationalist school generally rest. Because they must, in consequence of their pantheistic or deistic assumptions, derive everything from the human mind itself, they are incapable of understanding the theophanic revelation. We can, on the contrary, accept the history preserved in the Pentateuch, not only on the ground of outward and established authorities, but on the ground of an inward understanding. Even if the composition of the history first took place as late as our opponents say, there would be a possibility, but no real ground for doubting its credibility, any more than in the case of Genesis, which was indeed composed centuries after the events related in it. As an example, VAIHINGER may be named as holding by it in this way.[1] The whole opinion and belief of Israel in reference to their religion and history stand by the side of the representations of the

[1] See Note G 2.

Pentateuch, and strengthen them; and this, as it comes before us in the Old and New Testament, is no illusion, but truth. Israel is the one nation that has a historic consciousness.

Ewald in the first volume treats the history of Abraham and the patriarchs in a still more arbitrary manner. He starts with the idea of a Shemitic primitive race in Upper Asia, and their wanderings. THERA, Abraham's father, means the migration of tribes. "In the journeying from Ur of the Chaldees, which the name of Abraham and his companions indicates, just as that of Jacob, which followed in the same direction from Haran in the south (?), we see nothing but the continuation of the migratory journeys of the ancient race, which, after having gone perhaps in many different directions, penetrated farthest in a south-westerly direction, and thus found their utmost goal in Egypt." The religion of the fathers of the people was, like that of Moses, monotheistic; it must have contained something which was in more developed form perpetuated in the Mosaic system. Yet was their God rather only a household divinity, who allowed other gods along with himself for other houses and other men, and who did not oppose the worship of images. On the basis of this historical fact, the history of the patriarchs grew, in the centuries before Moses, into the twelve types of domestic life: husband, wife, child, nurse of heroes, overseer, etc. Actual worship of these ancient sacred names was avoided; while the elder patriarchs, who lived before the flood, "were once regarded by the people in the remotest ages as their divine-human ancestors, or even, as their ruling powers, altogether divine." At a later period "these types came more fully under the power and spirit of higher religion, and it transformed them into the beautiful forms which now have become their most eloquent interpreters. And because the divine blessing of the life of these ancestors had long been enjoyed inwardly by those who looked up to them as models, there arose, in looking back upon the age which had laid the foundation of all this exhaustless blessing, the thought which

boldly regarded the whole course of the history that had passed, and was being still further developed, as having had its origin from above, and so describes it in the light of its divine necessity." So the promises originated.

"Ewald's combinations, according to which Jacob is a second migration of Hebrew tribes into Canaan, and is so far only a son of Isaac, while his sons signify the only tribes among them who had a voice in the assembly, and who attached themselves to the original nucleus of immigrants, may be here simply mentioned." With these words the judicious WINER (in the article "Jacob" in his *Real-Wörterbuch*) condemns Ewald's treatment of this subject, who here yet more arbitrarily than in regard to the Mosaic period sets an invented history in the place of that which has been handed down, and pretends to give us a correct account of the various means by which the latter rose out of the former. We add, in proof that the treatment of the patriarchal history goes further than that of the Mosaic age, that the religious foundation and nature of it is set aside, and hardly anything but the externals of it left, such as the going from Mesopotamia through Palestine to Egypt. We would be thankful to Ewald for placing vividly before our eyes the natural bases for the history of the age of the wanderings. But we will not have the highest and most spiritual elements in it reduced to this merely natural and outward character. Even Ewald himself does not wish to do this: he admits there is a connection between the religion of these great patriarchs and Mosaism, and has to our joy lately felt himself obliged, in a new essay on the religion of the patriarchs, to bring out this connection "more accurately and more completely."[1]

We resume here our regressive consideration of the subject. If Israel in Egypt were a heathen nation just as others, the history of the Mosaic age, and the whole separate position and distinct development of this people, would be incomprehensible. For however much stress we lay on the revelation of God, as

[1] See Note H 2.

the originating power of the Old Testament law and religion, in opposition to those who think them the product of the national mind, yet we do not thereby exclude, but rather include, points of contact in which man's agency may be traced. In relation to God, man cannot be productive; receptive, however, he can be: he can receive and cherish divine communications, or he can put them away from him. If this capacity of man's, freely to receive, is but the second factor in the history of redemption, still it is an essential factor. Such a capacity to receive the revelations from God, however, would not have existed in Israel, if it had till then been in no way different from heathen nations, but had been, like them, under the curse and bondage of the spirit of the world. But there were in the minds of the people (and in this Ewald and others agree with us), memories of the fathers and their Monotheism. "Among all the reminiscences, even the oldest, of the Mosaic religion," says Ewald now, "none stand more sure than this, that the God to the worship of whom Moses summoned the people, is the same God who was once the God of the fathers, different from the gods of the other nations, but essentially the same that the great ancestors of this one people worshipped." We can here, however, further infer, that these forefathers must have reached a high stage of religious knowledge. For that Israel in Egypt was under very strong heathen influence is shown by many signs, *e.g.* the worship of the golden calf; and it is also expressly declared (Josh. xxiv. 14; Ezek. xx. 7, etc., xxiii. 3, 8, 19–21). The light of pure religion which rayed out from the fathers must have been strong indeed, to have maintained in its integrity this higher consciousness, notwithstanding the influence exerted through several centuries of heathen darkness.

Fortunately we are not without some more distinct rays of light: there are some hints of a historic kind, which even our opponents have admitted or will admit. Even Ewald reminds us of the name of Jochebed, the mother of Moses, which shows a trace of the name Jehovah, and furnishes us with a proof

of its pre-Mosaic origin; and from this we may gather also the existence of a religion given by revelation from on high. That name is also worthy of notice, as a sign that in the family from which the great mediator of the old covenant sprang, the worship of the God of revelation had been maintained in purity. It is also an unsought instance of what was said a little ago on the capacity to receive revelation. Here all is in accordance with the great rule of the kingdom: "Unto him that hath shall be given." A second significant fact is the name of God, El Schaddai (Gen. xvii. 1; Ex. vi. 3), which Ewald himself acknowledges to be the expression of the thought of the patriarchs, finding in it the truth, "that He who is alone rightly called the Almighty God can only be One before whom all plurality and distinctions of divine natures disappear." Ewald further truly observes, that the plural form Elohim stands in the most ancient Hebrew not for a plural, but a singular, and is so construed. Connected with this we have then, for a third thing, the expression, The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Ewald himself has perceived the odour and breath of antiquity not only in such expressions as quoted above, but also in the mode of writing Jahve (Ex. xx. 5, etc., xxxiv. 6, etc.; Deut. v. 9; Lev. xiv. 18). He calls it a periphrasis, which is as suggestive as it is peculiar. It is the same only in greater measure with the designation of God as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, which bears such a marked historical character. Such names are not invented; they are transmitted. We feel that the spirit of the most ancient family tradition still dwells in them. Compare Gen. li. 53, 42, where one may see, as it were, the rise of it; and the passages, Ex. xv. 2, xviii. 4, which by Ewald himself are referred to Jacob, "my father's God," in which religion is felt to be essentially the religion of the fathers. When Jesus argues from the fact that God calls Himself the God of Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, that the patriarchs and their true seed shall rise again, because God is not a God of the dead, but of the living (Matt. xxii. 31, 32), we may all the more

certainly conclude that these men during their earthly life were in communion with God, and must have attained to a high degree of faith: God would not otherwise have taken them into His august title—as it were, into His own name. With this name which God gives Himself, the Mosaic revelation properly begins (Ex. iii. 6). And it is thus expressly and fundamentally connected with the patriarchal.

That which can be thus historically inferred, lies, however, also in the very nature of the thing itself. If Israel is to become the people of God, the nation in a peculiar sense (in the Old Test. AM, in distinction from the GOIM; in the New, λαός, in distinction from the ἔθνη), then it could never have been a heathen nation. The heathen nations are all in the dark concerning their origin: they think themselves Autochthones, and such like. The very destiny of Israel, however, demanded a knowledge of their origin, and that it should be a genuine historic knowledge. In this "nation" it must be seen how a nation originates—how it is developed from the family. Yet this is only the external aspect of the case; the essential lies deeper. History shows how, throughout the whole of antiquity, nationality and religion are bound together. It is of the very essence of heathenism, that, as a natural religion, it has the natural national mind for its basis. Hence the biblical expressions for the nations which we have quoted, are at the same time the words which denote heathen. Israel must have been placed beyond the pale of this natural connection of the ancient national and heathen life; it must have been fundamentally separated, if it was ever to become the people of God. There was required within the natural life of the nations the creative establishment of a new nation, on which the seal of God was impressed from the beginning. Therefore a beginning had to be made, emphatically *ab ovo*, with a new ancestor; and this ancestor must have been a hero of the faith. Indeed, faith must have been the first and the essential thing in him; so that the natural was unfolded, not for its own sake, but

upon the ground of supernatural and divine consecration of the life.

This hero and founder of the family is given in Genesis in the wonderful history of Abraham. Everything that is said of him becomes clear and intelligible in the light of this idea. Like Moses, Abraham springs from a family which had preserved the knowledge of God in a relatively pure condition. He had, besides, prophetic gifts (see Gen. xx. 7). God can therefore reveal Himself to him, and in this time of wanderings (Gen. xi. 27–32), this age of the birth and youth of peoples, can call him to be the father of a great nation. He receives also a great promise: not only shall he himself and his posterity enjoy the divine blessing in full measure, but he shall be the bearer of blessing to all the races of the earth. (Let it be considered how this last expression, again, has the flavour of antiquity about it. It is derived from the family or tribe, not yet from the nation, while there stands alongside of it, with equal significance, the words, "I will make thee a great nation.") It is in harmony with the character of God thus to declare Himself concerning the final purpose of the new thing which is beginning, so far as Abraham can understand it. But this high destiny to which Abraham is called is connected with a costly sacrifice. He must break off all natural connections with his fatherland, his kindred, and his father's house, and go into a strange land, so that he may begin an entirely new work. This land was not pictured beforehand as a land flowing with milk and honey; indeed, it was not described at all. He was to show his faith in God, and his obedience, by journeying "into the land which I will show thee" (Gen. xii. 1). Shall this man, seventy-five years of age, with his childless wife, become the father of a great nation?—and to that end, set aside all the joys of life, and all family duties, and go into an unknown land? Notwithstanding, "Abraham went, as the Lord had said unto him." His whole life is thus divided from the natural ground of it, and, contrary to all outward appearances, and all

rational calculation, is placed simply on God and on faith. He comes to Canaan, whither the movements of his family had already tended; and there he receives a message from God, to the effect that that is the land which is to be given to his posterity. For a nation must have a country. Abraham himself, however, must wander in this land as a stranger all his life long; he calls none of it his own but a grave. Though, or rather *as*, the founder of the nation that is to be the people of God, he has himself no earthly fatherland, but is to cast himself entirely on God and the heavenly fatherland, as is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which, in the wonderful chapter on faith—the eleventh—so thoroughly recognises and explains this divine guidance of Abraham. As to the nation, Abraham's faith was exercised to such a degree, that he had to wait in Canaan for a quarter of a century for the seed of the promise. And even that is not enough, but he must be found willing to bring the youthful Isaac as a sacrifice to God. It is thus not only these two natural blessings, people and country, that Abraham must leave, so far as they belong to the earlier merely natural life; but even those new favours bestowed by God Himself, Canaan and Isaac, must first again be offered up; and only when, in the faith of Abraham, the natural element has been stripped away from them, they acquire a position and value as outward things, and in their natural character.

The very existence of Israel thus hangs entirely on the faith of Abraham: it is built, as it were, into it, as the foundation that bears up the whole. This faith is one of the greatest miracles of the Old Testament history, if not the greatest. The apostles, especially Paul (Rom. iv.; Gal. iii.), speak of it with the greatest reverence. And it is a miracle that is not at all miraculous: the outward laws of nature, and the like, are not concerned in it. It has often been pointed out, and rightly, as a proof of the genuineness of patriarchal history, that these fathers are not represented as having performed miracles. The myth would certainly have adorned their honoured heads with a

wreath of wonders. A still stronger proof of the sacred truthfulness of this history, is the fact that it begins with the mind-miracle of the faith of Abraham. Only he who misses the real mystery of this faith can suppose it to be a later invention. For no one in later ages within the old covenant times reached the height of faith that Abraham did; even the best of them walked in the footsteps of father Abraham (Rom. iv. 12). This faith, standing at the threshold of the old dispensation, like the life of Christ at the threshold of the new, could not be invented: it stretches, as Paul has shown (Gal. iii.), across the whole old covenant history, which, as depending on it, stands beneath it, and points directly onward to Christ Himself.

Such a faith is naturally something by itself, and cannot be communicated to posterity by way of natural transmission. So soon as this begins, outward institutions must be established by which the communion with God, the covenant, shall be made secure, even where there may be no living Abrahamic faith. Thus circumcision was instituted before Isaac was begotten,—the beginning of the law which was to put abiding restraints on the fleshly nature. If natural generation cannot transmit the faith and religious life of the founder, there shall be attached to it at least a visible token and sign that the nation so generated has a higher life than the merely natural. Paul therefore speaks, we observe by the way, with the deepest insight into the history of the matter, when he lays stress on the fact that faith preceded circumcision (Rom. iv. 9, etc.). It is part of the divine seal on the people of God, further, that the first of the promised seed, and the second too, were called into being, by natural generation indeed, yet by the miracle of imparting life to bodies that were as good as dead (see Rom. iv. 17–21, ix. 7–9; Gal. iv. 23, etc.). It is self-evident that the son and the grandson stand below the height of the father. Isaac, who seems by nature as well as by the event of his youth to appropriate the character of prevailing passivity, is the quiet, calm conservator of the blessing of the father. In

Jacob, again, we have an independent life, and one that is distinct from the others; first of all the expression, and then the conquest of his sinful nature. Such, as was shown before, is the course of this chosen one,—a course which in many respects is typical. Ewald well calls Jacob-Israel the best type of all the virtues, but also of all the vices, of the nation. With Joseph the history passes out of the Jehovistic region into the Elohistic again—from the circle of special revelation into that of general national life—from Canaan into Egypt. For in that country, where nature appeared in the most exuberant fertility, and which was inhabited by the most cultivated people of that period, the family was to grow into the nation. That, however, was only a natural historical process, for which there was no need of anything but the divine blessing of the creation. Therefore the revelation ceases for centuries. This is the period between Genesis and Exodus, which is passed over in silence.

Here, however, the question arises, whether it was possible that a true account of the patriarchs and of the still earlier pre-Abrahamic age could be handed down through that dark time. To this question we may reply, first, with the general answer, which in the department of sacred history sets forth clearly the relation of the transmission to the facts, and thus also of the Scripture to revelation. If God has done the greater, in revealing Himself to men, He will also have done the less, by taking care that His revelations should be handed down. Otherwise, they would have failed of attaining their object for the most part. This is a perfectly just argument, *a majori ad minus*, which is of force for the oral as for the manuscript. transmission, and to which one may always recur in connection with these questions. It is the same thought, in reference to the spiritual life, which Jesus enunciates in the Sermon on the Mount, in reference to the natural life. We should not take thought about the maintenance of it, He says: the life is more than meat; and God, who gave us that, will see also to this.

There are not wanting, however, points of support in the history. For the earlier history, mention has often been made, and rightly, of the long life of the patriarchs. This made the continuance of the tradition from Adam to Abraham possible, with very few links in the chain. The same circumstance also, though in smaller degree, supports the history of the patriarchal age of Israel. We must try to get a true representation in our own mind of the position of such an aged patriarch. Life even now offers some analogies, though they are somewhat far removed. He had seen the Lord, he could give blessing in the power of the Lord. He was a living, personal chronicle, compared with which, in that early age, a written one would have seemed a dead letter. The words which God spoke, the words of blessings, which the patriarch in his strength as a prophet left behind him, were burnt in on the soul as with letters of fire. All the facts clustered round these of themselves. "This ancient story was doubtless preserved with the utmost care;" says Delitzsch:[1] "to the chosen race it was the foundation of its existence, the bond of its unity, the mirror of its duties, the guarantee of the future, and so its most precious inheritance." What Ewald has said in respect to the commands of David, that his songs of lamentation were learned by heart by the sons of Judah, may be applied also to Gen. ix. 25–27, ch. xlix., and many other places. He says that this is about the same as if one now should commit anything to print. It is expressly said to Abraham, that the object of his being chosen was that he might command his children and his house after him to walk in the way of the Lord (Gen. xviii. 19). Here the careful transmission of the divine revelations is made a duty; for, as in the Acts (xviii. 25, xix. 9, 23, ix. 2) and elsewhere, genuine religious instruction has always been historical. It consisted of the declaration and explanation of the facts, and the careful impressing of the words of revelation on the mind. So there was formed, without doubt, a certain form of the account of

[1] See Note I 2.

the main facts. The New Testament furnishes an instructive analogy in the synoptic tradition of the life of Jesus. Whatever we may think of the relations of the three synoptic Gospels to one another, one main consideration for the explanation of their connection will be the similar oral tradition.

There is a still more palpable analogy in the history of Islam. There is no written history here of the very earliest times. It is in the second century of the Hidschra that history begins to be developed. They are the more careful, however, to transmit the oral traditions correctly. The tradition originally began with the repetition of the words and actions of the prophet. One communicated them to another as new things (Hadith); and while the eye-witness need to give no other guarantee for the truth of his report than his own good repute, naturally he who repeated the *Hadith* to a third, must have added the name of his informant; the third who told the story would name both of his predecessors; the fourth would, by naming all the series, go back to the original author of the tradition; and so on, so that the number of these men connected with the narration would in time reach an astonishing length. The text of the tradition is called el-Matn; the list of the witnesses, Sanad or Isnad.[1] Wüstenfeld has lately published the oldest book which has been preserved in the literature of Arabia. It is the life of Mohammed by Ibn Ishak, who died in the year 150 or 151 of the Hidschra. Wüstenfeld, introducing a complete view of the men who gave and attested the narratives with their Isnad, observes: "Ibn Ishak, throughout the greater part of his book, gives the words of eye-witnesses, or of the persons who did the things themselves; but there are generally two or three persons between, who bring the reports down to him. The number of contemporaries whom he names, from whom he collected his narratives, is 114, and among them many well-known men." So particularly conscientious were the Arabians in these matters, that they blame Ibn Ishak for

[1] See Note K 2.

having put the accounts he got from several different persons of the same event into a connected form. The stricter rule required the most exhausting minuteness and fulness of detail. To avoid the least deviation, the narratives of different persons were to be placed complete, one after the other, in their own words. The following is an example of an ISNAD of this kind from a later period: "The Cadhi Abu Bekr Ahmed ben el-Hasan-el-Haraschi told us; Abdul-Abbas Muhammed ben Jacub el Acam told us; Abu Zuru Abdel-Rahman ben Amr of Damascus told us; Ahmed ben Chalid el Wehbr told us; Muhammed ben Ishak told us, of Fatima, the daughter of the Mundsir, of Asma, the daughter of Abu-Bekr, she had heard how a woman turned to the prophet asking a question, and said," etc. Compare also p. xv.: "Ibn Abu Cheitaina says that Harun ben Ma'urf related: I have heard the Abu Muawia say: Ibn Ishak possessed a very strong memory: if any one knew five or more traditions, he came and entrusted them to Muhammed ben Ishak, saying, Keep them in good memory for me; if I forget them, then you have them in your memory ready for me."

This analogous case of the transmission of religious truths and facts from the East, and from that part nearest and most related to the patriarchs, makes the preservation of the patriarchal traditions in Egypt very clear. It is possible that, at that much earlier period, and with the close connection between the families, there was not the same painful anxiety in regard to them. At all events, the Scriptures do not stand in need of such an express series of traditions. They leave here, as often besides, the confirmation of their contents to their inward truth. The light is proved by the shining of its rays.

IX. THE FIRST ELEVEN CHAPTERS OF GENESIS.

"The lands of Africa lie in unexplored masses on both sides of the equator." With these words, Max Duncker begins his able work on antiquity; and then, on the very second page, he

comes to speak of the land and people of Egypt. All the preliminary questions concerning ancient history are passed over without a word; we are placed at once before particular nations, and it is of them he treats alone. It is doubtless, in many respects, a wise and commendable caution, which excludes the obscure domain of the primeval beginnings from the sphere of history. It is, however, also a characteristic mark of our time, which holds it to be prudent to keep to the middle of things, and not to inquire into the beginnings and endings of them. At other times, the investigation of ultimate reasons and principles has been regarded as wisdom. Indeed, we are hardly warranted to speak of a history of antiquity here at all; at least of antiquity in the true sense.

We do not fail to perceive and acknowledge the skill and power displayed within these limits. But such a method can appear possible, or be considered right, only at a time in which the philosophic and religious, the higher and highest methods of study, are undervalued and neglected. It is the kind of history of which Herodotus, not that of which Moses, is the father. Herodotus has written an entirely similar history of antiquity. He, too, leads us round among single nations, and describes them one by one. It is in harmony with our idea of the Greeks, the Coryphæi of heathendom, to enter deeply, and with all interest, into detached parts of the life of nations and of the world, and then to represent them with all the charms of art. Historic art, the plastic representation of separate forms, reached its highest point here. But the philosophy of history, the thoughtful contemplation of the whole, as unfolded in time and space, is something quite different from this. It is not the study of single nations, but of humanity; it does not stand in the middle, but inquires into the beginning and the end, into the idea of the world, and its realization in history. It is only such investigation as this, embracing all history, that satisfies the inquiring mind; and all these other works of historic art serve only as preparatory labours for it.

This highest view of history is at present one of our philosophic wants, as Schiller's well-known *Academic Inaugural*, for example, has shown. This view is not, however, in accord with the fallen nature of man in itself. Herodotus shows this, and the Greek philosophers as well as the Greek historians. They have not succeeded in rising to the true idea of the human race—the idea of humanity. It is only where the true idea of God is known, that the true idea of man and of history is understood. In this deeper sense, too, Israel is therefore the nation that has a true historic sense, and Moses is the father of history. In this light the first eleven chapters of Genesis have an immense importance.

It is a distinguishing peculiarity of the Israelites, that their historic recollections have this universal background and range of view. Their traditions are not those of a single people only, but of a primitive history of the race. This is not the case with the heathen nations. Before Christ, the world was throughout divided into different nationalities, and each nation went back, at the furthest, only into its own past. Even the most civilised of the heathen nations, such as the Athenians, regarded themselves as Autochthones, sprung from their own soil. In this, the limitations and narrowness imposed by the nation and by nature are distinctly manifest. The nation had no other antecedent than the land it dwelt in; it was the offspring of that. They thought little, or not at all, about other nations, which were considered barbarians. It was the same as we find among the Chinese at this day. If at any time, by the influence of commerce, a more general regard to other nations and their history was awakened, they thought of them only, as already shown, as separate peoples. The idea of the primeval connection of the nations, the idea of the human race as a whole, was not known, or at least very dimly seen. What they have beyond their own history, in the shape of recollections reaching into the remote beginnings, or views of heaven and earth, of gods and men, are mere theogonic and cosmogonic myths; and

in this the belief of the people concerning their own origin becomes more and more confused; and then, inversely, the myth itself becomes the source of their notions themselves.

Israel also is broadly distinguished from the other nations: the distinction between the terms, people of God and nations of the world, is similar to that between the Greeks and barbarians. And by the various movements into which the people were drawn in the course of time, this separation was rather increased than otherwise. There was no Herodotus in Israel, who might have written the history of the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Persians, though the Jews were brought so much into contact with all these nations. History of the world, in this sense, is a worldly, not an Israelitic science. The peculiarity of Israel was not its culture, but its beliefs and opinions concerning former times and the origin of man. Israel had not only distincter notions with respect to their own origin (since Abraham) than any other people, but they went back beyond their own beginnings to those of the human race as a whole; and they connected their origin with this, in a way that marked their separation as definitely as it did their relation. The line was Abraham, Noah, Adam. It has been observed, and justly, that Genesis makes Noah's ark to have grounded, not on Lebanon or Sinai, but on Ararat, which had no particular significance for Israel; while the heathen nations, in their traditions concerning the flood, owing to their limited nationality, for the most part represent the whole matter as occurring among the mountains of their own country; and the patriarchs of the deluge are degraded into the position of being the first men of that nation only, the progenitors of their own people. The national limit is thus broken through, in the book of Genesis, from the very first. With all its particularism, Israel is, in truth, the most widely human nation in history. This is manifestly closely connected with their religion. Since the people who possess the divine revelation rise above nature and the world to God, their range of view also passes beyond the

natural limits of national life, and surveys the wide field of humanity. Jehovah is Elohim; the national God of Israel is the Creator of the heaven and the earth. From the beginning, it was explicitly declared, that God based their particularism on the most universal foundation, and that it had the most universal object (Gen. xii. 3; Ex. xix. 5). The distinction between Israel and the heathen world is thus lifted up high above that between Greeks and barbarians. It is distinct in principle. Israel had from the outset an idea of a universal history; their thoughts embrace the past history of men generally, and point to their future, and to the blessing which was to be for all the nations of the earth. Israel thus from the first possessed, through its religion, in all universality and fulness, what Greece reached only late in its history, and then, in a very feeble and limited degree, through its culture. Here again we see, and here more deeply than before, into the ancient connection between religion and history. With the true knowledge of God, and in virtue of it, Israel has preserved the earliest recollections of humanity; and with these, too, it has preserved the true knowledge of God. The two go hand in hand; and the truth of the views of God which we find in Genesis, is therefore the guarantee also for the truth of the traditions: the truth of the religion is a guarantee for the truth of the history.

If we did not possess these first eleven chapters of Genesis, we should have nothing concerning the beginning of the world and the human race but the myths of the heathen, or the speculations of philosophers, or the observations of naturalists; we should be in the deepest darkness in reference to the origin and nature of the world and of man. It is with these chapters on one side as with the prophecies on the other: in the first we have true light on the beginning, in the second on the end; in the first on the originating principle, in the second on the issues of history; in the first on the reason or cause, in the second on the purpose of the world. Without this light, a universal history and philosophy of history are impossible. Prophecy itself,

indeed, has its roots in these chapters. All later revelation is founded upon them. Fortunately these recollections of the origin of our race have influenced and pervaded our whole mode of thought more than we are aware of. Not even those who think themselves obliged to reject them as historically incorrect, are exempt. These chapters maintain in its integrity the belief of mankind in their creation by God in His own image, and the consciousness of their original dignity and eternal destiny.

These eleven chapters accomplish this great work in the very simplest form. Assuredly there is none of the historic art of the Greeks here. All the story is grouped around the genealogies, which to us in western lands seem so dry. But the seal of inward truth and of the hoariest antiquity is impressed on them by this very circumstance. Genealogical registers, transmitted either orally or in writing, are the simplest and earliest expression of the historic consciousness. Here it leans upon the primitive form of all human society, the family, and regards history on the side of its natural basis, in the facts of descent and family connection. Hence genealogical registers are without doubt the oldest form in which history was preserved. They meet us among the nations of the East, as they begin to rise above the limits of their merely natural boundaries to some idea of general history,—as, for example, among the Arabs. They serve at the same time to adjust chronology, especially where, as in Gen. v. and xi., the years of birth and the duration of life are recorded. These tribal registers are thus a history in the most general outlines—names and numbers; but to the Oriental these are living things: they are to him like a gallery of family portraits, to which ever vigorous memory and oral tradition may attach many facts and thoughts (comp. Gen. v. 21–24). The example of the table of nations in Gen. x. shows how easily the genealogical register becomes historiography, genealogy becomes ethnography, ethnography becomes history (comp. Acts xvii. 26). Scattered throughout this table

of nations lie notices of the beginning of the state and the kingdom, with which history in the narrower sense begins (Gen. x. 8–12).

Hebrew antiquity also lays hold of the genealogical form, in order to set it in the light of those modes of view that have been transformed and widened by divine revelation. It is the specifically appropriate form for that book which has to deal with the origination of the holy people out of the family, and to pursue the history further back, up to the very beginnings of the race. Hence Genesis is divided and arranged on the principle of the (ten) Tolethoth, *i.e.* procreations, or generations; and this has become the fundamental expression for history.

The genealogical registers in the first eleven chapters of Genesis, and especially those in the fifth and eleventh, are doubtless very ancient—perhaps the very oldest example of oral, and then of written tradition, that exists in the world. Their existence and importance are founded upon two things, one of which relates to the past, the other to the future. These are an Elohistic and a Jehovistic or Messianic element. The first has respect to the divine origin, the second points to the divine goal of humanity. Man was created by God in His own image, and therefore the races of men are of value in His sight, and deserve to have their names preserved in the divine history and record. But by the fall, humanity has erred from its divine original, and become subject to death. Yet it was not to perish; it was to continue and perpetuate itself, though smitten with death. Indeed, this perpetuation itself was to be the means of deliverance from the prevailing ruin. The seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head (Gen. iii. 15), that the divine goal for men might yet be reached. Upon this great purpose of the perpetuation of the race in connection with the history of redemption, rests the real and biblical signification of the genealogical registers.

Sin having entered, men now assumed diverse relations to

this great task of the life of man. This is evident even among the sons of Adam. Some, like the mother of the race (Gen. iv. 1, comp. v. 29), hold by the divine end: they are the true children of this woman, the seed of the woman, the true humanity. The others wander ever further away from it, and exclude themselves, as the seed of the serpent, from the true humanity. Even these last, however, though they have departed from the face of Jehovah (Gen. iv. 16), are yet within the sphere of the Elohim (comp. ix. 27). It is only the first who are entrusted with the future of mankind, as they are faithful to Jehovah, and Jehovah to them (Gen. iv. 26, ix. 26). They do not merely share in the gifts of God in creation, but they have personal fellowship with Him, so that they are His people, and He is their God. Both of these tendencies rest upon acts of the progenitors of the race—a Cain and Ham, Abel and Seth, Shem and Japheth (Gen. iv. 3, etc., xxvi. 9, 22, etc.). These acts continue to operate in their descendants, and stamp each line of posterity with their peculiar characteristics. For after man has fallen under the dominion of the flesh, moral and religious qualities are also in a certain degree perpetuated naturally, *i.e.* by the family spirit. These primitive fathers, who are at the same time primitive children, could not emancipate themselves so well from that influence as we, for whom the right of free personality has been won by Christ. While from this point of view new light falls on the meaning of the genealogical registers, another circumstance also is explained. We see why the seed of the woman only, the "generations of Adam" (v. 1), on whom depends the future of humanity, are considered worthy of a continuous genealogy, while only a few names of the line of Cain are mentioned. The series is broken off, as soon as the wickedness of it reaches a characteristic height, in Lamech and his family (iv. 17–21).

There is a similar connection in the post-diluvian period between the table of nations already referred to and the Semitic genealogy (xi. 10). The table is carried at no point further

than a few stages; for it is, as Baumgarten well observes,[1] then that the heathen are left out of the Old Testament history. From that time onward they go their own way, yet are written in God's book, are unforgotten by His grace, and are at a future time to be called to share in His salvation. The Semitic genealogy, on the contrary, carries on with carefulness, similar to the earlier Sethitic one, the holy Messianic race, from the beginning of humanity, renewed in Noah, to the beginning of the people of God in Abraham, where the seed of Abraham and David connects itself still further to the seed of the woman (comp. Matt. i. 1, etc.; Luke iii. 23, etc.). But there is a most important difference between the period before and after the flood. In the former, only two series confront each other, like light and darkness. In the latter, an intermediate class appears. Between Ham, the slave of the flesh, and the Jehovistic Shem, by whom the spiritual life is borne along through the race, stands Japheth, who, under the blessing of Elohim, prospers and spreads over the earth, and becomes the head and fountain of the (psychical) culture of the world,—the great ancestor of Greeks, Romans, Germans, etc., who are still partakers of the blessing that is in the tents of Shem. The table of nations, in its connection with ix. 20, etc., is thus a light which casts its rays over the whole future of the history of humanity, in its main features, like ch. iii. 15. But as the fifth chapter is connected with the fourth, so here the Messianic genealogy comes very distinctly and prominently out of the general one (xi. 10); or more correctly *vice versa*, the latter arises from the former. The Messianic genealogy is the great distinguishing feature which runs through the whole old covenant and the ancient world. Because in their possessions and their knowledge the consciousness of the Israelites was raised above themselves to God, they were able to take a survey of the wide circle of humanity, and that just in proportion as it stood connected with the Messianic line. In the same measure, too, are the families of the earth

[1] See Note I. 2.

thought worthy to have their genealogy written in the sacred records.

All here is as simple and natural as it is profound and suggestive. And it is the union of these two, the greatest idea with the simplest form, which is the very signature of its divine truth. The power of the Bible over the minds of men is founded on this. In this respect, no historic, or poetic, or other art can compare with it, though there are always corrupt tastes which say, the heavenly manna should not look like mere coriander seed (Num. xi. 4, etc.).

Coming to details, we read of three great catastrophes of apostasy and judgment which occurred in that primeval time. They are linked to the three head names of the genealogical tables, and mark the beginning, the middle, and the end of them. These are Adam, Noah, Abraham. The fall and expulsion from Paradise are associated with the name of Adam (ch. ii. 3); the flood with that of Noah (ch. vi. 9); and lastly, Abraham is connected with and placed over against that state of things, the confusion of tongues, dispersion of peoples, and spread of heathenism, which resulted from the attempt to build the tower of Babel. These are the three great catastrophes which must always be presupposed in attempting to explain the present condition of the world. They exhibit a successive decline from the original purity and power of life, with which the gradual abridgment of life goes hand in hand. From the first it follows that our world is a fallen world; on the second rests the *natural* state of the earth, and on the third its *historical* condition. For history in the narrower sense is admittedly the history of particular nations, and therefore presupposes their existence. From the eleventh of Genesis, says Johannes v. Müller, universal history must begin. In this sense, what we have before us here should be named, history before history, the history of the primitive age. If all beginnings are miraculous, we should expect beforehand to find that these are so too. They are so, however, on a greater and more colossal

scale than the later beginnings, just because they lay the foundation for the present state of things, and therefore another and different state must be at the foundation of them. He who stumbles here at the outset, should remember the historic testimony of another book, the interior of the earth, which brings before us an original world of more colossal relations than those now existing. On the other hand, those who believe the testimony of Scripture, ought not to forget that what we have before us here is not a historical occurrence. It happened before history. It is not, however, the less actual. It only took place in a different way, and under different conditions of life; just as men nine hundred years old are yet real men, but different from those only ninety years old. The more remote any event lies from the present period, we are the less able to measure it aright with our present standards. This will be true in particular of the occurrences in Paradise, and this point of view will remove many difficulties. In like manner, we know little or nothing of the modes of our activity in the future ages of our life.

If these three catastrophes are the primeval facts on which the present state of the human race on the earth are founded, their effects must of course be still traceable, and we shall be able here to argue from the effect to the cause. We shall now give some illustrations of this remark.

We have already drawn attention to the fact that the word *Gojim* stands in the Old Testament for both nations and heathen. It thus embraces both nationality and religion. Now this fact is full of significance in reference to this point. It indicates the truth that there are just as many religions as there are nations, for every nation has its own gods. The second distinctive element between the different nations is language. Hence both the confusion of tongues and the dispersion of the people are connected with the building of the tower at Babel as *one* act (Gen. xi. 9). Nationality, religion, language—these are the three primal elements in the historic life of nations. Ethno-

graphic, linguistic, and historical inquiries into the earliest periods, are now causing them to be acknowledged in their relations to one another; but Genesis presents them to us in their inward unity, on the ground of the ancient traditions. This circumstance should dispose us to look favourably on the narrative. It is a strong testimony to the deep truth in it.

It is Schelling, as is well known, who, in his *Philosophy of Mythology*, enters on the discussion of these fundamental questions, with much greater earnestness than had previously been customary. He has led the investigation into entirely new paths. From the nature of the thing itself, he arrives at more positive ground in reference to the historic record in Genesis, and especially to that part which relates to the Babylonian tower. In his introduction to the *Philosophy of Mythology*, the criticism of former theories concerning the origin of it, leads him to the question, How did nations originate? And in answering this question, he lays down the following positions. Nations neither always were, nor did they begin to be of themselves. No merely physical explanations of the separation of nations is sufficient. "The human race could not have left that state in which there was no distinction of nations, but only of tribes or families, without an intellectual crisis having occurred, which touched the very foundations of the mind. We can only wonder, that what is so manifest was not seen at once. For we cannot conceive of different nations without different languages, and surely language is connected with the intellect. If the difference between the nations is not a thing that has existed from the first, but which originated from a former state, then the same is true of languages. These are principles of which people do not commonly think, or which they are prevented from thinking of by a subtle, over-refined criticism, which enfeebles and obscures the mind. But they are statements which, as soon as they are made known, must command assent. Here we are at one with the oldest record of the human race, the Mosaic writings, which

many have such repugnance to, simply because they don't know what to do with them: they neither understand nor know how to use them. Genesis places the origination of nations in connection with the rise of different languages; in such a way, however, that the confusion of languages is the cause, the origin of different nations the effect. This narrative is taken from actual recollections, which are still found even among other nations. A confusion of language cannot be conceived, except in connection with an intellectual movement, a violent disturbance of the general consciousness. This disturbance must have affected the mind most vitally and profoundly, in its very roots; and if there is to be a confusion of languages, it must be a movement which should shatter the bonds which had hitherto held men together: that mental force must give way, which had hitherto resisted every tendency to separate development. This force could only be a God who filled the whole consciousness of the soul, who was common to all the race; a God who, as it were, comprehended and drew them all into His own unity. Polytheism, spreading then, as ever, made a continuance of this unity of the race impossible. This cause of the inward change is indeed not actually mentioned in Genesis; but by naming the next cause, the confusion of language, it at least indicates the remote and final cause, the rise of Polytheism. Of these indications let me mention here only one. It names the scene of the confusion Babel, the site of the future great city. Historical inquiries that have been perfectly independent, have led to the conclusion that the transition to actual Polytheism took place in Babylon. The very idea of heathenism, *i.e.* strictly, of the formation of separate nations, is thus inseparably connected with the name Babel, in such a way that, to the last book of the New Testament, Babylon stands as the symbol of all heathenism, and all that is to be regarded as heathen. Babel is really, as the old narratives say, a contraction of Balbel, a word which is doubtless onomatopoetic. Singularly enough, the imitation of sound which has

disappeared from the word Babel is preserved in the Greek word Βάρβαρος, which properly means one who speaks unintelligibly, and is formed from the oriental word *Balbel* by the common change of the consonants *r* for *l*. By a similar imitation of sound has arisen the Latin *bulbus*, the German *babeln*, *babbeln*, (Swabian) *plappern*, French *babiller*, *babil* (English, *babble*). The connection of religious movements with changes of language is not more mysterious, than that certain peculiarities of the physical constitution should be connected with a particular form of religion. What could the speaking with tongues in the church at Corinth be, except a consequence of religious impressions? We are too little accustomed to regard the principles which determine the involuntary religious movements of the soul as principles of general application, and which therefore, under given circumstances, may be the causes of other, and even of physical effects. At all events, it is evident that the rise of nations, confusion of tongues, and Polytheism, are, in the Old Testament mode of thought, related ideas and connected phenomena. The origin of mythology will be found at the point of transition when a people have not yet risen into separate existence as a nation, but are just on the point of dividing and becoming such. This must be true also of a language. It is determined first when the nation is formed. Those names among the Grecian divinities which are manifestly not Grecian, which are pre-historic, are to be traced to that point at which the languages are not separated, but are only in process of separation. From that, too, may be explained some similarities in languages which are otherwise constructed on entirely different principles. In no nation does a language arise quite free from connection with the previous unity of speech, which amid all diversity seeks to maintain itself. For to such a unity, the power of which is felt even in the separation, all the phenomena as well as the conduct of the nations, so far as it can be traced through the mist of that remote age, point. Not an outward impulse, but the thorn of inward unrest, the feeling

that they are no longer the whole of the human race, but only a part of it—that they no longer belong to the absolutely ONE, but have become subject to some particular God or Gods: this was the feeling which drove them from land to land, from coast to coast, until each saw itself alone, separated from all that was foreign to it, and found itself in the place destined for it, and appropriate to it (comp. Deut. xxxii. 8). This fear lest the unity of man should be entirely lost, and, with that, all truly human consciousness, suggested to them not only the first institutions of a religious kind, but even their first municipal arrangements, the purpose of which was no other than to preserve whatever remnants of pristine unity had been saved, and to save them from further disintegration."[1]

So far the words of Schelling, which we gladly quote, because, though we do not bind ourselves to them in detail, or in all their consequences, we agree with them on the whole.

We would add the following observations from the ethical point of view upon the question we are now discussing. The idea of humanity is one of the most beautiful and one of the truest ideas of our time, because in its genuine form it is a Christian idea, though it has often been torn away from its Christian foundation, and then abused and falsified. Extensively, however, the idea of humanity is coincident with the idea of the unity of our race. All men are brothers. It is the violence that is done to this feeling, the indignity cast on human nature, that so shocks us in the slavery of the negro race, and led, *e.g.*, an Alexander von Humboldt actively to oppose it to the end of his days. It is the same deep feeling and principle which, transferred from social to international relations, is ever suggesting to noble souls the idea of universal peace and the brotherhood of nations, and which makes them regard war as a frightful curse, and which ought not to be. And yet all peace congresses and the like are mere chimeras: it is a new age of the world which will first turn the swords into plough-

[1] See Note M 2.

shares. These phenomena are, however, but the outmost points of the universal fact, which is as manifest as it is surprising, that the unity of our race never finds any historical expression in the life of men outside of Christianity and the church. The human race is split up into a number of separate nations, each one of which forms an exclusive whole for itself. This is so much the case, that they understand one another neither outwardly nor inwardly, neither in language nor religion. Indeed, generally one nation regards all others as barbarous compared with itself, looks on them as enemies, and considers itself the "middle kingdom." Egoism, which in the individual is the root of sin, is much more sharply defined among nations. It is just as far from being agreeable to the true nature of man in the one case as the other; it is something abnormal, and at the same time humbling; it is guilt, and at the same time manifestly punishment. The great majority of nations stand on a very low stage of life, which is hardly worthy of man at all. And who has not felt it lying like a curse resting upon the most civilised nations, when, being in the company of foreigners, and you felt that there was an inward harmony between you, yet you could at best very imperfectly communicate your thoughts and feelings? Humanity cannot set its entire life in motion: instead of being a living and happy organism, it is a mass of disjointed members.

If we are in real earnest in regard to this thought, as we ought to be where we have to do with what is and ought to be, we must conclude that there was some transgression committed long ago, by which the organism was rent and divided. We are led to ask history and ancient traditions whether they know of any such occurrence. Genesis gives us the building of the tower at Babel as the solution of the problem. It shows us, in the sons of Noah and their posterity, that the original purpose was that mankind should develop regularly in organic order, but that the whole race in ungodly arrogance withstood this natural development and gradual extension, and, instead of

seeking inward unity in God, sought outward unity in a colossal sensible work of their own hands; and that God then, by means of the confusion of tongues, caused dispersion and disruption to take the place of orderly diffusion. While mankind, by their pride in building the tower of Babel, have departed from God, and have lost God, they at the same time have lost themselves. Only in God, who as the source and upholder of all created life, is the bond of union to all, could they be truly one amid all diversity. By tearing asunder the bonds of union with God, they have also torn the bonds that unite the various members one to another. Therefore inversely, the reconciliation of man with God is also their reconciliation with one another (Eph. ii. 14, etc.; Luke ii. 14). There was, in real truth, no longer a humanity; there were only detached nations, whom God suffered to walk in their own ways (Acts xiv. 16). Every apostasy from God is at the same time a subjection to the world and its princes. So it was here. The nations left to themselves, to go no further into the dæmonic background of heathenism, came more and more under the dominion of natural forces, climate, soil, etc. etc., which they could no longer counterbalance with a spiritual power. From this fact are to be explained the diversities of races, to which, it is true, differences in the three sons of Noah have in some degree contributed, which obscure so greatly the unity of the whole. From it, too, the circumstance that only a comparatively small portion of mankind has ever reached historical importance,—those, namely, that dwell in the temperate zone; while the hot and cold regions hinder the development of their inhabitants so much, that they are sunk down into a half animal life. Hence, too, lastly, are explained all the divisions and limitations, egoisms and hostilities, of the nations, of which we spoke above.

In closing here, we shall take the liberty of quoting the local tradition regarding the tower of Babel, which has lately been discovered in one of the very oldest manuscripts. Oppert, one of the most celebrated of the explorers of Assyrio-Babylonian

antiquity, who travelled to Mesopotamia under the auspices of the French Government, and who has published the results of his journey and researches in a splendid work, gives in the *Journal Asiatique*, 1857,[1] a cuneiform inscription with an interlinear version: he also has had it printed in Hebrew letters, and adds an explanation. The inscription is on a cylinder, which Rawlinson discovered in the ruins of Babylon. The writing is by Nebuchadnezzar, who, in the words of Oppert's translation, says, among other things, "The Temple of the seven lights of the earth (the planets), the ancient monument of Borsippa, was built by an ancient king; since then are reckoned forty-two generations; but he did not reach the summit of it. Men had left it (the tower) since the days of the flood which confused their languages. Earthquake and thunder had shattered the bricks, and thrown down the tiles of the roof; the bricks of the walls were cast down and formed heaps. The great god Merodach has put it into my heart to build it again; I have not altered the place, nor disturbed the foundations. In the month of Salvation, on the auspicious day, I pierced the unburnt bricks of the walls and the burnt bricks of the casings with arches. I inscribed the glory of my name on the frieze of the arches." As our knowledge of the cuneiform writing is still very imperfect, we must wait for more light before we can be sure of the accuracy in all details of Oppert's translation. Ewald has raised doubts as to some of the conclusions. But if Oppert's translation is confirmed, then we have two points worthy of notice. In the ruins of Borsippa, the castle of the ancient Babylon which lay in the south-west of the city between the outer and inner surrounding walls, there is now a heap of ruins which popular tradition calls *Birs Nimrod* (Nimrod's Tower), and also the Tower of Languages, and maintains that it is part of the ancient Tower of Babel. Modern scholars have of course rejected this as a myth, and look on the ruins as merely the remains of the temple of Belus, built by Nebuchad-

[1] See Note N 2.

nezzar, and described by Herodotus. That inscription would prove that both are right, as Nebuchadnezzar intentionally built his temple on the site of the ancient tower. The architectural document—for so we may call the inscription—gives the local tradition concerning that building of the ancient time, which is still well known at the very place. This local tradition contains the essentials of the case, just as Genesis does: it is a vast building, which remains unfinished, in consequence of a great catastrophe, and the confusion of tongues dates from that time. The chronological point, however, is not less important. As Nebuchadnezzar reigned 604–561 before Christ, and the building of Babel is to be placed, according to biblical chronology, in the twenty-third century before Christ, there are about sixteen hundred years' interval between the two; and this harmonizes with forty-two generations, reckoning thirty-five to forty years to each. In reference to recent opinions which charge Genesis with errors in chronology to the extent of thousands of years, this fact is of great importance.

We now come to consider the flood. This is an occurrence in the natural world, and can be reflected therefore only in the state of the earth, not in the condition of mankind. It is so reflected very abundantly, as geology shows us. This science points us, in a way that seems to leave no room for doubt, to a whole series of great catastrophes that have occurred on this globe in the earliest ages. This, however, does not exclude, but include, the confirmation of the deluge as the last of them. Because of this plurality of catastrophes in creation, geology has often in recent times been used as a weapon against Genesis. It ought much more to have been considered a strong confirmation of the biblical account of the world; for it most completely demolishes the doctrine of the eternity of the present state of the world, and the permanent sameness of the conditions and relations of life. Geology, however, is still too young and incomplete a science, to warrant us in drawing very certain inferences from its different statements, either for or against the

Bible. It is the same with respect to this as with respect to Egyptology and its centuries. Let these sciences quietly develop themselves, and theology at the same time; at the end their true unity will come out, as surely as the God of revelation is no other than the God of nature and history.

There may and must be another testimony to the reality of the flood, in addition to that from the condition of the earth itself, if the father of the renewed human race was a witness of it, as Genesis says he was. This would be in the popular traditions of the nations. An event of such tremendous magnitude must have left many traces of its occurrence in the recollections of the posterity of Noah. And so it is in fact. Alexander von Humboldt says: "The traditions of the deluge held by the human race, which we find scattered over the earth like the ruins of a great shipwreck, are of the greatest moment in the philosophy of history. The cosmogonic traditions of the nations have everywhere the same character,—a family resemblance which produces astonishment. In the main, with respect to the destruction of the animated creation and the renewal of nature, the traditions hardly vary at all, though every nation gives them a peculiar local colouring. On the great continents and the smallest islands of the Pacific, it is believed that the men who were saved fled to the highest mountain in the neighbourhood; and the event always seems the more recent, the more uncultured the people, and the less the distance the knowledge they have of themselves goes back. If we examine," Humboldt adds, with special reference to America, "the Mexican remains of the period antecedent to the discovery of the New World, if we penetrate into the forests of Orinoco, when we see how insignificant and isolated the European settlements are, and in what circumstances the independent tribes exist, we can never think of ascribing this unanimity to the influence of missionaries and Christianity. It is just as improbable that the nations on the Orinoco have come to hold the idea of a great flood of waters, which for

a time destroyed the germs of organic life, from the circumstance that they found products of the sea high up on the mountains."[1] Lactantius writes (ii. 10): "Factum esse diluvium ad perdendum tollendumque ex orbe terræ malitiam, constat inter omnes. Idem enim et philosophi et poetæ scriptoresque rerum antiquarum loquuntur, in eoque maxime cum prophetarum sermone consentiunt." We shall quote some of these traditions of a flood from Lücke's very full collection,—one from the East Indies, the second from North America, the third from Central America. They shall thus be from nations that are widely distant from Israel and from one another.[2]

"The tradition found in many of the ancient writings of the Indians was first brought to light by Jones, from one of the *Purana*. According to it, the tradition in substance is as follows: When, at the end of last Calpa (*i.e.* the great epoch of Brahma), the giant Hajagrivah stole the sacred Bedas, and the human race thus lost the truth and ordinances of God, Vishnu came to the earth in the form of a fish, in order to sustain the Vedas and virtuous men. At that time there lived a pious and virtuous king, named Manu Satjavrata (perfecter of the good). This man was loved by the Lord of the universe, who wished to save him from the destroying flood, which was caused by the wickedness of the times, and gave him, in the form of a fish, the following directions: 'Seven days from this time, O thou subduer of the enemies, shall the three worlds be overwhelmed in an ocean of death; but in the midst of the great waves, a ship sent by me for thy use shall stand before thee. Then shalt thou take with thee all wholesome herbs, all manner of seeds, and, accompanied with seven holy ones, surrounded with the irrational creatures in pairs, thou shalt enter into the ark and abide in it, safe from the flood, on a boundless ocean, without light, the beaming splendour of thine own companions excepted. If the ship be struck with a violent wind, thou

[1] See Note O 2. [2] See Note P 2.

shalt moor it to one of the horns of a great sea-serpent: then will I be near thee; I will guide the ship with thee and thine, and remain in the ocean till a night of Brahma is ended. Then shalt thou know my true greatness, which is named rightly the highest divinity. By my grace all thy questions shall be answered, and thy soul receive the very highest instruction.' After the fish had given the king these instructions, it disappeared. The sea then rose beyond the shore, and inundated the whole earth; and soon the waters were greatly swollen by fearful rain from far-spreading clouds. The king, when he saw the ship drawing near, entered into it with the highest Brahmins (the seven wise ones, Richis), provided the whole some herbs, and did all according to the commandment of God. Then the god appeared in the form of a fish upon the vast ocean: it shone with the splendour of gold. It was a million miles large, and had an immense horn, to which the king made the ship fast. When the waters of the destroying flood had meanwhile assuaged, the god arose, struck the Dæmon Hajagriva, and again secured the sacred books. In Bhagavad we read: When the flood was at an end, the eight persons came out and worshipped Mishnu."

"In the New World," says Lücken, "the traditions of a flood are almost more abundant than in the Old. We may start from the Esquimaux in the utmost north, and travel to the other extreme of America: traditions of a great flood in the olden time meet us everywhere; the barbarians, when asked concerning their origin, always tell us that they are the descendants of the men who were rescued from the flood. And this is spoken of in such striking terms, and so like the Bible account, that we cannot wonder that the astonished Spaniards believed, when they discovered America, that the Apostle Thomas had preached Christianity there. We must regard it as a work of Providence, that this world, which was unknown to the rest of mankind for perhaps thousands of years, and pursued its own course of culture separated from them, was

suddenly, amid the light of the historic age, discovered, and now shows in its traditions a harmony with the traditions of the Old World, which must convince the most incredulous, that they are one race, and must have drunk of the same fountain of life. The tradition of the Dog-rib Indians is very remarkable. This tribe of savages dwells far north on the Mackenzie River, and they have a tradition among them also concerning the fall. 'Chasseweé, their ancestor, lived, as they say, with his family on a strait between two seas (evidently Behring's Straits; and this points also to their origin). There he constructed a weir for the purpose of catching fish; these came in such numbers that the strait was choked up, and the sea overflowed the land. Chassewee went into a canoe, taking all manner of four-footed beasts and birds with him. The water covered the earth for many days; but at length Chassewee said, This must not continue, we must find land again; and he sent a beaver to search for it. The beaver was drowned, and they saw its corpse floating on the water. Chassewee put a musk-rat on it, and sent it away for the same purpose. The second messenger was long away; and when it came back again, it was almost tired to death, but had a little earth in its paws. The sight of this earth made Chassewee glad; but he first of all looked to the welfare of his faithful servant, stroked the rat with both hands, and took it into his bosom till it revived. Then he took the earth, moulded it with his hands, and laid it on the water. It then gradually increased in size, till it formed an island in the ocean.'—(Franklin's *Second Voyage to the Polar Sea.*) We find the tradition, in nearly the same form, among all the North American Indians; in Central America also, the same particulars, especially the sending forth of animals on the falling of the waters, are related, and in some instances they are still more strikingly corroborative of the Bible. That the aborigines of America conceive of America as an island, is a remarkable testimony to their migration thither from Asia."

In the Mexican city of Cholulu is found a wonderful pyra-

midal temple or Teocalli ("house of God"), which was consecrated to the first man, Quetzalcoatl. There is a tradition connected with this temple, which connects in a remarkable way the flood and the tower of Babel. It is related by Alexander von Humboldt, in his work on the Cordilleras, as follows: "Before the great inundation, in the year 4008 after the creation of the world, the land Anahuai (Mexico) was inhabited by giants. All those who did not perish in the flood were, with the exception of seven, who had taken refuge in caves, transformed into fishes.

"When the waters had subsided, one of the giants, named Xelhuac, the architect, went to Cholullun (Cholulu), where he erected an artificial hill, in pyramidal form, in memory of the mountain Tlalock, which had served him and his six brethren as a place of refuge. He had the bricks for this purpose made in the province of Tlamanalco, at the foot of the sierra of Cocotl; and in order to convey them to Cholulu, he placed men in a line, to pass them from hand to hand. The gods looked on this structure, whose top was to reach unto heaven, with displeasure, and, indignant at the presumption of Xelhuac, hurled fire down upon the pyramid. Many of the workmen perished; the work was not continued, and it was in consequence consecrated to the god of the air, Quetzalcoatl (the first man of the golden age). This story," adds Humboldt, "reminds us of the old traditions of the Orientals, which the Hebrews record in their sacred books. The Cholulanians still preserve a stone, which is said to have fallen like a ball of fire from the clouds on the pyramid. This aerolith has the form of a turtle. To show the age of this fable about Xelhuac, Father Rios (who had, 1566, communicated the same tradition before from hieroglyphic pictures) observes that it was contained in a hymn which the Cholulanians sang at their festivals, while they danced round the Teocalli, and that this song began with the words, *Tulanian hululaëz*, which do not occur in any of the Mexican dialects. Everywhere, all over the globe, upon the

ridges of the Cordilleras, as on the island of Samothrace in the Egyptian Sea, fragments of the original languages have been preserved in the religious usages of men." So far Humboldt. With regard to the last remark, compare the words of Schelling, quoted above, upon the remains of the languages of the pre-historic period.

It is important especially to note, that, as Humboldt shows, the pyramid of Cholulu has the same formation as the tower of Belus at Babylon, according to the description of Herodotus. This agrees fully with what is gathered from the inscription of Nebuchadnezzar concerning the tower of Belus at Babylon. Lücken's supposition concerning it is also beautifully confirmed. That temple was to be expressly a restoration of the ancient tower of Babel, and was therefore constructed after the pattern of that, as it was still to be seen in the ruins and in tradition. Lücken carries the comparison still further. He connects the pyramidal structures, which are found not only in Mexico, Babylon, and Egypt, "but in almost all quarters of the globe, and which are everywhere the most ancient buildings and monuments of the nations," with the tower of Babel. Such buildings are the Indian pagodas, the Buddhist Stupas, the Chinese Thas, the Morais on the South Sea Islands, etc. Schelling, in the same strain, says (p. 116): "The nations sought to maintain themselves in external unity by these monuments, which clearly belong to a pre-historic era, which are found in all parts of the known world, and which, by their greatness and the mode of erection, testify to an almost superhuman strength. We are also involuntarily reminded by them of that fatal tower, which the most ancient record mentions where it speaks of the dispersion of the people. The builders say to each other, 'Come, now, let us build a city, and a tower whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the earth.'"

Here, again, we might pause to ask for rational reflection upon those traditions that we find to exist among the remotest

nations. To us, at least, it seems the most reasonable mode of explaining this wonderful harmony, evident particularly in the details, by regarding it as a common reminiscence of an actual occurrence. He who has adopted the mode of explaining all such matters by the theory of mythicism, and measures all things by his "critical principles concerning mythology and the history of ancient religions," will of course seek some way of escape from this conclusion, or will prefer, above all, to pass these matters by, or at least to treat them superficially. But for him to whom facts are something that demand serious consideration —and of such thinkers there are some now, as ever—the wonder will perhaps be, in the words of Plato, the beginning of knowledge. He will perceive that these oldest traditions of the human race confirm the historical credibility of the Mosaic narrative, down to its details, just as much as they do the inner purity and elevation of them, compared with the myths of heathenism. In regard to this latter view, it is especially seen how Israel alone, along with the fact, retains the deep, divine idea of it. The heathen, while they preserve with great fidelity the outward circumstances, clothe them in fantastic and national vesture. The difference is the same in kind as that between the canonical and apocryphal Gospels.

Thus, that which the gifted Herder says concerning "the oldest document of the human race," has still its truth, and science will perhaps cause it to be more fully recognised than he himself thought. "Its sound has gone out into all the earth, and its very words into all lands! Whence is it that the remotest nations have their knowledge of it? How comes it that they built on it religions and mythologies; that it is, in fact, the simplest foundation of all their arts, institutions, and sciences? If from it things may be made plain and clear as sunlight that are as chaos, as a riddle, and dark as night when it is denied, or when men prate of their hypotheses; if from this a whole antiquity may be reduced to order, and a line of light be drawn through the most confused events of

the early history of nations—light which, like that in Coreggio's picture, shines from the cradle of the race,—what then have ye to say, ye manufacturers of myths, ye who would profane the revelation of God?"[1]

We now go further back still, to the first catastrophe of all —the fall. This is only too much like the third, as it, too, has left the deepest traces of its effects in the condition of mankind. What the tower of Babel is to nations, the fall is both to humanity as a whole, and to the individual. The evil, as it actually exists in us, demands for its explanation such an original act and transgression as that which is recorded in Genesis, if that fact be rightly analyzed.

In the operations of our moral consciousness, there is manifestly a collision of contradictories. On the one side, we feel ourselves responsible for sins; on the other side, we know that the movements of our nature, which constitute the real incitements to sin in us, are involuntary; and the same conscience which tells us that we are accountable for sin, tells us also that we are responsible for nothing which is not a free act of our own.

To explain this, we must notice, first of all, a difference which is implied in what we have already said,—namely, the difference between the sinful act and the sinful condition—denoting by this latter term our natural being viewed as the source of sinful propensities. It is clear that we have to answer for our sins, so far as they are acts, free actions, by which, instead of repressing them, we have helped the sinful propensities to break out and obtain the mastery. The question can therefore only be, whether and how far we are responsible also for the sinful state. This state is our natural one; we are born in it; we bring it with us to the world, before a free decision is possible: hence theology calls it hereditary sin, in distinction from actual sin. For anything we have inherited, we clearly cannot be responsible in the same sense that we are for what

[1] See Note Q 2.

we have done ourselves. At the same time, the circumstance that we feel ourselves answerable for our actual sin, leads to an inference also respecting hereditary sin. From this fact it is clear, at least, that the hereditary sin does not serve to excuse the actual sin. This it must have done, however, if we had been obliged to acknowledge in it a natural necessity, in connection with which there could be question of guilt at all. If we could feel ourselves absolutely innocent in regard to hereditary sin, then we could hardly charge ourselves with any guiltiness in regard to actual sins, as we know that they always spring from the incitements that rise from the hereditary sin—the flesh. Not the sinfulness itself, but only the degree of it, perhaps could then seem to us a matter in which to accuse ourselves. On the whole, we could then say with right: It is my nature to act so, I cannot do otherwise; and as to that which it is a necessity for me to do, I need neither reproach myself for it, nor fear that I shall be punished for it. Spinoza would be right, then, in declaring penitence unphilosophical, and Carl Vogt in opposing the righteousness of punishment. If we did not acknowledge hereditary sin as something which ought not to be, and which might not be, then it would cease to be evil, and all sin with it. There must therefore be some sort of guilty transgression at the root even of the hereditary sin, from which I cannot altogether acquit and free myself, though it does not touch me personally. I am involved in guilt which I have not drawn upon myself.

This, however, is a new contradiction, which requires its solution. But the idea of that which is inborn, inherited, helps us here too. Man is not an isolated being; he does not stand in isolated glory. The roots of his being lie in his relation to the species; generation is the mysterious origin of the individual. The individual is organically connected with the family, with the nation, and with humanity. A dishonoured father leaves behind an inheritance of shame to his children; a bankrupt, debts which come on the whole family. Thus, we are not

able to free ourselves from the impurity of the race. If it is not individual guilt, it is a guilt of the whole, of which each of us must bear a part. In this sense, also, each of us must say, *Homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto.* This organic partnership in guilt is expressed in a hundred ways among men. Every one feels that he has some share in the sins of his family, his native city, his country, even though he has no direct hand in it. On this fact rests, *e.g.*, the profound meaning of a day of humiliation. Hereditary sin thus does not suffice as an excuse for us; but the knowledge of sin is deepened and pointed, when we know that we have been born of a fallen race, that the total life to which we belong is impure. David well understood this, when in a penitential (not self-justifying) psalm he says, "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me" (Ps. li. 7). But, because the whole of mankind are thus tainted, we are obliged to go back to the first man. If the whole race, as such, is in a corrupt state, which is hereditary, and yet, in the sense we have indicated, is responsible, then the first man, the progenitor of the race, must have sinned in freedom. Man must have been originally pure and good; the fall must have been his act, involving his personal guilt. He could, and should, have avoided sin; the sphere of his freedom must have been greater than ours; he must have had full liberty of choice between good and evil. Only if the sinful state is no mere physical state, but one ethically conditioned,—if it is the product of a free act, so that the act, with the accountability for it, still vibrates through the whole condition,—only then does hereditary sin not serve to excuse the actual sin, only then is the contradiction between the "frightful necessity of sinning" and freedom and responsibility removed. My sin tells me that Adam sinned; my sense of guilt tells me that he sinned in a different way from me: he was completely free.

Hereditary sin, *i.e.* the universal sinful state of men, furnishes a proof of the derivation of the human race from one

progenitor. If there were several, then there must have been several acts of apostasy, similar to one another; and sin, in its diffusion, would then be something accidental, while, in reality, the entire life of man and of nature shows itself conditioned by the same evil power. "By one man," says Paul, briefly and strikingly (Rom. v. 12), "sin came into the world."

A true analysis of the moral consciousness thus serves as an essential confirmation of the biblical narrative of the fall; and we see here again, how correctly Genesis deals with the facts of our condition, and alone satisfactorily explains them. Once we have learnt to state the questions of our experience accurately, the Bible always gives us the right answer. What the Bible positively records, will always show itself to be the truly rational view, the only *ratio sufficiens* for all that actual experience in the most diverse regions brings before us. Robespierre once said, "If there were no God, we should have to invent one." We may apply these words to the Bible, and the explanations it furnishes. Were there no such history of the origin of sin, we should have to invent it, if we could; for it is only when the divine light falls upon our condition and experience, that we really comprehend it. Heaven must first illuminate the earth, before the earth can be rightly seen. But in the inward harmony of Scripture and experience, of divine revelation, and what men see, feel, and pass through, lies the mystery, the treasure of wisdom and knowledge. Moving on this path, the Bible will become by degrees as rational and ideal as language itself. We are delighted when we find our thoughts expressed for us beforehand in language, this immediate expression of the Spirit and of the universal reason, and when we find that language itself philosophizes for and with us. The holy Scriptures appear at first sight to be very different from language in this respect. They seem further removed, and more foreign; yet it will be found true in this sense also, "The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart, the word of faith

which we preach" (Rom. x. 8). The Scriptures, in a genuine sense, are the word of the Spirit; they speak the true language of the Spirit. They are, in this sense, the *Scripture* (writing) *κατ' ἐξοχήν*,—the one writing of the Spirit in the world, the Spirit in which all other writings share only in endless degrees of remoteness. The more we succeed in rising into the Spirit, and to a truly spiritual mode of thought, the more will the Scripture become manifest as the nearest and most closely related to us, as well as the clearest and fullest of light. Then it becomes true, *θεῖα πάντα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα πάντα.*

But this narrative in Genesis is still further confirmed in the course of this regressive scrutiny. If the sin of the human race rests on a free act of Adam, that could not be the first cause of it. It must have some other ground. Every existence, and especially every personal one, is linked by an inward bond to its origin. The first men, too, must thus have been bound to God by a natural tie of the deepest piety; as Melancthon so beautifully says in the *Apology for the Augsburg Confession:* "They were happily joyous of heart toward God, delicately susceptible toward all good and divine things; they lived in and from God, as the child lives in and from the mother." If, now, the thought of breaking loose from God, the thought of spiritual parricide, had arisen in *their own minds*, they would have set themselves against God in their own deep selfishness: evil would not be something foreign to man; man would be evil itself; he would have *satanized* himself. And then the evil could not have been removed out of human nature; humanity would not be capable of redemption. Just because man is not a devil, must there be a devil. Evil in its human form, when it does not constitute the substance of the created personality, and where it leaves room for redemption, is to be explained only by temptation.

Thus the two ideas at which the natural mind most readily stumbles, because they belong to the sphere of the mysterious—

the idea of hereditary sin and the devil—are manifestly, in reality, much more the saviours of the true dignity of man. What declamation we have had on the degradation of our race by the doctrine of hereditary sin! Who, however, does most to maintain the honour of man?—he who regards the present fleshly and mortal state as the normal and only possible one for him, or he who teaches that we were born and created for something better; and that the whole of our present condition is only an interpolated period dating from the fall! No one has ever spoken more highly of the dignity of man than Genesis, with its doctrine of the creation of man in the image of God, and the fall of the first created. And no one ever more gently judged sin, or maintained the better Ego, the substantial good in man, more energetically than Genesis, with its narrative of the temptation of our first parents.

As the origin of evil in man cannot be otherwise explained than as Genesis does it, on the one hand, by a free act which establishes his guilt, and on the other by temptation, which makes redemption a possibility, so the Mosaic narrative, in describing its origin, describes also its nature in a way which is self-evidently true. The first act is, that the tempter seeks to loosen the bands of childlike trust which bound man to God (iii. 1, etc.); that he sows first unbelief and then disobedience in the heart of man. He must tear away the solid ground on which their existence rests from beneath their feet, by casting suspicion on the eternal love, as if God were envious, and thus inciting them to rebel against it. Upon the relation of man to God rests, in the first instance, the difference between good and evil. The Scriptures know no morality without a religious basis, no moral law to which man would be bound by anything in his own nature apart from God. But man in his inmost soul is bound to the living and holy God. The will and command of God, as revealed to the first man (ii. 16, etc.),—that is the good, the moral law. Sin, as a departure from the divinely ordained order of life, is ἀνομία (1 John iii. 4). To think of determining

the difference between good and evil apart from God, is to come near wiping it out altogether. Without God, the highest, the indestructible standard of good, is wanting; and sin is only understood in its true nature and in its whole depth, when it is seen to be an offence against the majesty of the living God. The first element of sin is thus departure from God, godlessness, unbelief, which first as mistrust allows itself to suspect the person of God and obscures His fatherly love, and then is manifest as disobedience, which does not regard His commandment as holy and binding. In the relation to God itself, the religious in the stricter sense, the inward attitude of person to person, the disposition of the heart goes before the moral activity. Upon this, too, rests the reciprocal relation of justification and sanctification, faith and works.

The tempter gives weight to this first suggestion, which does not succeed at once (vers. 2, 3—again a fine trait, giving dignity to man as compared with Satan), by a second (ver. 5). He drops into their mind the poison of self-exaltation, by representing to them that they would rise from their position of dependence as creatures, and be as God, knowing good and evil. Here the craft of Satan is most fully displayed. In denying the threatening of death, he cunningly weaves together truth and falsehood. It is truly the will of God that man shall rise to the higher stage of a consciously free life; it is the will of God, and our destiny, created as we are in the image of God, that we shall become like God: our whole nature, by reason of the Spirit of God which is breathed into us, longs for the perfection of its life (see Rom. viii. 29; 1 John iii. 2; Matt. v. 48). But as a creature, man has to pass through a course of development, under the hand of God, to reach this end. Only in that spirit of subjection to God which corresponds with his nature; only through a willing acknowledgment of his position as a creature, and active discharge of its duties in an act of obedience, which therefore God demands, and must demand, is the advance to a higher stage of life possible. Only as reward for

fidelity toward Him, can the free creature receive the crown of eternal life. While God first of all only shows man the way and not the goal, because he was to trust Him and be faithful to Him, the tempter, on the other hand, shows the alluring end, and promises to spare them the way, in order to persuade them to enter upon a path which makes the attainment of the prize impossible. Satan promises likeness to God in a moment, without trouble. Man is only to cast God away, to transgress His command: then his eyes are opened—then he finds himself at once in a new region of being; he awakes as out of a sleep to self-consciousness, to a knowledge of good and evil; and therein he is like God. It is this casting away of all divine bands, which hitherto have only kept the eyes of man closed—this free self-consciousness, this clearing up of his knowledge—which makes man a god. This is the thorn of self-exaltation which the serpent planted in the human heart; and this is the connection which comes out here in so noteworthy a manner, between the exaltation of self and the knowledge which is separated from life and action. Being and consciousness are set in the place of regular growth, sense of duty, and doing the will of God. Man, as a personal creature, has of course a principle of independence and of self-movement in himself. This he exercises normally, however, when he gives himself fully and freely to God. The tempter says, on the contrary: "You need only not to trouble yourself about God; you need only to act and to know yourselves, to live according to your own will: then are ye as God." He brings into the front the personality and the egoism, and pushes the idea of the creature aside; he perverts the fact of being in the image of God into the deification of self. Self-seeking, which, putting God aside, makes God of self—makes self the centre of all things—is the second element in the nature of sin.

To this comes a third, which, after the serpent has thus prepared the way, makes its appearance in Eve herself. This is desire, love of the world, gratification of the senses (ver. 6).

The testing command had this meaning. By means of an external cosmical object, to which man was drawn by no want of his—to pass by which was therefore easy—it might be seen whether man would freely decide for God or for the world, for the higher or for the lower, for the spirit or for the flesh, for the good or for the evil. The matter stood quite simply and abstractly. The tree had no importance in itself. It was of account merely as a means of exercising freedom. This its name tells us: the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Now, however, this tree, the forbidden one, acquires in the eyes of the woman a charm greater than all the unforbidden ones. God has now lost reality in her mind, and the world attracts her with the power of enchantment by means of an object in itself of no importance; the tree seems to the senses so sweet. The senses now obtain the mastery, and sin is committed. The flesh has obtained the victory; the true order of life is inverted. As the higher powers have forsaken God, their true ground and rest, the lower powers become dominant.

Men are now, it is true, greatly advanced in point of knowledge. But they would have advanced also if they had decided normally; for it is not sin, as Hegel, Schiller, and others say, but the trial of freedom, which is the condition of the transition from childhood, and the advance to the higher development of the mind. But if they had decided rightly, the advance in knowledge would have been accompanied with a similar advance in the whole sphere of man's being, ethical as well as physical. Their nature and being, however, have by no means fared as the tempter had represented. They have essentially sunk very deeply; they have in reality become subject to death, as God had said. Instead of having become a god, man has much rather become an animal, like the serpent, as he has given himself over to the dominion of the senses. Instead of having become spirit, like God, he has become flesh. The words in ver. 7, where with great simplicity and irony a reference is made to the words of the serpent, express the profound and

actual truth: "Then the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked."

That these three parts of the idea of sin are not accidental, but substantially express it and exhaust it, is shown not only in the fact that all sin that comes before us in life may be referred to them, but also in the fact that they correspond to the three fundamental elements of man's being and consciousness, —spirit, soul, body—the God-consciousness, self-consciousness, and world-consciousness. These have all become corrupted and perverted. They have become respectively, alienation from God, selfishness, love of the world. The first and highest element of human nature—the spiritual—is negatived, obscured, made powerless; the two others—the lower—are pushed into extreme but unhealthy prominence and activity. Man has become physical and fleshly. Unbelief is the negative; the union of self-seeking, and the lust of the senses, is the positive element in the idea of sin. Man no longer wishes for God; he is bent on having the creature in both ways, the mental and natural, the subjective and objective; he will have his own Ego, and the world too. According to Gen. iii. 5, 6, selfishness and sensuousness are related to one another in such a way, that selfishness is, as it were, the soul; sensuousness, the body of sin: the first is the deep, invisible root; the second, the external manifestation. The Ego, separated from God, seeks in the world the elements on which it lives. Genesis thus comprehends the various opposing theories of men on the nature of sin, the theory of selfishness, which in recent times is represented by Julius Müller, and that of the senses, by Schleiermacher and Rothe. It leads both ethical theories back to a religious basis; and in that matter modern thought has a great deal to learn. Redemption, then, opposes faith to unbelief, love to selfishness, the hope of a new world to the lust of this world.

The narrative of the fall in Genesis will bear, I think, to be closely looked at. There are powerful reasons supporting it no

less than the account of the flood and the tower of Babel. As the existence and state of Israel, and all its beliefs, serve to confirm the Pentateuch, so the actual state of the world, the life of nations, the consciousness of sin and of God, as well as the traditions of all nations, confirm this "oldest document of the human race."

If the mythical theory considers the pre-historic age from the outset as a conquered territory, we rejoice that historic studies have in recent times turned also in the direction of this period. This is the case in all departments, both theological and philosophical.

Shall I say more of that which the first three chapters of Genesis teach concerning God, the creation, the world, man? A "rational" theology, cosmology, psychology, are here *in nuce*. We have already pointed out some particulars. The very first verse of Genesis moves like a saving ark over the waters of heathenism, and announces ideas of God and the world, and their mutual relations, such as we seek for elsewhere in vain. The words (i. 27), "God created man in His image, in the image of God created He him," proclaim the position and dignity of man, in a way to which nothing in the old and nothing in the new world can be compared. In the parallelism, which is at most like a repetition, it seems, to use the exquisite words of Ewald, as if the hand of the writer had trembled for joy. The other passage relating to the creation of man will always hold its ground, as the true foundation of a correct anthropology; for the extremes which have been in conflict through the centuries in this science—materialism and spiritualism, sensualism and idealism—are here brought together, and that in a much profounder and more suggestive manner than might at first sight appear.

Where such stars shine, there we recognise the heavens, even though there be dark spaces between. Written monuments, like Gen. i. 1–ii. 3, and ii. 4–iii. 24, have a right to present us with difficulties; and these are not wanting, whether we

consider each by itself, or look at the two in connection with each other. The first difficulties are such as are inevitable in records so entirely pre-historic; as to the others, recent inquiries have placed the relation of the two in so clear a light, that what is intelligible here, and which is so great and magnificent, is much more than that which has not yet been penetrated; and exegesis and theology have certainly not more of such unexplored territory than other sciences. The first part, the Elohistic, shows us what nature is, and what is man's relation to it; the other, the Jehovistic part, shows what history is, and man's place in it. In the first, man, in his connection with nature, and his high superiority to it, in his kingly aspect toward it, is drawn in such a pure, noble, and lofty style, that it would much better become modern Pantheism and Materialism to learn from it than to mock at it. How, for example, is the difference between man and the animals, which in the hands of many moderns threatens to disappear altogether, simply and strikingly brought out by two touches! Man is said to have been created with all solemnity in the image of God, and in one pair; while the beasts always came forth from their elements at the Creator's word, and in teeming multitudes! Man appears as the top-stone and lord of nature; but the true glory of him is centred in his relation to God, in whom he is destined to find his Sabbath rest. Here the second portion comes in, in which Elohim appears as Jehovah. Jehovah comes into relation to man in history and redemption, and therefore has appointed a place for revealing himself—the garden in Eden (vers. 4–14). There Adam is first alone with God. He receives from God the command by which his freedom should be called into exercise; and thus man should become a factor in the development of the world (vers. 15–17). This is the beginning of history. The relation to God is the first of all relations. It precedes all relations of man to man. Even the most intimate of these, that of man and wife, attaches itself to it (vers. 18–25). Here the connection between history and religion, which has often come

before us already, appears: it corresponds in the wide sphere to the relation between religion and morals in the individual, in its essential principles and signification. All history is developed out of the relation of man to God, and upon it. First of all (ch. iii.), sin, judgment, and grace (promise) are connected with it. That all history, all life of man, individual and collected, has its root in religion, is a fundamental idea, in the apprehension and application of which we have yet much to learn, and long to labour.

Thus we meet, both in detail and in general, points of light which are not only clear and distinct in themselves, but cast their light far into the course of history itself. He who is in earnest about the truth, will, even if there are difficulties which cannot all at once be removed, at least not rashly decide or throw away, but will remember the words of Socrates concerning Heraclitus the obscure, which have cheered me often in studying these chapters: "What I have understood," says the wise man, "is genuine and solid; that also, however, which I have not understood, I think is so too—only it needs a Delian diver."

Our investigation has become unintentionally dogmatical; and indeed there is no better apology for the first chapters of Genesis than that which lies in this simple fact. If one will speak of them, one must enter into the deepest questions concerning evil—the nature of God and man; and so, *vice versa*, in discussing these questions, we are always carried to these chapters, they are so manifestly the very ground on which the foundations and principles rest. As we proceed, we find that the whole doctrine of the new covenant hangs upon them, because the second Adam presupposes the first; the redemption presupposes the fall. Indeed, these primeval testimonies must permeate more and more fully all our thought, if our ideas of God and creation, man and sin, are not to be utterly unworthy of both. Even our believing theology has not yet risen on all sides to the height of these chapters. This defect casts broad shadows

over systems which have otherwise a great deal of light. But we may learn from them this especially, not to restrict our thoughts on theology within too narrow a sphere, not to limit them to the field commonly occupied by systematic theology, but to give them that philosophic width and universality toward which theosophy has been striving, and which it has foreshadowed. For in the first chapters of Genesis lie the foundations of all the life of the world: marriage and family—labour and raiment—city and state—civilisation and art—the relation of man to nature and the world of spirit—nations, languages, religions, etc. There are rich and fruitful hints also for ethics. These fundamental chapters teach Christians, as they taught the Israelites, *Homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto.*

This is a wonder, says Herder,[1] to which the worshippers of reason have not yet given a name—"the story of the fall of the first man. Is it allegory? history? fable? And yet there it stands, following the account of the creation, one of the pillars of Hercules, beyond which there is nothing—the point from which all succeeding history starts. What a piece of work then follows: the cry of murder—the mark of Cain—the song of Lamech—a series of names of men living hundreds of years, like cedars—giants—and the flood, and an ark! Our philosophic wits must, forsooth, deal with the swaddling-bands of our race as if they were ashamed of them. They pretend to wish that the deluge had swept them away, or at most, had allowed them to appear only in the juggler's commentary. And yet, ye dear most ancient and undying traditions of my race—ye are the very kernel and germ of its most hidden history. Without you, mankind would be, what so many other things are—a book without a title, without the first leaves and introduction. With you our race receives a foundation, a stem and root, even in God and father Adam. And they are all taken in so simple and childlike a manner from the mouth of the ancestral story under

[1] See Note R 2.

the trees of the East, and so faithfully detailed by Moses as he found them, the echo of eternal times." And Herder writes to Hamann, "Believe me, my dear friend, the time will come when the revelation and religion of God, instead of criticism and politics, as now, will be the simple wisdom and history of our race."

PART SECOND.—HISTORICAL.

THE author, looking back over the way he had been traversing in the first part, perceived that the whole question of miracles and revelation had become more than he himself at first thought—one of consciousness. The matter is thus brought to quite a modern point of view; and in the controversy with our opponents, we involuntarily make use of their own categories. They will have all the less ground for complaint against us: we have in this respect, too, followed them to their own territory. The great matter now in the discussions on revelation, is the consciousness, the self-consciousness of the church, of the apostles, of Jesus Christ,—the consciousness and self-consciousness of Israel, the prophets, and Moses. If miracles and revelation are not facts, then the whole of these forms of consciousness are essentially self-deceptions and illusions. This may be demonstrated from the Scriptures, even by the admission of the most negative criticism. That FEUERBACH has only carried the modern deistic and pantheistic mode of thought to its legitimate consequences, we were long ago convinced. But we were surprised to find, that our extended historical and critical investigation of the sacred Scriptures carried us on all points to the same result. The alternative would thus, of course, finally be: Is the world a lunatic asylum, or is it a temple of the living God? *Tertium non datur.*

On the ground of this result, we have acquired a scientific right, on the supposition of the credibility of the Bible, to enter upon a dogmatic exposition of the divine revelation, and to place by the side of our regressive view a progressive one, in which would be exhibited not each particular of it in its truth, but the entire development, in accordance with the divine plan, and in harmony with reason. In order, however, to do this with advantage, we shall try first to make ourselves acquainted historically with the question on which we are engaged. The real point in hand can be fully understood only from looking over the whole field of our modern intellectual life. For the contest concerning divine revelation is not merely a single disputed question—it is not only a controversy in the domain of theology; but it is the great intellectual conflict of the last few centuries, and its roots lie still further back in the far past. Even from external reasons, because the opposing views have grown up on Protestant ground, but much more from internal reasons, we must first of all go back as far as the Reformation. We shall not attempt a complete representation, nor an exhaustive internal account of modern mental development, but shall give only a sketch of it in its bearing on the main religious questions with which we are concerned here. It will be felt to be natural in this case, that we should turn our eye principally to countries speaking the German tongue. We shall inevitably have to utter many words with which they who, on one hand, follow chiefly modern authorities, and they who, on the other, cling to the old Protestant ones, will be offended. We, for our part, with all respect for the men whom we revere, would not bind ourselves to any mere human authority, but would illuminate all human things with the impartial earnestness of divine truth, so far as it has unfolded itself to us. In it is "the one rule and guide by which all teaching and teachers must be tried and judged."

I. THE GREAT INTELLECTUAL CONFLICT IN THE CHRISTIAN WORLD.

1. *The Restoration of pure Christianity, and the anti-Christian Opposition.*

The modes of view that are opposed to the belief in a revelation are designated Rationalism or Naturalism. We shall make use of the former of these in the following pages, as it is the higher term, and in general language is regarded as the better of the two. Let us, too, say at the outset, that by Rationalism we do not mean merely that German theological thought of the beginning of this century which in a narrower sense is so called, but the entire mode of thought and view of things of which that is but one phase. Properly, these two expressions should go together, as is indicated in the fact that it is usually supra-naturalism, not supra-rationalism, which is opposed to Rationalism. Reason and Nature, (human-) mind and nature, are the two great provinces of the created world. In these two departments, and therefore in the world, Rationalism took its stand. The idea of God was so weakened and dimmed, and that of the world was made so prominent, that a revelation from God in the Bible sense appeared an arbitrary interference with the established laws of nature, and that which is above reason and nature, therefore that which is above the creature, seemed irrational and unnatural, and at the same time impossible.

The denial of a revelation was hence always closely connected with a denial of God Himself. Deism, Pantheism, Atheism, are nothing else than the necessary forms of thought resulting from thus lowering as much as possible the idea of God, and exalting that of the world or nature. The opposition began with Deism, which indeed accepted a personal God as the creator of the world, but put the created world as self-existent and complete in opposition to God, who, as one dwell-

ing remote, could not interfere in the course of things, nor reveal Himself to the world. If it be so that God is thus of no importance for the maintenance of the world, if its existence is maintained by its own power, then all the reality of life is in the world itself; and it is only a natural consequence of such a view to deny altogether the shadowy God, who is thus made to dwell above the stars, and then pantheistically to regard the divine and the world itself as one. It is the world only which has then a real existence, and Atheism is the natural result of this reasoning.

The whole question may be accordingly brought back to this: Which is the greater, God (and His kingdom), or the world? Creator or creature? Thomas Witzenmann, the able disciple of Oetinger, and friend of Fr. H. Jacobi, saw very deeply into the need of the time, when he in 1780 announced the principle, God is God, and creature is creature; and declared that he wished to refer all "that was revealed in nature and in the word of God" to this principle. We can say yet more definitely with Ehrenfeuchter: "Everywhere the question is: Is the originating principle the cosmic or the divine-human? Upon the settlement of this question rest the ultimate views of science, and the ultimate practical consequences of history. The whole question with man regarding his existence is, Whether to be a world-man or a God-man?"[1]

How deeply this cosmical characteristic pervades the whole of our modern time, may be gathered from the fact that the most important of those systems that are now leading again up from the abyss of negation, are not yet fully free from it. It is owing to this that Schleiermacher, failing to see the divine law in the conscience, and hence narrowing very considerably the distinction between good and evil, makes morality merely the action of the reason upon nature; and even Rothe places the human personality first in relation to nature, and then, in

[1] See Note S 2.

the second place, to God; so that in his *Ethics*, though theological, the religious always comes second to the moral, instead of being ground and root of it. Here, too, the world-ideas, reason (personality) and nature, stand much too one-sidedly in the foreground; and these defects in the *Ethics* are connected with defects of a dogmatic kind in these systems.

The principle of Rationalism forms the perfect antithesis to that of the Reformation. As Rationalism proceeded from the exclusive study of the world, the Reformation came from the knowledge and thought of God. What made Luther a reformer was, that he comprehended the relation of man to God in its central significance. He perceived that the grand question of human life is peace with God. For this prime need, nothing merely of the world was sufficient; neither its own righteousness, nor human mediation, such as Catholicism had placed between God and man. He felt deeply, and acknowledged, the true state of man before God: he saw that man could not approach God to offer works, but only to receive favour; that the sinner lives only by the grace of God; that the righteousness which avails with Him is a free gift from Himself, so that all the honour belongs to Him alone. Luther stood with his whole soul before God, and felt the terrors of His majesty and holiness, but also the overflowing consolations of His reconciling and forgiving love, in such fulness that his experience has been retained as a type and witness for all evangelical piety. It was thus upon the deepest reverence for God that the Reformation rested. It was essentially religious; faith, this root-word of the Reformation, is nothing but the expression of the Bible and the church for religion. In Luther himself, the religious, and more definitely the Christian life, was found in such strength as has hardly ever been seen since the days of the apostles. In him, Christianity as it was announced to the nations, especially by Paul and his evangel, was brought to light again in its original purity and vigour. The centre-point of all divine revelations—the redemption of the world through the God-man, and its

appropriation by faith—was set forth and acknowledged as the central truth.

Rationalism knew and understood nothing of this fundamental evangelical experience; in fact, it started from the most opposite principles: it disputed even the truths upon which the evangelical experience rested. While Protestantism is throughout religious, Rationalism is in principle irreligious; for it cuts away man from God, and places him on the basis of his own nature, so that morality (moral actions, works) comes in the place of religion. Humanity and the world are so self-satisfying and so complete in themselves, that they not only no longer speak of a reconciliation of the world to God, of a redemption by acts of divine love and compassion; but they reject every revelation of God to the world, and at last deny the very existence of a personal living God. In all this we have the diametrical opposite to the foundation truths of the gospel. We must not conceal from ourselves, that here at last the two great historical principles stand opposed to one another, the Christian and the anti-Christian.

Christianity itself gives us the key to a thorough understanding of this state of things; in its documents it is always pointing to the fact that the truth must meet with opposition in the world. The New Testament gives us historical facts and fundamental laws, when it says that all men have not faith; the cross of Christ is to the Jews a stumblingblock, and to the Greeks foolishness; Christ brings not peace, but a sword; He is come into the world for judgment and for separation; He is set for a sign which is spoken against. On this account, Christian truth has always had to struggle with error; and the purer it has been, the more fully has the error developed itself. The greater freedom Protestantism allowed to thought, has also permitted error to unfold itself more fully against the mighty revelation of the kingdom of God. In the Reformation, the spirit of the world gathered up all its forces; and in the course of the succeeding centuries, the opposition of the

natural mind, both Jewish and heathen, to the gospel, was exhibited with a power such as had never been seen in the church before, and with an array of intellectual weapons of the highest order. To understand the historical importance of this phenomenon, we must cast our eye back to the earlier history of the church.

2. *The Development of the opposing Principles in the History of the Church.*

Even in the apostolic age, error had risen in opposition to the gospel, partly in Judaic, legal-ascetic, and partly in heathen-gnostic forms, which impugned the majesty of Christ by the worship of angels, and by the doctrine of certain mediary spiritual beings. The apostles with one mind oppose these deceiving spirits, and so earnestly, as to furnish an example for all times of what true soldiers of Christ owe to the truth and the honour of their Lord; see the expressions of the loving disciple, 1 John ii. 18–26, iv. 1–6. They fought, however, with the perfect consciousness that they would not fully overcome the error, but that, as Paul says shortly before his death (1 Tim. iv. 1, etc., 2 Tim. ii. 17, iii. 1, etc.), in future times, and especially in the last days, the lying spirit would still more widely spread.

Both Paganizing and Judaizing errors, of different sorts, sought to creep into the church of the first centuries. The deification of the creature found expression finally in Arianism, of self-righteousness in Pelagianism. The church overcame these errors by the instrumentality of Athanasius, in whom the spirit of John seemed to live, and by Augustine, who seemed fired with the spirit of Paul. But the enemies pressed into the sanctuary of the church from another side, and Catholicism is nothing but a mixture of Christianity with Jewish and heathen elements. The Jewish-Pelagian element appeared in the whole institution of the priesthood and the doctrine of

meritorious works; and the Heathen-Arian deification of the creature in the worship of Mary and the saints, and in the magical virtues ascribed to the sacraments.

Even before the Reformation, however, the opposite elements, the Christian and unchristian, bound up so closely together, were striving to effect a separation. Since Catholicism had reached its highest point in the twelfth century, there had been a twofold opposition. Belief as well as unbelief stood opposed to superstition; the one in the many so-called forerunners of the Reformation, the other in the heretical tendencies of different kinds. In the sixteenth century both of these currents attained their greatest fulness, the one in the Reformation, the other in the Humanism, which had indeed many elements of true culture in it, but in literature was very weak, and indeed, by its undue zeal for the classics, more or less consciously approached to Paganism. The Reformation was a grand upheaval of true religion. It was so full of power, and had so profound an influence, that it not only conquered a large region from Catholicism, but even kept down the power of Humanism, taking up its better elements into itself for more than a century. But in the second half of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth, the one-sided Humanism, whose opposing elements Socinianism had meanwhile fostered and spread, sprang up again in Rationalism. When it was now opposed by a purified evangelical Christianity, it came out with greater energy than before, as in the Deism of England, and threatened the deepest foundations of the faith by direct assault on divine revelation in general.

Rationalism has been described, both by Catholics and Rationalists themselves, as only a natural development of the Reformation. The principle of free subjectivity began its course there, and ends it here: first of all, the mind was delivered from the authority of the church, then from that of the Bible. This assertion touches only the form, not the essence of the matter. The greater prominence of subjectivity,

the contest with existing authorities, the element of protest, are indeed common to the Reformation and to Rationalism, just as they were afterwards common to Rationalism and Pietism, and indeed as they are common to it and Christianity itself. Every great religious awakening appears in connection with great characters, and rests on the deepest, most inward experiences of the individual soul, in which there lives the power to sap a rigid objectivity that has become but a dead form, but by that very thing is able to save the substance and kernel of the matter, and to bring it out to the light in higher, fuller life. So was—not to mention the highest name, which however has an aspect in which it essentially bears on this point—the first martyr stoned as a rebel against the law and the temple, and the greatest apostle was cast into prison on the same ground. Christianity, Protestantism, Pietism, are all protests, sustained by the Holy Spirit, against the traditions of the elders, against the doctrines of men, and theological systems, which have gathered round the original word of God, and more or less have come to take its place. In the case of the first, the question was the continuance, in the case of the other two, the restoration, of the revelation of God in its true power and purity. Of these three instances, the Reformation is most favourably placed as to our question, for in it there were actual errors to be set aside; while in the first and third, it was not so much the removal of the false as the quickening of the dead (see Matt. xxiii. 3, Acts xxvi. 6, 7). Rationalism, on the contrary, is not a protest of the spiritual nature against merely human principles, in favour and in the name of the word of God; but it is a protest of the natural mind against the divine word, in the name and in favour of human reason. It is thus essentially the very opposite of Protestantism. It is but a ghost-like imitation of it,—a negative Protestantism alongside of the positive and evangelical Protestantism. As to its substance, Rationalism has more affinity to Catholicism, as is clear from the foregoing: it touches it in its Pelagianism and in its undue

exaltation of the creature, but it is specially allied to Humanism, which we regard as its real forerunner.

SARTORIUS was, so far as we know, the first to point out its relation to the former; HUNDESHAGEN especially to the latter.

SARTORIUS remarks, speaking against WEGSCHEIDER and his rationalistic doctrines: "When once men have departed from the sure canon of the written divine word, they must pass into the region of fancy and imagination; and it is then quite an accidental difference, if one places the supreme infallible power of the Papacy, and the other an all-sufficient reason, over the word of God: for it is but human authority in either case, and human imagination, which govern; and the only difference is, that in Catholicism these powers lead with strength and steadiness, in Rationalism with weakness and with frequent change. In Catholicism human tradition, in Rationalism human speculation, dominate over the Holy Scriptures. On the contrary, Protestantism is based exclusively on the true divine or supernatural revelation contained in the sacred Scriptures, which cannot be corrupted; and which is sufficient for all ages; it desires no other foundation to the end of the world; for 'other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ.' Hence Protestantism and Rationalism are just as irreconcilable as Supernaturalism and Rationalism; and Wegscheider himself confesses this last is impossible."

HUNDESHAGEN says: "If it is a question of having first realized absolute freedom from authority, it had a history in Italy, the land of humanistic hegemony, before it even appeared among us. It came up there in many different forms before the Reformation; indeed, it was the Papal, and not the Saxon Court, which first spoke jestingly of the *fabula de Christo*. The freedom of Wittenberg, measured by such a standard, cannot be compared at all with the freedom of Rome; indeed, the work of LUTHER must have seemed to be a backward movement, compared with that which had already taken a firm hold in the minds of educated Italians. History gives us four periods, following

one after the other, in which a decided infidelity, an undissembled hostility to Christianity, went the round of the principal nations of Europe, beginning in the higher ranks of society, passing down to the middle classes, and in both fostered and admired as the very highest point of civilisation, and honoured with a sort of worship. Italy made the beginning in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; in the seventeenth and eighteenth, England and France followed; and in the nineteenth, Germany finished the series."[1]

If we look over the whole history of the church, we shall not be able to avoid observing the historical progress in error. The Arianism and Pelagianism of the fourth and fifth centuries are only important misconceptions of Christian truths, in which their force is weakened, but they are not by any means anti-Christian. The Humanism of the fifteenth and sixteenth century is much more decidedly anti-Christian, though it still represented partly elements of true culture, and its anti-Christian character was limited to the circle of the more learned. Even the Rationalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century has many elements in it, which are not so much at feud with Christianity, as dim and feeble reflections of it. There are, too, as we shall see more clearly by and by, in the tendency of our times, which is not toward Christianity, some important elements of science and culture represented. On the whole, however, it is not to be denied that the un-Christian and anti-Christian spirit of the two last centuries has gone far beyond all similar phenomena of earlier times, as in the extent to which they have spread among the people, so too in their force, and the boldness with which they press on to the consequences. It is not the ancient heretics, but the heathen opponents of Christianity, a Celsus and Porphyry, who have risen up again in the church, in the deistic, pantheistic, and atheistic rejection of the divine revelation.

The rationalistic movement itself has naturally its own

[1] See Note T 2.

history and its progress. The fathers of both the modern systems of philosophy, with their autonomic reason, are not less opposed to the principles of Christian and evangelical religion, than are the representatives of the bare cosmos theory in their poetry and natural science. But the same DESCARTES who with his *cogito ergo sum* declared the intrinsic glory of the mind of man, with its power of thought, has established afresh the ontological argument for the existence of God. He says the idea of God is a necessity of thought. The same KANT who declared the intrinsic worth of the practical and moral nature of man, in his categoric imperative, brings forward the moral argument for the existence of God and for immortality, and so has come back to God by the path of the argument from moral being; he says the idea of a judge and rewarder is an ethical necessity. GOETHE and A. VON HUMBOLDT, however, looking at nature, and describing it as artists, regarded it as the highest thing both in life and science; and therefore they are more decidedly at variance with the kingdom of God. If they did not declare themselves enemies of Christianity; if, in truth, their mental wealth furnishes much which has not only a high human value, but may be of use for the knowledge of divine things, yet they were "decidedly not-Christian," and contributed, and still contribute, not a little by furnishing false surrogates for religion, to unchristianize our people. With KANT, if there is not a gospel, there is at any rate some Moses-like zeal for law; in them, on the contrary, we are sunk into perfect Hellenism. On the whole, we may say, that in the modern Autonism, the Jewish legalism with its human self-righteousness, and in modern Pantheism and Atheism the heathen deification of the world, are carried out to their legitimate consequences. In these the very essence of sin, as already expounded, is completed in full apostasy from God, and surrender to the service of the creature in its two sides, mind and nature, the Ego and the world. Such is the profound gravity of this signature of the time.

It is not, however, as if there was to be seen on the side of

the Reformation and its sons nothing but light, and on the side of Rationalism nothing but darkness: in the intellectual powers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the whole truth; and in those of the eighteenth and nineteenth, nothing but error and falsehood. So long as history is in process of formation only, the truth has usually an element of error mixed up with it, and so has the error an element of truth. For in history, the history of the church and the history of the world, they both appear with the impress of the human mind. The truth is not seen in divine purity, nor is error in absolutely diabolic darkness. We have found it needful, therefore, to state and define clearly the fundamental differences between the views of the two parties, and we must now as carefully distinguish them in their historical course. There is an absolute innate majesty in the truth, and no encroachment on it must be allowed through the relativity of a historical inquiry. But those who represent the primary aspects of truth often overlook its secondary ones, and these then are taken up by those with whom error is primary. So the matter stands between the elder Protestantism and Rationalism. The omissions of the former are not indeed the cause, but they are the occasion of the rationalistic opposition. Rationalism, it is true, did not assail merely the theology of the time, but the Bible and Christianity itself. However, many an occasion of attack would have been taken out of the way, if Christianity had found a practical and theoretical exhibition of itself, more in harmony with its true nature. Historical justice is not less one of our duties to the truth, than sincerity in profession.

II. THE ELDER PROTESTANTISM AND RATIONALISM.

1. *The Elder Protestantism.*

Protestantism, in both of its principles—the material one of justification by faith, and the formal one of the exclusive

authority of the Scriptures in matters of faith—laid down great fundamental truths of the church. The central idea of the Reformation, as already said, was this: Salvation is a matter in which each has to do immediately with God. God must bestow it of His own free grace: I can neither merit it by my own works; nor can other men, even if they be priests, merit it for me: I can only accept it in faith. Salvation, however, is the redemption of sinners, which God has accomplished through His Son. This salvation God declares and offers in His word, which is contained in the Scriptures. In it alone is the original and uncorrupted testimony, which faith discerns and receives. The church, with its tradition and hierarchy, has placed itself between us and the original Christianity of the Bible, and dimmed our views of it as much as with her meritorious works and her priestly mediation. She comes between God and the penitent. These false mediations, which are rather like dividing veils, must be taken away; man must have to do with God Himself, and His own revelation of the truth. These are the great and true fundamental thoughts of Protestantism.

We see here, also, how the two principles of Protestantism are connected, and how they mutually require and correspond with one another. Justifying faith does not throw man upon himself, but binds him in the inmost centre of his being to the living God: it is the appropriation of the salvation given by God in Christ. Therefore Protestantism is not devoid of authority, and it has not the authority of the mind alone; but, in its deepest essence, stands in relation to history, to the history of redemption, the history of revelation. The God of faith is the God who, through historical acts of saving love, has accomplished the redemption of the world. History, however, comes before us in its documents, sacred history in sacred documents; and so the sacred Scriptures are the God-given testimony of the Spirit to the divine acts of redemption. With the subjective element of justifying faith is hence given necessarily, at

the same time, this objective element, the sole authority of Scripture in matters of religion.

On the other hand, however, it follows from this very view, that the Scriptures are not an authority in the legal sense,—an error from which the Waldensians and the Bohemian Brethren were not quite free, and a trace of which may be found even among the reformed churches; but it is an authority in the evangelical sense. For through justifying faith, the salvation which the Scriptures declare, becomes the free and living possession of man. The same Holy Spirit who has given the Scriptures, dwells also in the believer as a power of inward testimony and appropriation. Protestantism does not set up the external authority of the old letter; but the Holy Spirit is the living personal bond between the Scriptures and the believing subject. In Him are united inwardly, in the only way agreeable to the nature of God and of man, divine authority and human freedom, history with its past indisputable facts, and the present with its ever-renewing life.

This is the deep signification of the two connected doctrines of old Protestantism,—the doctrine of inspiration of the Scriptures, and the doctrine of the witness of the Spirit. The first declares that the Scriptures are not of human origin, nor mere dead letter, but the word of the Divine Spirit, which manifests itself inwardly to the Christian, as such, in its divineness and truth. These two doctrines are thus closely connected together as objective and subjective, in the same way with the two principles of Protestantism; indeed, these two principles find in those doctrines only their continuation and more special expression. It is therefore with right, that the doctrine of the witness of the Spirit has recently been strongly insisted upon. Nitzsch says: "Without doubt, the ultimate ground toward which Protestantism in the controversy on all hands is drawing, is in the opinion that the word of God proves itself to be so to those who are mentally and morally able to receive it, just in the degree that they have been raised by it to a higher stage of

life." And Rothe, though his opposition to the old Protestant view of the doctrine of inspiration leads him almost to give up inspiration altogether, yet testifies: "It is as our elder theologians taught: we become certain of the divine origin and character of the holy Scriptures, from the fact that they demonstrate their divinity by the Divine Spirit, which speaks to us out of them directly and indirectly, with its attestation of their divine character."[1]

But these two fundamental ideas were not fully developed, or were treated in a one-sided and exaggerated way, by the Protestantism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

a. The Material Principle.

(1.) *Grace.*

Sin and grace, the two great central doctrines of Christianity, formed also the central points of Protestantism; but in justifying faith they were regarded only in their relation to the individual. Essential as this was as a foundation for the inner religious life and productivity of Protestantism, it was a defect: it kept too close to the mere individual experience, and almost regarded Christianity as only an arrangement for salvation—a religion; and not as at the same time a historical, cosmical power. Christianity is not merely the principle of the justification of the sinner; but it is also the principle of the new birth of each individual, and of the world: it is the kingdom of God. Christ is not simply the Saviour of souls, but He is the High Priest and King, the Origin and Heir, of the universe.

Catholicism had taken up the priestly kinghood of Christ in magnificent form, and had sought to manifest the kingdom of God externally in the mighty world-ruling structure of the hierarchy. But it had gradually become more and more a mere external representation of it: the kingdom of God had sunk more or less into a kingdom of the world—the priest-king to a

[1] See Note U 2.

new lawgiver for the nations—the gospel to the weak and beggarly elements against which the apostle warns us. In opposition to Catholicism, the Reformation, entering into the mind of Paul and the spirit of the new covenant, brought to light again the inward character and spirituality of Christianity, as well as the personal and individual experience of the believer. That is, and must continue to be, the essential life of the church, as it is the daily bread by which the individual is nourished.

But while the right foundation was thus laid again, the whole structure was not built up with equal completeness, either in the practical or theoretical province; for not to one person, nor even to one age, is everything given. As far as the first of these is concerned, which we have to do with only by the way, it is, without doubt, closely connected with the subjective and interior character of Protestantism, that, in spite of the deep insight of the reformers into the divinely ordained distinction between spiritual and worldly things, they almost nowhere established an independent church, but built the episcopate into the government of the country, and the church into the state. This was possible, because in the pentecostal days of Protestantism a deeply religious spirit breathed through the life of the people, and especially through the higher classes. Religious princes were themselves theologians, and had theologians as their chief counsellors, so that the state seemed rather to be dependent on the church than *vice versa*. It lay, however, in the nature of this arrangement, that when afterwards the religious spirit became weaker, the spiritual necessarily seemed, as compared with the secular world, the subordinate and passing one. The church, in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, sank almost to a mere member of the body politic; and the state, the concentration of the secular life, became all in all.

In theology, things went just as they did in the church. The structure of doctrine was not reconstructed out of the principle of faith: they never got beyond the doctrine of a

subjective appropriation of salvation, nor the doctrines of grace, election of grace, the arrangements of grace, and the means of grace. The *loci* of Melancthon, which arose out of his *Lectures on the Romans*, and which treated theology in this point of view, and which Luther, it is well known, declared to be a book worthy of a place in the canon, are the most characteristic expression of original Protestantism; though indeed Melancthon himself, in later editions, and Calvin, in his *Institutio*, advanced to a more comprehensive systematic theology. The great matter was, first of all to maintain and fix, according to the confessions, these fundamental doctrines, and secure them against hostile attacks; and when to the struggle with Catholicism was added the controversies among themselves, their strength was spent in formulating in the most exact scholastic fashion the disputed doctrines. Hence the evangelical principle never embraced the whole system of things, and never reached the form of a satisfactory doctrine of the world and of God, though the example of Paul, with all his wealth of thought, might have led them to it. Those doctrines, which are not immediately connected with the acceptance of salvation—the so-called objective or speculative dogmas of God and creation, Trinity, Christology, etc., upon which mainly rests the reconciliation of Christianity with the mind of man and the world generally—were carried over substantially unchanged from the ancient church. Hence, for Protestants, they stood in the second rank only. Even in Christology they proceeded from the Lord's Supper as the point of view. Closely connected with this was the defective view of eschatology, of which we shall have more to say further on. They stood in the middle of things, at the doctrines of redemption in the narrower sense: the doctrines concerning the first days of the world and the last were kept in the background.

This whole prevailingly subjective view of Christianity appeared in the reformers, especially in LUTHER, with such strength, that the inner fulness of it prevented the want of

further development of thought in other directions from being felt. Hence arose afterwards the danger of running into one-sided Pietism or Herrnhutism, in which Christ is regarded almost exclusively as the bridegroom of the soul; and of the great treasures of Christian doctrine hardly anything but the feeling of sin and enjoyment of reconciliation is retained,—a freer and more comprehensive development of Christian doctrine being looked on with indifference, and even not without suspicion. When the fulness of the religious life had still further subsided, the views of SCHLEIERMACHER came up as another stage onward in the same direction. According to these, the objective facts and doctrines, past and future, were declared to be unessential, or were rejected altogether, and Christianity made a matter of inward feeling. It was also held that the world has an independent existence and progress, apart from the assurance of its real and also external renewal by Christianity. The result of all this is, that when unbelief has become strong, the present world seems the only real world; and while religious feeling and life seem to be merely subjective, and to be belief in the sense of thinking and imagining, the objective truth is thought to be the region of doubtful presentiments, which begins when certain knowledge and understanding, prudent and useful action end, if indeed it is not mere fanaticism and illusion. As in political life the church was swallowed up in the state, so in the public mind and thought the spiritual vanished in the secular.

The doctrinal defect of the older Protestantism may be described from another side. The resurrection of Christ was not made sufficiently prominent, as compared with His sacrificial death, while in the apostolic preaching the Crucified and the Risen held equal place. This error was natural; for justifying faith is built on the sacrifice of Christ, in which forgiveness and redemption have been won for us. But on this very account Christianity was not seen to be the principle of the new life equally for the individual and for the whole mass. Theology,

if the expression may be allowed, kept back the medicinal as compared with the juridical aspect of Christianity. Salvation was not looked on, so much as healing of the sick or quickening of the dead, as a justification and acquittal of the accused by the judge. The New Testament unites the two—reconciliation and redemption, forgiveness of sin and renewal, adoption and regeneration. With the ideal element of imputation is associated the real element of the communication of the Spirit as immediate result (Gal. iv. 6; comp. Rom. viii. 14–16), just as the resurrection of Christ is connected with His death. It is not, indeed, as if these two elements which have to be appropriated by us corresponded exactly with those two in the work of Christ which are the foundation: for the resurrection, taken in its connection with the death of Christ as the sealing of His offering, is also a ground of justification; and His death in its connection with the resurrection, as the death of the old nature, is also a ground of renewal (Rom. iv. 25, vi. 2). The elder Protestantism looked too exclusively at the first aspect, so that the resurrection of Christ appeared as if merely a confirmatory appendix to His death: they did not sufficiently consider the other, in which the death is seen to be the path to the glory of the resurrection. And yet it is this very Lord who has entered into the eternal, incorruptible, and undecaying life of the Spirit, through the death of the flesh, who is the foundation and Creator of the new spiritual world. We must deeply ponder the risen and glorified One, if we would understand Christianity in its universal significance, as the power by which not only peace with God comes to all believers, but by which a new ethico-metaphysical principle is introduced, the principle of a spiritual life perfected in God,—a principle which can come from no other source, and can be replaced by nothing else, and which is proving itself to be the realization of the true ideal of humanity. We see in this thought the deep meaning and the indispensable need of Christianity; we see how it embraces all spheres, and is the power which carries them forward to perfection (1 Cor. xv.).

There was a point, starting from which, in the sixteenth century, this doctrine of the renewal of the world began to be understood. That point was the sacraments. The eye turned naturally from the question concerning the Lord's Supper to the Christ in glory. One would have thought, that the more realistic Lutheran doctrine would view the taking of the body and blood of Christ as the principle of the renewal of the nature of man, including the resurrection; and it is easy to connect this point of view with the Lutheran doctrine. The books of doctrine, however, do not enter further into the subject: they do not teach that the Lord's Supper is the bread of life eternal. The principal passage on the subject is given in the words of Luther, in the *Larger Catechism*, where, speaking of the use of the Lord's Supper, he says: "It is clear from the words, 'This is my body and blood, given and shed for you for the remission of sins,' that we go to the sacrament because we receive such a great treasure, through and in which we get the forgiveness of sins. Wherefore? Because the words stand there, and assure us of such blessing; for they say to me, Eat and drink, and serve me as a *pledge and sign*, yea rather, are the very defence provided to shield me from my sins, from death and all evil. It is therefore called a feast of souls, which nourishes and strengthens the new man. For we are first born anew by baptism, but yet the old flesh and blood continue with man: there is so much hindrance and opposition from the devil and the world, that we often become tired and weary, and sometimes even stumble and fall. This ordinance is therefore given for daily refreshment and food, by which faith may be restored and strengthened, we may be prevented from falling away, and may become ever stronger and stronger. For the new life must be so cared for, that it may always grow and advance." The formularies of the church touch only by the way, in a single passage, upon the meaning of partaking of the body and blood of Christ, when they say: "The true, essential body and blood of Christ, are received and partaken of by believers, as a *certain pledge and assurance* that

their sins are truly forgiven, and that Christ dwells in them with power." In these passages beautiful and fruitful points of view are indicated—the new life, and its increase in strength, the indwelling of Christ with power; in another passage, the union of Christians with Christ their head, and among themselves, is mentioned. But the taking of the body and blood of Christ is not regarded as the active cause of these blessings, but only as the pledge, just as in the first place it is the sign and pledge of the pardon of sin. The doctrine of the forgiveness of sin, or justification, is to such an extent the predominating principle, everything else is so determined by it, that the doctrine of the sacraments has been formulated wholly from this point of view. They are called, in the *Apology of the Augsburg Confession*, "Signs of atonement and the pardon of sins; for they offer the forgiveness of sins to us." If this is their peculiar and essential meaning, then the body and blood of Christ have no further function than to be the pledge and assurance of that blessing: the communication of new and eternal life then of necessity fell into the background. This arose very much from the Lutheran mode of exegesis, and is founded chiefly, as is clear from the above passage of Luther's, upon the words employed in instituting the Lord's Supper. It was not seen that the body and blood of Christ are not spoken of there as a pledge, but as the *cause* of the forgiveness of sin, as they were given and shed in the death on the cross. As a negative consideration, it is to be added, that the Lutherans, because of their doctrine, that the unbelieving also receive the body and blood of the Lord, could not refer to the Lord's Supper the passage in the sixth chapter of John, where the taking of the blood and flesh of Christ is represented to be the bread of eternal life and of the resurrection.[1]

Among the Reformed Church party, the doctrine of justification by faith, which was all in all with LUTHER, had not this high and all-regulative position. Of this party Calvin did

[1] See Note X 2.

most to unite substantially the ideas of new-birth and justification. Hence, in the Reformed doctrine, justification is not so much the principle from which all is derived, as the door through which we arrive at a spiritual understanding, and a proper mode of considering biblical truth. Hence the Reformed books of doctrine are drawn up more after the common arrangement of systematic theology than the Lutheran books. With respect to the sacraments, and especially the Lord's Supper, it is well known that with the Reformers also the idea of sign and pledge is most prominent. Zwinglius seems to have a very defective view of it. But his idea, that the sacrament is a sign or attestation of the grace before received (*factæ gratiæ signum*), was refuted by CALVIN. Even the first Helvetic Confession (of 1536) says, in its twentieth article: "The sacraments are not mere empty signs, but they are both signs and substantial things. For in baptism the water is the sign: the substantial and spiritual, however, is the new-birth and reception into the church of God. In the communion, the bread and wine are signs, but the substantial and spiritual is the communion of the body and blood of Christ, the salvation which is accomplished on the cross, and the remission of sins; which substantial, invisible, and spiritual things are received inwardly in faith, just as the signs are received bodily. And in these spiritual and substantial things the whole power, effect, and fruit of the sacraments consist." Then the second Helvetic Confession (article 19) declares, that God represents externally in the sacraments what He bestows inwardly (*quæ interius præstat, exterius representat*). The sign and pledge, therefore, do not lie in the invisible blessing of the body and blood of Christ, but in the bread and wine. In these there are two things which are outwardly seen: they are first broken (on this, therefore, the Reformers lay great emphasis) and poured out, then eaten and drunken. Corresponding with these is the twofold participation in the body and blood of Christ, in so far as they are broken and shed for us on the cross for the forgiveness

of sins, and in so far as they are now given to us as the meat and drink of resurrection and of eternal life. The first of these rests on the words used at the institution of the ordinance, the second on John (ch. vi.), which passage also was referred by the Reformed party to the Lord's Supper. While, therefore, on the part of the Lutherans, as Luther's mystical mind had some glimpse of the mystery of the real union with Christ, which is taught by the Scriptures and the church, more stress is laid on the fact of taking the body and blood of the Lord, and while it is secured, by being placed on a deeper christological foundation, against the danger to which it is open in the Reformed party of being understood too metaphorically and in too subtle a sense; yet, surprising as it may seem to many, the Reformed confessions show a profounder estimate of the signification of this ordinance than the Lutheran. In them, the body and blood of Christ are not reduced to mere sensible signs, and therefore are not regarded simply as a *pledge* of the inward gift, but they are the very inward heavenly gift itself, the active power and cause of eternal life. Thus, in the BASLE Confession of 1534, we read: "In the Lord's Supper, where, in the bread and cup of the Lord, together with the words of the ordinance, the true body and blood of Christ are set forth and presented to us by the servant of the church, true bread and wine remain. But we believe most surely that Christ Himself is the food of souls unto eternal life, and that our souls are fed and watered with the body and blood of Christ through a true faith in the crucified Christ; that we thus, as members of His body as our one head, live in Him, and He in us, that through Him and in Him we may rise at the last day to everlasting joy and blessedness. Therefore we confess and declare that Christ is present in His ordinance with all those who sincerely believe."

In both evangelical churches, however, this fundamental idea of the glorified life of Christ, and the communication of it to the believer, was brought out only in the doctrine of the

Last Supper (and also in that of the *unio mystica*), and was not viewed in all its width. If the sacrament had been regarded in the light of the glorified Christ, instead of the glorified Christ in the light of the sacrament, then the question of the sacrament would have been more simply and more fundamentally handled, and happy results would have followed in connection with other doctrines. Greater unity in their conception of the Spirit would have been attained. The emphasis laid by the Reformed church on the words, "He hath ascended up far above all heavens," and the prominence the Lutherans give to the other words, "That He might fulfil all things" (Eph. iv. 10), would then be explained: they would have discerned in Christianity the life, the transfiguring and renewing power that emanates unceasingly, in orderly development, from the glorified Christ. But their vision was not powerful enough to comprehend all the glory of the ascended and reigning Christ; and this defect is most clearly seen in the eschatology of the elder Protestantism, which is now generally admitted to be imperfect.

This eschatology is limited in the main to the idea of a state of blessedness or misery after death: the justified, who have received the grace of God, go to God in heaven; others go to hell. Even in this it hardly goes beyond the individual standpoint. At the end of time stands the last day, to decide once more the everlasting fate of all men; though one does not see why this is necessary, as a definite judgment is passed upon all immediately after death. A new condition of the world, in which the creature in its diverse spheres attains to the existence for which it is destined, was so little thought of, that the actual destruction of the world was taught by the old theologians. "Fulfilment," says QUENSTEDT, "does not consist in simple change or renewal of qualities, but in total destruction and annihilation of the very substance of the world itself." In this way, not only is more made of the dualism of the blessed and the lost than Scripture warrants; for the Scriptures teach that

the whole universe, heaven and earth, is to be renewed, and that a gloomy abode of death exists only "without" this glorious and only world of life; but one entire half of the world, viz. nature, has been overlooked, and Christ is not perceived to be, as He is—the restorer of all things. And as their view of the end of all things is thus defective, so is their view of the development of things. In fact, proper reference to this is not to be found either in the eschatology or in the history (universal and individual) of redemption. In the doctrines concerning the final end, the defectiveness is shown in the fact, that the two middle members—which, according to the Scripture, lie between the present state and final perfect one—are thrown out: the region of death (Hades, Sheol) as distinct from hell (Gehenna); and the future reign of Christ and His people over all kingdoms and lands of this world, as distinct from the final end and fulfilment of all things. The one doctrine was sacrificed to oppose the Catholic doctrine of purgatory; the other, that of the Anabaptist Chiliasm. They had not ethical and metaphysical breadth or freedom for the first; for the second, they had not historical completeness of view. The subjective standpoint has hindered a fuller development of the Protestant Church; but it has hindered still more a knowledge of the kingdom of God: as the king was little thought of, compared with the high priest, so naturally was the kingdom. Hope and love were neglected, as compared with faith; and so was the future appearing of Christ, compared with the past, and the idea of the kingdom, compared with personal salvation. Protestantism, like Christ Himself, preached in all sincerity, "Repent, and believe the gospel;" but that other part of the preaching of Christ, "The kingdom of God is come nigh," it kept back; just as, from the same causes, it kept back the apostolic view of the resurrection of Christ, and gave too exclusive heed to His death.

This neglect of these doctrines of the new creation, and everything miraculous that is involved in them, revenged itself at a later period. The supernatural character of divine

revelation was not considered sufficiently, or rather, the supernatural in it was not studied fully and on all sides: the great universal miracles of the end, as of the beginning, were neglected (Gen. i.–xi.). Hence the miracles of the middle period, which the Old and New Testament record, seemed like arbitrary interruptions of the stedfast course of things. If the scriptural idea of a grand development of the world, through the human acts of the fall and the divine acts of the restoration, had been vividly realized, then the miracles of the Old and New Testament would have fallen naturally into their place as parts of one whole, and would not have seemed like unwarranted exceptions.

The idea of God, too, to come from the end to the beginning, would have been considerably affected by a deeper and worthier view of the glory of Christ, and the new creation of the world accomplished in Him. Since sin and grace are the starting-points of Protestantism, it might have been expected that the fulness of grace would be better comprehended, and the abundance of God's life, which is the source of all salvation and life, would be fully demonstrated and set forth. That would have been the scientific and metaphysical consequence of the Protestant doctrine of God's all-powerful, all-sufficient grace. The Scriptures speak of the fulness of the Godhead, of the riches of the glory of God. They call Him the Father of glory, and apply to Him other similar names. Into this very glory Jesus has entered; this fulness of God dwells bodily in Him. From the glory of the exalted Christ, we may therefore infer the glory of God. The biblical realism, much talked of recently, has its roots here. It is a question of a realistic conception of spirit, instead of the idealistic and spiritualistic one which prevails in philosophy and theology. Spirit in the (biblical) full sense of the word is not simple being—not even mere perceptive or thinking being; it is personality, which is self-moved, and which in the fulness of power manifests its life and assumes form: so that spirit and a higher bodily or a glorified nature do not exclude,

but include one another (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 44; 2 Pet. i. 4). This conception of spirit is true, above all, of God (John iv. 24), whose self-revelation, in the fulness of His powers, the Scriptures describe mainly by the word glory.

In this light, the whole spiritual, invisible world of heaven, or rather of the heavens, has a much richer and fuller meaning than otherwise. The heavens are not merely a "blessed state" figuratively described; but they are the higher, the essential, archetypal world, of which this world is an image or reflection, and from which all real powers and life flow down, as light flows from the sun to the earth. It is a fact, on which the whole revelation rests, that there is above this visible world another world, a kingdom of God which was in existence even at creation, a perfect spiritual world, *i.e.* a world of life, light, and love. This is the ideal world, which is indeed rather the true and real world (Luke xvi. 11; Heb. viii. 2, ix. 24): there reigns in it a purity, holiness, and harmony of life, compared with which our life in the flesh is darkness and death. There is therefore a fulness, power, glory, and blessedness of life, compared with which our present life on earth is poverty and weakness; and such a life is in its nature eternal; such a kingdom is one that stands firm, immoveable, indestructible, glorious in undecaying bloom and beauty. This biblical realistic view of the divine and the heavenly, would have been of the greatest importance in respect to the ever-growing cosmical principle: here lies the one adequate counterpoise to Pantheism and Tellurism—to the entire earthly spirit of modern systems.

The history and true signification of revelation also are more clearly seen in this light. To the natural man, the distinction between heaven and earth is inexplicable; indeed, unbelief, with all its thinking and striving, is bound by the limits of this lower world. Therefore the one object of revelation is to awaken in humanity the consciousness of that perfect and spiritual world, and to raise it up to its holiness, power, and

joy. The old covenant paved the way for communion with the heavenly world, exhibiting its substantial blessings in pictures and types, as children are taught by the eye. But Christ, He who came from heaven, brought down the spiritual life of the upper world to the earth, and set up the kingdom of heaven among men. He Himself having gone back to heaven, He bestows upon His followers heavenly blessings, and brings them, through fellowship in His death and resurrection, into the heavenly life. Through Him, personal entrance into heaven is opened to the believer after he puts off the body of the flesh; and one day this distinction of earth and heaven will altogether disappear, when the glory of heaven shall have descended to the new earth. The Father has placed the fulness of His spiritual glory in the Son, and the Son gives it to His creatures, in order to raise them thereby in their order to the same state of glory and perfection, till God is all in all. The future is connected in this way with the invisible; and therefore it is essential to biblical realism, which appeals first of all to metaphysics, to be at once eschatological, and in accord with the history of revelation.

But, as we saw with regard to the historical-eschatological side of Christianity, which rests on the idea of the new creation, this metaphysical view of it was also neglected by the earlier Protestantism. God was thought of chiefly as the justifying God, the God of grace and righteousness; and this is indeed the first and greatest matter. But, scientifically considered, these are only expressions for attributes of God; they do not give any view of His essential being. Protestantism did not drive its roots down to the very idea of God itself, nor to the deepest questions in metaphysics. The abstract, scholastic metaphysics were not replaced by another and better system. They were first set aside, and then afterwards resumed unchanged. Melancthon had at first removed the doctrine of God out of his *loci* altogether, and contented himself with a description of God by His attributes: "God is a spiritual being,

intelligent, eternal, true, good, pure, righteous, compassionate, perfectly free, of infinite power and wisdom: the eternal Father, who hath begotten the Son as His image from eternity; and the equally eternal Son, the image of the Father; and the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Father and the Son." The more scholastic Protestantism itself became, the more naturally it returned to these ideas of the middle-age scholasticism; which, however, are quite foreign to the fulness of biblical realism. Even Johann Gerhard calls God, as Thomas Aquinas does, the pure and simplest essence, the substantial, absolutely undefined Being, in whom being, and thinking, and willing are the same. *Deus est mera et simplicissima essentia; ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum; in Deo idem est esse et intelligere et velle.*[1] It is the old error: wishing to deny all limitation in God, they denied also all defined existence; to raise the glory of God far above everything finite, they believed it necessary to exclude all concrete life from His nature, and conceive of it as absolutely simple.

So long as piety was strong and healthy, the life was better than the system, and even the system itself was better: the full heart filled up the void in the idea, and the abstract definitions were supplemented and corrected by those that were more concrete in other "*Loci.*" When, however, faith became weak, it was only a scientific result to pass from such a conception of God, on one side to Deism, and on another to Pantheism. The former occurred in the seventeenth century, especially in England, the latter in Holland through Spinoza. That spiritualistic conception of God is extra-biblical in its origin. It is derived from the philosophy of the ancients, and therefore leads right back to heathenism. It places God before the world in such abstract spirituality, that He is no longer of any importance in it. The first consequence was the denial of revelation; for the infinite God, who is raised high above all concrete being, cannot come down to the finite. On the other side, the

[1] See Note Y 2.

words of Gerhard quoted above remind one very much of Spinoza's conception of God, and his principle, that all determination is negation. From the substantial, purely undefined Being of the church dogmatists, to the world-substance of Spinoza, which, though it was originally uncosmical, yet first attains actual existence through the attributes of thinking and extension, there was, as may be understood, only a step. In this abstract idea of God, all concrete life, all riches of existence, fell away from God, and rested in the world itself: the idea of God had no longer living power or inward reality enough to maintain itself against the rich cosmos, and so it fell into Pantheism.

The first Protestantism, we have seen, understood Christianity rightly, but not fully. It understood it correctly in its deepest ground as a religion, but it fully recognised neither its historical nor its metaphysical (and physical) side. It is only giving another expression for this defect, when we recall to mind how the elder Protestantism expressed itself scientifically in a new scholasticism. Scholasticism arises when faith, the substance of the universal consciousness, and the dogma of the church, is acknowledged as truth. Then science seeks to work out formally what is given to it in these: then the great aim is the logical accuracy of single points in their relation to the acknowledged doctrine, drawing right conclusions, avoiding inner contradictions, etc. A scholastic system is thus an artistically and ingeniously constructed edifice of religious doctrine; and we are assuredly not behind any in respect for the greatness of these systems, in which, as SCHNECKENBURGER says, our forefathers for centuries placed their highest thoughts, and which are the result of the prolonged toil and study of many great minds. Throughout, however, it is only the formal question that is considered. It is not the real truth of the doctrines. In fact, this is presupposed. Religion is not distinguished with sufficient care from the other powers of life; and these are not exhibited in their full and indepen-

dent completeness. Religion and theology are the all-dominating powers, else men would never come down to a mere scholasticism. And a thorough recognition of the ethico-historical and the physico-metaphysical side of Christianity is never reached, just because history and nature are not fully recognised. The whole of life is here more or less religion, religion becomes immediately theology, theology is essentially dogmatism.

This state of things is natural and bearable so long as earnest faith pervades the general thought, and rules public opinion. Then the religious consciousness and the scientific consciousness fall in with one another. When, however, the religious spirit gives way, then the dogma in the ecclesiastical sense makes its appearance. We have then publicly authorized doctrine as dogma in the sense of the ancients, *i.e.* as fixed statute, as mere form without spirit and life, as external restraining rule without power of inward conviction. Then, too, law stirs up anger, and excites antagonism against itself. Rationalistic criticism follows scholastic dogmatism, as it did the Catholic scholasticism in the fifteenth century, and still more the Protestant scholasticism in the eighteenth.

(2.) *Sin.*

The foregoing section referred to the subject of grace; we now pass to that of sin, and shall perceive similar deficiencies here. To regard the relation of man to God almost solely from the two points of sin and grace, is not exhaustive; the more general relation of Creator and creature is neglected. The first article of faith was pushed behind the second and third. Be it far from us to impeach in any way the earnestness and truth of the Reformers' opinions of sin: it is one of the two burning centres of all the light of the Reformation. But that the whole of the natural life of man should

be looked at almost exclusively from this point—sin—was neither in harmony with Scripture nor experience.

The Reformers were universally gifted and educated men. The popular and German national element was best represented by Luther. Zwinglius, too, was a man who loved his people and fatherland with warm affection; indeed, the patriotic element occupied only too important a position in his action as a Reformer. Melancthon, the Humanist, and *præceptor Germaniæ*, was not only at home in the classics as few are, but he had thought deeply on rhetoric and dialectics, physics and ethics, psychology and history. Even in these respects considerable influence proceeded from the Reformers; but the Protestant system of doctrine as such was hardly touched by any of them. They did not arrive at an ethical or historical settlement of the relation between classical and Christian thought, between humanism and the gospel; indeed, ethics were comparatively subordinate, compared with systematic theology. Only in the directly practical questions of the relation of the church to the secular authorities and the laws of marriage (especially of the priests), was a more thorough exposition of the relation between the religious spiritual life and the natural life given; and in the correct and profound views of the Reformers upon these questions, as well as in the connected doctrine of the three states, ecclesiastical, political, and domestic (*status ecclesiasticus, politicus, œconomicus*), fruitful germs of a system of ethics are to be found. The natural arrangements of the family and state were acknowledged as divine institutions, independent of the church. But they regarded, at the same time, the difference between civil and spiritual righteousness almost only negatively, and did not properly estimate the preparatory stages of that perfect righteousness which the New Testament shows to have existed even in the pre-Christian world (*e.g.* John iii. 21, xviii. 37; Acts x. 35; Rom. ii. 7, etc., xiv. etc., xxvi. etc.). Against Flacianism it was expressly taught that evil was not the substance of man's nature; and from that one admission all that we desiderate in

these systems might have been deduced, or at least connected with them. But while this care in guarding against an extreme doctrine of sin gives a strong testimony to the ability of Protestantism to reach anew the line of truth in such fundamental questions, the circumstance that one of the leading champions of Lutheranism fell into that error, is a proof that the right view had not so completely taken possession of men's minds as could have been wished. Many old Protestant terms, too, used in describing the ruin of sin, unquestionably go beyond Scripture. The Reformed party, having a less central view of the truth, but seeing it better in its various sides, had worthier views of our natural life in its propædeutic significance than the Lutherans. Their theologians not only formed a *theologia naturalis* of their own; but some of their confessions —as, for instance, the Gallic and Belgic—begin with a description of God, and then notice independently His revelation in the creation and government of the world, before the clearer revelation of the word (after which follow the usual details concerning Scripture; then the material doctrines of the confession as derived from Scripture, such as the Trinity, etc. etc.). Still, on the other hand, the doctrine of predestination stood in the way of further progress in these respects.

Neither party considered sufficiently the nature of man, as it was created, either in the individual or the mass, the points at which the gospel could touch men, such as the conscience, and their unsatisfied restlessness. However much they were indebted to the authors of heathendom, they formed their opinions of them almost exclusively from their darker side; unlike Paul, who brings forward their good points strongly, while certain expressions of Zwinglius go much too far in a contrary direction. They consigned all heathen, in spite of the second chapter of Romans, to damnation, and could not give its full weight and right place to the distinction which the moral sense compels us to make between a SOCRATES and a NERO. A better understanding of the revelations of God in nature, history, and

conscience was necessary, in order to perceive that belief or unbelief was possible in reference to these revelations too, and that even the heathen might be called comparatively righteous or unrighteous, according as they received and obeyed these divine testimonies or not. In John's Gospel itself, we read of the children of God and Christ's sheep in this sense (John xi. 52, x. 16). He who is the Saviour is also the Logos, by whom all things were made, and by whom they consist, and who, as the "true light, lightens every man that cometh into the world." But this was not remembered as it ought to have been in their theology; in fact, their doctrine of the Trinity was simply transferred from the middle ages. Else would they have taken more comprehensive views of the connection between the creation and redemption—between the whole divine plan of the world, and the plan of salvation; and this would have been more agreeable to Protestant principles. They would have been preserved, at the same time, from those errors of a doctrine of absolute predestination with which all reformers were infected, which marred equally all their ideas of God and man, and which are not yet quite expunged from the formularies themselves. As it is, there are a number of points in this circle of doctrine on which we have just touched, with which not only rational thought, but also the moral sense, may be offended, and which help to explain the moralistic and intellectualistic opposition of Rationalism. The opposition had begun indeed in Arminianism and Socinianism.

The Scriptures represent to us the entire world-drama, as the great transaction between God and the creature, which begins with the creation of heaven and earth, and concludes with the new creation of both. Nature and history are both included, and have a profound and rich significance, as on one side existing in the Logos, on the other lying in wickedness: they form the foundation and preliminary stages of the revelation of the gospel on the one hand; they form "the world" on the other. Creation and the fall; blessing

and curse; powers of God, and power of the enemy, even in nature; traces of the divine image in the conscience and in the personality of man, with its rich and manifold gifts, which are ever set in motion and developed by the eternal power and Godhead manifest in the things that are made, though not freed by them from the original curse of darkness; restrainings of the evil, preparatory schools of the law and the gospel, or, according to NITZSCH'S beautiful expression, "preliminary redemptions" in the divine institutions of the state and family; remains of the primeval creation, and the oldest revelation in the heathen world, and organic continuation of them in the revelation of both Testaments, and with these the prince of the world as a co-efficient in history; the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent; Israel and the nations in a state of nature; the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world in their development with and by each other, up to the final struggle and eternal victory, as it is all wonderfully given so early as Gen. iii. 15, as Thema of the history of the world;—in such outlines as these would Scripture, if placed again in the right light, have furnished the first elementary outlines of a philosophy of nature and history, which, without trenching upon the foundation-truth of the Reformation doctrine concerning sin, would have brought grace in all its stages—grace preparatory (as *gratia prævenicns* in the large, universal sense) and grace perfecting, and not merely the grace peculiar to the gospel—into full view.

These last observations have brought us to the second great principle of Protestantism—the formal one. Be it granted us, however, to add to the present section some closing remarks.

It may be said, that in the foregoing observations we have applied the measure of a more advanced period and stage of knowledge to the earlier one, and that this is neither just nor historical. But to show in this way the defects of the older Protestantism is necessary, if we are to arrive at a right understanding and just estimate of Rationalism, with which we are

here concerned. For the strength and importance of Rationalism lie in the fact, that it brought out in their value and power the elements of truth neglected by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, though it does so in a most one-sided and extravagant way. The opponents of the truth have, through all history, the merit of causing its friends to seek a deeper and wider view of it. Even a number of the most important books of the New Testament, the Epistles to the Galatians, Colossians, etc., owe their origin to false doctrines. Rationalism has also led to a more comprehensive knowledge of Christianity and the Bible; and from this very view we have taken, will result a truly historical understanding and judgment of the older Protestantism as well as of Rationalism. The important and decisive matter, however, is, that the measure we have used is the biblical one.

There were, indeed, by no means entirely wanting in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, men of profound theosophic insight. We remember PHILIPP NICOLAI, the author of the hymns, "*Wie schön leucht 't uns der Morgenstern*," and "*Wachet auf, ruft uns die Stimme*" (*ob.* 1608); JOHANN ARNDT, the author of the work, *True Christianity* (*ob.* 1621); JACOB BŒHME (*ob.* 1624). But their hour was not yet come. Of NICOLAI, THOMASIUS says: "It does one infinite good to come from the scholasticism of the long (Christological) controversy into the blooming and verdant garden of his, in the best sense of the word, Christian mysticism." But with his high, comprehensive ideas, he was alone. ARNDT and BŒHME were treated as heretics. The prevailing, orthodox tendency regarded living Christian faith and knowledge only as deviations in doctrine. BŒHME'S fate, in particular, proves how little there was of apostolical and truly evangelical freedom in the church of that time, how little of that spirit of freedom which could bear in patience and love with different gifts on the ground of a common faith, and could lead and wisely use a real power, even if it were not a common one. How differently the Consistorial Rath, CARL HEINRICH RIEGER, of Stuttgart, at a some-

what later period, treated the visionary theosophistic peasant, JOH. MICH. HAHN! It was a genuine feeling for the hurts of the church of that day, sorrow for the theological, and especially crypto-Calvinistic controversies, and for the way in which they were carried on, which moved the young, gentle, childlike BŒHME to set out in search of truth, and to pray for the light of the Spirit. The remarkable visions which he afterwards had, he used with great humility and self-discipline. Yet he did not escape the hostility of the chief ecclesiastical dignitary at Görlitz, GREGORY RICHTER, whose successor refused to preach the funeral discourse over BŒHME, though he had died after making a purely evangelical confession of his faith, and received the last supper with the words: "O great Lord of Sabaoth, save me according to Thy holy will! O Thou crucified Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on me, and receive me into Thy kingdom! Now I am going into Paradise!" By order of the city council, one of the deacons was obliged to undertake the discourse; he began by saying that he would rather have gone twenty miles to please another, than preach this sermon, and chose for his text, "It is appointed unto all men once to die, and after death the judgment" (Heb. ix. 27). Theologians of higher character did doubtless judge BŒHME more leniently; and, for example, JOHN GERHARD, ARNDT'S spiritual son, said he would not take the whole world and help to condemn that man. But no theologian till SPENER had the courage to take his part earnestly, or even to make an impartial investigation of his works. Even OETINGER says, when justifying his interest in BŒHME, and study of his works: "Theologians who shrink from studying this man, will pardon me for thinking that they are chargeable with timidity, fear of man, or undue desire to please man. For assuredly BŒHME'S doctrines must be looked at with SPENER'S eyes, and not with learned pedantry, or with a hateful disposition to discover heresy."[1]

[1] See Note Z 2.

What we complain of in the elder Protestantism, is not a too much, but a too little in knowledge (it is a different thing with creeds, which should be as simple as possible) of Christian truth. In saying thus much, we have admitted that we can most heartily approve of going back to the substance of the confession of the Reformed party. But it is also implied that it could only be for the substance of religious truth, and not as an attempt sharply to define theological doctrines. Each period expresses these in its own language, and in the sixteenth century it is scholasticism which rises and speaks again. That now lies far behind us. This principle is not rejected even by the most decided adherents of the Lutheran Confession. They, too, distinguish between the "substance of the creed" and the "leading of proof for a certain theology which cannot be binding on all times." They also wish for a progressive and continued formation of symbolical doctrines.[1] It is, at the same time, not to be forgotten, that such continuous forming of doctrines can never be simply the addition of something new to the old. The truth is an organic whole, which must be brought by each successive period afresh into the currents of science. It is not a question of solitary improvements, but the raising of a new structure out of the whole of the former material; and in the new edifice, that which has been previously established naturally finds its necessary place, but may stand in a different relative position from that it held in the older and more limited system.

b. The Formal Principle.

One of the greatest things done by the Reformation was to bring the Scriptures into the light of day, and make them accessible to the people by translating them into the common tongue. By this means every Christian man was put in a position to use the Scriptures in all their fulness every day;

[1] See Note A 3.

and the streams of blessing which have flown from this source into innumerable souls and churches during the last few centuries, eternity alone will reveal. The theologians of the church have confirmed this gain, which cannot be too highly valued, exceedingly well, by their teaching concerning the Scriptures and their characteristics, especially concerning their sufficiency and perspicuity. We have already referred also to the profound truth and importance of the old Protestant doctrine of inspiration; and the witness of the Holy Ghost. At the same time, there are considerable defects in the older Protestant way of using and of looking at Scripture; and these defects in the carrying out of the formal principle are naturally intimately connected with those which we have found in the carrying out of the material principle, to which we have already had to make repeated reference.

(1.) *The Use of Scripture.*

If Christianity itself was regarded only on its religious side, and not on the historical and metaphysical, the same error will be perceived in the way its documents are viewed. The Bible was regarded as a book of religion, *i.e.* as a book of religious doctrine and improvement, a book of instruction and devotion. Its object and aim were considered to be, as they are very commonly still, to teach us what it is necessary to believe and to do to procure salvation; that point of view in which the Scripture itself teaches us to regard it—namely, that it is the historical record of the establishment and onward progress of the kingdom of God in the world, and of the divine revelations in word and deed—was kept in the background. The independent investigation of Scripture did not keep equal pace with its application to theoretic and practical uses. Law and gospel were the points of view, excellent in themselves, under which the divine word was placed. But these were regarded almost exclusively in their relation to the salvation of the individual, in as far as the

law leads to the knowledge of sin, and the gospel promises pardon. That these principles of the individual salvation are at the same time those of the entire history of redemption in the world, was not fully recognised or thought out. This fundamental view—necessary for the understanding and right estimate of Scripture as a connected whole, as the historic record of the revelations and kingdom of God—was therefore more or less wanting.

"Luther held the signs and wonders to be mere outworks, —apples and nuts, as he expresses it, wherewith one attracts children, and makes them willing to listen and learn. He blames, for example, the Evangelist Luke for making mention only in brief of the sermon of Christ, and then giving a detailed account of the draught of fishes; and speaking generally, he puts the synoptical Gospels far below the Gospel of John, because those contain chiefly the deeds, this, on the contrary, the discourses of Christ. And just because he did not perceive the inner indissoluble connection between the word of God and His work among men, neither had he the power to take in fully the entire contents of Scripture, in so far as they form a perfect, harmonious, historical, and prophetic whole, advancing in deeds and wonders of God through all ages, and developing gradually up to the most glorious revelation of all at the last day. It may be safely asserted that we have been too long bound to the limits of Luther's circle of doctrine, and that of his excellent colleagues in the work of reformation, who all more or less started from the same principles. We have accustomed ourselves to think of the Bible, and to treat it, more as a book of instruction in dogma than as a historic document in the highest sense of the word; and have forgotten that the history of the work and kingdom of God is an essential part of evangelical doctrine. It was by Bengel and his followers that this history came to be again recognised and considered in the church." [1]

Luther's words, at the end of his preface to the New Testament,

[1] See Note B 3.

run thus: "From all this canst thou now form a right judgment concerning the various books, and decide which are the best. For the Gospel of John and the Epistles of St. Paul, especially that to the Romans, and the first Epistle of St. Peter, contain the true kernel and marrow of all the other books. For thou dost not find in these many of the works and miracles of Christ; but thou findest drawn out with a master's hand, how faith in Christ overcomes sin, death, and hell, and gives life, righteousness, and happiness. If I should have to do without one of these, the works or word of Christ, I should rather want the works than the word; for the works give me no help, while the words give life, as Christ Himself says. Because John writes little concerning the works of Christ, but very much of His word, and the three other evangelists relate His works at great length, but only few of His words, the Gospel of John is the one precious, true, and chief Gospel, and is to be preferred before the others, and raised high above them. So also St. Paul's and Peter's Epistles go far beyond the three Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. To sum up, the Gospel of John and his first Epistle, the Epistles of Paul, especially those to the Romans, Galatians, and Ephesians, and the first Epistle of St. Peter,—these are the books which show thee Christ, and teach all that it is needful and well for thee to know, even if thou shouldest never see or hear any other book or have other teaching. The Epistle of James is very dry and useless compared with them, for there is nothing of an evangelical kind in it."

The very spirit of the Reformation led them to study chiefly the doctrinal parts of the Bible, more especially the Epistles of Paul; and of these, the Epistles to the Galatians and Romans, which treat of justification and predestination, in particular. But even in the last named epistle itself, the eighth and eleventh chapters were neither understood nor applied so well as the others; and it was just the same in every other part of Scripture, much as exegetical study on the whole was invigorated by the Reformation, and excellently as it was conducted espe-

cially by Calvin, who manifests the greatest and most unbiassed historical feeling and insight of them all. It was natural that only those chambers in the great temple of holy Scripture could be opened which the existing key fitted; but many must have remained altogether closed. Still more than this. Calvin's absolute doctrine of predestination is a proof how severely the neglect of the historic studies avenged itself. Because the ninth chapter of the Romans was not understood in its connection with the two following chapters, that which the apostle said of the history of the kingdom of God on earth was transferred to eternal religious relationships; and thus that anti-scriptural error was, if not originated, at least strengthened. And this way of treating Scripture exegesis was not only erroneous, but it wrested the meaning of Scripture. Because many expressions did not seem to agree with the adopted views, which yet could not be overlooked, they had either to question their authority, as LUTHER did with the Epistle of James, or, by doing violence to them, reduce them to harmony with their creed. This was how it fared in Calvin's hands with the passages which declare the universality of grace, and the expressions in regard to the eating and drinking of the blood of Christ (John vi. etc.); and so with the whole of the Reformation and old Protestant theology, for example, in the prophetic parts of the Bible. The purely religious standpoint, and the related dogmatical one, had thus most influence on them in expounding Scripture; and they therefore never reached an impartial historical mode of inquiry, nor a perfectly unselfish discipleship. Hence the whole blessed wealth and value of Scripture were far from being known or enjoyed.

The circumstance, that the Reformation was developed amid constant struggles, first between Catholics and Protestants, then between Lutherans and the Reformed party, materially contributed to produce this state of things. A peaceful, still, and profound study of Scripture was indeed not possible. The employment of Scripture for the purposes of controversial

theology came always into the foreground. The Bible came to be used mainly as an armoury of proof passages. Out of the polemic theology arose the scholastic, to the nature of which it belongs not to start from a fresh biblical intuition of revelation, but only to work out that which the church has already obtained and sanctioned, by means of the logic of the schools. The Scriptures were therefore used and described in the old Protestant age, much more as a rule than as the source of Christian knowledge. As an example of this, the beginning of the Statement of Doctrines is characteristic.

The use of Scripture for edification was, as a rule, similarly atomistic with its dogmatic use. Single passages were chosen, to be applied, often without regard to their original connection, to the needs of the present,—in one place to doctrine, in another to life. The daily texts of the United Brethren are the happiest example of such use of Scripture for edification, but at the same time the most dangerous to a correct understanding of Scripture. Passages become isolated from the context, and so are misinterpreted. If Scripture is used in the one case as an armoury out of which single expressions are taken as proofs of certain dogmas, in the other it is like an apothecaries' hall, in which God has placed particular single remedies for diseased men in general, and for special cases in particular. In both, it is not so much the word as the revelation of God and the history of it which is the foundation, but the mere letter of the word by itself. The word is therefore not considered as an organic whole, but as an aggregate of single expressions, from which those are selected which may be serviceable for each particular occasion; the remainder being left unconsidered, or reduced by undue pressure into harmony with particular views.

(2.) *The Doctrine of Inspiration.*

The views concerning Scripture itself, expressed in the old Protestant doctrine of inspiration, correspond with the mode of

using it to which we have referred. Scripture was thought of as an oracle, which as a tribunal decided the questions of doctrine, and as a spiritual counsellor decided questions of practical life, directly by single expressions. First of all, in the controversy with Catholicism, a present authority was needed; so the Protestants met the church, and its Pope and councils, by the counter authority of Scripture, of whose divine truth they were most deeply convinced. They were looked on as the word of God to the present time, and for the present; and the historical circumstances of their successive origin were disregarded. The whole aim was to establish them as a divine authority for the church, as the canon and only guide of truth, in opposition to all human and ecclesiastical authorities. The part man had in the origin of the Bible was ignored, as its historical development had been. At length the great point came to be, to establish only the authority of the book, the actual existing written word, to which appeal was always made; they neglected, therefore, what is closely connected with this—the relation of the written word to the living words and deeds in which it was revealed. The origin of the Scriptures was considered by itself alone; it was God's work of revelation, by which the church lived, and alongside of which the *history* of the revelation was therefore held subordinate. The book almost took the place of the thing which it was intended to declare. The substance of the old Protestant doctrine of inspiration may be expressed in these words: the Holy Spirit dictated the Bible verbally (*singula verba a Spiritu Sancto in calamam dictata*, says HOLLATZ), and the human composers are not authors, but only the writers—indeed, only the hands, or the pens (*notarii sive tabelliones Spiritus Sancti, manus Christi, calami Dei auctoris*).

This is the doctrine of the orthodox theologians, which must be known in order to avoid an unfair judgment of Rationalism and its biblical criticism. These theories are not found among the Reformers, or in the books of doctrine. On the contrary, we

find that, for example, LUTHER expressed himself very freely about some parts of the Bible. The Lutheran symbolical books do not go deeply into the subject of inspiration at all; those of the Reformed Church contain many beautiful expressions on the subject, which even now might serve as models. "We believe," says, for example, the Belgian Confession (ch. iii.), "that the holy men of God, moved by the Holy Ghost, spoke the word of God; God Himself afterwards commanded the prophets and apostles to commit these revelations to writing; He Himself, indeed, wrote the two tables of the law with His own fingers: this is the reason why we call such writings the holy Scriptures." Here there is still a living connection between the writing and the word, between history and composition; here the persons of prophets and apostles are taken into account, as possessing the Holy Ghost.

But in that other view, the Holy Spirit stands outside of and above man, simply dictating to him; and for the composition of the Bible, the only thing needful was the art of writing. There was therefore no need of apostles and prophets. The difference between the inspiration of the historical and didactic books, between the prophetic and apostolic, between Old and New Testament inspiration and the like, was never touched upon at all. For the historians of the Bible there would have been no necessity for any connection with the history at all, if the Holy Spirit dictated it to their pen, word for word. The successive origination of the books of the Bible becomes doubtful; and, in fact, the difference between the Old and New Testament almost disappears in the views of the elder Protestantism. The Bible may be regarded as a whole, or in its parts: we may look into it where we will—say Luke i. 1–4, John xix. 35, 1 John i. 1, etc., or into the Epistles of Paul, with their fulness of personal and historical life, which is the most impressive and convincing thing about them;—nowhere does this view of inspiration correspond to the picture which the Bible itself gives us of its nature and origin: it is mani-

festly too lifeless and insufficient to embrace the wealth and variety of the Bible.

We have already shown and acknowledged the essential truth that lies in the thought underlying this doctrine. All the more may and must we point out its scientific defects. It is a theory, invented in the interest of the dogmatic theologians, that they might have an infallible authority of a kind similar to the infallibility of the Catholic Church. In doing this, Protestantism came down from its own original elevation, and transferred the Catholic conception of authority to its own authority, the Bible. In this doctrine of inspiration especially, our scholasticism shows its derivation from a polemic source. Certainly it would be in all respects most agreeable to have the divine authority to which we bow in direct and external form before us, without the necessity of any corresponding inward action; but then this would correspond neither to the nature of Protestantism and the new covenant, nor to the nature of man in its relation to God. Had God purposed to make the Scriptures a canon in this sense, they must have been given by Him in the same way with the tables of the law at Sinai; and, indeed, the theories of inspiration held by the early dogmatists, with their one-sided and exclusive emphasis upon the divine origin of the Bible, really amount to that. It is no longer inspiration, the giving of the Spirit, but the giving of the letter of the Scripture; the character of spirituality, of which it is said, "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty," is quite lost. The same care would have been necessary then for the preservation of the Scriptures as for the tables of the law: the difference of manuscripts, readings, etc., cannot properly be spoken of in connection with such a kind of infallibility. Further, to adduce one example of the character of the Scriptures, the life of Jesus could hardly then have been represented in four different ways; but, being simply dictated by the Holy Spirit, one must have been the absolutely sufficient account. The picture of the life of the Redeemer, however, was to be

presented from different sides, in its relation especially to the principal elements of universal history and the history of God's kingdom, to Israel, to the heathen world, to God and man generally. This is not less, but more: it is richer and fuller of instruction than if we had received only one representation. But, at the same time, it is clear that a representation of the life of Jesus which is directly exhaustive, and by itself complete, is not given us in this way. But as the Holy Spirit, in the first production of the Gospels, made use of the agency of different men, each fitted for the respective views (Jewish, Christian, Pauline, etc.) they were to present, so there is still need for human co-operation in heart and mind, still need for a scientific activity, guided and sanctified by the Spirit, to realize a complete picture of the life and doctrine of Jesus. The use of single parts for instruction and edification of course continues undisturbed by this view: the wonderful good effected by many separate expressions and narratives, as John iii. 16, cannot be told; but the church and theology, as a whole, can and will live only by means of the whole. And the supreme authority is by no means immediately and palpably before us, and, as it were, externally comprehensible; but God moves us to labour and to prayer, if we would arrive at a full knowledge of His Son. This is true in respect to systematic theology as to historical. The church and theology, so long as they live in the flesh, must eat their bread in the sweat of their brow; and this is not only not a judgment, but for our present state a great blessing. If the highest were, indeed, so easy and simple, then the flesh would soon become indolent and satisfied. God gives us the truth in His word, but He takes care that we must all win it for ourselves ever afresh. He has therefore, with great wisdom, arranged the Bible as it is. And on this account, too, the Bible, wherever men have given themselves to the study of it, has spread science and civilisation, for it sets in motion the highest intellectual activities of man. The spiritual excites and animates at the same time the intellectual, and

is therefore the truly sound and healthful word for all human activities.

There is still more, however, in this difference of human authors, as the example of the evangelists will again best illustrate. It is worthy of remark, that precisely in this the "most holy place" of the Bible, which by its inward truth and glory always makes the deepest and first impression upon the conscience of men, there are the greatest number of things at which men may be offended. In an earlier part of this work we pointed out that those doctrines and miracles which are most offensive to the common consciousness of men all occur in the Gospels, and at special length. It is the same also with the critical difficulties as with these dogmatic ones. No one of the four evangelists knew everything which happened in the days of our Lord's life in the flesh. Luke himself tells us that he gave himself much trouble and made careful inquiry to get together his materials (i. 1–4). What Paul says of knowledge and prophecy, even the apostolic, that they were "in part," may of course be applied not less to the composition of the biblical books, the historical as well as the others. As we have seen already that each evangelist was limited according to the point of view from which he wrote his account, so he was limited, too, in respect to his knowledge of the materials. From both of these causes inaccuracies might flow into the narrative; for his object the writer might not intend or contemplate a more exact account, or perhaps he was not able to give it with the knowledge he had. Of this class are the differences between the accounts of the synoptical Gospels and that of John, the narratives of the childhood in Matthew and in Luke, and the like. If we had only Matthew, we could not have imagined that a considerable space elapses between Matt. iv. 11 and 12, of which the first chapters of John give us the account. Luke can have known nothing of Matt. ii., else he could not have written ii. 39; for between the presentation in the temple and the return to Nazareth, the visit of the wise men from the east and the flight to Egypt

must have occurred. Compare many little deviations in the accounts of the facts as well as of the discourses of our Lord; *e.g.* Matt. viii. 5, etc., with Luke vii. 3, etc.; Matt. xxvii. 44, Mark xv. 32, with Luke xxiii. 39–43; Matt. xxvi. 34 with Mark xiv. 30; Matt. xx. 29, etc., with Mark x. 46; Luke xviii. 35, Matt. x. 10, with Mark vi. 8, 9, and others. Here we can make up and supplement the one account by the other, as in the books of Kings and Chronicles, where also there are important deviations, in the numbers especially. We can of course no longer deny that, where such control is impossible, inaccuracies in outward things may be found.

For him who has spiritual discernment, or who can exercise an intelligent judgment, these things will matter very little: they are the natural and unavoidable phenomena in historical and literary matters, if violence is not to be done to the human authors by the Holy Spirit—if the supernatural is not to become the unnatural. An example from recent times may serve to make this clear. When SCHLEIERMACHER and STEFFENS were professors at Halle, they took a run out to the Petersberg with two students, of whom one was CARL VON RAUMER. We have descriptions of this excursion from all the three named,[1] which are different from each other in some important circumstances. SCHLEIERMACHER mentions two companions; STEFFENS, who wrote later, only one. We have thus, in the accounts of a matter which come not only from eye-witnesses, but from those who were actually engaged in it, similar differences to those which are found in the Gospels and other books of the Bible. The same phenomena meet the historical inquirer everywhere, in comparing synoptical records.

It is more important to observe, that the holy Scriptures give us significant intimations how they themselves regard such differences, and how they would have them regarded. This is the case where, in one and the same book, one author relates the same event differently. One of the most familiar examples

[1] See Note C 3.

of this is the account of the conversion and call of St. Paul, which is given three times in the Acts,—in the ninth, twenty-second, and twenty-sixth chapters. In the first passage (ch. ix.) the Lord tells Ananias that Paul is destined to be an apostle, and it does not appear that Ananias informs Paul of the fact; according to the second (ch. xxii.), Ananias did make the communication to Paul at once; in the third (ch. xxvi.), the call to the apostolate is attributed to the Lord Himself. This is only one of the points of difference between the three reports: there are others besides. The explanation is furnished by the middle passage. Of course these differences in the accounts were as well known to the writer of the Acts as to the attentive reader; but, with divine indifference, he allows the apparent contradictions to stand, and trusts the religious understanding of THEOPHILUS and his successors to find the meaning and solution of them. The Spirit acts in the same way when the accounts are from different authors. He would teach us, that in Scripture generally we should lay stress on the spirit and essence of the matter, and not on single passages and outward things, as such; He would raise us from the pharisaic devotion to the letter, to the freedom of that Spirit who moves in the history. If we look at the details from within, we shall generally perceive how, in harmony with the particular aim in each case, here this, there that, side of the matter is brought out: here it is summarily, there more exactly recorded; so that upon a deeper view of the subject, the differences are often more than justified.

The Bible itself makes this rule—namely, to look at the spirit and essence of the matter, and not to stand upon details and external characters as such—very clear in a second instance, which belongs not to the region of history, but of doctrine, where scripture is compared with scripture, and one passage is measured by the other. We mean the quotations from the Old Testament in the New. These have been used indeed recently by ROTHE, in support of an argument against the inspiration of the Bible, as they seem to him for the most part to rest upon

wrong interpretation,[1]—not justly, however. The more recent organic historical view of both Testaments (which indeed many of our older theologians seem no longer to sympathize with: they seem simply to hold themselves aloof, on account of certain existing difficulties) leads to quite other results. The New Testament writers, in quoting from the Old, use the greatest freedom in regard to single words and sentences; but they show the deepest and truest insight into the spirit and essence of the Old Testament and its utterances. Inspiration gives the power not only to write, but also to read, holy Scripture. The apostles do not indeed develop the reason of their quotations scientifically; they see and testify: our science has often to insert the connecting links, in order to reach the height of the apostolic thought. But they have reached the height of true spiritual intelligence: our grammatical and historical exegesis, which still dwells in the low grounds, and cleaves too closely to the earth, must regard that spiritual insight into the Old Testament which is furnished in the New by Jesus and the apostles, as the end toward which it is to strive, the height to which it is to rise (1 Cor. ii. 11, etc.). The great type of all New Testament quotations in this respect is the word of Jesus (Matt. xxii. 29–32). Who could have drawn from the words, "I am the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," a proof of the resurrection? And yet the whole matter, as Jesus says, lies in knowing the Scripture and the power of God (which is avouched in these words). Then indeed some confidence is placed in the word of Scripture, even that of the Old Testament, because it is seen that God's Spirit breathes in it, and the will of God is revealed. To bow to the authority of the word of God, is not to adopt a literal and rabbinical exegesis, such as the Rabbinism of which Paul is accused; nor is it the slavery to the letter with which they reproach us: it is the understanding of the word, in which is the unity of the spirit and the letter, so that the letter must be understood by the spirit. Those are much more the literalists

[1] See Note D 3.

who go no further than the mere outward meaning of the word, —who do not know how, with Jesus and the apostles, to catch the mind of the Spirit in it, but dismiss it as something that cannot be attained.

But if, in defending the Scriptures, we take up this position of spiritual freedom (2 Cor. iii. 15–17), then we are bound also to leave behind all legal anxiety and pedantic literalness in regard to them. The first glance, for example, at the passages in the Gospels we have quoted, shows that we do not possess a canon that is absolutely free from mistake; nor, indeed, do we require it. What we require is a record of revelation absolutely true, and that we possess in the Scriptures. Our Lord Himself, during His earthly life, was so deeply veiled in the lowliness of the flesh, that He had to say, "Blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in me." He says, also, of His teaching by parables, that He concealed the truth purposely from those that were without, so that they should see with their eyes, and not perceive, and hear with their ears, and not understand. Only those hungering for the truth—the true disciples—should break through the shell to the kernel, and know the mystery of the kingdom of God (Matt. xi. 6; Mark iv. 11, 12). So it is still. The divine will must in this world have its veil—its offence. Whosoever will be offended therewith, may and will be offended. Faith, as it involves an intellectual, involves also a moral work and attainment; it is a work wrought in God (John vi. 27–29). The mind that seeks the truth, breaks through the veil easily and simply. A man of great ability once said, he would prove the divine perfection of the Scriptures from their human imperfections. It is precisely the most exact investigation and criticism which evermore shows that, even considered in a human light, there does not exist a more credible book than the Bible on the earth. The divine truth of it is so convincing to the conscience and understanding, when once they are awakened, that we are not only spiritually, but even intellectually, convinced of it. We may

here remind the reader of what was said in the first part of this work.

If we thus, on several grounds, cannot approve of the expression borrowed from the Catholic authorities—infallibility, or entire freedom from error in the Bible—we would, in conclusion, apply to it what LANGE says of the so-called sufficiency of the holy Scriptures, when he observes: "The Bible is not only a *sufficient* witness of the truth of salvation, but one that is rich and abundant beyond measure." It is clear, likewise, that this negative expression says a little too much in respect to details; but in regard to the whole, much too little. "We give up," says STIER,[1] "the claim of perfect freedom from error for the Bible, but only in such things as are really indifferent to salvation and the doctrines of the gospel, the domain and limit of which, whatever may be said to the contrary, can be very well distinguished from the essential." We do not admit anything like a *falli* or *fallere*, any erring, or leading astray, in connection with the Scriptures as a whole. They are, on the contrary, the only true light in the midst of the twilight or darkness of human thoughts, the full and clear witness of the truth, by which, directly or indirectly, all must be brought back from their errors, who would come into possession of the highest, the eternal truth. This is the Scripture, because it is the true witness of the ways which God has adopted universally with humanity, to save it from its wandering and error. It is therefore their full, concrete contents, including history and doctrine, upon which their importance rests; it is the record of God's striving with men, up to the victory of Christ, and the gift and effectual operation of the Holy Spirit. Hence the great matter is to take the place of a disciple before the Scriptures as a whole. It is not simply to listen to an authority, which utters single dogmatic or edifying words, as it were direct from heaven. But heaven has come ever nearer and more fully to the earth; the Spirit of God has sunk into the minds

[1] See Note E 3.

of men with increasing power and fulness. The successive origination of the Scriptures falls into this historical process: their authors are persons taking part in the drama of the history of revelation; they are moved by the deepest spirit of it; and so they are able, as men influenced and inspired by God, to give the net result of each period in inspired writings. The Scriptures are therefore not less the word of God according to our view, than according to the old; but the Holy Ghost makes use of holy men of God, not as mere machines for writing, but as living men, so that here it may be said: *θεῖα πάντα, καὶ ἀνθρώπινα πάντα* (all things are divine, and all are human). The Scriptures are not less holy scriptures; the honour paid to them, even as a book of doctrine and edification, is not less; but it is honour with more life and truth. It is, too, only an apparent injury that is done to the reverence we owe to Christ, when His human nature, striving, struggling, and overcoming, is brought forward definitely and clearly: He becomes the more truly ours, and we follow Him with the more intelligence and confidence; and so, with more faith, we also understand His example and life, as the evangelists represent them, more truly: they become more instinct with life. It is so with the Scriptures, either in whole or in their parts. Then everything is full of life—everything has a message; then its full stores are properly disclosed and possessed. Then we perceive it more and more to be the true light, which alone truly illuminates the ways of man and the world. We do not lose, we gain immensely; and there is truth in our joy in the Scriptures: we do not need to carry on our defence of them by means of artful and ingenious devices.

The exaggerated doctrine of inspiration was necessarily made prominent in the course of time, by the reaction of the sense of truth in the minds of men. In this lay the power which biblical criticism exercised. Its task was to liberate from the fetters, not of the Scripture, but of an arbitrary, dogmatical view of it.

We gladly quote the words of a Swiss co-worker, on the

points of which we have just spoken:[1] "As the operation of the Holy Ghost in the church has become feebler and dimmer, men have clung with the more tenacity to the theory of the inspiration of every word of Scripture. In times of the church's vigour, on the contrary, when the Spirit of God has been perceptible in godly men, His living agents, a freer judgment has been exercised in respect to the contents of the Bible: it has been acknowledged to be the word of God, but in human forms, and beneath a human veil; and so it has been held that the Holy Ghost was as needful for a right use of the Scriptures, as for the original preparation of them. The Reformers honoured the Scriptures, and were very jealous for their divine authority; and yet they made undisguised use of very free expressions concerning their defects, obscurities, and difficulties: they acknowledged there were instances here and there of contradictions and inaccuracies, and never forgot that, with the divine working, there was human co-operation in the composition of the Scriptures. So LUTHER, CALVIN, MELANCTHON, and BEZA. It was in the century which followed the Reformation, that there arose an exaggerated solicitude that the Bible should be acknowledged perfectly free from fault and omission, even on the human side of it. It was not taken as God had given it. A system was set above it, which was not in harmony with the real conditions on which it is given. They were obstinately blind to the imperfections which God had allowed to remain in His word. This extreme, which takes the Bible not as it is, but as men would fain have had it, I do not intend to defend; it is connected with a one-sided system: I charge it, indeed, with a part of the guilt of those who think themselves justified, as its opponents, in representing and condemning strict faith in the Bible, as scientific dishonesty or blind narrowness of mind. The word of Scripture allows and demands a free judgment and treatment: eye and heart should be open to the human form and side in the Scripture, just as much as to the part God has had in it.

[1] See Note F 3.

"We may learn this free treatment of Scripture from Scripture itself; for just as the Old Testament is treated in the New, so may we with good conscience handle both. The Old Testament is seldom quoted word for word by our Lord or the apostles, but often inaccurately, or from the Greek translation of the LXX., which is by no means exact. The passages from the prophets are not given so much in their verbal order, as in their deep significance; but in each case, without too much anxiety about the words, and with a free interpretation of their meaning, which the Spirit Himself must teach us. The same thing is true of the quotation of the words of Christ by the evangelists. Christ spoke in Aramaic; but with the two exceptions (*Hephatah, Talitha koumi,* and *Eli lamma sabachtani*), we nowhere have His discourses in their original form, we have only a free translation into the Greek; and even this is not very carefully exact: His words are rendered freely, and the sense is given in different forms of expression. No one can say with diplomatic accuracy what words the Saviour made use of, when He delivered this or that discourse, spoke this or that parable; yet we possess the words and discourses of our Lord in all their essential meaning, reported freely by such evangelists as were led by the Holy Ghost. Truth and freedom are joined together in a holy covenant; truth in essentials, freedom in form and things subordinate.

"What, then, are we to do with the little inaccuracies and contradictions in the Gospels, and how shall we decide upon them from the standpoint of faith? My answer is simply this: we must acknowledge the difficulties, and let them stand, without suffering ourselves to be in any measure led away from belief in the Bible. They are permitted by God, not to disturb our faith, but to exercise it, and to remind us that the Scriptures can only be rightly understood by an honest heart,—that they need, as corrective of their trifling inequalities and human traits, the unction from the Holy Spirit in the souls of their readers. God will not lead and instruct men by the Scriptures alone; He em-

ploys also His Spirit and the church: therefore He has given His word in a form which can be sufficient to lead into all truth only in connection with the other guides. The Scriptures alone, without the Spirit, would not be a sufficient guide; but, again, the Spirit and His inward illumination, without the Scriptures, would be insufficient to preserve from error. The traces of human co-operation in the composing of the New Testament, injure the souls of believers in no way: they only compel them to inquiry, and to compare scripture with scripture. These human characteristics, on the contrary, may be to the frivolous, and those who seek for doubts, both a judgment and a snare, in which their unbelieving heart shall be held bound, and they shall be blind to the many traces and seals of the divine truth in the word of God. This existence of human elements is a convenient excuse behind which the heart may hide its hostility to the word and will of God. The traces of human weakness belong, however, as a useful and necessary characteristic of Scripture, to its excellences and perfections; for by these apparent imperfections God accomplishes important and useful objects with friend and foe,—with those who in the simplicity of faith honour the Scriptures, and with those who despise and reject the Bible, who have not been withheld by regard for the truth from a free decision against the light. The mode in which we possess the divine revelation is a test of men's dispositions. Be they good or bad, they are matured and manifested thereby."

Before passing to the consideration of Rationalism, I shall mention only one matter more. The deficiencies in the statement both of the material and formal principle are common to both Protestant confessions. What the one may have more than the other, is less than that which is lacking in both. It was this, in which both were defective, that tended to the production of Rationalism, which arose in the one church as well as the other. We must therefore keep in mind that the defects which we seek to remove, as also the advantages which we seek to preserve on the right hand and the left, are not

merely Lutheran or Reformed, but essentially and generally Protestant.

2. *Rationalism.*

We shall now attempt to describe Rationalism in the same points of view under which we have considered the earlier Protestantism. We shall consider it in its material principle—Reason and Nature; and then its treatment of Scripture, which is the result of this principle, and which may be described as the critical treatment. While, on the one side, the reasons for the unfavourable verdict we have already expressed concerning Rationalism will be more fully exhibited, we shall, on the other, endeavour to show in what its real significance, and the element of truth it represents, consist, and thus pave the way for understanding the whole question, both historically and in itself. We shall distinguish therefore, in the two sections into which this part falls, the development itself, and its result.

a. Reason and Nature.

(1.) *The Rationalistic-Humanistic Development in the different Departments.*

The first movements of the rationalistic spirit, in the age of the Reformation itself, as they appeared in Arminianism and Socinianism, were connected with the exaggerations of the doctrines of sin and grace, which found their expression especially in the dogma of predestination. While it is true that these movements, especially the Socinian one, proceeded from not understanding religion in general, which was the chief strength of Protestantism, yet we must confess they are also a reaction of the moral sense, and, as that was neglected by the Reformers, are relatively justified. Then began, however, that tendency which, inverting the true order, places morality in the

foreground and religion in the second rank; whereas morality can only be the fruit and outcome of religion, good works can only come from faith.

In Socinianism this tendency of thought strove to show that it was in agreement with the Bible and Christianity. In England, on the contrary, where the folly of the State church, the excesses of dissenters, and the sins of party spirit and strife stirred up opposition to positive Christianity, Deism arose in the seventeenth century. This at first, professing to teach a purer Christianity, and so to serve religion, soon began to make direct and violent assaults upon the divine revelation and its documents, ostensibly in the interests of morals. The foundation idea from which they started was the so-called natural religion, in which Christianity was thinned away to a general belief, taught by the reason, in a personal but almost inanimate God, who had no real contact or fellowship with man and the world. If we admit that the claims of natural religion, in the good sense of the words, were maintained against the theology which in Protestantism was growing more arrogant, and the claims of practical Christianity in the midst of dead orthodoxy, and the controversies about dogmas in the different parties; yet this opposition, which was so far justifiable, went far beyond the proper limit. Then practical Christianity became a mere natural morality, which indeed still retained the name of religion, but which in reality completely negatived religion, and even history, in the higher sense of the word. Christianity, *i.e.* mere natural religion, was, they said, as old as the world: the positive and historical in religion only attached themselves incessantly as new delusions, as priestcraft, etc., to the natural or rational, which is always essentially the same. The creature in both its parts, the intellectual as well as the natural, was made separate and independent of God; therefore there could be neither religion nor miracles—there could be no redemptive revelation. A position was thus reached which was diametrically opposed to that of the Reformation. With the theologians of the Re-

formation, God was everything, and the creature as nothing; with the Deists, the creature was everything, and God as nothing.

We find the better sort of representatives of this school in the German Rationalism (this word here in its narrower sense), with its sincere but spiritless moralizing of Christianity. The more virulent and dangerous we find in France, where the free-thinkers had a Jesuitical Catholicism before them, in the antichristian literature of which the moral standpoint was very often turned into the immoral.

If these movements were, on the whole, restricted to the religious and theological province, philosophy had, on the other hand, in the first half of the seventeenth century, entered upon a new course through the works of DESCARTES and BACON. BACON was at one with the Reformers in the importance he attached to experience; but while they had made the supersensible experience of faith one of their principles, he insisted chiefly upon sensible experience and the knowledge of nature, and so contributed his part to lead the eye away from things above sense. The outward world of sense, placed in the background in the religious upheaval of the Reformation, was again by Bacon restored to its place. DESCARTES, on the other hand, pierced down to the inward depths of the human spirit, in order, by doubting everything, to find the touchstone and source of the truth. Subjectivity, which set the Reformation in motion, but which also restricted it as faith in the word of God, in the person of this Catholic, educated by the Jesuits, rose in opposition to all objectivity, not excepting even the divine, though it wore still with him a dreamlike character. DESCARTES himself did not know what a mighty principle he enunciated in his *Cogito ergo sum*. It was the exaltation of human thought which, in the Hegelian system, at length imagined it might be regarded as being itself, as the divine fountain and fulness of all existence. There came thus to the side of the one-sided moralism already spoken of, an intellectualism which

in its principles and results was not less irreligious. Whither it would lead, might have been gathered from SPINOZA—to a Pantheism which, as it caused the finite to disappear in the infinite world-substance, retains at last nothing more than the two great departments of finite being, thought and extension, nature and spirit. For thought could not so easily get rid of nature as of an invisible God. It is self-evident, that from such a position as this the world of biblical revelation and miracles could not but be disputed: this had been done already in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* of SPINOZA himself.

From that time, therefore, they went on in the main with these two ideas, nature and spirit. After the system of the great LEIBNITZ, whose German mind sought to measure and embrace all powers of being from an idealistic position, had degenerated into a pretentious popular philosophy, the not less gifted KANT, with his follower FICHTE, confined themselves to the human mind, reason, the I, in order to establish anew, and on a deeper basis, Moralism, or moralistic Rationalism. Despite all praiseworthy earnestness, these philosophers so little understood the religious nature and history of man, that they made the attempt to restrict religion to the limits of the pure reason, and from that view to undertake a "criticism of all revelation." It was but the self-glorification and self-sufficiency of the created mind, the direct antithesis of the principle of the Reformation, which celebrated their triumph in the great ideas of the categoric inspiration and freedom. It was quite natural, therefore, that FICHTE should allow the truths concerning God and immortality, which KANT had said were postulates of the practical reason, to drop, and should set up the Ego as existing alone without a God, and certainly without a world.

But this position was untenable and intolerable. SCHELLING won nature back again for mind, inasmuch as he looked upon it as being in itself intellectual, as a mind in a state of growth, and at different stages of its growth becoming, as it were, fixed.

HEGEL, pursuing these ideas still further, completed a comprehensive philosophy of nature and mind, which was imposing from its wealth of ideas and energy of thought, though it sought also to place the state, art, religion, and historic development in all these departments, and especially in that of philosophy itself, under the categories of his logical Pantheism. The mind, being logical, was the "*Prius*" of all; logic was theology, and the true doctrine of the world, and metaphysics altogether. In this identity of logic and metaphysics, of thinking and being, the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum* arrived at its last consequences. And yet not quite the last. SCHELLING and HEGEL had conceived of nature intellectually; it remained, then, to conceive of mind naturally. And that was a necessity. For mind had lost its inner ground in God, the true support of its independent existence distinct from nature. HEGEL maintained that the divine mind had a concrete existence only in the human mind; but he connected the latter with nature, in so far as he made its personal existence to cease with the body. Nature was therefore the ruling power over mind. Man was a mere "exemplar" of species. As theology had become anthropomorphic, anthropology of necessity sank down to zoology. Idealism fell into materialism.

This whole development, indeed, thus passed sentence upon itself: the later systems criticised the earlier; and the ultimate logical result, which lies before us in the Pantheism of STRAUSS and the Atheism of FEUERBACH, condemns the principle itself. But, on the other side, we would not be blind to the elements of truth which have been brought to light even here, or to the earnestness of these thinkers' efforts. It is especially worthy of notice, that of the four pairs of thinkers, DESCARTES and SPINOZA, LEIBNITZ and WOLF, KANT and FICHTE, SCHELLING and HEGEL, the first, those who struck out the new path, were always the richer in positive truths; while those standing in the second line fell more into the one-sided intellectualistic, subjective, pantheistic character of the times. So they came to oppose the

divine revelation, even when they originally, like WOLF and HEGEL, wished to serve and support it. In general, however, nature and mind are admitted to be great realities; and we have observed that this is not denied by the earlier Protestantism: it was only not taken into account sufficiently. That which the Reformation did lay stress on in man, his relation to God as affected by sin and grace, lies indeed in a higher order of things,—in the very highest, to which modern philosophy has not yet succeeded in rising. Sin presupposes freedom and self-consciousness. If, now, the earlier Protestantism did not sufficiently develop those ideas which are implied in the chapter recording the creation, who shall hinder free inquiry from looking at the wonders of the "Ego" of knowledge, of freedom, and of the moral law by themselves? In the intellectual sphere there obtains an ever-widening division of labour. And we see from such a historical glance as this, how limited is the horizon even of the greatest minds. As, however, the mind of fallen man is prone to take its little part for the whole, will philosophy be in danger of taking these threshold ideas for the central truth itself, and forgetting what is higher and deeper. The recent philosophy has fallen into this error. It thought to make itself master of the higher from its low position; indeed, to absorb it into itself altogether. Not the divine revelation, however, but the philosophy itself, has perished. Nature and the mind of man were not understood in their true nature, or they could never have seemed to oppose the true ideas of God and His revelations. The most recent wisdom of the world has thus materially contributed to the development of the modern worldly spirit, which, in its exclusive joy in this world, is in its deepest ground unspiritual and antichristian. On the other side, however, it has given manifold impulses to Christian science, and imposed new and important duties, which we may here just indicate by summing them up in one word: it has to expand our systematic theology to theosophy, and so meet the assaults of philosophy.

The systems of philosophy and natural science were developed, in the way we have shown, in the spirit of worldliness. The wisdom of the world was reinforced by its culture in literature, art, history, etc. As our religious poets had sung: *Mach mir nur zuckersüss den Himmel und gallen-bitter diese Welt* (only make heaven sweet to me, and this world bitter as gall); and as Pietism in particular had secluded itself from all natural life, we can understand the reaction from this extreme in our recent national literature. The world itself is created by God: delight in it has its truth and beauty, even when it is not directly religious. The spring, love, the fatherland, move all hearts. The heaving of the inward world of feeling—the mighty striving of the spirit with itself and with the mysteries of being—the marvellous enchantment of nature and the tragic earnestness of history—life with its thousand-fold changing colours, with its sorrow and joy,—our poets have placed before our eyes in the fairest and most varied forms. In their best productions, they have drawn the ideal of noble beautiful humanity,—an ideal which in the main is right, but one only to be reached by a divine way. And this, alas! the true royal path, they have not taken. Our literature, in its *coryphæi*, is for the most part estranged from what is highest and most Christian. Culture has taken the place of the new birth as the end of life. It is thought that a perfect humanity may be reached, not by renewal and transformation from above, but by careful education of man's nature and its gifts.

The relation of the modern classic writers to the old also helped in a special degree to bring about this state of things. Being taken as models of form, they too often became models also in their substance. Classical antiquity, previously regarded only as a help to biblical philology, now opened up to their astonished eyes its real artistic treasures. But they idealized the life of antiquity, and confounded art with reality. The Christian became second to the classical; and in the place of

Israel, which had never been rightly known, came in the Hellenes with their bright happy life, and unhistorically enough, these became the representatives of a humanity such as was first introduced into the world by the gospel. The misery of heathenism was never thought of. HEGEL could put the Old Testament religion below the Grecian and Roman; GOETHE could write the *Bride of Corinth*, even SCHILLER the *Gods of Greece*. The heathen history alone was regarded as real history; the laws of all historical life and events appeared to lie in it. In comparison with the rest of men in the ancient world, the people of God were never thought of; nor was the church, compared with the wide-spread merely secular life of modern times. The dark middle age was ignored altogether. It actually seemed as if the Old and New Testament churches, with their claim to a higher supernatural origin, were an unwarranted exception in the world, which it was a duty to set aside. While to some this world of miracle was an arbitrary interference with all the laws of nature and history,—a province in revolt against the reason which reigned everywhere besides,—others saw in the cross of Christ and the angry severity of Jehovah, a gloomy religion causing the head to hang down in the midst of this joyful world. To the light of our modern enlightened times, to the cheerfulness of life as well as the clearness of knowledge, the divine revelation was darkness and obscurantism. In the face of the certainty and clearness of the present world, all beyond appears to modern heathendom cloudy, uncertain, confused, fanatical, and narrow. Christianity itself was and is called Mysticism and Pietism.

Others, who wish to give Christianity a higher place, say (and this is language frequently heard now) that we must make our idea of it so wide, that a LESSING, GOETHE, HUMBOLDT, etc., may have a place in it. Many go so far as to say, that they would not care for a heaven where these men were amissing. Such language witnesses not only to an entire loss of the spiritual discernment of Christianity, but also to a great obscu-

ration of the natural judgment concerning art and science. It is evident that these two departments are relatively very distinct from the characters of those who occupy them. A man may be a great artist, or distinguished man of science, and yet stand very low as a man. The work here does not necessarily always praise the master. A GOETHE or HUMBOLDT would, as their known character indicates, be very pleased with the homage of such admirers for a little while; but they would soon find them far too insignificant and wearisome to think them worthy of a longer or an everlasting fellowship. The self-denying, sacrificing love, which constitutes the soul of Christianity, is not exactly what we find in these intellectual heroes. If our Lord had acted upon the principle of HUMBOLDT, that we owe truth only to those whom we deeply respect, where would have been the preaching of the gospel and the redemption of the sinful world? These modern apostles hold quite a different principle from that of Jesus, as they themselves indeed confess. Let us not try to make them what they themselves have no desire to be. On the whole, however, this language is nothing else than a new way of dragging Christianity down to the level of the culture and humanity of our day.

Our task, in respect to these views, will be to exhibit and unfold the divinity of the old Christianity, as the one true strength of humanity.

The Son of God is also the Son of man, the perfect man. A pure and genuine human life *can* bloom, and has actually sprung, from a divine root, but not before the impure humanity is consigned to death.

Natural science has often been used in recent times as one of the principal weapons against Christianity. As early as the time of the Reformation, the knowledge of the earth and the heavens was extending with rapid strides. The concurrence of the discovery of America and the Copernican system, with the revival of the church, is one of the greatest events in the history of divine providence. The very fathers of the modern

view of the universe, COPERNICUS, KEPLER, NEWTON, were indeed devout evangelical Christians; but when the secular spirit began to prevail in the eighteenth century, the Copernican system seemed, to superficial thinkers, inconsistent with the Christian one; and even earnest men found a difficulty in the thought that a small planet, of a small solar system, should be the scene of the incarnation of God.

In the course of the later centuries, physics and chemistry, anatomy and physiology, and in general everything known as exact natural science, made amazing progress. The more men came upon the track of law, in the particular phenomena of nature, the more they became accustomed to regard all nature as a machine acting according to law; and they took such a view of it, that they left no room for miracle. It will be shown further on, that this view of nature is an untrue one, and that miracle is no interruption of its laws; but the conclusion was adopted in wide circles, that faith in miracles and exact science were incompatible.

We have now, therefore, principally to consider the practical worth and force of the results of modern science.

The discovery of America and the passage to India had given an impetus to trade and commerce such as they never had before; and this, in the course of the centuries, had been ever increasing. It introduced great changes in town life, and in the manners and opinions of the civilised world. This development was incredibly strengthened by modern scientific discovery, and by the inventions connected with it: machines of all sorts, steam-ships, railways, and electric telegraphs, began to spread over the earth; industry allied itself to trade, as a power of ever-growing importance. The idea of a dominion over nature was thus entertained by natural science. This seemed to be the true wonder-worker, the benefactress of the world. The inventive mind of man won ever new glory and praise. The homage, amounting to idolatry, paid in all parts of the world to ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT, and his magnificent

work, embracing all natural science, which bears the exceedingly characteristic inscription COSMOS on its brow, is the expression of this side of the modern secular spirit. SCHILLER'S idea of progress—an idea which prevails in the minds of most of our contemporaries—is specially connected with this development: they say the age of happiness and prosperity for all is dawning, in which both culture and freedom will be fully enjoyed; it is, however, rather a cotton than a golden age. Still there are, in these improvements of the outward life, many elements which are in themselves good. But our contemporaries are so blinded by them, that the sense of the divine foundation of life is lost; and it is not considered that outward progress, with moral and religious declension, brings with it far more dangers and losses than true gain. Our present generation needs that word: "What shall it profit a man, though he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" It is most evident, and indeed it is generally confessed, that we are sinking ever deeper into the service and restraints of the visible, and becoming more entangled in the net of material interests. Many frightful examples show how, through the service of mammon in high and low, not only religious feeling, but even the moral sense and its influence, is lost. The modern scientific materialism is but the natural outcome of this whole mode of thought and life. It prevails now, not always consciously, but really in millions of minds. These phenomena have had the good effect of making men see, at least theoretically, that science was overstepping its limits when it ventured to touch the higher and highest life of the mind. Here too, however, there are great scientific and practical tasks remaining for the church. She must strive after the gifts of the Spirit from above; for this Spirit alone is able to overcome, with His light and power, the reign of nature in science and life: the spirit of man cannot do it.

Lastly, we must glance at our political and social life for a moment. Even before the Reformation the states and nationalities had begun to emancipate themselves from the church. This

tendency was one of the secondary factors working along with others to bring about the Reformation. On the other hand, it was considerably strengthened by the latter, as the Evangelical Church not only acknowledged the secular power to be an independent, divine ordinance, but itself became incorporated with the state. The Catholic States, too, had more freedom after the power of the Pope was so diminished. In Protestant countries the church had at first, so long as religion was a substantial power in the life of the people, a very extensive influence. But when, in the course of the seventeenth century, and especially since the Thirty Years' War, the secular interests of power, trade, etc., became so prominent, the independence of the state was more and more developed. In fact, it became almost supreme. It found its historical expression in absolute monarchy. There are, however, two forms of this—the French-Catholic and German-Protestant, to say nothing of the Russo-Grecian, Peter the Great. The German form, as determined by FREDERICK THE GREAT, consisted in an enlightened care for the welfare and progress of the people. In France, on the contrary, the *l'etat c'est moi* was held by the kings in a purely egotistic sense; and if Egoism appeared in LOUIS XIV. with some dignity and splendour, under LOUIS XV. it sank to a shameless and dissolute pursuit of pleasure by the court. Then came the consequences. If Germany followed mainly the ideal of culture, and England that of prosperity, France followed that of liberty. The modern idea of the autonomy of the mind of man was there understood politically, and out of it was developed the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, in which the people took from the mouth of the king his *l'etat c'est moi;* out of this doctrine sprung the Revolution, which, in the following years, strengthened by sins in high and low, made and is making the round of Europe. Carried over from the state to social life, and united to the industrial spirit before referred to, these views, according to which men look on themselves as creators of a new order of things, produced the theories of communism and

socialism. This politico-social autonomism, which has become in our time so prevalent, though not always in its extremest forms, and often in an indistinct and half unconscious way, has for its foundation the negation of revelation—that of the past, for it rests on man's own strength, and casts away the divine bonds,—and also that of the future, for it professes to bring in by an arm of flesh a condition of human well-being and national glory, which we believe shall first appear when the Lord shall come again, and the kingdoms of this world shall bow beneath His peaceful sceptre. The self-sufficient creature can indeed destroy, but not create. The world has no real support in itself. If the national life is once cut off from the true fountain of its sustenance in God, then it cannot but be that its development should go on in perpetual changes, and in ever greater storm and shock, which must at last cause the dissolution of the whole, unless it is followed by an inward renewal.

(2.) *Results.*

If we look over the last two centuries, so far as they now concern us, a gigantic movement of mind, worthy of all admiration, presents itself to us in all departments. A host of old, rigid, useless forms of life and knowledge are broken up, and everywhere that which is agreeable to nature and reason takes their place. What men had ever possessed of art and science is taken up anew, and almost entirely and independently developed. New sciences rise in great numbers. History is investigated with a thoroughness and breadth never seen before. The study of nature surpasses in compass and practical importance that of all previous centuries. The ideal toils and efforts of philosophy and poesy flourish. The nature of man in its intellectual and æsthetic, in its moral and political aspects, is set in motion as well as studied. But the highest good of man is neglected. Religion, which in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries had been the ruling principle, often seems in the eighteenth and nineteenth to have disappeared from the earth. And if it is thought, on one side, that some cheering traces of a coming spring may be seen; we are, on the other, always again reminded of Hegel's words, 'The owls of Minerva begin to fly at eventide.' In Greece and Rome the ripest bloom of poetry and philosophy, science and art, was concurrent with the approach of twilight, with the destruction of the power and substance of the people, and the departure of their old strength, simplicity, and piety. The Alexandrian age and the time of the emperors followed; and how many things in our days remind us of these periods!

It is an affluent world this modern one. And as Egypt once had to serve the departing Israel with its treasures; so must these modern treasures, also, of knowledge and capacity, render manifold services to the kingdom of God. The advances in outward civilised life help the spread of the gospel to the ends of the earth; and the invention of new means of intercourse comes along with the general awaking of missionary zeal, in a similarly providential way with the invention of printing at the Reformation. The progress of the sciences is also a great advantage, in many ways, in promoting the knowledge of the Bible and its documents. It furnishes not only an abundance of linguistic, archæological, and such-like aids; but also, which is more important for a right understanding of Scripture, the historic, poetic, and philosophic spirit has been awakened, and liberated from the fetters of a restricted dogmatism. Besides this, nature and history are themselves also scenes of divine revelation, and serve, the more exactly they are studied, to further the knowledge of God. But the modern world of ideas is a world without God. In all departments in theology and philosophy, in literature and education, in pure and applied science, in political and social life, the autonomic and cosmic principle, the self-glory of the human mind and an ungodly worldliness, has set itself in opposition to the principles of evangelical religion.

The opposing principles have been openly and distinctly stated; for religion is the union of man to God, and is opposed, on one hand, to the idea of human self-righteousness and sufficiency, and on the other, to worldliness and exclusive regard to the seen (Rom. iii. etc.; Heb. xi.). Herein lies the contribution which Rationalism has furnished to the development of the antichristian spirit.

It is necessary, therefore, carefully to distinguish what is warranted and what is not, in the intellectual work and effort of our time. We have in this respect a similar task in regard to Rationalism, with that the Reformation had in regard to Humanism. The accomplishment of it demands severe and prolonged mental toil, of which beginnings are now being made in all departments. In that which we occupy—the theological, the modern principle is reason *versus* revelation, knowledge *versus* faith. Even here we must distinguish between the true and the false. For in that which is usually opposed to revelation as reason, two very different elements are joined together in a way that is unjustifiable and causes confusion,—these are the rational and the rationalistic. On one hand, by reason is meant the human mind in its nature, its intellectual and moral equipment; on the other, it is conceived of as a self-sufficient divine essence, so that it excludes everything superhuman, and becomes the representative of that view of things which, during the last two centuries, has rejected supernaturalism of every sort. The appearance of truth, and the scientific character with which the modern opposition to Christianity has surrounded itself, rest upon the fact that the second idea has been thrust into the first, so that this particular doctrine, though essentially false, has been given forth as if implied in the nature of man itself. Because man is a rational being, it is assumed that he must be a rationalist. This illusion is now being gradually dispelled. Revelation has to come to an understanding, not with one but with two elements—with human nature and with the modern antichristian views. The

last of these are to be refuted. As far as the nature of man is concerned, we have the given facts before us, to which revelation must not be in opposition, if it is to be the truth, namely, the facts of our intellectual, moral, and religious being, the facts of reason and conscience,—in short, the entire intellectual endowment of man as a created being, on one side sinful, on the other personal, and still bearing traces of the image of God. These facts Christianity must have for itself; these are its points of contact with man: it must be shown that the nature of man needs, demands, and predicts the divine revelation; that by itself, without Christianity, it cannot attain to its own ideal and destiny; and that the Christian is the true man.

It must be shown that the human need and the divine gift of life cover and correspond to one another; that they are for one another in the same way as the earth and the sun, the womanly nature and the manly; indeed, the Scriptures often compare the revelation of God to His people, of Christ to His church, with marriage. Revelation would thus be exhibited in its reasonableness; and reason would be restored to its right position as the receptive and perceptive, not as the creative, self-sufficient faculty; as a human, not a divine principle.

The service of Rationalism consists in having compelled Christian science to seek out the points of contact Christianity has in man's nature, and so to acquire a more vivid and scriptural conception of the relation between the divine and human. The earlier Protestantism, as we have seen, gave exclusive attention to the ideas of sin and grace, and kept back those of the Creator and creature, and therefore thought of man as simply passive before God, not as receptive—a being who is free to accept. In opposition to the passivity of the "block and stone," as the fallen man was called, there arose the perverted activity of the human autonomy. The truth in the case is, free receptivity. The old Protestant leading idea of man was that of sin, the Rationalistic is that of reason: in our time, the idea of conscience is becoming ever of more importance; and

conscience is, on one side, a witness to the sinfulness of man, and, on the other, to his original relation to God.

The clearer views of the relation between God and man, the stress now laid on the human, and in connection with it on the historical, and on development, have already become the common possession of the most diverse parties among the believing theologians of our time. Whether those who labour in the theological field at the present day start from an ecclesiastical, or biblical, or speculative standpoint, there is in the whole mode of looking at, thinking of, and exhibiting the subject, something common to all, which distinguishes us just as decidedly from the earlier Protestantism, especially in respect to form, as, in a material point of view, it separates us from Rationalism. Indeed, in regard to scientific method we stand, consciously or unconsciously, nearer the latter than the former; though we are at one with the former in the confession of evangelical truth. Modern authors have, as the ancient classic writers, poets, philosophers, historians, etc., had, a great influence on the church in matters of form.

With a new form, however, a new and deeper comprehension of the matter and substance is always connected. This new spirit may be perceived in all directions and in all branches of theology. The Old Testament is opened up in all the course and progress of its revelations with a vividness never before seen in the church; the person of the Redeemer stands before us ever more effulgent in all the moral and human truth of his life, rising sublimely from its divine foundation; in the views of the work of reconciliation, the legalistic rigidity of earlier times has been touched with new life; the character of the apostles and the historical features of the primitive church come out with growing distinctness; and the place and importance of the church in relation to the great development of the kingdom of God, both past and future, are being more and more recognised. All these are indeed but beginnings, which, by faithful labour, by mutual friction

and correction, must be yet further developed. But they are beginnings of a work in which it is a pleasure and joy to have any share. We shall, further on, go more at length into their history.

On the other side, the deep essential falsehood and corruption of the autonomic, cosmic tendency has already been made manifest by its consequences in the history of the world. The practical consequence of it is Revolution, with its not less frightful companion, Despotism; the theoretic consequence is Materialism, which at last annihilates not only Christianity, or what is called blind faith, but even science and art, as well as all moral and political life, and drags all humanity down to bestiality. Since these consequences have become apparent in the middle of the nineteenth century, a panic has seized the minds of men in many circles. They shrink back from the abysses which yawn before their eyes, and fly back as far as they can go, some centuries at least, and arrive at last at Catholicism. Not only have some of the extremest standard-bearers of modern intellect become Catholic, such as DAUMER and the COUNTESS VON HAHN-HAHN; not only has the Romish Church gained considerably in outward power during the last few years through the reaction, but in the midst of evangelical believers themselves, a catholicizing tendency of no inconsiderable strength has become manifest, which would load the minds of men with the apparatus of external authority, and which sees salvation chiefly in the maintenance of Christian institutions. True Protestantism, therefore, stands to-day between foes on the right and the left, as the Reformers did between the Pope and the ecclesiastical and political destructives. Only the struggle is now much hotter and more fundamental; and alas! the powers which we have so far at our disposal are not greater in the same degree, but the contrary. We are perplexed, but not in despair. Neither by concessions to unbelief, nor by making the gospel into law and making flesh our arm, will we serve the cause of God. In opposition to every form of human tradition

we continue Protestant, free in our faith, as in opposition to every sort of false freedom we continue Evangelical, standing firm by the word of God. The weapons of our warfare are spiritual—faith, and the word; a free and joyful conviction which comes in as a personal witness for the Saviour, of whom we have living experience; and the divine revelation to which the Scriptures testify, which is demonstrated to be the very highest thing in the world—to be the history of history. We shall not allow the second weapon, the word of Scripture, to be wrested from us, not even under the most plausible pretence. They must leave the word of God standing ever. If we thus conduct an honourable controversy, we shall not perhaps gain any very brilliant victory, but we shall do our duty, and shall have joy in the day of His future. And it will become true in a different sense from what many think: the kingdom must continue unto us.

b. The Criticism of the Bible.

If the word inspiration in reference to the Scriptures was characteristic of the early Protestant orthodoxy, the word criticism is characteristic of the Rationalistic age, whose watch-word was, "Everything to the test of reason!" At present, and in the immediate future, perhaps the idea of the history of revelation, in deed, word, or doctrine, and Scriptures will acquire a similar significance. Even SCHLEIERMACHER remarked that the word criticism is very hard to understand as an actual unity. In order to avoid the confusion which has arisen from the uncertainty of the use of words, and to see clearly the limits within which criticism is a right and duty, we must keep the different sides of the idea distinct and separate. We must distinguish between textual, literary, historical, and dogmatic criticism.

The Scriptures are a collection of ancient documents, and the very first duty for the right use of them is the restoration

of the original text. It is well known what has been done in this respect by WETSTEIN, BENGEL, and GRIESBACH, and down to LACHMAN and TISCHENDORF, by a comparison of the manuscripts and other ancient authorities. The fruit of this first exercise of criticism is the various editions of the Old and New Testaments with their critical apparatus.

Upon the ground of the textual there then arose the literary criticism, which has been, as the higher criticism, made to follow after the lower, the textual, inasmuch as the investigations into the authenticity of the biblical books were allotted to it, and those into the integrity of them to text-criticism. Literary criticism investigates the single books in their internal peculiarities, and estimates them historically; it thus has to go into the question concerning their origin, the time and place, occasion and object of their composition, their place and value in the entire body of biblical revelation. Literary criticism falls again into two parts, the external and internal, of which the first deals with the so-called external testimonies, *e.g.* in the New Testament, the opinions of the fathers upon the rise of the different books, the old citations from them, and such like; while the second looks at the books themselves, and seeks to draw from their contents as a whole and as parts the relations out of which they originated. External criticism is the field in which the literary connects with the text criticism: both have to draw their conclusions partly from the same ancient sources. An inference as to the time when a whole book or certain parts of it were composed, may be drawn from the character of some words or sentences in it. Even in these lower provinces, but especially in internal criticism, the subjective judgment of the critic has considerable scope. This is the case particularly in the Old Testament. Here there is almost no external testimony; and even the language or its development does not offer many secure points we can lay hold of. This field has accordingly been in an especial degree the theatre of war between different hypotheses, on which for centuries the most opposite opinions

have emerged often simultaneously, or in quick succession, on many points. The investigation has not come to any definite close. This is the case with respect to the Pentateuch, the writings of John in their mutual relations, etc.; and it is not likely that a final decision will soon be reached. The result of all these inquiries is embraced by that science, which is now usually called "Introduction" to the Old and New Testaments, and which has lately been understood and treated more and more scientifically as the history of biblical literature, in connection with the history of the entire revelation.

When such a historical view of the Scriptures as a whole, and in its parts, has been reached, then it may be employed scientifically to ascertain and set forth the history of divine revelation in word and deed. As the Scriptures furnish a variety of sources for such a history, *e.g.* in the different Gospels, a mode of treatment is required here too, which aims at a comparison and reconciliation of the different sources with one another, in order to obtain as faithful and complete a representation as possible of the divine doings and sayings. This harmonistic process may also be called critical, in so far as it seeks to discover the real state of the facts from an investigation and estimate of the different accounts. And it is this which we have described as historic criticism. The result of the historic element thus introduced is biblical history (in the higher scientific sense of the word, the histories of the old and new covenant), and biblical theology (history of doctrine).

Lastly, we have spoken also of dogmatic criticism, certainly not as acknowledging that it is really so, but only to use the right expression for that in modern criticism which is to be rejected. There is not merely an orthodox, but also a rationalistic dogmatism. It denies the possibility of a true revelation, of miracle and prophecy more or less fundamentally, even before coming to the Scriptures at all, and begins critical action upon the foundation of this preconceived opinion. In the introduction to this work, some characteristic expressions of leading

representatives of modern criticism have been already quoted. They clearly and openly profess this to be their method, and call it the true historic one. EWALD, BAUR, and others constantly claim to be the representatives of genuine historical criticism. That would be correct if the error we have disputed in the first part of our work were truth, namely, that true historical study of Scripture is to bring down the sacred history to the level of profane, if it were indeed part of the idea of history that it should be without miracles. So long, however, as the highest law in the writing of history is to get at the actual facts from the various original sources; so long as we have to measure theories by facts, and not facts by theories,—such criticism as this must be called a dogmatic or dogmatistic, an unhistorical or antihistorical criticism. If we have been compelled to describe the old Protestant doctrine of inspiration as dogmatistic, the rationalistic biblical criticism is obnoxious to a similar objection. It is therefore to be avoided and rejected by true science, as well as by true faith, which last has always acknowledged the Scriptures to be worthy of belief, on the ground of the inward witness of the Holy Spirit, and the concurrent testimony of the church in all ages.

Only in one sense is dogmatic biblical criticism just, that is, in the sense in which the apostle's words may be applied to the books of the Bible: "He that is spiritual judgeth all things" (1 Cor. ii. 15). Such a criticism, however, is not possible from a rationalistic standpoint, which is alien from the spirit of the sacred Scriptures, nor from mere philological and historical points of view; it is only possible when one, by the operation of the Spirit, has been brought into inward unison with the mind and essence of the word of revelation—with the mind of Christ (ver. 16). From such a position the single books of Scripture are estimated, and a different value ascribed to them according as they are occupied with Christ, that is, as they stand in closer or remoter connection with the central point of the gospel. Thus the Old Testament is less central

than the New, the Book of Esther than Genesis, Ecclesiastes than Isaiah, the Epistle of James than that to the Romans, though to all of these is given their essential place and signification in the entire Bible. It is quite common for the devout mind, in the practical use of the Scriptures, for edification, to make such distinctions, though it is often done unconsciously and involuntarily; and no one has been bolder in this respect than he to whom we are accustomed to look up as one of the most spiritual men since the days of the apostles, Luther. His well-known opinions concerning the Epistle of James and other biblical books are not indeed to be followed, and they admonish us to care and humility in this matter. But if Scripture is now so often and rightly called an organism, it must also have its more and less honourable members. If the mechanical theory of inspiration is wrong; if the individuality of the human author and the historical development of revelation is not only acknowledged, but is regarded as essential and significant,—then a principal point of view is furnished for the unbiassed historical study of the Bible; and this point of view by no means tends to lower the word of God, but rather serves to open up and enhance its manifold wealth, and to reveal the wisdom of God in educating men by providing for their most varied wants and for the different stages of their progress. The clearest example of this is the Gospels, rising up in an ascending line from Mark to John. This kind of dogmatic criticism, however, the spiritual, is wide as the heavens distinct from the unspiritual criticism of a rationalistic dogmatism.

(1.) *The Criticism of Rationalistic Dogmatism in its different Phases.*

In point of fact, the biblical criticism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has proceeded mainly from the rationalistic dogmatism. It is only a part of that entire system which makes the lower the measure of the higher, the cosmical the

measure of the divine, the present the measure of earlier, greater times, and even of the primeval creative periods. The ultimate consequence of this method is the derivation of the life of mind from matter. A similar method is seen also in the study of nature and history. Geogonic views, which, notwithstanding all geological discovery, are regulated by the standard of that which is now taking place in the earth, and hence set millions of years for less important processes in its preparation, arise from the same limited vision which, while baffled by the very least, ventures to approach the very greatest. Of this kind is a mode of writing history, which, rejecting tradition with an uncritical criticism, and having no true sympathy with the spirit of these days of old, interprets antiquity, *e.g.* ancient Rome, with an utterly modern mind, and according to modern categories. Such procedure may for a while exercise influence, and be thought bold and piquant; it may be learned, acute, and ingenious; but the anointing of true science will soon be missed in it.

"The thoughts and circumstances of the nineteenth century," says a jurist and historian,[1] "are utterly inadequate as a standard for the ancient world. The modern yard-measure is too short to measure the power and greatness of those men and things. With shame, not with presumption, should our pigmy generation look up to the strength and loftiness of mind that distinguished the ancient world and its peoples. The gulf which divides them from us, is deeper than that which separates the royal structures of Egypt from Trianon or Sans Souci. The modern opinions concerning the great characters of antiquity, remind us of the conduct of those painters of the last century who introduced Greeks and Romans into their pictures in the costume of the courtiers of Louis the Fourteenth. What the self-complacent nineteenth century, and some of those trained in the culture of the day, who are penetrated by modern ideas, think of Rome and Greece, cannot compensate or take

[1] See Note G 3.

the place of the actual history which has been handed down. From their words we learn what they themselves are, not what the ancients were. It is from this alone they have now any importance. Future generations may learn from them to what a stage of temerity and perversity a certain mode of thought attained, which preferred the shifting sand of changing personal opinion to the solid ground of fact. We may say of such treatment of these subjects with SIMONIDES, 'It has not recognised the lion from the claw, but has constructed heaven and earth anew by wick and lamp.' *Scribendo res antiquas antiquior mihi fit animus.* That is the sign and reward of true history. Livy could thus boast concerning himself. Our modern authors, however, prefer to dispose of the records, and to come before the people of ancient times, not for the purpose of raising their minds, so that they might understand them, by continued and profound study, but to bring them down to their own level, and to reduce their greatness to the narrow proportions of their own brain. Their works, therefore, lead the reader ever further and further away from the true spirit of antiquity. We are at last left quite in the dark in the midst of the confused dialectics of the day. No bond of inward sympathy connects these authors with the subject which they have selected for treatment. Whoever lacks such sympathy must not presume to take the pen of the historian in his hand. He should select other departments of the science of antiquity, copy epitaphs, reckon cycles of the world, and explain the grammar of dead languages. Heroic nations must be studied with a freer and higher spirit. To demand proof of historical reports is absurd; to set up the defect of perfect agreement in little details, or chronological uncertainty, or great space of time between the authors and the events they relate, in order to show that they are not correct, is a foolish misunderstanding of the nature of all national traditions. There is no criticism but that which lies in the very matter itself. Everything carries the law by which it is to be determined only in itself. To explain all difficulties will never be

possible. Just as little is it possible to comprehend everything. If everything wonderful is to disappear, then we must first of all strike out and deny Rome itself, the greatest of all miracles. The supposed solution of an enigma in history produces a hundred new ones. Like cloud-structures, arbitrary and transitory as they, the new combinations then follow on one another. What a variety of them has passed before us since NIEBUHR'S days! The absurdities of a summer night's dream could hardly press one another in more motley succession. And all of them lay claim to that unconditional faith which is denied to the accounts of the ancients themselves. These were thrown overboard with ever-growing contempt. The ancient authors seemed to exist only for the purpose of giving, by parts arbitrarily extracted, the appearance of strict inquiry to airy fancies, which indeed seldom had even the semblance of probability. Rome might boast of having become the sort of common land on which, in passing, every crude imagining might be thrown with impunity. That which peculiarly distinguishes this negative tendency, is the enmity to prominent characters. One after the other they are made to pass away into cloud and dust. To such a dizzy height had criticism risen, that, looking from its seat in the clouds, all things on earth seemed like an indistinguishable heap. It seemed to have exalted the monotony of the North German heathen to be the prototype of the life of ancient nations. Rome had to submit patiently while the work of emasculation was completed upon it. History makes itself. A natural organism, like a plant, a nation rises, grows, and falls, without any room being made for the action of great men, in forming and leading the destinies of their age. However, a man, and even a learned man, must acknowledge something higher than himself. If he has satisfied his critical needs, in opposing the ancients, he feels a double call to bend the head abjectly before modern authorities. He comes back to that respect for personal greatness, whose higher significance in the development of earlier times he would not admit at all. How puzzling

and full of contradictions is the mind of man! How much more he feels at home in the society of his equals! To all greater than himself he still cries, 'Depart out of our coasts.' Who could hear and rightly judge of that in other nations, of which one's own nation has no share, and which is rejected by one's own time? What has the old state constitution to do with religion? How far Rome would sink in our estimation, if it should actually appear that its whole state rights, its whole life, the very greatness of its best times, rest upon a religious foundation, and everything should appear in the light of a religious act! A people that gives itself up to priestly deception and superstition is no worthy object of thought to us. How well NIEBUHR understood and pleased the spirit of his age, when he shut his eye altogether to this aspect of ancient life! So we have come now to this, that we have happily got rid of the greatest elements in the life of the ancient nations—the influence exerted by individual greatness, the power of religion, and its influence on the state, and on life,—and now possess Roman histories, which, by removing all this delusion, are agreeable and pleasant to the present age."

This fundamental error comes out most distinctly in modern biblical criticism. Men of mere book learning, who have never seen what the Spirit of God is working in the church at this day, and who know little of life in general, take it upon themselves to pronounce final judgment upon the greatest revelations of spirit and life the world has ever seen; upon the greatest of men, and the greatest inward and outward conflicts; upon events which, more than all others, have moved the world; upon words and writings which, more than all others, have been productive of life. Little modern literary opinions and theories are made measures of the great pentecostal periods of history; so that the New Testament becomes a mere bundle of controversial writings, such as might have resulted from some present party strife. What does not occur in our days, or at least what is not seen by certain eyes, cannot have happened in an earlier age,

the products of which yet lie before us the greatest in the world, and to which we have nothing even remotely similar. And all that is the better and more innocent part of the matter; for it must not be overlooked, that there lies at the root of modern biblical criticism, in one part of its labours, an inward opposition to divine truth, and hostility to the church.

This is not the place for a detailed history of biblical criticism; but we will give a sketch of dogmatistic criticism, taking again the Gospels as our illustrative example. The critical activity began, as a rule, with the outworks—with the Old Testament; but ended in the central point of divine revelation—in the life of Christ. This example is therefore the most instructive here also; indeed, it is more than a mere example, the very core and essence of the matter is here disclosed.

If we start with the presumption that the Bible history, because miraculous, cannot really have happened as recorded, there are two possible ways of regarding and disposing of miracles. Criticism abides either by the facts and the persons who act in them, or by the accounts and those who gave them. In both cases, the miraculous, which, as such, is untrue and unhistorical, may have been, either purposely or without purpose, added to the historical part. In the first case, we have deceit, lies, conscious delusion; in the other, we have error or fiction. Two things are thus possible in both cases: when criticism holds by the facts, and also when it holds by the reports. There are thus four possibilities, which have all in turn actually been realized. The criticism of the facts will make the commencement; for it requires a refined idealistic mode of thought, which avoids the actual, and which is ingenious in negation, to treat the Gospels as a mere web of arbitrary representations, and forget in such inquiries, or lightly to touch upon, the question of the actual facts.

In connection with the attacks of the English Deists upon the Bible, already referred to, criticism in the coarsest form made its appearance in Germany, in the *Wolfenbüttel Frag-*

ments, which LESSING published in the seventh decade of the last century. "The author" (REIMARUS, Hamburgh, 1768, to use the words of STRAUSS concerning him)[1] "attempts to brand MOSES with all the disgrace of a deceiver, who did not shrink from using the most scandalous means to make himself the despotic ruler of a free people. To introduce his plan, he pretended that God had appeared to him; then he gave out divine commands for rules of conduct, such as the borrowing and taking away the property of the Egyptians, and the extermination of the Canaanites, which would else have been branded as fraud, highway robbery, and inhuman cruelty, but which, by the addition of the words—God has said it,—were to be regarded as having the seal of God's approval. Just as little could the Fragmentist find in the New Testament history a divine record. The design of Jesus was in his eyes political; His relation to John the Baptist a preconcerted affair, by which the one should recommend the other to the people; the death of Jesus was a frustration of His plans which He had by no means foreseen—a blow from which His disciples recovered, only by giving out the false account of His resurrection, and making a cunning change in their system of doctrine."

No sound mind could be satisfied with such an opinion as this, and therefore the disbelief of miracle struck into a different path. It no longer assailed the character of the men of God in the Bible; it admitted that Jesus was a pattern of virtue, and a wise teacher, who, however, performed no miracles, but only acts sometimes of kindness and philanthropy, and sometimes of medical skill, and occasionally was favoured by accident and good luck. The belief that He wrought miracles arises from a mistake of those unenlightened times, which took simply natural actions for supernatural. This so-called natural explanation of miracles was first applied to the Old Testament by EICHHORN, and to the New by PAULUS OF HEIDELBERG (since 1800). So long as the human race, says the first, who expresses essen-

[1] See Note H 3.

tially the view of EWALD and many other scholars, had not reached solid ground in the inquiry into the true origin of things, it derived everything from powers superior to nature, or from the intervention of beings of a higher order. Sublime thoughts, great resolves, useful inventions and institutions, and especially vivid dreams, were all supposed to be wrought by the Deity, under whose immediate influence they imagined themselves to be. The proofs of superior knowledge with which any one astonished the people, passed for miracles and proofs of supernatural powers, and intimate intercourse with superior intelligences; and not only was it the common people who were of this opinion, but these very eminent men themselves never doubted it, and cherished the full conviction of secret intercourse with the Deity. In the opinions of these men, the smoke and burning of Sinai at the giving of the Law, to take one example, was, according to Eichhorn, nothing more than a fire which MOSES lighted on the mountain, to assist the imagination of his people, and by good chance a thunder-storm happened at the same time; the shining of his face was only a natural consequence of great heat, which Moses himself, with the people, regarded as something divine, because he did not know the true cause of it. As for PAULUS, we have already had occasion to show how he explains miracles as a mixture of the natural fact, and the supernatural estimate of them. At the time of Jesus there was still a strong tendency to attribute every extraordinary event at once to an invisible, superhuman cause. The historian has therefore to separate these two parts that have grown up so closely together, and to extract from the shell of the personal opinion and views of the particular period, the pure kernel of fact. To this end he must get as clear a picture as possible of the times, place himself in the scene of the events, and, by taking in the surrounding circumstances, which were overlooked, or not sufficiently recognised at the time, explain the miracles naturally. In the miracles of feeding the multitudes, *e.g.*, the evangelists relate that Jesus caused His little

store of provisions to be divided out, so that the whole multitude is fed; that is based on fact. But instead of the miracle, the natural circumstance to be supplied is, that the example of Jesus encouraged the others who were there to bring out their stock of provisions and divide them also. The turning of the water into wine is explained by the Jewish custom of giving wedding presents in oil and wine, and also by the intention of Jesus to give, for the sake of amusement, His present in an unexpected and mysterious way—(here Dr. Paulus has evidently transferred himself to the scenes of his own Suabian fatherland, where it is common to disguise the so-called wedding bouquets in curious ways),—a playful deception, which, at a late hour in the evening, when they had drunk pretty freely, might be easily taken for a miraculous change.

As science, on such a path, becomes, with all its ingenuity, at last simply laughable, it could not long continue there either. It is so far good, however, that these two schools were anxious to bring out the facts, the true history in each instance. As the Kantian Rationalism, which forms the dogmatic presupposition of the criticism of PAULUS, had a practically useful element in it in its moral earnestness; so is this desire to discover facts relatively a sound and good thing, compared with the further steps which criticism took. The fundamental question, Who was Jesus? what did He teach and do? was from this point onward more or less neglected, or they contented themselves with only the most superficial and imperfect treatment of it; the origin of the New Testament representations and books was now alone investigated. As the Hegelian Idealism, which is the basis of STRAUSS' and BAUR'S criticism, converted the whole world into a logical process of thought, and placed being in thinking, and sacrificed life to knowledge; so here the acts of Jesus were converted into mere mythical representations, and the history of the apostles into literary party struggles.

Even before Strauss, whose *Leben Jesu* first appeared in 1835

and 1836, the religion of revelation had been likened to the heathen religions, by the view that there were myths in the Bible also. This was first said of the Old Testament in reference to the Pentateuch (comp. above, p. 116). Then came HEGEL'S *Philosophy of Religion*, which gave expression to an already current opinion, when it taught that in religion the human mind possesses the truth only in the veil of outward sensible symbol, from which it must be freed and raised to the form of the pure idea by speculation. One of these external forms is, that the unity of God and man, which is perfected pantheistically in the whole human race, is historically manifest in the one person Jesus Christ. Now it is owing to this that this person is so adorned with a wreath of miracles, *i.e.* of myths. Myths are part of the essence of every religion, just because the idea first of all takes the form of an outward symbol. We have thus here simply a dogmatic inference from a philosophic system, and from a false view of religion, an *a priori* hypothesis with no historical support or objective scientific value. The formation of myths was derived simply from the conception of religion; there was no need of historical causes for them. The belief in such cases is, as Strauss says,[1] "nothing else than a want of faith in mind and the power of ideas, as if these were not able of themselves to produce narratives; as if there was need of some outward event, be it ever so accidental, as cause." The myths are thus simply "a historical investiture of primal Christian ideas, woven in the purposeless legends that were then forming." But whence these Christian ideas? This is the one point at which STRAUSS takes a step out of the inner world of representations and symbols into the actual world. But even this one only apparently. They were Jewish ideas which begot these Christian ideas. Jesus applied the idea of a Messias to Himself, and thus the Jewish representations of the Messiah and the Old Testament types were transferred to Him: the myths of ELIAS, etc., found their echo in the myths of JESUS.

[1] See Note I 3.

We see here quite clearly the necessity of the transition from STRAUSS to FEUERBACH. Religion becomes wholly an internal world of unreal representations and illusions: whoever lives and dies believing that it is history, is the victim of a mere idea. In proof, however, that the evangelists' narratives could not be facts, STRAUSS partly made use of the differences in the accounts of the Gospels, and sought to make them contradictions, and partly and chiefly appealed to the impossibility of reconciling the accounts with the laws of historic events, *i.e.* he appealed to the metaphysical impossibility of the appearing of angels, miracles, etc. For the mythical interpretation, as such, these two grounds prove nothing; but they would, if they were valid, only prove the unhistorical character of the narratives in the Gospels in general. The natural explanation, however, would then be quite as possible as the mythical; therefore STRAUSS is accustomed, in every single instance, to support the mythical explanation, by proving the impossibility of the natural. We see here, again, how little positive and real foundation this mythical view has; and that, at the very best, it has only the value of a hypothesis. These two points of view, the historico-critical and the metaphysical, are blended together by STRAUSS in such a way that at the first it dazzles; but, in truth, as already remarked, it is unscientific. The second point of view is merely the dogmatic assumption for which we call this criticism dogmatistic, and which is thus simply admitted here also. In the first respect, the work of STRAUSS has incited to much exhaustive research; its scientific significance is, as Hase says,[1] the gathering up and definite marking off of all that has been brought against the harmony and historic trustworthiness of the Gospels.

The criticism of STRAUSS has not yet gone into the essence of the Gospels as books, but only into the representations contained in them; nor has it been occupied with those who furnished the accounts, but with the accounts themselves, and has

[1] See Note K 3.

attempted to prove how they originated. The mythical explanation, however, necessarily presupposes a later origin of the Gospels. Eye-witnesses could not narrate myths: the historical character of Jesus must have become faint and dim, before it could be so dressed up in unhistorical form; the legend that was forming without purpose required time for the formation of the myths. It was a scientific defect in STRAUSS that he paid but little attention to literary criticism of the Gospels, and thus neglected the foundation for the possibility of the formation of myths. Attention had, therefore, now to be directed chiefly to this point.

In the first instance, however, criticism passed from the representation of the Gospels to the writings themselves and their authors in another way. It was much more abstract, and showed very distinctly how, in this matter, everything started from some philosophic presupposition, and nothing from actual historical study; nothing from any inner difficulties in the matter itself, but everything from modern speculative categories and conclusions, which demanded that the evangelical record should be set aside at any cost. BRUNO BAUER, in his criticism of the synoptical Gospels, which appeared in 1841 and 1842, said of STRAUSS, that his purposeless legend was just as "mysterious a substance" as the inspiration of the orthodox critics. In this case, as in the others, the idea of any outward substantial realities would, according to the most recent doctrine of categories, have to be reduced to a matter of self-consciousness. Simply expressed, it was not the purposeless legend, not harmless poesy, that formed the evangelical narratives; but they are the conscious and intended inventions of an author, whose work we possess in the Gospel of Mark. The opinions of WEISSE and WILKE (1838), published about the same time, that the Gospel of Mark is the oldest, is lauded by BRUNO BAUER as "an extraordinary discovery, the memory of which will be immortal;" and calls the author of this Gospel, from whom he derives not only the form but also the matter of the whole Gospel history, the creative and original evangelist,

from whom the others have plagiarized with ever-growing misunderstanding. He also takes away from STRAUSS the historical weapon which he uses to explain the formation of myths, by proving "that before the coming of Jesus, and before the formation of the church, the conception of a Messiah was not at all general; that there was thus at that time no Jewish Christology on which the evangelical one could have been framed." As, however, Mark with his book cannot well be the creator of Christianity, BRUNO BAUER is compelled to go back to the church, which gave the impulse to his activity as an author, and must have furnished him with the Messianic idea. In this way, indeed, he falls half way back to the position of STRAUSS, and the difference consists only in this, that they were not Jewish Messianic representations, out of which the church constructed the evangelical narratives, but they were Messianic conceptions of the church from which the first evangelist formed them. But whence the church? BRUNO BAUER answers: the thought of the Messias, and the idea that this was He, gave to the Christian community its existence; or rather the two things, the formation of the church, and the rise of that thought, were one and the same thing, and similar in substance. Bauer thus does not derive the church from Jesus; for "everything we know of Him belongs only to the world of symbol; nothing that we read in the Gospels can be regarded as real testimony concerning Jesus; and whether such a character ever existed at all, can only be decided by the criticism of the epistles of the New Testament, especially those of Paul. Not therefore the Messias who actually came, but the thought of the Messias, gave existence to the church. Whence, however, this idea of Messias came, we do not learn; and the origin of Christianity remains entirely unexplained. BAUER, however, tells us what the idea of Messias or Christ was. Self-consciousness had broken through the limits of the ancient common and natural life, by means of the Roman supremacy and philosophy. Religion was still a universal power; but it was not

then understood in its free, universal, human character; its substance and inward nature was represented in a distinct person, as, indeed, the religious consciousness generally is the mind in a state of estrangement from itself. In this BAUER goes over from HEGEL to FEUERBACH. "This Christ," says he, "the Ego, become God and exalted to heaven, casts down the world of antiquity, and conquers the present world by extracting everything out of it; and it has fulfilled its destiny when, through the enormous disorder into which it plunges the mind, it has constrained it to acknowledge itself, and with a thoroughness and decisiveness which was not possible to antiquity to become self-consciousness."[1] Comp. p. 74.

This is the BRUNO BAUER of whom we read lately in ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT'S letters to Varnhagen von Ense: "BRUNO found me long ago converted to a pre-Adamite." If such a frivolous, purely constructive book, utterly devoid of any real research, had come before the author of *Cosmos* in any department of natural science, he would not have thought it worth a second glance. BRUNO BAUER has not succeeded in attaining the influence of STRAUSS; still it is he who makes the transition from this latter to F. C. BAUR of Tübingen, seeing that he carried criticism into the literary region, and maintained a view of the second Gospel similar to BAUR'S of the fourth. But everything was done by the latter with much greater earnestness, and with a much better supply of mental vigour and learning.

There is a still closer connection than this between BAUR and STRAUSS. BAUR was the teacher of STRAUSS, and exercised over him the most decided influence, not only by the whole tendency of his thought, which may be described as an application of Hegel's principles of the foundation of history to the history of the church and dogma, and especially to primitive Christianity; but he also came before the public with the first edition of his New Testament criticism some years before the

[1] See Note L 3.

appearance of STRAUSS' *Leben Jesu.* His treatise on the parties at Corinth (1 Cor. i. 12), which formed the basis of his entire critical method, by setting up the difference between Paulinism and Petrinism, heathen Christianity and Judaism, as the moving principle of the history of apostolic times, appeared so early as 1831. On the other hand, it is quite clear that the scholar also influenced the teacher by his *Leben Jesu,* and made him bolder to pursue the path into which he had struck; so that the most important critical labours of BAUR fall into the fourth decade of the century. In the critical work which resulted from the Hegelian principles, STRAUSS and BAUR have so divided the labours, that STRAUSS makes the contents, BAUR the literary form of the Gospels; STRAUSS the life of Jesus, BAUR the accounts of that life, the object of investigation. BAUR places the composition of the Gospels in the second century, and so furnishes the substructure for STRAUSS, as in this way a wide space remains open for the formation of the myths. Inversely, the mythicism of STRAUSS provides the presupposition for BAUR'S literary criticism of the Gospels. We have already quoted his characteristic expression to the effect, that the chief argument for the later origin of the Gospels is, that they, each for itself, and still more all together, relate so many things in the life of Jesus in a way which cannot possibly be real.

Jesus is to BAUR nothing more than he is to STRAUSS,—a Jewish rabbi, who declared himself to be the Messiah; who taught that it was not the mere outward act, but the inward disposition, which gave a man his moral character. This was the great principle of a universal morality, a true humanity, sublime in its divinity, which gave such absolute weight to the person of Jesus. But even this principle had, in the person of Jesus, to enter within the restrictions of the Jewish ideas of the Messiah (the truth is rather that the Jewish national ideas are unbound, and expanded in the idea of Messiah to world-wide universalism; but the criticism of Baur

is tainted by a defective knowledge and estimate of the Old Testament, which are traceable to the systems of HEGEL and SCHLEIERMACHER), as a form that was necessary, in order to have a point of contact for its historical development, and to find the path on which it might come to be the general consciousness of humanity. Attaching themselves to the Jewish idea, the twelve apostles "could not rise above the Jewish particularism." It was PAUL who worked out the first and universal side of the principle.

Agreeably to this theory, BAUR distinguishes three stages in the development of primitive Christianity: (1.) The Jewish, Christian, and Ebionitic, represented by the twelve, and first taking definite form in the Apocalypse, which was composed by the Apostle John, and in direct opposition to Paul. (2.) The heathen-Christian and universal, which is represented by Paul, and is contained in the Epistles to Galatians, Corinthians, and Romans. These two tendencies were opposed to one another during the whole of the first century and far into the second. The remaining writings of the New Testament, none of them genuine, are the products of the conflicts and negotiations between the two parties; until at length (3.) in the second half of the second century, the fourth Gospel got the victory over the Pauline universalism, which it further developed speculatively by the introduction of the idea of the Logos; and in other ways, especially in the theocratic institution and aristocratic forms of its constitution, many Jewish elements passed into the Catholic Church.[1]

If the criticism of PAULUS and STRAUSS had declared that the miraculous narratives arose from a harmless mistake, and from legends formed without any definite purpose, the New Testament literature, according to BAUR'S criticism, falls under the other point of view. It is composed with a deliberate purpose, just as the history itself was declared to be by the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*. Most of the New Testament books

[1] See Note M 3.

bear on their front the so-called pious lie, that thay assert they were composed by the apostles, though they were not. BAUR opposes, and not altogether without reason, "the narrow prejudice arising from ignorance of antiquity, which looks on pseudonymity and literary fraud as identical conceptions." He says, however, that "the same interest is at the bottom of the appearance of the pseudonymic apostolic epistles, as of the Acts of the Apostles; it was the movement of the time toward unity by closer attachment to the persons of the apostles themselves; and just as surely as these writings are therefore writings with a particular tendency, so natural is their pseudonymic character." In this view, the great majority of the New Testament epistles are characterized by the "same intentional change of the actual facts" as the Acts of the Apostles.[1] If the most of the New Testament writings have arisen out of mutual concessions of the parties, then their authors have ventured to play fast and loose with divine truth in a way which, looked at in connection with the reality of the witness of the Spirit, must be most emphatically repudiated. Not only the doctrine, but the whole history is in danger through such treatment as this; for the way in which, in this view at least, the author of the Acts of the Apostles handled his material, is nothing less than a falsification of history in the interest of a party. The Gospel of John — "the one beautiful, true, and chief Gospel" — is a "romance," composed with a deliberate purpose, which yet professes to be a veritable history. Whoever has observed the moral influence of the New Testament on humanity, whoever has experienced such influence in his own life, will come away from this treatment of the New Testament authors with the same impression and opinion as from the corresponding treatment of the historical persons.

Dogmatistic criticism, at least, seems to have thus beforehand exhausted its possibilities. STRAUSS, in his latest expressions concerning his *Leben Jesu* (to which one might supply the

[1] See Note N 3.

words of our Lord as superscription: "Let the dead bury their dead, follow thou me"), acknowledges the advance made by BAUER and BAUR, and gives his adhesion: "I regarded the miraculous stories of the Gospels as mere legends, formed without purpose or intention, at least as far as their truth was concerned; now, however, it is proved that a great part of these accounts—the fourth Gospel especially—were got up of set purpose for party objects. Who has aught to say against this opinion? Certainly not I." Even they who are most anxious, as they profess, "to clear space, by taking down the old boundary walls, in which the mind may freely move," themselves know nothing beyond this.[1] Then there came a manifest pause in critical activity, as there had in the movement of philosophy with the rationalistic principles of which it was connected. As to the great question between the rationalist and the believer in revelation, nothing is proved by this criticism. The unhistorical character of the biblical history is, as we have said, simply assumed, and the different phases of dogmatistic criticism are just so many futile attempts to explain the existence of the biblical narratives and books on this assumption. Nor has the later origin of the latter been historically demonstrated; for, as Baur himself confesses, the principal ground for that view is a dogmatical one. "The whole historical importance of this criticism, as to the principal matter, thus lies on the negative and destructive side: it has materially contributed to undermine faith in the gospel, and to further the antichristian cause on many hands. At the same time, it has brought gain, as repeatedly hinted already, to the church and its science, not only by having given occasion for deeper research, but also by so many acute and correct observations in Scripture, themselves important, but falsely interpreted in the light of the false assumptions. There is, for example, a great truth underneath that distinction, on which BAUR lays such stress, between Jewish and heathen Christianity, which was not so clearly perceived

[1] See Note O 3.

before, and which has operated to bring about a deeper understanding of the biblical distinction between Israel and the heathen world, and through this of the whole history of revelation, and especially of the Old Testament. In this way, genuine, historical, and literary criticism owes not a little to the dogmatistic, which gives itself only the name of historical.

Glancing now for a moment to the Old Testament, we see that here the dogmatistic criticism has a still greater number of representatives than it has in the New Testament. We have quoted (p. 5) the canon of KNOBEL, in which he expressly professes his allegiance to Dogmatism, both as to facts and literature, while he calls miracles simply myths, and the books in which they appear he would therefore regard as later productions. Predictions, too, particularly special ones, such as several we find in the mouth of Jesus (John ii. 19; Matt. xvi. 21; Mark xiv. 30; Luke xxii. 10), are declared *a priori* impossible; and it is according to this principle that literary criticism is practised. So we observed (p. 80) the remark of HITZIG, that the character of prophecy excludes prediction.

In both respects, historical and literary, and at the same time in respect to miracles and prediction, we shall endeavour to illustrate the method of the Old Testament criticism by the example of Ewald. While he cannot find words enough to express the error and danger of the school of BAUR and STRAUSS, he himself, in order to set aside the Old Testament miracles, the unhistorical character of which is simply assumed, unites the three latest ways of explaining them—the natural, the mythical, and that which relates to the authorship. So he says, for example, concerning the pillar of cloud and fire: "As Israel, in looking back to those times, saw that it was only by the strength of Jehovah dwelling in them that they had gained this position among the nations of the earth, so it might appear to them as if Jehovah, in leading His people, had made the opposing world tremble, so that even mountains like Sinai shook before Him."[1]

[1] See Note P 3.

After that the idea had been thus clothed in a myth, it was further developed by the different authors of the original sources of the Pentateuch, of whom Ewald believes in four, or rather now five. "The oldest narrator first draws the fair picture, that an angel of God, at that time invisibly (?), yet with great power, went before the host of Israel. The angel gradually became in the imaginations of men a visible appearance, and a more palpable image. We find this second stage of the story in the book of the origin of the people: a bright cloud hovering over the earthly sanctuary. It is added, that at night the sacred cloud became a pillar of fire. The only actual circumstance which, in their recollection of the journeying in the desert, would give reason for such a representation, would be the sacred altar fire: in the holy place a perpetual fire was to burn; in the desert this must have burned all the more brightly on the march, and especially at night, and would thus appear like a tall cloudy column by day, and like a pillar of fire by night." This is the natural explanation in which we have, what is very rare, the recollection of an actual fact first coming up in a later form as a myth. "But, again, this matter takes a new form with the third writer; and we observe, when we look closely, what a great space of time divides this last view from the former. The cloud, now called the pillar of cloud, and thus already differently conceived of, is now thought of as quite separated from the ark of the covenant and the tabernacle, and as itself the visible veil of Jehovah." It is true, indeed, as EWALD (p. 165) observes, that, "according to the most ancient of these authors also, God came down to Sinai in the fiery clouds of heaven (Ex. xix. 16, 18);" an admission with which this whole story of the cloudy pillars, fabricated by Ewald, falls essentially away to nothing. Still it is to be regretted that the fourth author, so able and ingenious in other things, did not devote his services also to this "representation;" with him it would probably have become a "pillar of stone," as such an idea actually does occur in some of the Rabbins.

On the second point named, prediction, and the literary criticism which is based upon the denial of it, let DELITZSCH[1] speak in our stead. "From the predetermined rejection of all prophecy, there results a method for deciding the time when the Pentateuch was composed. The *vaticinia post eventum* serve as marks for this purpose. Because it is promised to the patriarchs in the Elohist that kings would arise from them, the Elohist cannot have written before SAUL was raised to the throne of Israel. Because ISAAC announces to ESAU his subjection to JACOB, and because BALAAM predicts the subjugation of AMALEK, EDOM, and MOAB, the Jehovist cannot have lived, at any rate, before the victory of Saul over the Amalekites, and that of David over the Moabites and Edomites. But Isaac speaks (xxvii. 40) of an attempt of Edom to free itself from the yoke of Israel; so that we must come to the time of Solomon for the period of the Jehovistic history, as it was toward the end of that reign the Edomites revolted. This method, which makes prediction, instead of looking to the future, look the other way, is one of EWALD'S leading modes of proof. The oldest part of the Pentateuch is, according to Ewald, the so-called book of the covenant. The author lived in the time of Samson. How does Ewald know this? Because he takes Gen. xlix. 46, etc. (Dan shall be a serpent by the way), as a *vaticinium post eventum* of the time of Samson the Danite. The prophecy of Balaam is ascribed to the fourth narrator. It is said in it: 'Ships shall come from Chittim, and shall afflict Asshur.' This, too, is a *vaticinium post eventum*, from which it appears that the fourth narrator wrote near the time of the victory of the Tyrian king ELULAEOS over the piratical fleet of the CYPRIAN Phœnicians in the eighth century. Here MENANDER in Josephus must determine the time in which the fourth author wrote, which may also be gathered from the prophetic words of ISAAC concerning ESAU (xxvii. 39, etc.); the whole character of the 27th chapter suggests a time when the conflict with Edom,

[1] See Note Q 3.

and its successful revolt, moved the whole of Judah. Is not this criticism," continues DELITZSCH, "a fettered criticism? True criticism does not assume the Pentateuch to be either Mosaic or post-Mosaic, but decides the question from external and internal evidences. But this criticism is compelled, in spite of external and internal reasons, to regard it as a product of a post-Mosaic age, because it contains accounts of words and manifestations of God, miracles and prophecies; while, in reality, all things happened in the Mosaic age in quite a natural way as in our day. But only those think that all things take place in a natural way even in our day, who have not heard that God who came down on Sinai speaking in their own hearts; who have not passed from the realm of nature to that of the Spirit, to taste the powers of the world to come; in whom the eye of faith has never been opened to behold the glory of God, which has unceasingly been revealing itself in miracle. The possibility of miracles is assured to the believer by his own experience, in the miracle of the new birth and the work of the Spirit in his heart. He therefore stands before the miracles and predictions of Scripture free, not compelled either credulously to receive them, or to deny them beforehand. Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty, and there too there is free criticism, which is neither bound to affirm *a priori*, nor *a priori* to deny, but is in a position to give a free judgment, as the facts of the past and the present demand."

Besides the Pentateuch, it is the twenty-two chapters of Isaiah, from the 40th to the end, and the prophet Daniel, which, on dogmatic grounds, especially because of their special prophecies, are dragged down into a later period. With them, also, the period of fulfilment must be the time of composition. As to Daniel, I would refer to my work previously named; and as to the so-called deutero-Isaiah, I would recommend further consideration and application of the points indicated already, in speaking of the 53d chapter of that prophet. As to the Pentateuch, there is, without doubt, some ground for that distinction of parts in

which the name Elohim is used, and those in which Jehovah is applied to God. But here it has happened as with BAUR'S distinction between Jewish and heathen Christianity: an observation, true in itself, has been perverted in the service of rationalistic suppositions. The distinction and union of Elohism and Jehovism is, in truth, historically intelligible only in the Mosaic age. According to the principal passage (Ex. vi. 3) this distinction is essentially identical with that between Patriarchalism and Mosaism. Every stage of revelation is distinguished by its own name for God: the patriarchal by El-schaddai, which is related to Elohim, and only defines that conception more closely, and expresses, in opposition to heathen errors, the unity and personality of God; the Mosaic stage by Jehovah; and the kingly-prophetic by Jehovah-Sabaoth, which does not appear before the first book of Samuel, but is found at the commencement of it (i. 3). If this be the case, then this very distinction of Jehovism and Elohism points us precisely to the age of Moses for the composition of the Pentateuch: there it has some meaning; but later, it has none. The whole succeeding development presupposes Jehovism, and is based upon it; it is only an expansion of it, just as the name of Jehovah is widened, expanded to Jehovah-Sabaoth. One cannot see how a later age would have come back to the Elohim, or how Elohistic history could have originated in later times. It is not denied, however, that echoes of this distinction, as of much else peculiar to the Pentateuch, would be heard in after days, as, for example, in the Psalter. As Moses by the revelations (Ex. iii. 13, etc., vi. 3) is consecrated as Jehovist, so the Elohistic parts represent the standpoint of the earlier revelation. It agrees in a remarkable way with this view, that, though we can perceive two modes of representation throughout the middle books of the Pentateuch, yet the distinction of the name of God itself ceases precisely with that passage in Ex. vi. 3, as from this point the name Elohim never appears. With the revelation recorded there, the Elohistic stage passed definitely over into the Jeho-

vistic. It is the progress of revelation itself which is thus mirrored in the change of style. Genesis and the first chapters of Exodus, to the beginning of the escape from Egypt, are written partly Elohistically and partly Jehovistically, as the patriarchal revelation is partly regarded, purely and simply, in its own points of view, and partly prophetically, as preparing and paving the way for the Mosaic stage. After this was reached, the distinction, so far as it rests on the name of God, falls away. We know well that these hints, the further establishment and elaboration of which must be left over for another opportunity,[1] do not nearly dispose of all questions and difficulties connected with the criticism of the Pentateuch. We would, however, draw attention to the fact, that this distinction between Elohism and Jehovism has been hitherto regarded far too exclusively as a literary discovery; it has never been inquired into, as it ought, what root this literary phenomenon had in the life and history of the people themselves. We see that this very circumstance, which has hitherto been applied to prove the post-Mosaic composition of the books of Moses, leads, when rightly explained, to the opposite conclusion.

The representatives of the dogmatistic criticism in the province of the Old Testament, especially EWALD, have rendered much greater services for the linguistic and historical understanding of it than can be said of the critics of the New Testament. Dogmatistic criticism itself, when taken up in real earnest, impels to a more careful investigation of the books of the Bible; for it must strive to support its *a priori* grounds as much as possible by *a posteriori* ones, by observations and facts. In this way many a correct and important discovery has been made both in the Old and New Testament. A thorough understanding of the Old Testament requires, however, quite a different philological equipment from that of the New: Hebrew antiquity is closely connected in language and material with the rest of the Orient. The less one recognises the specific

[1] See Note R 3.

peculiarity of the Old Testament as a revelation, the more attention will be devoted to these natural connections; to him from whose eyes the highest is hidden, the natural side of life, the kingdom of the means, in and by which the spirit is expressed and acts, will become the chief thing; and hence, if he is a conscientious inquirer, he may render valuable services in these departments. We name the lexicon and grammar of GESENIUS; the grammatical labours of EWALD; KNOBEL'S work on the tables of the tribes; his valuable collection of information for an understanding of the Egyptian plagues, the journey through the desert, etc., in his *Commentary to Exodus;* and all that these men have done in their exegetical and other writings to make the Old Testament grammatically and historically clear.

In opposing the dogmatistic criticism, we must always remember the canon of HANDESHAGEN,[1] "That it is an indispensable requisite in a critic to have a certain inward affinity with the material of the subject on which he may be engaged. This is true, not only of biblical but of all criticism." Such criticism of the Bible has in modern times been by no means quite awanting. SCHLEIERMACHER, BLEEK, LUECKE, and others, have practised the literary criticism with the view of acting as mediators between the opposite parties; indeed, they often favour the dogmatistic criticism too much. NEANDER'S works, the *Leben Jesu*, and *Planting of Christianity*, are examples of historical criticism in harmony with this canon. HENGSTENBERG, HAVERNICK, KEIL, EBRARD, THIERSCH, GUERICKE, and others, have conducted their investigations in conformity with the contents of Scripture as received by the church.

While the men of this school must ever remember and be reminded not to follow too closely the received opinions of the church in regard to single questions of criticism, yet we cannot refuse them this testimony, that they have gone very deeply and thoroughly, more so than the others, into all that the opposing criticism had to say, and that they have laboured for

[1] See Note S 3.

the restoration of the genuine historic standpoint with ample resources both of acuteness and learning. Neither have they neglected to take advantage of all the well-established results of modern historical inquiry, either in exegetical or in literary and critical studies. In respect to exegesis, not only are the labours of HOFMAN a proof of this, but also more or less those of STIER and HENGSTENBERG. In respect to the other department, the views of DELITZSCH and KURTZ on the origin of the Pentateuch are specimens. It is in respect to historical criticism, however, that is, biblical history and theology, that this orthodox tendency has borne the richest fruits. We name the *Symbolik* of BAEHR; KURTZ'S *History of the Old Covenant;* the later works on the *Life of Jesus,* and *The Apostolic Age;* SCHMIDS' *New Testament Theology,* and the dogmatical works of BECK, HOFMAN, and others.

(2.) *Result.*

If we look at the mode of criticising the Bible that has been current under the influence of Rationalism, and compare it with that view of the Bible which is indicated by the elder Protestant doctrine of inspiration, there can hardly be two things more opposed. In the first, it is history without revelation; in the second, it is revelation without history; the second overlooks the actual development of revelation, and treats it as a completed form of doctrine, which itself comes to be looked at more and more through the spectacles of ecclesiastical dogmatism. From these remarks we shall easily deduce the real character and worth of the rationalistic criticism.

It is first of all negative. Criticism has liberated us from the mechanical view of the Bible, and the scholastic way of using it. It has freed exegesis also from many great restrictions, and from receiving the word simply on the authority of the church. "We have come down," Oetinger sighs, "from the simplicity of the primitive (apostolic) times to metaphorical modes of speech,

to abstractions, to endless subtilties, especially since the disputes with the Papacy have acquired importance. Since that time our Lutheran ideas of doctrine swarm with innumerable references to these controversies. Divisions have been made which are foreign to the simplicity of holy Scripture. And so we groan under the load and burden of philosophies, formularies, abstractions, and nice distinctions." Let us remember the distorted way in which the declarations of Scripture concerning Christ were sought to be harmonized with the church doctrine of the two natures, and the communication of their idioms, by adopting the different *genera propositionum idiomaticarum*. Such artistic theories could only make the reflecting mind, so soon as it was free from prejudice, conscious of the difference between the picture of Christ in the Bible and the scholastic one, concerning which last even Thomasius confesses (ii. 477), "It is split up into mere single pieces; and out of the picture of Christ, which floats before the authors, comes a figure which is more like a mathematical diagram than a life-like painting. One cannot get through such a representation without a feeling of weariness and dissatisfaction. We miss the warm breath of life, which the scholastic form cannot give to the word." In modern times, a protest has often been entered, and with right, in the name of the simple truth of Scripture and a sound view of life, against the abstract constructions of rationalistic or rationalizing science, which pass high over the real mystery of life. But we must not forget, if we will be quite just, that the old orthodoxy had no less its "burdens of philosophies, forms, abstractions, and subtilties," and that these burdens pressed all the more heavily as in the course of time they were weighted with the authority of the church. In opposing this, the rationalizing criticism has, in fact, vigorously represented sound reason and nature, the simple and natural, against the artistic, factitious, and arbitrary. As the eighteenth century strove to escape from the stiff and pedantic forms of human tradition, and go back to the natural and original in all departments, in

poetry, in social life, in the state, in education, etc., it tried to do the same also in theology, and specially in the study of Scripture. The Bible must be itself again, and not be treated according to dogmatistic formulas. So, instead of every mystic and allegoric fancy in exposition, we are trained now, in the school of grammatical and historical exegesis, to hold by the strict and simple sense of the word and the line of thought. The independent Scripture science, exegetical theology with its different branches, which we in our day rejoice in as the foundation of the entire circle of theological sciences, is the fruit of this part of the labour of the eighteenth century.

It is true they have not simply opposed the natural to the artistic, but also to the supernatural; they have opposed not only reason to caprice, but also to revelation; they turned, to use a distinction already made, the natural into the naturalistic, the rational into the rationalistic. Thus the dogmatism of belief was opposed, as we have seen, by a worse dogmatism of unbelief, which called forth a destructive criticism, that made havoc of the very kernel and essence of Scripture. The elder orthodox mode of thought is not simply the opposite extreme of this sceptical dogmatism, though it regards the divine in a one-sided way, as Rationalism does the human; for God and man are not like powers of equal position and authority,—the divine is everywhere the foundation; the true standpoint is not the human-divine, but the divine-human. If the elder Protestantism so exclusively regarded primary and essential elements of revelation, namely, the divine, then it held the essence of the matter; the human historical development of revelation was not denied, it was only not yet recognised. Hence their errors are not fundamental: it was a defect in the conception of science and its scope, which caused our ancestors to overlook many elements of biblical truth. Rationalistic criticism, on the other hand, gave such a one-sided and exclusive prominence to the secondary and human, that the divine reality of revelation was denied and assailed, and the sacred Scriptures were dragged

down to the line of heathen history and literature. There is therefore an advance in science, but an immense retrogression in the truth; the formal gain is purchased with a frightful material loss, with errors that overturn the very foundation of things. Yet rationalistic criticism has, even in this respect, conferred in the end an important benefit. It has served to confirm and establish the credibility of the Bible anew. For it has turned its weapons not merely against orthodoxy, but also against itself. We have seen how one critical system has dissolved and annihilated the other, and how the last, like the first, falls to pieces, not upon any external authorities, but on the self-witnessing moral and religious realities of the Bible, as well as upon the biblical facts (discussed in the first part of this work). It has been proved from all this, that the Holy Bible need not shrink from the fire of the extremest criticism. To him who will see, it always comes forth from the furnace confirmed sevenfold in its divine character and its truth.

It remains for believing science to gather in and turn to its own use the not inconsiderable booty accumulated by the enemy. It has indeed long ago made a beginning in this work. We have already shown how much the rationalists have done to bring out the human and natural side of Scripture. It was wise, and it is still well, not only to employ its historical material scientifically, but also to learn from them the eye for reading history, and unite it vitally with the elder divine spiritual conception. The task of evangelical theology in this province is to conquer the rationalistic, unhistoric historicism, not by going back to the old position, with no history at all, but by recognising the sacred history, the history of revelation and the kingdom of God. If a deeper view of history generally shows (a thought to which we were repeatedly led in the first part of our book) that its ultimate roots lie in religion, so it is also inversely essential to true revealed religion to become history. Divine revelation is the power which makes and moves the history of the world; it is, in the highest sense of the word, the element

of progress in history, as it alone leads the development of the world up to new and really higher stages. The task we have thus described is only the special application of the more general principle, which we have found to be the result of the material consideration of Rationalism, which is, that we have been compelled to seek a better view of the relation of the divine to the human. For this relation fulfils itself in the successive self-communications of God to men and the world, that is, in the history of the kingdom of God.

With such a view we should not, for example, so mix up the Old and New Testaments together, as to make them one, almost without any distinction of parts, as the earlier Protestantism did. It regarded the difference between the two Testaments only in the form, in the lesser or greater clearness with which the articles of faith are taught.[1] Still less should we rend the two Testaments asunder, as the rationalistic criticism does, which doubts whether the Messianic predictions find their fulfilment in Jesus Christ, or that criticism which, if it does hold rather more firmly by the New Testament, compares the Old to heathendom, and therefore consigned it to destruction; we shall understand the old covenant as the gradual organically unfolded preparation for the second, and the Old Testament as the lower preliminary stage of the New, but resting no less than it upon a divine revelation. Nor should we look upon the New Testament as a work of the Holy Spirit, in the sense that only an abstract unity prevails in it, and that the individuality of the apostles disappears; still less, however, should we exaggerate the differences between the New Testament books and types of doctrine into contradictions, or into the mere polemics of two opposing parties. We shall perceive that they are something higher; and the task of theology at the present day is to demonstrate the *organic* unity of the New Testament books, to show that it is such an organism as of itself opens out into a great variety of members, and so to hold

[1] See Note T 3.

fast the divine unity with human diversity—human diversity with the divine unity. "The different authors of the biblical books," says a Swiss writer,[1] "are illumined, inspired, and ruled by one Spirit, who is manifest in the entire development of the kingdom of God; and they are affected in such a way, that the whole of the books composing the canon, furnish, not indeed a scientific system in the modern sense, but a true, life-like picture of the self-developing organism of the kingdom of God. Thus, from their mutual dependence and relations, and from their harmonious structure, as if it were a natural growth, not even one member can be removed without mutilating the whole. The Bible has been completely proved, by all scientific investigation, as by all the fiercest fires of the sharpest criticism, to be the oldest historical record of the great manifestations of the rule of God's Spirit in the human race."

Rationalism, we may say in a word, has a twofold significance—negative and positive; and the latter, again, is partly formal and partly material. It has freed us from a mechanical, one-sided view of holy Scripture, pointed out the path of a historical, organic, genetic method, and helped to a recognition of the human factor in the revelation: one-sided stress had been given before to the divine. It is thus our work in the present day to carry out this divine-human idea of Scripture in all its fulness, both ethically, metaphysically, and as the history of all revelation.

III. THE DEFEAT OF RATIONALISM.

1. *The beginnings of it in the Eighteenth Century.*

a. Spener and Pietism.

There have been two periods of widespread religious awakening and revival in German lands since the Reformation, the first at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth,

[1] See Note U 3.

the other since the second decade of the nineteenth century. Neither can be compared with the Reformation itself in importance; but they move upon the ground prepared by it, they are its spiritual children. Indeed we had already (p. 208) to notice the fact that, on the one side, there may be perceived in them a gradual diminution of the strength of the Reformation faith; and, on the other side, it was their work to bring the evangelical religious principle into new and more active life, and to clear it from extraneous growths and errors. They had also to develop it further, and give to it that thorough study in the light of life and science, which we missed in the Protestantism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For every sort of error must, in the kingdom of God, finally serve to bring out the truth more fully and in greater breadth. The first of these two movements, which, after much that was preparatory, found its chief representative in SPENER, and is usually called Pietism, strove to quicken the life of the church, amid the rigid orthodoxy of the 17th century; the other was the rise of the church out of Rationalism.

The relation of Pietism to Rationalism has often in recent times been spoken of as that of the forerunner, since it broke the objective power of the church and church doctrine, and opened the door to a one-sided subjectivism. This opinion is as true and as false as that which makes Protestantism the forerunner of Rationalism. Those who cling to the old—in the one case the Catholics, in the other the modern friends of the old Protestant church systems—are always disposed to make the good, which is also new, responsible for the bad which may be in the new. The revival of the orthodox opposition to Pietism has therefore been criticised and considered, in what we said already of the corresponding view of Protestantism. The true history of the matter is as follows. As there was a twofold opposition to Catholicism—that of Scepticism and that of living faith, the humanistic and the Reformation; so against the church and state orthodoxy of the seventeenth century,

arose the rationalistic and pietistic opposition. Both insisted on practical religion in opposition to one-sided dogmatism; but the one party found it in the so-called natural religion, the other in a living, active Christianity, which is the root of the theology of spiritual men. Humanism was older than the Reformation, and Rationalism was older than Pietism. English Deism, this father of modern rationalistic negation, began its work long before Pietism. HERBERT of Cherbury, who first promulgated the idea of natural religion, died as early as 1648, when SPENER was only thirteen years of age. At the same time Pietism had, like Protestantism, a formal relation to Rationalism, and outwardly paved the way for the spread of it, through the fact that it laid stress before all things on a subjective experience, and granted a freer movement of mind than the authority of the church had allowed. It must further be admitted that the church, with her doctrines and ordinances, was and is in many ways misunderstood and neglected, not indeed by the fathers of Pietism, but in pietistic circles. But Rationalism, also, because of its one-sided direction of the understanding, stands essentially nearer to orthodoxy than to Pietism, just as, through its fundamental Pelagian view, it stands nearer to Catholicism than to Protestantism. The "religion of thought" is more closely related to the mere faith of the head than to the faith of the heart. At any rate the modern worldly spirit is most completely antagonistic to Pietism, with its tendency to flee from the world. "Only as the other extreme," say we with DELITZSCH,[1] "not as the inevitable result of Pietism, is Rationalism to be understood." Pietism has been opposed to Rationalism from the very beginning; and this opposition became more decisive as Pietism was further developed theologically by BENGEL and OETINGER; OETINGER especially with his scholars and followers furnishes us, as we shall see, with the most important elements for the refutation of Rationalism by a scientific method.

In the midst of the coldness and rigidity of evangelical

[1] See Note X 3.

religion in the seventeenth century, Pietism went back to the living faith of the Reformation. Precisely, however, because this return movement was a living one, and strong in the Holy Ghost, it could not be a mere going back. We must not forget that the orthodoxy of the seventeenth century was just the carrying out to an extreme of an error, the beginnings of which we find in the time of the Reformation itself, and especially in LUTHER, and which prevailed increasingly in the Lutheran Church, through the suppression of the views of MELANCTHON. It was the confusion of the *fides qua creditur* with the *fides quæ creditur*. The principle of the Reformation was the fact of justification by faith, as LUTHER had experienced it, not the doctrine of faith and justification. But in opposing the Catholics it was needful to maintain this doctrine as the pure truth, in which man should find the way of salvation. On this account there was great danger that faith and the doctrine of faith would be taken as identical; when the controversies between those who held the doctrine of justification by faith became more frequent and bitter, it could not but be that the "pure doctrine," the theory of faith, in contradistinction to the personal and practical faith of the heart, would come out with increasing one-sidedness. In this light the seventeenth century is not a distortion of the sixteenth, but only the result of its principles carried to an extreme. When, therefore, SPENER objected to this undue regard to the mere doctrine, he is not to be blamed; we must rather admit that he was right. He was not indifferent either to a fuller development of Christian knowledge, or to a confession of faith on the part of the church; he only held that the church of God would not be built by an uninterrupted succession of dogmatic and polemic discussions, but only by bringing the great truths of religion into the heart and life. Without being heterodox, indeed expressly acknowledging the church dogmas, he carried faith back from the dogmatism of the head to the heart, from the school which the church had almost become, to actual life. He was entirely at

one with the Reformers respecting the central importance of justifying faith; but the doctrines to which this was opposed in each case were different, being in the Reformation, as with Paul, meritorious works; in SPENER, as with James, dead, intellectual faith. By the Reformers faith was correctly understood in its internal, religious character, as an acceptance of mercy, and this was opposed to the doctrine of justification by works; but then the temptation arose, to regard faith quietistically and intellectually, and to confound the reception of actual grace with the belief of doctrines. The Apostle Paul escaped the danger; but the Protestant church of the seventeenth century fell before it. "Many after LUTHER'S death could not declare the doctrine of justification in the same connection with sanctification that LUTHER himself had done. They had not learnt it, as he had, in the school of the Spirit and the conflict of life, they had learnt it only at college."[1] As SPENER saw this defect, he carried the evangelical conception of faith a step further, and added to its inward religious characters, which he always held to be the inviolable foundation, the quickening of the moral nature. He earnestly taught what Paul also teaches in the very Epistles to the Galatians and Romans, in which he expounds justification,—the faith which worketh by love, the life of the Spirit, and the heavenly walk and conversation (Rom. viii. and xii. etc.; Gal. v.).

A new life now began to spread through many parts of the church. The orthodoxy of Church and State had come to look upon the baptized as the true Christians, if they were only confirmed in pure doctrine. They no longer required conversion, in the sense of that personal conscious belief which lived in LUTHER, and overcomes the world. The country which was supplied with pure doctrine and sacraments was, even with unspiritual mind and rude customs, a Christian land. The distinction between the worldly and spiritual nature, between living and dead members of the church, was practically ignored,

[1] See Note Y 3.

even if theoretically the difference between the visible and invisible church was still held; no thought was given to the world outside the church, to Jews or heathen; they thought they had done their duty in this respect when they had been opposing other Christian churches. The church thus lived, on the whole, in great security, its doctrine pure, and its condition well ordered as a State church, especially since it had gradually recovered from the alarm of the Thirty Years' War. "In the times after the Reformation," says a preacher of Würtemberg in the last century,[1] "the common people for the greatest part believed, as, indeed, a great many do still, that salvation depended upon sound doctrine alone; if one were only not Roman Catholic, and not Calvinistic, but confessed and believed the pure evangelical Lutheran doctrine, all was well; sanctification was not so very necessary; in the salvation offered to sinners, no reference was made to good works," etc. Then arose Joh. Arndt, Joh. Gerhard in Jena ("his piety got him the name of a Rosenkreuzer and a Weigelian, which at that time meant the same thing as the word pietist in this century"), Joh. Val. Andreae, and specially Spener and his successors.

Spener was not only in earnest about faith for himself and for other individuals, but he collected all who were seeking salvation in the so-called *collegia pietatis*, and bound them to cultivate a living, active Christianity,—to be a little church within the church. With great moderation and wisdom he avoided the ways of the Separatist, while he provided satisfaction for the deeper religious needs, and furnished a powerful and practical testimony against the world in the church. If the distinction between the church and the world, especially in the so-called things indifferent, was often carried to an unhealthy extreme; yet it was of great importance that the antagonism between the church and the world should be earnestly dealt with and clearly expressed. Nor was Pietism by any means satisfied with simply withdrawing from the

[1] See Note Z 3.

world. While they sought to avoid its evils, they looked upon it with compassion, and endeavoured to rescue it. The activity of a loving faith was seen not only in the union of believers among themselves, but also in the fact that they then began to seek the lost. What are now called the Inner and Outer Missions were commenced in the German Evangelical Church at that time. A. H. Francke established his celebrated Orphan House in Halle, where also Canstein's Bible Institute and the Callenberg Jewish Mission were established; while the Danish East-Indian Mission was supported by the university of that town all through the eighteenth century, after Ziegenbalg had withdrawn from it in 1705.

It is thus really a second period of Protestantism which is manifest in this movement, inasmuch as new gifts, not previously developed in the church, have been brought into play. The tree of faith, planted at the Reformation, now bore the fruits of love. As this was the fruit of faith in the practical region, knowledge was in the theoretical. Nor were there wanting new impulses toward the last. Though Pietism, from its very position, and the work it had to do, accomplished directly much less for science than for life; yet it had its Halle, as the Reformation had its Wittenberg. It was from a university that the streams of life again principally flowed. And though Francke and his followers regarded it as their first and chief work to recall theology from a one-sided scientific scholasticism to a living faith, yet that very circumstance, as in the Reformation, rendered a great service to the science of Christianity, by placing it again on its proper foundation.

The authority of the Bible replaced that of the church. The Bible had in great part lost its control over the doctrines of the church, and exegesis had fallen into slavish dependence upon acknowledged creeds and prevailing systems. We must therefore regard it as a great matter, and as a great service to the truth, that the Bible was again studied more independently with the eye of faith. Pietism, starting from this position of

belief, did what Rationalism attempted, starting from unbelief. If, indeed, the Bible was thus explained mainly for practical and edifying use, yet a learned and philosophical exegesis was at the same time cultivated by such men as Francke, Paul Anton, and others; and the practical use and explanation of Scripture was necessary to counteract the evils of the orthodoxistic, as well as the rationalistic, mode of handling it.

With respect to the material principle in this movement, and the development of dogma, the "theology of the saints" furnished what was subjectively requisite for the theologian. But not this alone. It had also an objective contribution to theology, by pointing out the way to supplement and vitalize the doctrine of justification as Scripture teaches. This had not been sufficiently considered hitherto; but the doctrine of justification thus considered, united with the gift of the Spirit, make together the idea of the new birth—the transformation in which the whole nature of the man is renewed. Because of these elements of Pietism, it produced a good; and, on the whole, healthful mysticism. It is best represented in the hymnology of the period, by such names as Richter, G. Arnold, Freylinghausen, Rambach, and others; for genuine evangelical mysticism has its root in the fellowship and spiritual unity of man with God, which begins with the second birth. Then, too, the idea of the new creation in general was recognised. The perception of the defects of the existing church organizations led Spener's glance further and wider; in his inmost soul he longed for a more perfect manifestation of Christianity, in accord with the promised revelation of the kingdom of God the "hope of better times" woke up in him. Men thus began with the deepest insight into the true nature of the church, and the actual disorders and corruptions of it, to look into the great redemptive plan of God; the true light for the prophetic part of Scripture now began to dawn from the right quarter. J. W. Petersen relates in his life, how he first, from Spener in Frankfort, "got to know many things of the *fatis ecclesiæ* of

which I had heard little at the universities; how the Papacy would increase greatly, and persecute true evangelical believers, but would afterwards fall when it had attained the highest point; how, on the other hand, the Jews would be converted, and then the better church would rise on the earth, and at the eventide of this world there would be light." And Bengel says, in his history of the exposition of the Apocalypse, "A wide door was opened by dear Spener, who brought forward again what was by him and others called the hope of better times, who indeed avoided most prudently all particulars and details, but defended the chief positions with great earnestness, stedfastness, and certainty, even to his death. From that point the truth in this matter has lived on, and become ever stronger amid many mistakes."[1] It was Bengel and his school who developed still further this germ of a new knowledge of revelation which they found in Spener's views.

(*b.*) *Bengel and his School.*

The gifts of the Spirit are not hereditary, they generally begin to decline in the second generation; and in the branches that spring from a great religious rising there appears, as the distance increases, a growing measure of neglect and degeneracy: the form is maintained, but not the spirit. If the rise of Catholicism followed the apostolic age, and the period of Orthodoxism followed the Reformation, we shall not be surprised to find that all manner of errors came in the train of Pietism,—an outward methodism of conversion, narrowness and formalism in life, contempt of science, indifferentism in doctrine, subjectivism in relation to the church. And from the subjectivism of "saving application" to Semler's "moral improvement," the way was not long. But, on the other side, there grew up upon the ground that had been prepared fresh and living impulses, which acted as correctives of the other evil growths, and more fully

[1] See Note A 4.

developed the good. There were two phenomena connected with Pietism, the one in practical matters, and the other in respect to knowledge, which have continued it, and have made it a fruitful element of good for coming generations; these were the rise of the United Brethren, and the influence of the school of Oetinger and Bengel. Both were at first restricted to small districts, and exercised but little influence on the progress of ecclesiastical and national life in the eighteenth century. They could not prevent the entrance of Rationalism into the church; but they stood in the midst of it like oases in the wilderness, and out of them afterwards flowed and still flow streams of living water into the entire church. Schleiermacher came from the "United Brethren;" and the treasures of the Bengel-Oetinger school are now recognised more and more both by theology and philosophy. In proof, we need only name Schelling and Franz von Baader, Beck and Von Hofman, Rothe and Dorner.

The last says: "While the storms were gathering which assailed the whole body of previous theology, indeed made it an impossibility, the tree of German theology sent forth a fresh green twig, despised by the greater number of contemporaries, ignored and scorned by the official theology of the church of the day, but none the less a true outgrowth of the Reformation principle, which began then to make itself master of a new aspect of Christianity, and to furnish, on biblical grounds, the necessary counterpoise to an abstract earthly development of it. We refer to that great theologian of the last century, J. A. Bengel, who succeeded in founding a school, based on biblical truth, and withdrawn from the tumults of his age. He understood how to take a position in relation to Pietism and the United Brethren, which harmonized with the true idea of the church, and freed both the old orthodoxy and Pietism from hurtful excrescences. He served the latter by faithful culture of deep biblical scholarship and extension of view; the former, not by explaining it away, but by awakening and strengthening

a new impulse to theological knowledge, which might operate upon it with regenerating power. Bengel and his school opened, as it were, a new leaf in the knowledge of Scripture; and to the worldliness of the principle of religion which, in the so-called orthodoxy, had hardened into self-sufficiency, he opposed the prophetic word of God, as well as the necessity of a constant renewal of faith. However much of human may have mingled with Bengel's conception of eschatology, he has rendered incalculable service to the church by having brought this part of evangelical truth, so essential to faith, near to the heart of evangelical Christians, and subjected it to a searching investigation. This view has not lost ground since his day, but has continued to grow in moderation, clearness, and fruitfulness. Dorner, in fuller and more detailed manner, shows how important such an introduction of eschatology into German theology for the first time was. Oetinger, that splendid and opulent mind, the friend and scholar of Bengel, sought on one side to supplement the evangelical system eschatologically, but on the other side, to which Bengel did not feel himself called, he, with his speculative and original mind, brought nature and corporeal existence, as also God and His nature, within the circle of theological and theosophical study. In this he was, like Bœhme, whom he held in very high esteem, alone in his day; in the directest opposition to the materialism and also the prevailing idealism of philosophy, and even of orthodox theology—an idealism without nature, and even contrary to it,—he came back again to the realism of a Luther. With the Apostles Paul and John, he studied the cosmical signification of the completed revelation in Christ, and the relation between spirit and nature, which it sets forth and determines. He had the strongest sense of the connection between the first and second creation, and demanded a *philosophia sacra*,—indeed worked at it himself,—by which Christianity should take intellectual possession of the world of nature and mind, as destined to be its own. He endeavoured also to show the absoluteness

of Christianity, *a parte ante*, cosmologically and theologically. Bengel had considered the absoluteness of Christianity only eschatologically. That Oetinger was unnoticed by his own age, was owing not altogether to his peculiarities. The age had become centrifugal and eccentric; it was intoxicated with self-complacent regard of its imagined wisdom, and therefore had no ear for such a summons as his to labour at these objective doctrines. It had struck with the greatest determination into another path, directly opposed to this. It became destructive, and pressed on to the utmost extreme in this direction. And Rothe, the thinker, to whom so high a place is justly given by Carl Schwarz, in his history of the most recent theology, says: "I can foresee that if any place is granted me in the great house of theology, I shall stand in the room of the theosophists, near to Oetinger. I belong to no other part, and wish no better place. It will be good for me to sit at the feet of the noble man; and he will not, I think, put me away from him, as the peculiar *scandala* of his doctrine are also those of mine." [1]

Our work, which has to do with the science affecting revelation, requires us only to notice briefly the United Brethren. They cultivated the practical Charisma which Pietism had awakened in the church in yet greater measure. The idea of a church within the church was carried out in the establishment of an independent community, holding, however, friendly relations with the church of the land. From this centre, the Herrnhuters operate upon the church by means of societies, by the work of the Diaspora and educational institutions, and upon the heathen world by an extensive and useful missionary activity. The independent organization of the Moravians, though many narrownesses and much one-sidedness were bound up with it, was yet of great importance at the time of the overwhelming spread of Rationalism, and even now has its use, as a pattern and type. For the formation of living societies, not in the separatistic sense, but for the purpose of operating with vitalizing effect

[1] See Note B 4.

upon wider circles in the church, is an end which Luther himself had in his eye, and which Protestantism will have to regard the more as the apostasy increases, and the external political supports of the church give way.[1]

In Würtemberg, Pietism, for which the work of men like Andreae and others had prepared the way, found the heartiest reception. The court had been anxious to retain Spener, who had begun his career in that country as private tutor in Tübingen; and though this did not succeed, he was greatly respected and trusted, and his advice was often sought by the government in matters connected with the church. When Francke came to Würtemberg in 1717, there was granted, "by special command of the duke, in the hospital of the prince at Tübingen, and throughout the whole province of Würtemberg, free carriage and board for the professor and his party." In the Institute at Tübingen, following the example of Halle and Leipsic, a union of students was formed, for the culture of practical knowledge of Scripture, and a living, active Christianity. A zealous member of it was Joh. Albr. Bengel (1687–1752), whose Scripture theology may be described as the scientific fruit of the awakening that began with Spener. Würtemberg, by entering freely and independently into the pietistic movements, was preserved from those proceedings connected with them in North Germany; the small Lutheran church of that duchy was a still and peaceful soil for the successful development of the new germ. Not only this, however, but it was, to use the words of Tholuck,[2] "through the deep, thoughtful character of this people of Suabian stock, that the practical element of Halle was supplemented by the theosophic-intellectual one."

This element was, however, distinctly biblical. If we look back over what has been said upon the old Protestant and Pietistic mode of treating the Scriptures, we may say, that the formal principle of Protestantism has now, at least within the Lutheran Church (for in the Reformed Church the school of

[1] See Note C 4. [2] See Note D 4.

Cocceius had already effected something similar) reached an independent development. The Bible was applied before chiefly to polemical and dogmatical purposes, and then later to practical uses, but Bengel and his school now introduced a mode of study which was at once scientific and devout. The Scriptures were studied as a whole, and their aim was to attain to a clear understanding of all its parts, and their mutual relations. When Bengel blames the Herrnhuters for too exclusive attention to the doctrine of atonement, it is an evidence that he wishes to open up and possess all the manifold riches of Scripture truth. "The human heart," he says, "needs all the variety of doctrines to help and to direct it aright. The blood-theology I believe in heartily, as it has been maintained as a matter of first importance by all true hearts since Luther. The apostles also knew the worth of the doctrine of satisfaction and the merit of Christ. Yet in their discourses and epistles we see a beautiful variety and richness of detail."

Applying themselves thus to discover the varied wealth of Scripture, the idea of the history of revelation became ever more the leading point of view for understanding it. "Along with the ground of salvation," says Bengel, "the holy Scriptures lay many other precious things before us. The books of which it consists, have not come to us by chance rather than others. Nor are they to be regarded as mere books of words and example, nor as single remains preserved from antiquity, out of which nothing can be brought as a whole, but as an incomparable account of the divine economy among men, from the beginning to the end of all things, through all ages of the world, a beautiful and glorious connected system. For though every biblical book is a whole by itself, and each author has his own manner, yet one Spirit breathes in all, one idea runs through all." As, however, a way is known only when the end is known to which it should lead; so is it with the ways of God, on which He leads humanity on to its destiny. Hence the word of God, from the very commencement of Genesis,

contains prophecy, which ever points onward to the end of the history that is beginning, and in course of development. It points to the bruising of the serpent's head—the blessing which was to come on all nations through the seed of Abraham—to the universal kingdom of peace under the sceptre of Judah, etc. etc. In Bengel's case it was thus an insight into the meaning of prophecy which led to his idea of a great historic plan in revelation. The one book of the Bible which is called Revelation, was the key that opened to him the whole revelation. It was in it he learnt to comprehend the *ordo temporum*. After the publication of his work, *The Revelation of John, or rather of Jesus Christ*, in 1740, there appeared in 1741 the *Ordo temporum, a principio per periodos œconomiæ divinæ historicas atque propheticas ad finem usque ita deductus, ut tota series et quarumvis partium analogia sempeternæ virtutis ac sapientiæ cultoribus ex scriptura Veteris et Novi Testamenti tanquàm uno revera documento proponatur.* The apocalyptic chronology was here made the chronology of the world, or chronological study of the kingdom of God.

A mere chronological study may seem to be an external thing, poor and dry; and it is well known that Bengel's apocalyptic chronology was indeed very faulty, and that his other chronological calculations are not quite free from fancies and arbitrary views. His was more a moderate, mathematical, and logical nature, than intuitive or speculative. But with all deficiencies in detail, the fundamental idea was great and true; and the author of the *Gnomon of the New Testament* did not occupy himself with the chronological framework merely, it was not mere sport and fancy with him, he was in deep earnest about the matter itself, "the divine economy among men," and the course of its development according to the arrangement of the highest wisdom. That the sacred history is drawn up in measures and numbers, was to Bengel only the expression of its absolute conformity to plan and reason. Mathematics of history was the shell, the philosophy of history was the

kernel, though, indeed, he himself was not perfectly master of the kernel.

From this movement, a renewing and enriching influence fell upon theology. The treatment of Scripture was no longer chiefly dogmatic or for edification, but became, without diminishing the practical earnestness, or darkening the power of vision, more and more exegetical and historical. In fact genuine religion and a correct method contributed to this result. While in Protestantism hitherto the central point of the gospel had been mainly regarded, the preparation for it in the Old Testament, and the eschatological completion of it, was now better understood and estimated. The school of Bengel shows that a true historical view of Scripture is possible without going round the rationalistic way,—that is, the view which regards the Bible as a history of God's revelation to mankind. "If we," says Delitzsch,[1] "now understand the Old Testament better, it is by reason of the light which Bengel has brought from the Apocalypse and thrown over the Old Testament. To whom do we owe it, that the orthodox church of the present day no longer brands the chiliastic view of the last times, as all books of systematic doctrine do, as heterodoxy, but has woven it into her own inmost life so deeply, that hardly a believing Christian can be found who does not hold it? To whom do we owe it that the church now believes in a glorious future of the people of Israel, and therefore recognises in their history in the Old Testament a prognostic of their latter history, and in the Old Testament prophecy a view from afar, not only of the church of the Gentiles, but of Israel in particular? To whom, that the church, in acknowledging the outward and sensible reality in which the super-sensible redemption shall at last manifest itself, has been able to set the outward and visible reality of the Old Testament history in its right place, and to apprehend the organic union of spiritual and corporeal? We owe it to Bengel. It was he who had to sweep away the errors

[1] See Note E 4.

of a theology which, under the name and pretence of orthodoxy, was excessively anti-chiliastic. He was also of service to the United Brethren, who thought they had realized in themselves the glorious future, the so-called Philadelphian period of the church. He broke the fetters of an exegetical tradition that had come to be regarded as inviolable, vindicated the rights of exposition in relation to dogmatic theology, and pointed out to the church, in the Scriptures, the Castalian spring out of which she should ever renew her youth. The writings of Bengel have not yet been studied as they ought to be. We would be a great deal further on in many things than we are if they were read more carefully, instead of being only named with respect."

Bengel and his scholars thus did not expend their chief activity upon the dogmatic department, but on the exegetical and the biblico-historical; this they opened up again, though it had been known before. Bengel, by his *Gnomon*, laid a foundation upon which his successors afterwards built. His exposition rests, above all, on a solid, philological, and critical basis. He had edited some writings of classical antiquity, and, taking an independent part in the then still recent investigations of textual criticism, arranged for an edition of the New Testament of his own. But with him, and quite spontaneously, as if it could not be otherwise, the theological element was united with the philological, both of them in delicateness of idea, and brevity and compactness of style. He wished to furnish indications of the way in which, to quote the title of the *Gnomon*, *Ex nativa verborum vt simplicitas profunditas, concinnitas, salubritas sensuum cœlestium indicatur.*

The exegetical labours of Bengel's scholars all have some relation to the *Gnomon*. His son-in-law, Philipp David Burk, sought to apply the method of Bengel to the Old Testament, and wrote a *Gnomon in* 12 *prophetas minores*, and a *Gnomon psalmorum*, in which, though he does not show the ability or conciseness of his master, he carries out the new way of viewing the prophets with foresight and moderation. Carl Heinrich

Rieger's *Meditations on the New Testament, for growth in grace, and knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ,* published after his death, are a practical extension of Bengel's *Gnomon,* peculiarly full of point and light, especially in the Epistles. Magnus Friedrich Roos wrote a number of independent exegetical works, "short expositions," *e.g.* of the Epistles to the Romans, Galatians, Thessalonians, in which he aims principally at an exact development of the line of thought and main ideas. In a different way Friedrich Christoph Steinhofer produced expositions, or contributions to the exposition of the Epistles to the Romans, Colossians, Hebrews, and first of John. The first and third of these works bear the title: *Daily Nourishment of Faith from the Knowledge of Jesus, according to the instructive Testimonies of the Epistles,* etc.; the last: *Blessed and holy Communion of Believers with the triune God, in an explanation of the first Epistle of John for the Furtherance of our Knowledge and Experience.* Steinhofer, as a rule, takes up single characteristic verses—he expounds only the last-named epistle continuously,—and appends to them an exhibition of the main truths of the epistle. His observations are in the highest degree suggestive, of solid worth both didactically and practically. His greatest gift is the power of describing the glory and sufficiency of Christ and His atoning work; and this is based upon wide and genuinely evangelical experience. He was for a long time connected with the "United Brethren," while court preacher to Count Reuss at Ebersdorf. We possess, lastly, from Philipp Matthæus Hahn, who belongs to the theosophic section of the school of Bengel, treatises on the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians, and on the Revelation of St. John, entitled, *Hours of Edification; or, Short Discourses upon each verse, which were read before a Society to introduce edifying conversation.* These are works of considerable originality and width of view. They always seek to embrace the whole of the plan of God in redemption and the final glorious end; but they are marked sometimes by a boldness that does not abide by the standard of

the Bible closely enough. These works of the school of Bengel belong almost entirely to the so-called practical exegesis; but they are also rich in theological matter, and in thoughts on subjects adapted to quicken, deepen, and enrich the body of doctrine held by the church, to the substance of which all these writers firmly held.

In the department of biblical history the works of Roos must be named before all others. They embrace almost the whole course of the divine revelations. His *Introduction to the Bible Histories from the Creation to the Time of Abraham* treats of the primeval revelation; the *Vestiges of the Faith of Abraham in the Lives of the Patriarchs and Prophets* embraces the Old Testament; the *Teaching and Life of Jesus Christ* includes the Gospels—the first volume touches doctrine, the second takes up the history. These men regarded especially, however, the connection of the Old Testament with the New in type and prophecy. This was done by Roos in his thoughtful work in which he gives a sketch of the whole prophetic theology: *Exposition of the Prophecies of Daniel, which reach to the Time of the New Testament, and a Comparison of them with the Revelation of St. John, as explained by* Bengel. Philipp Friedr. Hiller, the poet, wrote a *New System of the Types of Christ and the Church throughout the whole Old Testament.* Phil. Matth. Hahn applied himself to the doctrine of Jesus, as "the good message of the kingdom," and published a work in four parts. In the two first parts he gave a view of the history of Messianic prophecy from Genesis to Malachi, as that on which the preaching of Jesus rested; in the third he explained the discourses of Jesus before the Sermon on the Mount, especially John i. 5; in the fourth, the Sermon on the Mount itself. (A further continuation was proposed, but never appeared.) In these works we have already before us thus what are now called the History of Revelation and Biblical Theology. Not only Exegesis itself, but also the historical and related sciences of exegetical theology, were built up anew by the school of Bengel; and so, in many

ways, the foundation was laid for an independent biblical theology. These works did not appear, indeed, in strictly scientific garb, as their authors were clergymen engaged in practical work, but it is the very simplicity of their style which gives them special value; and though there may be points of detail one could find fault with, and on the whole an absence of scholastic form may be felt, yet there is rich compensation for this in the depth and fulness of their biblical knowledge, in the strength and opulence of genuine fundamental theological thought, in their clear insight into the ways of God and the plan of His kingdom. In these respects these works greatly exceed many more famous, and even in regard to form, more perfect systems. One circumstance shows the worth of them. They have nearly all been edited and published anew in late years. The following passage, as an example, will show how well the idea of the organic-genetic development of the divine revelation was then understood. It is from Ph. M. Hahn: "So is the word of God. In small and unimportant notices great things are contained, which God discovers more fully from time to time, in such a way that the oldest promises are not displaced and repealed by the newer revelations, but the newer are, on the contrary, attached to the former, which are thus placed in a higher light, and more clearly unfolded; as, when a flower grows up the formative power is already in the seed, and reveals its inward hidden force and structure more and more by every leaf as it is unfolded."

But Bengel did not exercise a quickening influence upon theology alone; we indicated above what is now called the philosophy of history, as the core of what he strove to attain. His chronology of the world starts from the idea that the kingdom of God and its history are the supporting bases of the whole history of the world, and that the divine acts of revelation are the real points of juncture, and the real elements of progress in the world's course; so that Bible history and prophecy is also the key to the understanding of profane history.

His exposition of the Apocalypse in the light of the history of the church and the world, was only an embodiment of this main thought. Here scriptural thought passed beyond the limits of the ordinary theology, by recognising the divine revelation in its universal signification. Bengel led Protestantism from the individual religious view of Christianity to the historical and cosmic one. "There are," he says, in his *Sixty Discourses upon the Revelation of John*, "two great doctrines, which are presented to us in the word of God. The first directs us to the knowledge of salvation in Jesus Christ. According to this, it is for each man necessary that he should accept the Son of God, who has come into the world to save us by faith, and secure the forgiveness of sins through His blood. It may be that divine things are considered sometimes apart from this doctrine, but this must ever remain the chief ground; the other, without this, is pure curiosity and unwarranted presumption. But if one will be a child and heir in the house of God, he may look around him and see how its affairs go on. There he will behold the great plan of God in Jesus Christ; how He has led His saints from earliest times down to the present day, and how He will continue to act toward them until the final end be reached. In this way we should receive all instruction which is given us in holy Scripture, each part in its order. A soul is so furnished in this way that it will be raised above self and folly, and will become the more interested in the study of God's works. It will reach a fuller knowledge, a peace, satisfaction, and strong confidence in God, which will be blended with childlike awe and self-abasement; it will be moved to constant adoration of God."

This is the grand meaning of Chiliasm. It teaches us that Christianity is not simply a salvation, but also a kingdom, or new, divine order of things. It is very far from being unscientific enthusiasm; it is rather built up on a firm biblical foundation, and is of great importance to history and philosophy. By it, says Oetinger, religion receives first its true and beautiful

form. We add, that by such a view the history of the world still to elapse before the end comes, is then first furnished with a close that corresponds to its true idea.

The doctrine of the restitution of all things which Bengel believed, but did not wish to be publicly taught, becomes at this point intelligible and important. Compared with the individual conception of Christianity which prevailed before, it is the universal idea of it carried to the extreme. In His creative and redemptive plan, God not only purposed the eternal happiness of some individuals (and along with this there was also the doctrine of the eternal condemnation of others insisted upon as much), but His purpose extended to the renewal of the whole world, even the world of nature. And this purpose will be actually attained in the restoration of a new heaven and a new earth, in which everything which lives shall be filled with the glory of God. But the Scriptures show also a region of death, in which those who continue disobedient are placed. They will no longer belong to the world at all, but be "without," in a mysterious and awful existence that is not life. It was quite in accordance with the usual course of human things, that, when the knowledge of the significance of Christianity in universal history was thus revived, the world of glorified life should be alone regarded.

A further thought, however, was associated with this. In the world thus glorified, history has not only found its goal; nature also is raised to a new and higher stage of existence. This idea of the new heaven and new earth gives to nature a high significance for Christian thought and inquiry. The idea of nature, however, is here freed from its ordinary inflexibility, inasmuch as nature itself is one of the *momenta* of history in the highest sense. It also has some part in the great history of the fall and the restoration of man. The distinction between empirical nature and nature glorified helps to a better conception of nature altogether. Christian thought is thus carried from the fundamental views of revelation to the study

of history and of nature too; for the plan of God in redemption is seen to be at the same time His world-plan.

c. Oetinger, Crusius, and others.

It is at this point that Oetinger (1702 till 1782) is connected with Bengel,—quite independently, however, and with equal ability; indeed, for the most part, excelling him. Oetinger added the physical and metaphysical to Bengel's historical view of Christianity. That Christ was the Architect, Lord, and Restorer, or Physician of nature; that the ideas of Scripture are not to be understood morally only, but also physically, were fundamental ideas with him. As he was thus led, however, to give his mind to the study of nature, especially chemistry and alchemy, his scientific labour was freer and more comprehensive. This is the reason why we do not consider him simply as a member of the school of Bengel, but give him a position by his side as the founder of a new school. We have at least as much right to do this, as the history of philosophy has to place Hegel, not under, but alongside of, his teacher Schelling, or Aristotle on a par with Plato. Bengel was essentially a theologian, even when he passes beyond the limits of preceding theology. His thinking, even in the *History of Philosophy*, is strictly and exclusively confined to and guided by Scripture. Oetinger, on the other hand, was consciously a philosopher. He held the same ground with his teacher most firmly—the ground of the Scripture; but he sought not only a *grammatica in Spiritus sancti verbis occupata*, as Bengel, with Luther, defined theology to be, but a "*philosophia sacra*, the fundamental wisdom, or the fundamental ideas of holy Scripture, which constitute the deep hidden ground out of which that which is written came to be written, so that this philosophy is like a key to the temple of the sacred Scriptures." Such a philosophy as this, which takes God and His revelation as the starting-point for the study of the world, we call theosophy. Oetinger

is therefore more correctly a theosophist, and is expressly allied to the older theosophy,—above all, to Jacob Bœhme, whose works he had studied a great deal. The impulse toward a universal knowledge in harmony with faith, which lay in the original Protestantism, and which, repressed by scholasticism, had appeared in great strength in Bœhme, found an able representative in Oetinger.

As theology is here widened into theosophy, or the religious view of Christianity is led onward to the historical and metaphysical, there is furnished, at least in its beginning, that which we found to be wanting in the elder Protestantism. And as, on the other hand, nature and mind were now brought within the circle of divine things, the ground was taken away from philosophical and theological Rationalism. Oetinger was a decided opponent of Rationalism. In philosophy he opposed idealism most energetically; he saw the ruinous effects it would have, though it then prevailed in the harmless form of the Leibnitzio-Wolffian doctrine. In theology he opposed the moralizing teachings of Semler, Teller, and others, by which the fulness of the biblical ideas was sought to be explained away and destroyed. He did not enter on this work lightly, or do it superficially. He grasped the question in its full significance. He met the false gnosis not with the external authority of the doctrines of the church only, nor even with a simple, pious faith, but with a true gnosis after the pattern given by Paul in the Epistle to the Colossians. In his Autobiography he says: "It has been my aim day and night to find ultimate principles which should confirm or confute the views of Leibnitz and Wolff. This was a very difficult task for me, but I saw that it must be done. I could not otherwise obey the will of God, so as to serve the present generation." We may therefore say of Oetinger, that he comprehended, as hardly any other man has done, the whole extent of the work that was laid upon Christian knowledge and Protestant science in the widest sense, by the new period of mental life which dawned in the

eighteenth century, if they were to be in a position to meet the antichristian tendencies of philosophy and natural science. Oetinger is thus the prophet of this work, the completion of a genuine theosophy, though he did not succeed in perfecting it, his labours often only foreshadowing it. They have a tentative character, and are not free from caprices. But he comprehended the nature of it with a sympathetic eye, and in all points made a fair attempt to accomplish it.

This is clear, especially in the discrimination and candour with which he acknowledges and uses whatever is good in modern systems. He also, in his department, is a son of the eighteenth century. Mere ecclesiastical authority did not satisfy him. He strives to go from the "too subtle conceptions" back to the original idea; and this he seeks to do, not by way of rationalistic criticism, but of inward mystical experience. He aims at the formation of a living connection between the divine and the human. In this respect, his psychological and theoretic idea of the *sensus communis* is of the greatest importance. To him the natural life of humanity does not fall under the point of view of original sin alone. It has also an original relation to the Logos, who is the Author and Lord of nature. The *sensus communis* is "the universal feeling for life, light, and truth, for the omnipresent wisdom;" in it "the original truths, surrounded with a divine power of impression, which like a flash precede all exercises of the reason," attest themselves. Oetinger wrote a book entitled, *Inquisitio in sensum communem et rationem*, in which he shows that the *sensus* must precede the logical discursive thinking, not simply as sensation, but as the feeling associated with it, as the actual contact of our nature with things, as a direct perception of the object in its deepest point, as intuition of the divine manifesting itself therein. In this sense Oetinger says: *Qui parum sensit parum scit.* He thus directly opposes philosophic Rationalism, which professes that it can construct a system of knowledge from the mere abstract *ratio*. He regards the higher knowledge above

all as the perceiving and receiving of impressions, in which the "most necessary, the most useful, and the simplest" of every object is given. This doctrine of the *sensus communis* is therefore only an extension of the Protestant principle of faith to knowledge generally; *sensus communis* and *ratio* have a similar relation to one another with faith and knowledge. The *sensus communis* is the psychological principle of faith. Oetinger himself suggests to us by such teaching, and by translating *sensus* by feeling (Gefühl), Schleiermacher's mystical idea of religion; he goes still further, and derives hence the idea of conscience, which, in its significance for the idea of religion, has been expounded by Martensen, Beck, Schenkel, and others. His *sensus communis* is, however, more comprehensive than feeling and conscience: for it is not only an organ of religious knowledge, but of universal knowledge; or rather, he shows that the religious element is essential to all knowledge, in so far as all things at last can be fully known only in God, as the omnipresent supporter and source of all life. We have thus here the fundamental idea of a, in the best sense of the word, mystical or theosophical doctrine of knowledge; and the peculiar conditions of mystical illumination, and the insight into the centre of things which Oetinger holds by, are only higher and intenser degrees of this universal human power of intuition. On the other side, there is here an acknowledgment of what is true in modern humanism. It is confessed that there is in man, apart from redemption, a feeling for truth and right. This is the point at which the revelation must connect itself, by which it reaches and enters a man; only that with Oetinger this feeling or sense, as a *sensus*, cannot be a productive organ, either morally or intellectually, but only receptive. Our theosophist, precisely because he is in principle an opponent of the idealistic and rationalistic mode of thought, helps that which is right in it to its right place, and in this way proves himself to be a true and competent opponent of it.

In the objective sphere, the idea of life, as the metaphysical

principle of Oetinger's system, corresponds to the *sensus communis:* the *sensus communis* is the universal feeling of life. The substance of it is derived *in concreto* from the two great books of the revelation of God, which are really written for the *sensus communis;* that is, from nature and the natural life of man as the scene in which the omnipresent wisdom operates, and from the holy Scriptures. "Amid all God's works, as mightily from within outwardly, as from without inwardly, the inward overflows into the outward, and the outward exhibits the inward. . . . . It is a plague in the world of ideas to regard nature apart from the presence of God: there is in all men an irrepressible consciousness or feeling of invisible powers which animate nature; there is also a secret yea and amen in us to the presence of wisdom in us and without us. . . . Wisdom still utters her voice, and calls loudly even by the institutions of society, which God secretly governs as He does the languages of the nations. Just as God is revealed in the humanity of Jesus without error or defect, so is He also revealed by other men, though they have so many defects. For kingdoms and armies meet one another, or exist because of their relation to one another: the Lord has made them all. All men must accordingly be the instruments of wisdom. . . . In the New Testament, living forms proceed out of the Spirit: they have a miraculous power and an indescribable beauty, not only, where possible, to represent the life, but to kindle in the hearts of others a similar susceptibility." The whole course and the various stages of the divine revelation are here spread out before us: not only Scripture, but also nature and the world of men, are media and spheres of divine revelation, in which life is attested and displayed. If the elder Protestantism laid almost exclusive emphasis on Scripture, and Rationalism on nature and reason, the aim of Oetinger is directed toward a combined view of both the higher and lower revelation.

Oetinger opposes with this idea of life Idealism, and specially the Leibnitzian theory of Monads in their twofold character, as

simple and as representative essences: "Thought is not the first thing, and being is not the first, but life and self-movement." More particularly, he defines life as "*intensum*, a nature essentiated and simplified from powers, as all things are but one, or all are in each, and each in all: externally, *Monas, punctum diffusivum et manifestivum sui;* internally, *Myrias.*" This self-manifestation in an interaction of forces is, however, essentially the production of corporeality. "No spirit can become manifest without a body. Everything which is spiritual is therefore also corporeal. To have a body is a reality, or perfection, if it is purified from the defects that adhere to the earthly bodily nature. These imperfections are impenetrability, resistance, and the grossness that it is tainted with. All these three can be taken out of the bodily nature, as is manifest from the (glorified) body of Christ, and His flesh and blood (John vi.), and from the resurrection of believers." Life and (spiritual) corporeity are therefore Oetinger's fundamental ideas, on which his whole system is built. In God, life, the band by which the powers are united, is indestructible; in the creature it is destructible, and through sin it is actually dissolved. Christ, however, by His life on the earth, His death and resurrection, brought life again to the world. He is now, in His exaltation, the author of endless life (Heb. vii. 16); *corpus Christi est perfectio spiritus.* "The flesh and blood of Christ are to bring all to a true corporeity; so that God, dwelling with the creature in His glory, may be all in all. In this sense is 'corporeity the end of the ways of God.'"

Oetinger would thus have all fundamental ideas regarded, "physically or essentially, not only morally." It cannot be denied that he does this with a certain one-sidedness. The reaction against the current spiritualism which had prevailed in the orthodox scholasticism, and now, by the idealistic philosophy, the moralizing enlightenment, and the rationalistic theology, was pushed to such an extreme as almost to wipe out all ideas, especially all Christian ones, led him to take the physical

too directly as the metaphysical or essential. In opposition to that abstract spiritualism, the reality seemed to lie in corporeity. Oetinger seems often to forget that even then the moral, the ethical, the personal, are always first. At the same time, he is not sufficiently careful and precise in his expressions, especially in respect to the difference between the lower and higher bodily natures. When he describes the idea of life as a chemical idea, his principle is seen to be too natural, it has too much of the earthly nature; and so his whole thought will often appear too sensuous. He does not sufficiently distinguish the different stages of life—the natural, the intellectual, the divine; and so he threatens to convert the spiritual life into a process of nature. In real truth, however, the matter is not so critical as this. What Oetinger with his idea of life and corporeity means, is indeed nothing else in the first and last instance than the new and higher life, the divine nature, the spiritual body (2 Pet. i. 4; 1 Cor. xv. 44), which he carefully distinguishes from the earthly body, and the defects that belong to it. "Life, glory, and spirit," he says, "are always associated; each has the qualities of the other. Eternal life and eternal self-movement are the first and highest ideas of God as a Spirit." What Oetinger strives to establish is thus, in truth, a realistic conception of mind, starting from which he then of course seeks a transition to (material) nature, and to get at a more real idea of it than idealism can possibly supply. If we must say that it was a defect in him not to have estimated sufficiently the idea of personality and the ethical in their principles, yet the physical in the higher sense, as he understands it, presupposes the ethical, just because it is the new nature, the self-manifestation of the Spirit. Hence freedom and history are not excluded by Oetinger's mode of thought, by his natural philosophy, but are included.

The idea of a divine purpose and plan in the world, and in redemption, as developed especially in the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians (which were leading books with Oetinger),

is more definitely taught by Oetinger than by Bengel. This idea is the divine outline of that which we term the philosophy of history. Paul calls it the "hidden wisdom of God (Theosophy, Θεου σοφια, 1 Cor. ii. 7), which God has ordained before the beginning of the world for our glory." Oetinger lays stress on the freedom of this divine purpose: he speaks of the "unconditioned good pleasure of the counsel of love," and thinks it a defect in Bœhme, that while "the ground of all being had been revealed to him, he did not understand the voluntary in God." His view had been restricted to the physical and metaphysical region, and neither included history, which has its root in freedom, nor its divine plan. Moreover, Oetinger says that this purpose of God is a purpose of the ages, *i.e.* the great periods of the world. "Not all at once, but after long periods of time, shall the universe be led back to God by Christ. The ages are there, that the depths of the divine life may be evolved and made known." History is in this way regarded in its inmost essence, as the free, successive self-communication of God to the world, and the restoration of the world to God, conditioned by it, and to be perfected in long periods. Hence Christ is, thirdly, the central point of the divine counsel. "The purpose of the ages is a purpose in Christ. The mystery is hidden in the Old Testament; but in the New it is revealed, that in the man Christ all the fulness of God should dwell—all things be reconciled to Himself by Him, whether they be things in earth or things in heaven; and that all things should again be subject to one Head, both that which is in heaven and on the earth. The whole world and the church, angels and men, must furnish means to further the great objects of this divine purpose."

This free and gradual introduction of the divine into the created life, which is the fundamental idea of the whole development of the world, is made manifest at all decisive points: first of all in Christ Himself; then in those who are His; and lastly, in history in general. In Christ, Oetinger (and his

scholar, Ph. M. Hahn, carries out this idea still further, and with great ability) finds the development of a real human life. "It is not only a union of the natures, but a patience assailed by resistance and opposition. The course of the life of Jesus places before us very complete steps of growth, *ut psychicum in spirituale elevetur*. Therefore He had to rise gradually from the lower stage of the servant to the highest of Godhead." After He had borne and taken away on the cross the wrath of God experienced in death, "the resurrection was a transformation of the flesh and blood of Jesus into spirit, or the glorification of humanity. By it, holiness was made communicable to souls and bodies. The great end is, that Christ should in the future manifest bodily in the creature all as it had been in Himself." The glorified Christ is thus the personal principle of the development and end of the world. The whole of the arrangements in connection with redemption move round the *vita vegetabilis per gratiam creaturis noviter implantanda*. Agreeably to this view, the principal emphasis in the Christian life is laid on the new birth and renewal, as "successive participation in the glory of God. The spiritual nature, from the life-giving flesh and blood of Jesus, is blended with the soul by a new birth, which puts the course of the soul's life into altogether different circumstances, so that the image of God may be again realized by the truth, which implants righteousness and holiness in it again. The Spirit received from God for a possession and a pledge of the inheritance, is in truth like a vegetable growth—a tree of life, where hope is the root, love the sap, and faith the forming power. Spirit thus embraces the whole of the divine life in the soul." And finally, the raising of the creature to spirit is begun by the higher, divinely spiritual order of things in the church. "In the purpose of the ages, it is the first work of Christ to mark out, ordain, and call those who let themselves be made worthy to become His inheritance, and His abode in the Spirit, in this hidden state. In the church all things are to be bodily displayed which are hidden in God. It is to be supposed that

these first-fruits of the creature are preparatory to the succeeding exaltations of the creation through Christ. For the second Adam is destined, in the course of the ages, to call forth all things which are spirit, with all distinctions in bodily forms." It is evident that eschatology, in its different stages of development, acquires very great importance in this view.

The new creation, which we found wanting in the elder Protestantism, is here, as we have seen, the fundamental idea. If Oetinger does indeed give more prominence to it than to justification, it is hardly more than the elder Protestantism did with justification as compared with the new creation. If he speaks of justification as if it were absorbed in the other, as "God reckons the future perfection to the believer as if it were actual, because he is in Christ," this error may be easily avoided, and yet the fundamental truths of his system be acknowledged. The doctrines of justification and the new creation do not exclude one another, but rather require and supplement each other, as they have been combined by Paul. Oetinger may be described as the man who first worked out the Protestant principle into a more comprehensive system, not merely theological, but philosophical, or rather theosophical.

He was moved to this work, as we have seen, by the "philosophy of the world" which then prevailed; his system is a fruit of the opposition to the Rationalism which was beginning. We have named Spener, Bengel, and Oetinger as three principal opponents. These three represent respectively faith, knowledge (intellectual, *Wissen*), and perception (real knowledge, *Erkennen*), or the religious, the historical, and the speculative elements of Christian science. These three aspects, which we may describe as the mystical, the biblical, or biblico-ecclesiastical, and the theosophical, in their reciprocal bearings, bring out the genuine Christian gnosis. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries we see that three elements appeared one after the other, just as in the ancient church and in the middle ages. These were the religious-mystic, the polemic, and the

scholastic (see pp. 206, 220). Scholasticism is the formal, lifeless mode of Christian knowledge, theosophy the real and living one. Spener, in common with Rationalism, opposed the dead scholastic orthodoxy; he did it, however, not in the name of unbelief, but in the name of a living, active faith. He thus, in opposition to Rationalism, represents the Christian principle as religious in its subjective practical vitality. This, in the church, is the true foundation for every step of progress, even toward knowledge; and the foundation that is thus laid is not removed by the knowledge that is built upon it. It is rather preserved and strengthened. What is characteristic in Spener is found again in Bengel, and what is characteristic of both is found in Oetinger. But Bengel adds to the religious element the historical, to the subjective the objective, to the saving of souls the biblical development of revelation. Thus there arises out of a living religious faith, the historical faith, or Christian knowledge. Oetinger lastly adds the knowledge from experience to intellectual knowledge (*Erkennen* to *Wissen*). While Bengel rejoices chiefly in the wealth and manifold variety of the divine revelation, Oetinger is more concerned to prove the rationality of it. He goes from history back to metaphysics, and wishes to attain to a view of God and the world which should furnish the key to an understanding of the depths and wonders of Scripture, that is, of the whole development of the world. This was a fundamental thought with Oetinger, as with his disciple Ph. M. Hahn,—a thought which we meet with frequently in the division of his sermons: (1) faith; (2) understanding. "It is worth while," he says, "to be laughed at by the unbelieving. There is no greater folly than unbelief, no greater unreason." His whole work is directed to the end that "the great truths of Jesus Christ should be held to be reasonable not only *ex fide*, but *ex ratione*."

Oetinger's system thus opposed the science of the time, by which, however, he was despised. He establishes a rational system against the rationalistic, or, if the expression will not

be misunderstood, positive Rationalism against the negative, true against false enlightenment, the wisdom reached by the foolishness of God against the human wisdom which had become foolishness. The necessity of knowledge, which asserts itself in Rationalism, is fully recognised by Oetinger; and is met in a much deeper method than in the opposing philosophical and theological systems. Indeed, his disciple Ph. M. Hahn, with all his earnest desire to reach fuller and clearer knowledge, reminds us in single expressions of Rationalism itself, from which in the fulness of his thought he is *toto cælo* distinct.

Rationality was the theoretic, Humanity the practical ideal of the eighteenth century. While Bengel and Oetinger, on the foundation laid by Spener, were carrying forward the Reformation principle on the side of knowledge, Francke and Zinzendorf were developing it on the side of love. In the former, genuine rationality was exhibited; in the second, genuine humanity in Christianity. Not, indeed, the humanity of mere enjoyment, which dwells only amid the flowers of life in art and culture, but the humanity of self-sacrifice, which gathers fruit for this and for the future life,—that humanity which holds nothing human foreign, which seeks to extend to the most deeply fallen brother a helping hand, and goes after him to the remotest lands, and to which, because it seeks first the kingdom of God, all other things come of themselves to fill up the joy of life. The kernels of truth that were contained in the errors of the eighteenth century were thus extracted, and these views have been proved able to withstand false Rationalism and Humanism. They did not, indeed, succeed in rooting them out utterly; for a Rationalism and a Humanism without a cross, and which profess to enlighten and regenerate the natural man without first consigning it to death, is most attractive to the multitude. The Moravians and the Pietists of Swabia were, however, regions of the church, and almost the only ones, which were unscathed by Rationalism, and from

which in later times have gone forth new powers of life and light.

The immediate effect of Oetinger's work must not be overlooked: he exercised great influence in the limited sphere of his own fatherland. His greatest disciple is Phil. Matth. Hahn, already frequently referred to here. He preferred to follow the simple life of the pastoral office, to that of a philosophical professorship. The most of his writings have recently been republished. The completest of them is, *Meditations and Sermons of an anonymous Student of Scripture on the Gospels for the Sundays and Festivals, and on the Passion of Christ, for Friends of the old Bible Truth* (fifth edition: Stuttgart and Canstatt, 1847). Oetinger, in addition to his theological labours, studied chemistry and alchemy. Hahn studied mathematics and mechanics. This difference is quite characteristic of the two minds. Oetinger had a more restless and aspiring, a stronger and more comprehensive mind. Hahn was simpler, more rectilinear in his movements, and limited himself in his works to the Bible. He carries out Oetinger's ideas in a clear and simple system, but without being a mere imitator of Oetinger. Though he is greatly indebted to Oetinger, he has a position of his own. Between the two there seems, in many respects, a similar relation to that between Luther and Melancthon. Through this Hahn, another of the same name, yet not related, Johann M. Hahn, attached himself to Oetinger. This Hahn had, like J. Bœhme, the power of "seeing the centre of being," and was the founder of a religious society which is still widely spread in the south-west of Germany. They are called the Michelians. A selection from his numerous works appeared in 1857 and 1858, arranged under three heads—knowledge from Scripture, from experience, and from illumination. In the year 1859 appeared, *The Doctrines of J. M. Hahn, systematically developed and exhibited in extracts from his works, by W. F. Stroh, pastor.* Two other names are associated with the two Hahns—the names of two able men, and of lovely spirit, but,

alas, both taken away by an early death. They were J. L. Fricker (1729–1766), on whose "profound and far-reaching philosophy" Oetinger himself leaned not a little; and Thomas Witzenmann (1759–1787), who was tutor with Ph. M. Hahn, and afterwards was a friend of F. H. Jacobi, so that he promised to be a connecting link between the biblical-realistic south and the idealistic north. A full and interesting biography of him was published in 1859 by Alexander Freiherrn von der Goltz.

In the other parts of Germany, this biblical, historical, and theosophic view, which was carried out in opposition to Rationalism, had some able representatives, who were for the most part directly connected with the men of the Würtemberg school. We name in Mid-Germany, Christian August Crusius (1715–75), whose memory Delitzsch[1] has lately renewed among us; in the north, Gottfried Menken (1768–1831), a collected edition of whose works appeared in 1858, and whose life and labours have been briefly described by Gildemeister, the biographer of Haman; in Switzerland, Johann Jacob Hess, a native of Zürich (1741–1828).

Crusius, in his whole tendency and aim, very closely resembles Oetinger, though he is not naturally so intuitive: he is rather discursive in his temperament. He, too, is a disciple of Bengel, though only by the study of his writings. Standing firm on a biblical foundation, he unites upon this basis philosophy and theology. He was first professor of philosophy, then of theology, in Leipsic, and has written a considerable number of books in both departments. In the year 1739 his first work appeared. It is entitled *De decoro divino*, and bears especially on the work of reconciliation. This book is characteristic, not only because it unites philosophical and theological treatment, but because it discusses an idea which, holding a middle position between one-sided freedom (caprice) and one-sided (logical or physical) necessity, and nearly allied to the Pauline good

[1] See Note F 4.

pleasure of the divine will, is offered as a key to the plan of redemption and the history of revelation. Crusius himself says: "When afterwards I made use of Bengel's works, I was more and more convinced that I had come upon no unimportant idea; for I found that this divine, distinguished by learning and rich in all wisdom and experience, referred frequently to the *decorum Dei*, and pointed out the traces and examples of it, though he has not, so far as I know, attempted any general investigation of the grounds of it." In this sentence we see the relation of Crusius to Bengel. He appropriates Bengel's biblical knowledge and riches, as he himself says, to construct an entire and unmutilated Christian theology, which should humbly conform to the whole Bible without exception, which should not be mere naturalism, or mere deistic fancies—not a scattering and splitting into fragments of the truth of the Lord. He seeks, however, like Oetinger, to make this biblical knowledge philosophically clear by means of a general investigation of the grounds of it, and endeavours to show that it is the highest wisdom, by thus going back to first principles. Crusius shows that he is throughout, says Delitzsch, a student of Scripture, and also, just because philosophy and theology work together into his hands, and the gospel, as the revelation of the hidden σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ, is the highest thing true philosophy can reach, that he is a speculative theologian, who seeks to bring into the light of day the intellectual riches of Scripture. Crusius is thus a theosophist also, who knows nothing of an opposition, or even a separation between philosophy and theology. He wrote a book entitled, *Disquisitio, an cum Luthero recte negari possit, idem verum esse in philosophia et theologia*, in which he shows with great acuteness that metaphysical truth can be but one, as surely as God Himself is one. I do not know whether Crusius was personally acquainted with Oetinger: he corresponded with Roos, and wrote a preface to Ph. D. Burk's *Evangelical Fingerpost*. Like Oetinger, he wrote against the *Leibnitzio-Wolffian* philosophy; and Kant

assigns him the first place among the opponents of that system, on account of his great acuteness, reckoning him among the *perspicacissimos nostri avi philosophos.* He opposed also the Rationalism that was then spreading, and in Leipsic especially was gaining the upper hand. The university at that time was divided into Crusians and Ernestians. Crusius preserved in this contest the pious gentleness of his character: he advised his students to hear the lectures of his opponent; while he, like Oetinger and others, was depreciated and ridiculed by the opposite party in Ernesti's theological library and elsewhere. The notorious Bahrdt, who was one of his students, and himself narrates how earnestly and pressingly Crusius exhorted him, calls his theology "the lowest and most marked stage of madness;" and Frederick the Great prohibited his books from circulating in Prussia, while he recommended those of Wolff. Nevertheless, Crusius was the founder of a not unimportant school, which has preserved his opinions to the present century. His friend and scholar, Burscher, was senior of the theological faculty of Leipsic University till his death in 1805. Among those who venerated Crusius as their teacher and spiritual father, was the preacher Jänicke of Berlin († 1827), who, resting on the prophetic word, founded his well-known mission school.

Crusius also perceived that, to meet Idealism and Rationalism, it was necessary to obtain a realistic conception of spirit, and a clearer view of the relation between nature and mind. The soul, he taught, exists neither in a mathematical point, nor is a mere representative power; but it is a substance, and has not one power only, but many. We do not reduce the soul to matter when we say that it occupies space, and can touch as well as be touched, any more than we reduce it from a simple substance to a compound one when we distinguish a variety of powers and activities in it, or ascribe extension to it when we say that it is in a certain place. Though, further, the soul, like mind generally, is specifically distinct from matter, from the body, yet there is beneath that which differentiates them a

common general nature. Mind and matter form in these operations not only, as Leibnitz holds, a parallel co-existence; but there is, in fact, a real working of the two into each other according to physico-spiritual laws. The spirit begins, by virtue of its inward immaterial activity, a movement of its own substance, and thereby it moves certain substances; or the movement of certain material objects causes such a movement of the substance of the mind, which, according to certain laws founded in nature, is a condition under which certain inward activities of mental powers are excited and prolonged. According to this view, it is not absolutely impossible that, by the will of the Almighty, a substance may be raised from the state of materiality to that of mental existence without ceasing to be the same.

This view of the nature of spirit and of man is reflected in his idea of God also, especially as he takes the idea of the image of God in man in its plastic fulness. He speaks of a physical image of God which finite spirits bear in the quality of their nature. And he distinguishes this from the moral, which is conditioned by a free regulation of itself according to the will of God. (In this his principle of morality consists.) His idea of God is therefore not abstract, but concrete or intensively infinite, in which the forms of existence, finiteness, space, and time, are placed according to their real and infinite possibility. There is between the visible and invisible world generally the relation of image and type; and Crusius, like Oetinger, very earnestly maintains this view of heavenly things, and compared with the pantheistic spirit, which is sunk so deeply in the things of the earth and the present, it cannot be too highly prized. The heaven of glory is to him, though, or rather, because it is incomparably exalted above the visible heavens and everything earthly and material, a world of endless variety, full of reality, life, movement, and actual sensible feeling as well as intuitive knowledge. Here is the throne of majesty, where God, and also the God-man after redemption is

completed, are revealed in visible glory to the angelic orders, and to all the redeemed. In the glorified Redeemer the infinite and finite are in most intimate union; there is the highest conceivable exaltation of matter; He is the fountain of all realities. It is the final purpose of the divine revelation to bring the earthly world also into the glory of this ἀσάλευτος βασιλεία. Crusius here grasps not only the true theological point of view of the divine revelation, which includes at the same time its historical development; but he brings out, besides, the participation of the invisible world in the history of revelation, and the significance which even this last has in reference to the former. In his *Observationes de cœlo per adventum Jesu Christi commoto*, he carries through this parallelism of the history of the earthly kingdom with the history of the invisible world of light and darkness in splendid outlines, taking Scripture always as his guide.

Because this lower world is thus, in its true nature, in harmony with the heavenly world, and is destined to be raised to the perfectness of it, the divine revelation was from the beginning prepared for by that constitution which man received from the Creator. This opinion is stated at length by Crusius in his *Probatio, quod verbo Dei instrui naturæ humanæ essentiale sit.* Man was not to be developed merely from himself, but under a continued manifestation of God to him, and under the influence of an ever-growing communication of divine knowledge and divine life. Reason and revelation are two correlates, as necessary as the senses and the world, bodily life and nourishment. The fall of man did not therefore first cause the revelation of God, and His supernatural administration and rule in the world's history. It has rather only modified these, so that now the great object is, in their organically progressive development, to bring man again into union with God, to lead him into his normal moral course, and to perfect his moral being. The end of the work of God may be philosophically described as the realization of a moral order of the world;

according to Scripture, it is the kingdom of God, or in the concrete, Christ, under whom by the eternal counsel all things are to be brought as it were under one head. If this view gives the human ground of revelation, it has a not less sure foundation in the idea of God. A supernatural, miraculous intervention of God, in distinction from that natural one by which the world is sustained, is a necessary metaphysical conception of the government of the world, or so far as rational and free creatures are the final end of God in creation, *i.e.* so far as there is not only nature, but also history. As there is in the world an endless number of free actions taking place, the most of which are evil, and which thus run counter as well to the divine ends as to one another, a government of the world without the supernatural action of God would not be possible. This lies in the original world-plan. The sphere of it, which may be described as the active participation of God in the life of the soul without abolishing human freedom, extends much further than our knowledge of it. The divine miraculous works are only known by us when the divine purpose requires not only that they take place, but also that they should be known; and this is the case when they serve to carry on and to confirm the divine revelation.

If the historical character of revelation lies thus essentially in his conception of it, we naturally should expect to find in his writings, as we do, valuable thoughts upon the history of redemption and its eschatological close. He gives them in his work, in three volumes, *Hypomnemata ad theologium propheticum.* This is a history of Messianic prophecy, which in the second part is brought down to the Psalms; the third, which appeared after the author's death, treats of Isaiah. The first part contains an introduction, which is very full and instructive, in which all the great questions connected with prophecy, both formal and material, are discussed. The third section of it treats of the epochs into which the Old and New Testament history, like prophecy, is to be divided. The work of God

between creation and the fulfilment falls into two Æons or periods, of which the first, the Old Testament one, is again divided into seven, the second or New Testament one into three. The periods of the first are: 1. The antediluvian world; 2. The postdiluvian patriarchal age before Abraham; 3. The wandering of Abraham and his posterity till the departure from Egypt; 4. The time of the tabernacle; 5. The time of Solomon's temple; 6. The Babylonian captivity; 7. The time of the second temple till the birth of Christ. The work of Christ on the earth forms the dividing line between the two Æons; after it the kingdom of God has come, which from that point onward "continues to move along its course, and is gradually revealed" in the following three periods: 1. The time when the gospel passes from Jerusalem to the rest of the world, from Pentecost to the destruction of Jerusalem; 2. The time in which the gospel is taken from the Jews, who reject it, and given to the heathen, who are obedient to the faith, and Jerusalem is oppressed by the heathen; 3. The time of the prosperous and glorious condition of the church, in which all nations are converted to Christ, and the hitherto disobedient portion of the Jewish people is saved after the destruction of the godless, and in its native land is blessed again of God, and enters upon a state of greater and more enduring prosperity than it had before. Then follows the judgment, and the present state of things is closed, and eternity begins.

It appears from this glance at his views, that Crusius, like Spener, Bengel, Oetinger, and others, recognised the place and importance of Israel for the historical accomplishment of the divine plan, and also the future which is promised to this people in connection with it. As he and his disciples had to announce this much disputed truth, we quote in conclusion a passage which is calculated to dispose of many of the objections which may be raised to it: "The knot is not cut by laying down the rule, that in the promises of grace in the Old Testament which refer to Israel, the church of the new covenant, or

the Christians, are always to be understood,—that they are the spiritual Israel, of which Israel according to the flesh was the type. For the relation between Israel and Christians is quite a different one from that between type and antitype. The theocracy under Israel is not related to the conversion of other nations, as the shadow to the substance, or the figure to the thing signified. Israel is the basis and the very body of the church, which is continually to grow and increase. It is so, not in virtue of its temporal future, but because of its faith and obedience to the covenant of God with it: thus it receives the inheritance of the heathen. When Paul, in Gal. vi. 16, names the true Israel of God (the passage to which reference is generally made in this connection), he understands the believing Israelites. And these true Israelites have not gone over to the Gentiles, but the Gentiles to them (Eph. ii. 19, iii. 6). As the ancient Israel even before the advent of Christ received proselytes, who then constituted a part of the people; so, after the coming of Christ, according to the covenant and promise (the believing acceptance of which from the beginning distinguished the true Israel from that which was unworthy), it is increased by the incorporation of a great part of the Gentile nations, and will at last receive the whole earth for a possession." In the following period, similar things will take place on a yet greater scale. Crusius and his followers, observes Delitzsch (to whose accounts of Crusius we have been chiefly indebted), have always shown from Scripture, that it is only a part of Israel which God cast away, but that even to this part, amid the severest judgments, a return and restoration are held out; and that Jerusalem, the seat of the first Christian church, from which the gospel went out, shall yet be glorious as the mother church and chief city of the kingdom of God. "A final and endless rejection of Israel," says Crusius, "is decidedly and in the most various ways denied. The land of Canaan is given them for a perpetual possession, when God will reveal Himself again to Israel as their covenant God, and as such will be acknow-

ledged by all nations. Then will Israel again enter his own land, and enjoy great happiness and prosperity till the end of the world. The order in which these events will occur may be gathered from the words of our Lord, the epistles of Paul, and the Apocalypse. These are the words of God, which must be as true as all the rest are. It is better to give God the honour, whose power to fulfil the unfulfilled is guaranteed by that which is already fulfilled, than to spiritualize all the texts which bear on the subject, or to give them all a hyperbolic interpretation."

We have named also Menken of Bremen, a contemporary of Schleiermacher, who was born in the same year, and died three years before him. Such a coincidence leads naturally to a comparison of the growth and respective positions of these two men; and this may suggest many ideas, of which we shall here indicate a few. While the one had not yet found his way to Scripture, but was deriving his theology from the Christian consciousness, the other was taking deep and copious draughts from the head fountains of the word of God. Schleiermacher—a man of much more comprehensive mind and greater gifts, a strictly scientific student, which Menken was not—was under the influence of his age and its tendencies, and hence Christianity in his representations appears in a diluted form. But this very deficiency was, in the hand of God, to be the means of enabling him to operate upon a wider circle, and make a commencement of a greater victory over unbelief. If his historical influence is greater, yet it is almost exclusively historical; while Menken's writings have an enduring value for a circle of readers which is indeed much smaller, but deeply and earnestly Christian.

Menken took his stand upon the entire word of God, and upon this sure ground opposed the scepticism of his age in the most decided manner. He has to do not only with Wolf, but also and especially with Kant, whom he regards as "the most dangerous of all men." Menken's wife writes of him: "I see his failings, but yet he makes the impression on my soul, that

he is a great and extraordinary man. Before God he feels himself as nothing, but before his age he is like a God in greatness. Leaning on God as upon a rock, he sees the succession of systems ascend and burst like bubbles; and all the powers of hell and the scorn of the world would not move him to acknowledge an idol of the earth." To him Scripture is "the word and testimony of God, which in all its declarations is truthful and trustworthy. It follows that, in reading the Bible, even more than in reading human writings, it is essential to come to it free from prepossessions and foregone conclusions, and to observe simply what the book says. When we once clearly and truly acknowledge this, we shall have no great difficulty with respect to the nature of the contents of the Bible. We shall then feel that what God tells us, we must hear; as He teaches us, we must submit to be taught." For the word of God is the light, which convinces those who love the truth of its divine truth. To bow to it is not at all blind acceptance of authority, in Menken's opinion; but it is obedience in freedom, intelligence, and joy (he lays special emphasis on the last). "When Menken looked into the Bible, it was full of life, and became the fountain of the richest knowledge; where to others everything seemed dead, where they saw nothing, he saw and exhibited the wonders of the holiness of God."

Next to the Bible, he valued most highly the writings of Bengel, and they were largely used by him in his biblical studies. "Of all human writings," he says, "I regard Bengel's *Gnomon* and *Discourses on Revelation* as by far the best. These were blessed hours, which I shall never forget, full of the joy of the inner life, when I first read the discourses." At an early period he adopted the views of the school of Kollenbush and Hasenkamp, which was established in Duisburg and Barmen. Along with the doctrines of Bengel, this school incorporated elements drawn chiefly from Oetinger and Fricker, but partly also from Tersteegen: the visions of a young woman named Wupperman (or Wipperman?) had also some influence. This biblico-theo-

sophic party went so far in the prominence it gave to the new birth, that it undertook not only to throw new light on the church doctrines of original sin, satisfaction, and justification, but to dispute them altogether. In distinction from the formal juristic and dogmatic doctrines of the church, says Max Göbel, the great truths of the Bible with them were practical, medicinal, ethical. But the principal antagonist against whom the Kollenbush and Hasenkamp party direct their attacks, was Rationalism. "Never to be ashamed of the word of God before good or evil men," was the principle to which they all their life were faithful, as energetic defenders of the truth of the Bible against the charges of Neology. The aim of these men was to get a full and clear view of the "teaching of Scripture in reference to the kingdom of God and righteousness." Accordingly they held firmly to a biblical realism, and to the realities of the invisible and future world. With them the participation of the glorified body of Christ was the means of sustaining and building up the inner man, or the germ of resurrection; and hence the frequent observance of the Lord's Supper was a matter of prime importance. This was the bond which kept them connected with the church, and opposed the tendency to separatism which had spread through the influence of Tersteegen. That they did not more accurately estimate the doctrines of the church, will not surprise us when we remember how deeply the church at that time had sunk. Menken in 1805 first published the outline of his system, the *Attempt to provide a Guide to Individual Instruction in the Truths of Scripture.* In the preface to it he says: "If I had completed this work sooner, I would have dedicated it to the sainted *doctor medicinæ*, Samuel Kollenbush,—a man to whom I am under greater obligations than to any other, and whose friendship I look upon as one of the greatest blessings of my life." In the same preface he says further: "I would gladly speak of the conformity or nonconformity of this work to the standards of the church, if there were a church still existing. As, however,

we have without doubt come to this, that in respect to the profession of a positive religion, every one thinks and declares his own head to be the sole fountain of knowledge, and his own opinion the one rule of truth, and wishes to have this recognised and honoured accordingly by his devout hearers and favourably disposed readers, and is actually honoured to the praise and glory of the enlightenment of the age, it would be ridiculous to speak of a church. I am simply concerned to see whether Christians, those who honour the Bible, recognise this book of mine as Christian, as agreeable to Scripture or not."

Menken has become the representative in literature of the Kollenbush and Hasenkamp party. But in his works their doctrines are found in a purer form. His relation to these men, in respect to the "scoriated form" of ideas on one side, and the biblically simplified form of them on the other, is similar to that of Ph. M. Hahn and Oetinger, only in the latter case the teacher was the greater, in the other the scholar. Hasenkamp and Kollenbush were themselves, however, scholars of Oetinger. Hahn and Menken furnish many points of comparison, such as their free and capacious nature, their energy of action, their inward majesty, their mode of preaching, which directly aimed at doctrine and knowledge, but all the more powerfully sometimes affecting the feelings, and their wide and comprehensive way of viewing the Scripture historically and dogmatically. We may perhaps say, that in Menken the historic-ethic mode of thought prevailed, in Hahn the dogmatic-metaphysical. Wupperthal and Bremen, where Menken exercised the greatest influence, and where, for example, Meinerhatzen, already referred to, was one of his pupils, have shone as stars in the night of the age of pseudo-enlightenment; and there are many friends of this party in these places till this day. As a testimony to this fact, may be taken the issue of the whole of Menken's works, which may be recommended to the consideration of a wider circle, and may afford a useful stimulus of thought in the theological world. From the adherents of Kol-

lenbush mainly has come the earnest support of missions to the Jews and heathen; so, too, of the Barmen Mission; and the Missionary Society of North Germany in Bremen receives many contributions from the friends of Menken.

Oehler thus writes concerning the scientific value of Menken's writings: "I should regard him, if any in recent times, as the originator of the organic-historical view of revelation. He is too little known. He has not, indeed, given the results of his biblical studies in strictly scientific form; he has rather adapted them for general use. He regarded the investigation and illustration of the development of revelation as the work of his life; for in proving that the history of the kingdom of God was a complete and harmonious picture, he saw the best defence of the Bible. By his explanation of Scripture, which is as clear as it is profound, he met and opposed both the extravagance of mysticism, and the levelling tendencies of Rationalism."[1]

The third of those we have named is J. J. Hess of Zurich. He started from the central fact of the Bible, the life of Jesus, and from this position swept gradually over the whole Old and New Testament history. He treated them on one hand, in an extensive series of volumes, with great minuteness; on the other he gave a condensed view of the whole, regarded in the light of the kingdom of God, and with an apologetic purpose. In 1774 appeared his work entitled, *Concerning the Kingdom of God; an Essay on the Plan of the Divine Institutions and Revelations;* and in 1819 his *Essence of the Doctrine concerning the Kingdom of God, according to the Historic Record in the Bible.* In the introduction to this book he says: "The author confesses frankly, that for many years nothing has tended to convince him so deeply of the truth of Christianity, of its history and doctrines, as that on one hand he found in the documents of revelation precisely that which is suitable to man's condition for time and for eternity; and, on the other hand, he perceived in all the appointments and institutions by which his

[1] See Note G 4.

condition and destiny were affected, a close connection, advancing from the smaller to the greater, from the particular to the universal, which could not possibly be of human invention." Hess thus became the author of the independent mode of treating the sacred history, in its parts and as a whole, and also thus of the view of Scripture, which regards it as the history of revelation. Among other things, the expression "the documents of revelation" is worthy of remark. He extended his observations in this region into a wider circle than Bengel or Roos; for the style of his books was more in accord with the style of his own age. There is a wise pragmatism in which we recognise the practical intelligence of the Swiss, and especially of the Zurich mind. If Hess's mode of thought and his system want that profound dogmatic foundation which the systems previously described had, it has at any rate, in common with them, the earnestness of true faith, and the view over the whole of the plan and kingdom of God. In this respect, the *Letters on the Revelation of St John* are remarkable. They were written by Hess, from 1808 to 1809, but were first published by a friend in 1843, after the death of Hess. They go more closely into the subject of the eschatological fulfilment of the kingdom of God, which is discussed at length also in the *Doctrine of the Kingdom of God.* These show us, as Delitzsch says, that Bengel had exercised a very wholesome influence on him. For though there are considerable differences in his apocalyptic system from that of Bengel, yet his influence is manifest in his general fundamental ideas, and in the pervading "sensible-intellectual" mode of view. "The ultimate glory of the church on the earth, and the restoration of Israel, cannot be more strongly expressed than by Hess."

We will only further observe, in conclusion here, that those men whom we are accustomed to call the representatives of the Christian principle in the department of general literature, also hold a realistic and historical view of divine revelation. We find them all in nearer or more remote relations to the Wür-

temberg school. This was the case with Lavater, who was the cotemporary and friend of Hess. He was acquainted with Ph. M. Hahn and his friends, and had more sympathy with their biblical-mystic realism than Hess; indeed, with his predominating power of imagination, he reduced it too much to a thing sensibly present. So with Jung Stilling, who lived in Bengel's apocalypticism, and exerted himself actively to spread it, as well as a related scheme of Time and Christian work. He also sympathized with the view of Kollenbush and Hasenkamp. Lavater belonged to Switzerland, and Stilling to Western Germany; but there is one yet to be mentioned in the extreme north-east, who excelled them both in scientific method. This was Haman, whom it has been usual in the north to place as Magus by the side of Oetinger, the Magus in the south. He is, without doubt, the man of all others of the century who had most sympathy with Oetinger, and evidently was familiar with his ideas even in detail, though he writes, two years before his death, that he knows him only by name and repute. He had read carefully, in his twenty-ninth and thirtieth years, Bengel's *Gnomon* and Hiller's *System of the Typcs of Christ.* In his latter years he corresponded with Witzenman; and in 1786 he writes to him: "The sermons of your favourite Hahn have been my constant Sunday book since May 1777, when I received them from Lavater."[1]

There are in the works of Haman great treasures of fundamental ideas in relation to religion, philosophy of language, and æsthetics, by which the Würtemburg school is supplemented; and, to use the words of Lange, "considerable helps are furnished for reconciling the divine and human authority and reason in Christian faith." Since we have had such a complete biography of Haman from Gildemeister, a systematic study of his works would be very useful to theological science, and well reward the labour bestowed upon them.

[1] See Note H 4.

2. *The Defeat of Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century.*

Rationalism was met with most energetic resistance in the eighteenth century by some distinguished individuals, and in restricted circles in which their opinions prevailed. In the course of this conflict, new and fundamental ideas were brought to light, which contributed to a more comprehensive view of the divine revelation, and one which met the objections of their opponents. It is to these ideas and their expounders that we have chiefly directed attention in the course of our remarks.

We have passed over without notice many able and noteworthy defenders of the truth, because they represent no elements of actual progress in the knowledge of revelation. These appear more in the garb of the older orthodoxy, or apologetics, or of the so-called supranaturalism, in the narrower sense of the word. But even the men whose names and systems we have mentioned did not thoroughly carry out their ideas; and this was not simply because they appeared in unconnected form, but also because they were drawn too exclusively from the entire revelation for the age to bear. The enthusiasm for what they called nature and reason ruled the time so completely, that there was no halting until they utterly denied the truth of everything supernatural, and all the record of Scripture. It was an hour of the power of darkness, which yet called itself light. This tendency reached its extreme point about the middle of the nineteenth century, when the general reaction had already long begun in theological circles.

Of course it was not science alone, or even chiefly, which produced the reaction, or commenced it. Divine chastisements, while they punish, are at the same time the only thoroughly effective aids to improvement in such periods of apostasy. The great events which, for the space of a whole generation about the end of last century and the beginning of this, shook the world, swept away like a flood many of the

abuses and wrongs of the previous age; and on the other side, they showed whither the rejection of religion and denial of history led, and thus like a school of sufferings and humiliation led back to God. The more earnest Christians were led, by the horrors of the Revolution and the dæmoniac character of the work of Napoleon, to pay the more attention to the signification of prophecy. In the feeling of deep earnestness that belonged to that crisis of the world, they roused themselves to renewed activity, to preach the gospel of the kingdom in all the world, as a testimony to all nations. Thus began a time of new life in the church, which is manifest chiefly in the societies and institutions for missionary work, the spread of the Bible, the education of poor children, etc. What Pietism had begun a century earlier, but which was now exclusively confined to the United Brethren, again made its appearance in the church. At first it was indeed covered with much reproach, but it gradually assumed a place of greater importance. Missions contributed in an especial degree to bring the gospel before the minds of men as a living power, and they exercised an increasing influence upon the home. The evangelical spirit also reappeared among the official representatives of the church and theology. Rationalism disappeared from most of the professors' chairs and from the pulpits, and also from the liturgies and hymn-books. Efforts to raise the church life by reforms of the cultus, the constitution, the discipline, etc., have indeed shown how widespread and how powerful still is that spirit of ignorance of ecclesiastical things, and opposition to them, which has its main supports in our modern literature, and always appeals to Lessing, Schiller, Goethe, Humboldt, etc., as its apostles. The actual condition of the church now is by no means so prosperous, so progressive, as many think. The tares are growing along with the wheat. We live in a time when crises are ever repeating themselves, which may produce great changes in the church for longer or shorter periods. In such circumstances there is need of strong indi-

vidual faith, and free but firm union of believers among themselves. The principle of association which has been so diffused in our century, by means of the various Christian institutions and societies, is therefore important in relation to the future, and may perhaps, in God's plan, be meant to extend so as to form particular communities. Those associations that have been formed, as that at Kornthal in Würtemberg, and recently that at Hermannsburg in Hanover, are phenomena of the happiest kind, and likely to result in great blessing. In the crisis of 1848 the Inner Mission was established; and the true thought which lies at the foundation of it, is no other than the union of the living members of the church to work upon the lifeless, just as before the destruction of Jerusalem the living societies of Christians stood in the midst of Israel.

These, however, are lines of thought which we cannot pursue here. We have only sought to obtain a preliminary glance into the movement against Rationalism in the church. We now turn to our proper task, to give an account of the opposition offered to it in the theoretic and scientific department.

We have pointed out already that the true answer to Rationalism is furnished by a strictly scientific theosophy. But this was a work of time. It could not be done at once. The theosophists of the last century could not find any general hearing for their opinions. They provided strong meat, but not always in the suitable scientific form. Rationalism, as we have shown, represents the formal and ideal claims of science; it compels the truth to move onward to a deeper insight and a sounder position. If Christian truth has a more general hearing in our century, it has got it, as is the way in human things, first of all by being smoothed down and weakened in favour of science. A man appeared, in whom the ideal of scientific knowledge was as remarkably distinct and as fully represented as in any man of his age, and who compelled the attention of his cotemporaries to this matter. This man,

Schleiermacher, was at the same time a herald of Christian religious truth. But he understood it and could communicate it so far only as it could be cast in his scientific forms: these were very splendid, but not without defect. Just because he presented the truth to the sickly age in gifts, materially very small, but formally very large, he found a very general hearing. He understood how to follow a generation which had sunk so deeply into the subjectively human. There he began with the very lowest. He conquered a footing for religion in general, and then advanced from that point to the specifically Christian truth. In opposition to the one-sided intellectual culture of the age, the great need for the establishment of a solid theosophy was to make sure of the mystical foundation, by showing that religion was an integral part of human nature and life—that it was, indeed, the inmost heart of them. To this religious mystical element there were added, in the course of development, the historical (biblical and ecclesiastical) and the speculative, which together constitute the full knowledge of Christian truth. We thus see in our century the order of the preceding one to some extent repeated; perhaps in a less profound and simple manner, but with more freedom, more breadth, and more completeness. Hence, also, we can now better judge the witnesses for the truth of the eighteenth century, and can give a higher value to their ideas than was done in their own age.

The reconquest of Christian truth begins with Schleiermacher, and we may perceive an ascending line onward from him. Then, however, there are two wrong paths which the development will have to avoid on its way. They are in danger of taking the first, whose thought is still influenced by the intellectual characteristics of the immediate past: they are exposed to the same danger as Schleiermacher, of wishing to make the gospel acceptable to the age by concessions to unbelief. The other error threatens those who are anxious to maintain the fulness of the Christianity both of the Bible and the church: they are easily tempted to be satisfied with the posi-

tive re-establishment of doctrine, and to neglect or to underestimate the inward living appropriation of it, its free action upon the whole mind. Both that concessionalism and this confessionalism are wrong. They are contrary to the fundamental principles of Protestantism, the one to its formal, and the other to its material principle. And so it is well that there are workers of different orders of mind in the field of Christian science, some of whom represent rather the positive, others the ideal element. They serve mutually to supplement and correct each other. To "split up and scatter the goods of our Lord" cannot be our duty; the truth stands over us in its own incorruptible majesty. The treasures of the faith of the church are not only not to be squandered away, but are to be increased up to the fulness of apostolic faith. But neither is it to be laid on the neck of the disciples like a yoke of bondage; it is to be accepted in free and joyful conviction as the light of the world. We must again see that it is not a matter for weak souls and narrow minds alone, but for free men and genuine thinkers, to bow before God and His revelations, and to receive from the hands of the crucified and risen One the true freedom, and the truth which makes free. The foolishness of God is not thereby taken from the cross of Christ—the simple way of salvation by repentance and faith is not omitted or avoided; but the pretext is snatched away from unbelief, which says that reason and revelation exclude each other.

a. The Theology which originated with Schleiermacher.

Schleiermacher appeared at a time when the prevailing mode of thought was quite alien from religion and Christianity, and was directed purely to the humanistic movements of philosophy and poetry. The church itself at the time was divided between the two schools of Rationalism (in the narrower sense) and Supranaturalism; the first of which made the essence of Christianity to be a dry, flat morality, and the mere light of reason; the

second found it in the external and not less arid revelation of certain supernatural articles of doctrine. Schleiermacher's great service to the church and the science of revelation consists in having opposed the indifference and unbelief of his age, and re-established the necessity and inalienable rights of religion. By the method in which he did this, he also prepared the way for the defeat of Supranaturalism and Rationalism through a new and profounder conception of Christianity itself.

If Schleiermacher's idea of religion will not satisfy a deeper investigation of Scripture and experience, yet it was of the utmost importance to point to the seat of religion in the inmost immediate consciousness of man—in the feeling. By establishing this idea, with respect both to knowing and doing, the intellectualism as well as moralism was broken down, into which we have seen recent philosophy had sunk, and into which theology also had more and more completely allowed itself to be drawn. Schleiermacher had looked with a clear eye into the depths of man's nature, and not only brought into the light an element of it, which was mistaken by the entire age, or considered only in the domain of art, but he secured for religion its essential and necessary place in the deepest life of the human soul. This fundamental principle, which he first announced with winged words in his *Discourses on Religion* about the beginning of the century, must have produced a very deep impression at such a time as that. Many inquiring minds were convinced by it; and by degrees, life, warmth, heart, and enthusiasm entered into theology again; and this enthusiasm was controlled and sustained in Schleiermacher with the utmost sobriety of thought, and the most penetrating acuteness of dialectic science. What De Wette's æsthetic Rationalism, moved perhaps by Schleiermacher's influence, was intended to do, the genius of the latter carried out to the completeness of a theological system.

It is true that in the *Discourses* religion appears only in the hazy vesture of poetical feeling, losing itself in the universal

life; and this pantheistic, æsthetic view, not sufficiently distinguishing between art and religion, because it overlooks the importance of conscience in the latter, clung to Schleiermacher all through his life. At the same time, the moving principle of his life was the effort to arrive at a more definite Christian view of things than that furnished by mere general, fluctuating, and dissolving piousness. As early as 1811, in his short *Summary of Theological Study*, the positive element appears in greater strength. The whole of the theological sciences were not only arranged together here in a new way; but, what is much more important, they are referred to their connection with the church, its nature and its work. If Schleiermacher, in his discourses, had, as it were, discovered the idea of religion afresh, he here found that of the church, and of theology as the science of the church. For as theology had lost its independence and dignity, as compared with philosophy, so had the church as compared with the state.

Schleiermacher's principal work, which appeared ten years later—in 1821—was his *Glaubenslehre*. This added to the other two things a third: it brought the form of the Redeemer Himself before the age in a new light. Religion, Church, Christ—these are the great conceptions by which Schleiermacher led theology back to its proper foundations. His *Dogmatik* taught us to recognise in the person of the sinless, perfect man, the historic manifestation of the ideal and of the divine; and in communion with Him, the one way to perfection and happiness for men. His idea of religion thus also acquired in the *Glaubenslehre* a firmer footing and greater fulness: in general, because it was represented as the feeling of absolute dependence on God; in particular, because Schleiermacher, in order to gain a point of transition from religion generally to Christianity, disregarded with a praiseworthy inconsequentiality his idea of religion, which was still essentially æsthetic, and distinguished the æsthetic from the teleological forms of religion. The former belong to the lower stage, and comprehend heathenism and

Islamism; the latter to the higher, and embrace Christianity and Judaism. Finally, Christianity was defined to be the consciousness of sin and grace, living fellowship with Christ the Redeemer. In this thought Schleiermacher had found again the central point for the understanding and reception of Christian doctrine; for that view of Christianity or of Christian consciousness is essentially identical with the material principle of Protestantism, justification by faith in the redemption wrought by Christ, though it may not have reached the clearness and fulness in which it is found in Paul or Luther. In the domain of the church, every revival must proceed from this mystical element of inner experience. It was so in the case of Luther and Spener. Schleiermacher also establishes the reality of this element, which he himself describes as mystical, and shows its application both to Rationalism and Supranaturalism,—by means of it disposing of the empirical, merely natural theorizing of the one, and the magical, abstractly supernatural mode of view of the other. In his *Dogmatik* he refers all Christian doctrines to that original central point of the experience of faith; he describes them all as expressions of the condition of the pious Christian soul; and thus he seeks to develop them out of the principle of the Christian consciousness. The work of Schleiermacher, in this architectonic respect, still stands as an unsurpassed masterpiece.

It could not but be, that the man who grasped so deeply the essence of religion, would also see the importance of history. For religion and history stand, as we know, in the very closest connection. If a man perceives that, in regard to religion, he is an absolutely dependent being, he will also find that he is historically conditioned. Idealism and Rationalism had made fatal mistakes with reference to both principles. They made man an autonomic being. With Schleiermacher, it was only natural and logical that he should advance from the absolute feeling of dependence to the historical institutions of the church and the historical Christ. But it is just in this respect that, on

the other hand, he shows himself to be a son of his age: he has not succeeded in completely escaping from the errors of it. As his absolute dependence is not exactly dependence upon a personal living God, but only points to Him, so he showed the true way to history, and to the history of revelation, but did not walk in it himself. He did not come out of the subjective region of religion to the objective one of revelation. He seems always to be reducing the historic into the ideal again, or deriving it from that. His Christ is not Christ as historically attested; but it is a representation of Christ, taken from the Christian consciousness (doubtless influenced also by both history and the Bible).

Schleiermacher's relation to the Bible and church is connected with this remaining subjectivism, in which the idealism of Kant and Fichte, and the Christianity of feeling as it prevailed among the Herrnhuters, are mutually blended. As he held a pious subjectivity to be the one source of knowledge of Christian faith, these two objective sources of knowledge did not attain their true position in his system. Hence we shall find that his theology, as it advances, has to supply this defect. As to Schleiermacher's relation to Scripture, we observe, as the first thing of importance, his depreciation of the Old Testament; then, further, the circumstance that by his investigations of the writings of Luke and the First Epistle to Timothy he has given considerable support to a subjective criticism, and as it were sanctioned it. We have to notice here, however, especially the way in which he dealt with the Bible in regard to dogma. Because he regarded that only to be truth which he could derive in his method from the Christian consciousness, so he held that only those parts of Scripture which were in harmony with the utterances of the devout consciousness were true. Thus, instead of permitting the consciousness to be regulated by the Bible, he expounded the Bible by the deliverances of his devout consciousness. Hence he often is forced to violent interpretations, of which his view of Col. i. 15 is a celebrated

example. In that instance, converting the metaphysical into the religious, he tries to carry over to the new creation what is said of the natural. Connected with this is his sermon on the words of our Lord to the malefactor, where he explains the being in paradise as the being with Christ, and enjoying His inward blessedness.

Then, as to Schleiermacher's relation to the doctrines of the church, to say a word on it too, his *Glaubenslehre* was the first dogmatic work in which the union of the Reformed and Lutheran churches, which had been brought about by William the Third of Prussia, was recognised. He cites some of the leading passages on each doctrine from the standards of both. If the Prussian union was indeed a measure more or less external to the church—if it were partly forced, though well meant,—then a reconciliation of the dogmatical differences was all the more to be wished. But in the system of Schleiermacher, neither a Lutheran, nor a Reformed, nor a Union Christian could find the full substance of his religious consciousness; for, though Schleiermacher not seldom accommodated himself to the church formulas, yet a number of doctrines were given up which had been believed by all the churches in common from the first.

This treatment of Scripture and the doctrines of the church by Schleiermacher is connected with the fact that, with all his religious feeling, his whole thought was influenced by modern philosophy. The subjective idealism of his age influenced him, as we have seen, in the formal and theoretic department: in the material and metaphysical he stood under the influence of the Pantheism of Spinoza. We have above, comparing smaller with greater, placed Schleiermacher by the side of Luther and Spener; more appropriate still would be a parallel with Melancthon. Luther and Spener were both men adapted for active life and work; Melancthon and Schleiermacher, with all the rich sense of life which was in them, were yet pre-eminently men of science. The great matter in both is, that they united

in themselves the evangelical faith and the humanistic culture of their age. The dogmatic works of both had an epoch-making influence; and Melancthon's *Loci*, like Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, starts from subjective experience, and keeps objective dogmas subordinate. But while Melancthon christianized Humanism, Schleiermacher humanized Christianity. Hence the former in later editions was able to restore the objective doctrines which he had only placed in a different position, not denied; while Schleiermacher continued in the position relative to them that he holds in this book. In his opinions the religious consciousness was rooted in a view of things which was not only alien, but opposed to Christianity. The life of the heart, therefore, suffered from this error of the intellect; and the gospel in many of its most important doctrines was weakened, and, indeed, given up altogether. In regard to the objective doctrines, and particularly those that refer to another world, the doctrines of God and the Trinity, of creation and fall, of the good and bad angels, of the pre-existence of Christ—His miraculous conception, resurrection, and ascension—of His second coming, and the last days generally, and even of the immortality of the soul, the position of Schleiermacher is sceptical and negative; and it is self-evident, that among these the doctrines of sin and grace, of redemption and the Redeemer, the central meaning of which he indeed saw, would suffer not a little. Schleiermacher caused Christ and His church to be recognised again as actually existing in the world; but he did not perceive that they are not of this world, that they proceed from the other world, and point to it again as their end. The result of this is manifest in the mutilated form of Christ, which, solitary and enfeebled, is saved from all the fulness of the divine revelation, so much of which is thus given up. It is isolated from its right connection with what goes before and what follows—its connection with heaven and with earth. Its objective ground is taken away, its true glory and meaning are not perceived. Christ is not the eternal Son of God. He is

only the sinless man, whose image might be easily destroyed by a criticism based on Schleiermacher's pantheistic views. Redemption also is only the liberation of humanity from the bondage in which its faculties are held: it is not the creation of a new world, on the ground of the expiation of the guilt of sin. Thus Schleiermacher, this most distinguished man in the evangelical church of this century, occupies a remarkable position. It has a twofold aspect. With one hand he has given much to the church, considering its condition at that time; and with the other he has, when we take its eternal and inalienable treasures into account, taken much away. But as every man of great influence must always be judged in connection with his age, that first side of Schleiermacher's work has produced by far the deepest and most permanent effects. He has impressed upon our century, in a way that it can never again be effaced, the fact that there is something in Christianity—that it is a living power, with which nothing else will bear comparison, and which nothing else can replace. This mystical element was that in him which was new and truly great, which was most fruitful and quickening. The dogmatic expression which he gave to his mystical religion, the formulæ to which he reduced them, though they had great influence, are not for the most part of permanent value. His idea of "living communion with Christ" has more sterling worth by far than his Christology itself. His very scientific inconsistencies, such as the step from the æsthetic to the teleological idea of religion, and the idea of a sinless Redeemer, notwithstanding his pantheistic views, are among the most useful things in his works. In short, his religion is better than his theology, his faith is better than his science. Therefore, too, the most important of his followers were unable to rest satisfied with his theology. They were obliged to carry it essentially further.[1]

Only few of his disciples undertook to retain that twofold position of their master in the church and in science which

[1] See Note I 4.

was possible to his individual nature alone. The most notable of these were several preachers in Berlin—Jonas, Sybow, and others; and among the theologians, Schweizer of Zurich. It is a characteristic circumstance, that these men have recently united with the representatives of Rationalism in the *Protestant Kirchen-Zeitung*.

The greater number of the followers of Schleiermacher, and the ablest among them, very soon saw that Christian theology could not remain long on the standpoint of their master. While those whom we have already named passed from the pantheistic to the deistic standpoint, others, whom we have now in our eye, approached the Trinitarian idea of God again.[1] This one example, taken from the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, is characteristic of that vigorous and useful effort which then commenced. Beginning from that which Schleiermacher had established afresh, the living faith, the *fides qua creditur*, they sought also to make clear the *fides quæ creditur*, the saving truth of the Bible and the church, and to bring it out with growing fulness. On this account, the system of these men has been generally called the believing theology. This recognition of the material principle of Protestantism could not fail to quicken a sense of the importance of the formal one again; in faith, the heart and eye were opened again for the Scripture, and exegesis was pursued with greater interest. The influences of rationalistic criticism could not be shaken off at once, and they made an unwarranted distinction between the Scripture itself and the word of God; yet their views were much more in harmony with the biblical writers: they studied them with much greater interest, fidelity, and enthusiasm, and therefore reached a much better understanding of them. Schleiermacher had excited anew a sense of the importance of the church, and consequently this profounder study of the Bible was associated with a more vivid apprehension of the past history of the church, and a resuscitation of historical theology. An effort to raise

[1] See Note K 4.

and renew the church in the present was made, on one hand by building up a practical theology afresh, on the other by an enlarged participation in those practical labours which promoted and guided both the general religious life which had been springing up here and there since the movement of the war of liberation and the celebration of the Reformation in 1817. There was also increased activity in supporting missions, circulating the Bible, etc. New periodicals were originated for the discussion of theology, and as organs of the churches in the interest both of Christian science and Christian life, which even by their titles show the healthful reciprocal influence of theory and practice which is founded deep in the nature of Christianity, and which is therefore an indispensable requisite for a successful development of the science of revelation. It could not but be that systematic theology, too, would benefit largely from all that we have named. Faithful to its founder, the believing theology has become, both in respect to the church and to dogma, the champion of union between the two evangelical churches. It advocated, however, a *real* union according to the Consensus, in contradistinction to the latitudinarian union represented by the narrower school of Schleiermacher's followers,—a union which, in the name of union, abandons more or less of the positive doctrine. The scientific periodical which represented chiefly the believing theology was the *Studien und Kritiken*, established in 1828 with the personal co-operation of Schleiermacher. Its chief editor is, or was, Ullmann,—a theologian of great ability, and well qualified for this work by his familiarity with all departments of theology, by the sobriety and mildness of his judgment, by the noble liberality of his disposition, and the beauty of his style.

We shall now glance at the work of the believing theology in the different main provinces of it, so far as they fall to be considered in connection with our object and the science of revelation. We shall thus pass over the departments of church history and of practical work.

First of all, in respect to the exposition of Scripture in the New Testament, it is chiefly Lücke and Bleek who have opened up the new path. The one, influenced by Schleiermacher's fresh and vivid view of the person of Christ, has written with warm enthusiasm upon the Gospel and the Epistles of John; the other, in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, has furnished a pattern of thoroughness and breadth of view, especially in respect to the philosophic side of exegesis. The pectoral and scientific elements of biblical inquiry were thus brought before the eyes of the theological world again in works that commanded respect. The levelling exposition of Rationalism, and the dry exposition of Supranaturalism, were both vanquished. Yet both of these men pay their tribute to the rationalistic view of Scripture,—Lücke in his *Introduction to the Apocalypse;* Bleek, in particular, in his critical works on the prophet Daniel. They make the prophecies of these books to be substantially mere poesy, and the vision to be fiction. They thus deny to the "revelations" the special characteristic of a revelation.

De Wette's *Short Exegetical Handbook to the New Testament* is written from a similar standpoint. De Wette takes an earnest religious interest in Scripture, and brings to its investigation great logical acuteness and philological conscientiousness. On the other side, however, he is less free than the others from the subjective assumptions of modern criticism. It is most useful as a repertory of the most important interpretations, and has had a very wide circulation. Alongside of De Wette's handbook, and more and more taking its place, appeared the *Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament*, by H. A. W. Meyer, member of the Consistorial Council in Hanover. It was completed with the help of some co-workers, such as Lüneman, Huther, and Düsterdiech. Meyer possesses the excellences of De Wette, and even surpasses them. He unites the greatest, sometimes excessive, logical and philosophic accuracy with a better idea of revelation and of the truth of

the Bible. At the same time, "Meyer is not free from the malady of the modern philological historical exegesis, which boasts of being pre-eminently scientific; else he would have broken completely with the legendary theory, and all the modes of speaking of myths with ideal truth, of ideal history, and the like. It is painful to the simple reader of Meyer's commentary, when his joy in the surpassingly precious philological acuteness and the able treatment of the matters is disturbed by the intrusion of those prepossessions which are not warranted by the text."[1] On the whole, however, the good influence of these commentaries of De Wette and Meyer has been, without doubt, far greater than the evil. They by no means satisfy all the demands of thorough exegesis, yet they lay the foundation for it most excellently. They have carried the grammatico-historic exposition further than before, and made it more profound; they have made it an indispensable necessity for every student of Scripture that he have impartiality, thoroughness, conscientiousness in discovering the sense of the words and the connection, along with sympathy and interest in the sacred subject of his study.

Umbreit occupies a similar position, in connection with the exposition of the Old Testament, with that which Lücke holds in connection with the New. His treatment of Scripture is characterized, above all, by poetical and religious enthusiasm. He has received the impulses in these directions more from Herder than from Schleiermacher, who, it is well known, did not rightly estimate the value of the Old Testament. Yet the title to Umbreit's principal work, *Practical Commentary on the Prophets*, points to the pectoral element of the believing theology. The men of this school are generally distinguished by a receptive disposition, a willingness to learn, and an increasing attachment to the truth of Scripture; and Umbreit, in the course of years, also attained to a deeper and truer theological understanding of the old covenant.

[1] See Note L 4.

Corresponding to De Wette's *Handbook to the New Testament*, there appeared one also to the Old Testament, but it is not of equal value. It is not simply much less complete as a repertory of the history of exposition, but there is a lack of inward unity among those who were associated in its preparation. Between the dry Rationalism of a Knobel, or the often profane Rationalism of a Hitzig, and the earnestness of Bertheau and Thenius, which at least is akin to faith in revelation, the gulf is greater than the latter themselves are inclined to confess. They would have taken a more decided position if they had not been connected with those first named, through a too subjective and one-sided literary criticism, and by the predominance of the philological and archæological interest over the religious and theological. In the domain of Old Testament research and literature, it has been very clear that it is not pervaded with the spirit of Schleiermacher. Even Ewald gives no compensation for this. The more strongly, however, in recent times, that the idea of the Old Testament, as a history of revelation, has been developed, the more are these rationalistic and half rationalistic views felt to be meagre and unsatisfactory. With all their indisputable services to the externals of the Old Testament, they have contributed but little to the understanding of its nature and spirit. It is the more gratifying to find, that even from this side, along with a Bertheau, men like Hupfeld (in his *Commentary to the Psalms*), Stähelin (in his *Messianic Prophecies*), and others, are seeking to discover and establish the theological import of the words of the Old Testament.

If we turn now from the exegetical to the historical treatment of the sacred Scriptures, the honoured name of Neander first claims our notice. This great historian continued his great classical work, the *Church History*, so as to include the very beginnings of the church. He wrote the *Leben Jesu*, and the *History of the Planting of Christianity by the Apostles*. With the first he sought to meet the criticism of Strauss, and with

the second, at least in the later editions, that of Baur. These were the first efforts of any importance to describe the origin of Christianity, and to treat the New Testament historically, on the basis of that view of Scripture which is equally remote from the old dogmatism and modern Rationalism (from which Hase, with all his desire to advance, and many profound maxims, which indicated further progress, never completely escaped). Neander took up these great subjects with an ardour and interest peculiar to himself. Christ was to him "the second Adam, the progenitor of a new race, which should be his spiritual seed. The whole appearance and work of Christ is a supernatural communication of the divine nature to humanity, for the purpose of accomplishing the moral transformation of it,—a new beginning, which has been inserted into the chain of human development; in one word, it is a miracle." On the ground of this supernatural basis, however, Neander is concerned to prove, even in the *Leben Jesu*, "the historical connection and the historical development." This is naturally the case also in the history of the apostolic age. The development of the church, from its beginning, amid the Jewish Christians, to the Pauline Gentile Christianity, and from that onward to the close of the apostolic age in John, was for the first time set forth at length. The narrative was also accompanied with references to the apostolic writings, the epistles in particular. In the concluding section he gives a comprehensive view of the apostolic doctrines, not certainly arranged on the principle of advancing from lower to higher (the order is: (1) Paul, (2) James, (3) John; Peter is omitted), but in such a way that "the living movement and variety of the proclamation"—and in this very thing, "the living unity, the wealth and depth of the Christian spirit"—is brought into prominence. In all these respects, these two biblical-historical works, the second especially, have operated for good. They open up a new path of inquiry. Neander's efforts to mediate between the supernatural and the natural, is indeed not seldom, in critical, historical, and

dogmatic questions, more like a halting between the two: his views have often an uncertain and fleeting character. Sharpness and definiteness of theological thought is not his gift naturally; and in his depreciation of the miraculous, he is too much under the influence of his age. In this and other respects he failed to raise himself to the full clear height of the Scriptures. But in regard to the history of Christianity, even of primitive Christianity, his influence marks an epoch, as Schleiermacher's did in regard to the dogmatic statement of it. He pointed out and first trod the way in which others might go further than he. The investigations that have been conducted since his time into the history of Christ and the apostles, by men like Ebrard, Wieseler, Lange, Baumgarten, Schaaff, Lechler, Ritschl, and others, are all like continuations of his work, though many new and higher points of view have been added.

The influence which Schleiermacher has exercised in stimulating the study of the New Testament theology, is shown by the widely-read *View of the Doctrines of Paul*, by Usteri. Like Neander's *View of Apostolic Doctrine*, it is not sufficiently free from modern conceptions to furnish a perfectly unbiassed and accurate account of all apostolical ideas. The *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, by C. F. Schmid of Tübingen, which was published after his death by Weizsäcker, is a much more independent and reliable work. The first part contains a concise account of the life of Jesus, and a careful exhibition of His doctrine; the second part contains similarly the life and doctrine of the apostles. The apostolical doctrines, the agreement as well as the differences between which are first proved, fall into two main forms, according as Christianity is regarded in its oneness with the Old Testament, or in its distinctness from it. The first is done by James, who looks upon Christianity as the perfect law, and by Peter, who looks upon it as the fulfilment of prophecy; the second by Paul (polemically, anthropologically, dialectically) and by John (positively, theologico-christologically, intuitively). Schmid has represented the relation of

the gospel to Israel and to the Old Testament, as the moving force in the development of the history of doctrine, just as Neander represented it to be in the actual history of events in the apostolical age. The more the difference between Jewish Christianity and Paulinism was exaggerated by Baur and his school, and made to appear as an actual contradiction, the more carefully had the investigator of the history of revelation to inquire into this point; and it could not but be that a great impetus would be given to the study of the Old Testament, and to the knowledge of the real significance of the kingdom of Israel.

The believing theology has, however, furnished but little that is worthy of mention in the historical and theological treatment of the Old Testament. This, again, arises from the defect in the system of Schleiermacher in respect to the Old Testament. There is only one more important work to be named here, but this with the greater distinction. It is Bähr's *Symbolism of the Mosaic Cultus.* This is not the product of impulses received from Schleiermacher. Indeed, it indirectly opposes his views of the Old Testament, as it does directly those of Hegel and the pseudo-criticism. Yet this work is numbered with the others that have come from the believing theology, as Nitzsch and others understand it. With incisive force of thought it vindicates for the Old Testament the character of an ethical Monotheism or Theism. The author writes, in 1837, "As at the present time great uncertainty prevails regarding the relation of the Mosaic cultus to the other religions of antiquity, and the two are not seldom placed together, and mixed up with one another, I thought it needful to show, on one side indeed the similarity of form, but on the other to bring out as sharply as possible also the distinguishing characteristics, and especially the admirable ethical principle of Mosaism, which pervades the whole, even into the minutest details. Hegel even thought himself obliged to liken the Mosaic religion to the systems of the Greeks and Romans, because the Jehovah of Israel seemed to him an abstract and

remote God. But it is precisely the fundamental idea of Mosaism, that Jehovah is united with Israel, and is not a separate, far-distant God, but dwells in the midst of His people, and holds intercourse with them. And whoever has said with the Psalmist, from the depth of his soul, 'O Lord, if only I have Thee, I ask for nothing more in heaven or earth,' knows also that in truth this Lord is no abstract being, but the most concrete God; and no philosophy will ever reason him out of this belief." From these points of view the author proposes to himself the task of exhibiting "the reasonable and rational in the symbolical language of the Mosaic cultus, and showing that down to the simplest details it is a connected and organic whole." He has contributed very largely to bring about a better understanding of the inmost spirit and nature of the old covenant; and though one cannot always subscribe to his ideas—as, for example, his view of sacrifice—yet it is a work that holds an important place in our theological literature.

We have now finally to turn to Systematic Theology, which gives to the science of revelation its fundamental conceptions and its metaphysical basis. Here the first we have to name is C. H. Sack, who has devoted his attention to the two sciences which Schleiermacher, in his *Short Outline of Theological Study*, mentioned as the chief parts of philosophical theology, but which he did not work out himself, viz. Apologetics and Polemics. The impulse was derived from Schleiermacher, but the work is done in an independent spirit, and with a much more positive mind. The Apologetics of Sack treat the fundamental questions of biblical science in a way that is very stimulating and fruitful. In respect to Dogmatic Theology, properly so called, there are three men of the school of Schleiermacher who have carried out the *Glaubenslehre* of the master further than he did. Each of them has added and specially developed one of the elements of dogmatic knowledge that had been neglected,—Nitzsch the biblical, Twesten the ecclesiastical, Julius Müller the speculative. C. J. Nitzsch, the pro-

foundest of all the disciples of Schleiermacher, was mainly instrumental, by his *System of Christian Doctrine*, in bringing the theology of the time away from the views of Schleiermacher to the Bible. He has restored all the principal dogmas to their proper place. It was he, too, who, in his replies to the *Symbolism* of Möhler and the *Dogmatik* of Strauss, furnished the most considerable help in defence of evangelical religion from assaults on the right hand and on the left—from the superstition of the Catholic, and the scepticism of the Pantheist. And, lastly, he has exhibited in the ablest manner the beautiful alliance between science and life, theology and the church, by publishing his *Practical Theology*, and placing it by the side of his *System of Christian Doctrine* as a work of equal importance. Nitzsch, though his principal work is called *A System of Christian Doctrine*, is no systematic theologian in the stricter and higher sense of the word. Connected and organic thought from one point and in one line, in which all particulars, flowing out of the main idea, are seen in their proper form and relations, is not his characteristic gift. He is too intent upon the style for that, and his care for this often seems to crush the thought; and it becomes, in its close and compact fulness of meaning, unwieldy and obscure. The strength of Nitzsch lies in his abundance of profound and ingenious thoughts, which are genuinely theological, and display the inner fulness of Christianity; and, on the other hand, they reveal its connections with the other departments of life, and with the nature of spirit itself, often in surprising clearness. It is by means of this very peculiarity that the influence of Nitzsch has been so inspiring and so full of blessing. Twesten, in his *Lectures on the Dogmatik of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, has exhibited many parts of the older church doctrine in a very able, clear, and intelligent way; but his instructive and comprehensive work remains a fragment, perhaps because the difficulty of uniting the old with the new in one radical principle was too great. Julius Müller's principal work, the *Christian Doctrine*

of Sin, may be described as the most important dogmatic monograph of recent times. It was in itself an excellent idea to make this doctrine the subject of a special investigation, because modern philosophy, the mind of the age, to use the words of Hundeshagen, "stands in need of being handled by a man of earnest thought; we require the positive instead of the merely negative view of sin;" and also because it is only when this great indisputable fact is again recognised in all its seriousness, that we may hope for an understanding of redemption, and thus also of Christianity. Müller's acute and comprehensive treatise on the problem of evil, throws at the same time a much greater light upon many of the related subjects; for the author proposes as his task to confute modern Pantheism, and its attenuations of the ideas of freedom and sin, by an energetic development of the idea of personality. The solidity and worth of the result corresponded to the opportuneness of the effort, even though Müller does carry the idea of individual freedom up to the extreme of adopting the idea of a fall of souls before the beginning of time, and though one could wish that his thought, which is dogmatico-historical and philosophical, were more deeply baptized in the fundamental views of Scripture. Julius Müller has written a number of treatises in addition to his great work, which have a classical character, from the author's noble spirit, his clear thought, and beautiful style.

We have seen and acknowledged in the foregoing pages, how the school of Schleiermacher has contributed a great deal to all branches of theology, and has been the cause of much progress. But it has left those who would press still further on as much to do. Ullmann himself says, with a noble modesty, of the theology of the *Studien und Kritiken*, "There will come a time when others will perfect it, and then introduce it into the life of the church."[1] The believing theology has risen above the Pantheism of Schleiermacher, but not in an equal degree above his Subjectivism. It has given us

[1] See Note M 4.

mainly the anthropological, religious-ethical side of Christianity; and the titles of such leading works as Müller's *Doctrine of Sin*, and Ullmann's *Sinlessness of Jesus*, are themselves indications of this. Christianity is regarded too much merely as religion, and not fully enough as a revelation. Hence, both in respect to faith and science, much yet remains to be done. In the first, the believing subject has not sufficiently acknowledged and submitted to the divine authority of the revelation and its documents. The majority of the representatives of this party have not had the courage requisite for a full reception of Christianity: they have not emancipated themselves entirely from the rationalistic and cosmical elements of modern thought, and they have made too many concessions to modern criticism. It is therefore, as they themselves call it, a mediating theology. But it is so not only in the good sense of the word; it is so also, at least partly, in the bad. As to the Bible, great emphasis is laid by these writers upon the distinction between holy Scripture and the word of God. There is indeed, when the conceptions are regarded *in abstracto*, a simple truth at the root of this distinction; but it will be seen to be inappropriate, as the Scripture conceptions are more carefully studied and better understood. This leads us to the second point, the scientific defects of the believing theology. Because Christianity has not been clearly apprehended as a divine revelation, its historical and metaphysical sides have not had equal attention and justice with the religious side. In history, these writers have not arrived at a comprehensive knowledge of the development of revelation as an organic whole. This arises from the unduly subordinate position given to the Old Testament, and the defective estimate of Scripture which has just been named. Christianity is not fully apprehended as the power of God for renewing and perfecting the world, or as the kingdom of God, the history of which is the real moving principle of all history up to the restoration of a new heavens and a new earth. In this view, the founding of Christianity, at which point the

believing theology remains, should be regarded as indeed the central point; but yet, on the other side, as only one link in the series of the divine acts of revelation, by which the heavenly world comes down to this fallen earthly world, in order to raise it gradually to itself and its eternal spiritual glory. The historical consideration of the subject leads, however, back to the metaphysical. There are, indeed, many things for which we have to thank the believing theology, especially in the department of religion and ethics; but it has not grappled so satisfactorily with the very foundation of the structure, the ultimate metaphysical conceptions, the speculative problems. Even in Julius Müller's work on sin, the speculation is mainly ethical. A believing theology, a theology of religion, has indeed again been won; but there is still a great deal to do in the interests of knowledge and of science proper. Schleiermacher wished to keep philosophy and theology quite distinct and separate; and as he, notwithstanding, mixed up his pantheistic philosophy with theology, his followers, become prudent from experience, were the more careful to adhere to this principle of their leader. They, however, have done, on the whole, too little in the domain of philosophic speculation: they knew of no properly theological gnosis of equal strength to put in the place of it. They were not sufficiently conscious of the fact that Christian science requires a complete and inward reformation, in order successfully to dispose of the deistic, pantheistic, and atheistic errors of the age. The great matter now is to state anew, in amended form, the objective dogmas in particular; to reach deeper and truer conceptions of God and divine things—of the spirit generally, and its relation to nature—of the unseen world, etc.; in short, to reconquer a view of things which, in opposition to modern Idealism and the older Spiritualism, shall be new, and yet be no other than the old, biblical Realism. On this account, also, philosophic speculation has been able to take such an unchristian attitude. There has been no sufficient counterpoise on the side of theo-

logy. "Without the discovery of some new and adequate fundamental ideas," Rothe well says,[1] "we shall not make much further scientific progress, with all our labour and care."

The believing theology represents in our time a similar stage of development with the supranaturalistic-apologetic theology in the last century. By the latter, Christian science came down from its former Protestant height to the depth of Nihilism; by the former, it rises upward again: they are both only middle points, and mediating agencies testifying to a period of transition. The more recent believing theology is better and deeper than the other, as far as the ascending is better than the descending movement. Those who have now reached a more advanced position must never forget what they owe to it: it first led, with its leader Schleiermacher, many degrees upward from the depth to which it had fallen. Its deficiencies have been more or less made good already, by those who have sought to advance still further. Those parties which may be called the church and the biblical have established again the substance of the Christian faith in its fulness: the latter also points to some important principles for the development of a Christian gnosis; and in this respect their philosophic and theosophic labours have had a mutual influence on each other, in a free and very varied way.

b. The Church Party and Biblical Studies.

The Church party in German Protestant theology is almost exclusively Lutheran. The writers of the Reformed churches differ from them in two ways, partly because they do not give such importance to the distinction between doctrine and church life, and partly because they do not emphasize so strongly the one particular church which adopts a common creed, but speak more freely on one hand of the single church, and on the other of the universal church, or the kingdom of God. They them-

[1] See Note N 4.

selves speak freely of reformed *churches*, and not of a reformed church, as the others of a Lutheran Church.

There were three causes tending to call forth this church spirit with growing power and definiteness. The first was Rationalism. As it assumed to be the true Protestantism, Claus Harms brought forward against it, on the occasion of the Reformation Festival in Kiel, 1817, his ninety-five theses, in which he showed that the true character of evangelical religion was something quite different. In the course of the following ten years, Ernst Sartorius, as formerly mentioned, proved in several works that Rationalism, with its Pelagian exaltation of the human, stood nearer to Romanism than to the faith of the Reformers. He showed what their views were from the acknowledged writings of the Lutherans, which he treated with great affection and reverence. A second opposing principle was Catholicism. When it, perhaps about ten years later, made encroachments upon the liberty of the Protestants in Bavaria—for example, by compelling Protestant soldiers to kneel before the host—Harless and others appealed to the rights guaranteed to the Lutheran creed. If the first cause led to a correcter estimate of the dogmatic value of the symbolical books which had been improperly neglected and made light of in the rationalistic period, the second taught them to recognise their importance in connection with the rights of the church. The third cause was the union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, especially as it has taken place in Prussia since the year 1817. The opposition to this was also to some extent justified. If the spirit of the later times had driven what was specifically Christian out of the general consciousness, it was to be expected that the distinctions between the various Protestant creeds themselves would be in the public judgment, even of the clergy and theologians, an antiquated and unimportant matter. It therefore seemed to be not merely a step in advance which the times seemed to require, but it was an act of true love to the evangelical church, when Frederick William the Third put

an end to the separate existence of the two confessions, with all the inconveniences attached to it. But this act of the King's did not spring from the religious power: it had not the spiritual seal of the act of the German Reformers; and therefore we need not wonder if Lutherans, knowing how rich their church was, sought to prevent the union. First of all, it had not been sufficiently considered that there still lived in the quiet depths of the popular mind, a piety which, untouched by the influences of the age, found the roots of its life in the Lutheran catechism, hymns, and sacraments, and therefore felt itself wronged by the change. There was, in addition to this, a higher point of view. If, indeed, the point from which the promoters of the union started was not rationalistic; if, on the contrary, the most important forces of the reviving belief of Schleiermacher and his scholars contributed to it, yet Christianity had not even here been received in all its fulness. And since the men of modern times had not attained to the power and fulness of the faith of the fathers, it seemed all the more a sacred duty to maintain the wealth of the church confessions in all its integrity, against the union, because through it a dangerous indifference to true and false threatened to invade religion. So far as the orthodox opposition to the union was an affair of conscience, and strove to maintain evangelical religion in its fulness, it was manifestly right, and justified, in the first respect as to the rights of the church, in the second as to dogma. In the former Scheibel, and in the latter Rudelbach and others, have become noteworthy representatives of Lutheranism, though in the periodical published by Rudelbach and Guericke, for the whole Lutheran church and theology, the editors ought to have exercised more care in excluding the extravagances of some of their colleagues.

If the Lutheran party is right in its zeal for the maintenance of evangelical truth, it overlooks at the same time one point which must be regarded as one of the most important results of more recent developments in the church and in theology. This is the distinction between religion and

theology, between the simple saving truth which rests upon the divine acts in the work of redemption, and a complete system of dogma. The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles of faith is connected with this. It is only the first element which forms the ground of church life; the other is the affair of the theological school. In it there may be freedom and variety within the church. It is a fact, however, lying clear before the eyes of all, that in the time of the Reformation and its confessions, especially those of the Lutherans, the two elements were mingled with each other. This arose from the undue stress laid on doctrine by Luther and his followers, which we have formerly noticed. Points of doctrine have thus been the cause of divisions, upon which there may well be different shades of opinion existing within the one church. It is upon this principle that the union rests, and this knowledge purchased in severe struggles cannot be given up with impunity. Otherwise we come to that point at which one of the writers to the *Magazine for the Lutheran Church and Theology* has arrived,—namely, to exclude the Epistle of James from the canon, because it does not express truth in the same way with Paul. But the truth is, that the contemporaneous existence of these two—James and Paul—in the primitive church as in the canon, is very instructive also for the relation between Luther and Calvin. Then, further, it happens that, when undue weight is attached to what is relatively of secondary importance, divisions must arise in the one church. Thus we have now a number of controversies and struggles within the Lutheran party, which are not far behind those between the Lutheran and Reformed, or between the Union and Confession party in importance, and are often carried on with even greater warmth. There are the differences between the separate and the national church party, the high church catholic, and the low church evangelical party, and lastly the strictly orthodox adherents to the symbolic books, and the progressive party,—all these within the Lutheran Church. In all this the neglect

of the distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals avenges itself; and this indicates the path upon which the swelling tide of church feeling must return to moderation and reflection, if the church is not to lose its œcumenical character altogether, and sink to the condition of a series of parties or sects. The confessions and subscription to creeds are not, as is often now assumed, the summit and perfection of what is truly Christian and evangelical: they are but a human and historical form of it. Creeds have a right to existence as such, but they bear the human characteristic of weakness and one-sidedness. If the Lutherans fail to perceive this, and, thinking only of their own glory, despise the brethren and their gifts, it may be explicable to some extent, as the other extreme to former oppression; but we must remind those who thus speak, in all love, and for the sake of their own church, of the word of the Lord which the Spirit has sent to the churches: "He that exalteth himself shall be abased."

He who is truly anxious to secure to the evangelical church the full treasures of the gospel, will have to take care not to make too much of the confessions and creeds, or to enforce them merely in a legal way. He will not be able to avoid the conclusion that they contain too much for the church, and too little for theology.[1] Only the substance of the faith, and not the single details and clauses of the creeds, are to be taken as law. Whoever will seek to enforce all these, and only these, does an injury to the truth at its present stage. Many of the articles of the church we can now understand in a wider, fuller sense, and can also add to them from the doctrines of Scripture, which are now on all sides thoroughly investigated; and Scripture teaching is much richer than the church doctrine. It may possibly appear that the new scriptural and comprehensive view of the truth will show here a Lutheran, there a Reformed opinion to be the more correct; in a third case both may be incorrect. Luther was not free from the common fate of

[1] See Note O 4.

humanity to err, and the reformed Reformers were not without the Spirit of God. We shall have then a threefold division. The foundation is formed by evangelical truth, as it is briefly contained in the two principles of Protestantism, and expressed at greater length in the Consensus of the two churches. Whoever thinks little of this Consensus, or speaks slightingly of it, should take heed what he is doing. A second is the historical and national or provincial peculiarity of particular sections of the church, which, be they Lutheran, or Reformed, or United, should have free room to grow within the one evangelical church; only there should be between the brethren brotherly fellowship, and not envying and disputing, biting and devouring (Jas. iii. 14, etc.; Gal. v. 15). The third division is that of theological study, which, not bound by any human or historical authorities, but alone by the word of God, has to investigate the truth which is but one, ever more deeply and fully, so that we all who build upon the one foundation may come also more and more to unity in knowledge.

If, on the contrary, theological thought, with which we have here chiefly to do, confines itself too exclusively to the confessions of the church, it may indeed not be without benefits in many ways; but it will contribute the less to the scientific task of the present, since it works with the means of a past, age. In the department of systematic theology, Sartorius, with his doctrine concerning the holy love of God, has the merit of having opened up to a wide circle of readers the evangelical doctrine of faith and morals. Thomasius, in his work on the *Person and Work of Christ*, gives many valuable and carefully reasoned statements on the history of dogma. Philippi, in his *Theology of the Church*, seeks to establish the old orthodoxy upon new grounds. But these men have done little for a further extension of our knowledge of systematic theology, such as is demanded by the necessities of our times. And they have done least precisely where, as Thomasius in his *Christology*, they have not been bound by the older orthodoxy.

It is the same with exegesis. In connection with the New Testament, the church party has, on the whole, but little to show. The principal authors are Harless on the Epistle to the Ephesians, and Philippi on the Romans. The chief merits of these commentaries lie on the philological, logical, and historical side. They have this in common with the commentaries of Meyer. If, on the other hand, we look for any deeper views of theology, we find that these expositors are not seldom hindered from grasping the apostolic ideas in their full freshness and power, in their original width and depth, by their particular church relationships and tendencies. Indeed, this sometimes, as in the case of Philippi on several passages in the Romans—for example, in the second and ninth chapter—leads them into error. The *Ethics* of Harless is a work of greater independence and freedom in its treatment of the Bible, and is full of deep and fruitful thoughts, presented in a compact and suggestive style.

In connection with the Old Testament, Hengstenberg and his followers have had the greatest and best influence of any of the church party. We have previously observed that, with respect to the Old Testament, Schleiermacher did very little to excite to the study of it. Rationalism, therefore, held its ground here longest. The intermediate stages were relatively fewer and less important. Hengstenberg appeared from the first as a champion in decisive antagonism to rationalistic criticism and exegesis. He was equipped with the full armour the church supplied. He followed such expositors as Calvin and Vitringa. Furnished with very considerable endowment of acuteness and learning, he opposed, in his *Lectures on the Introduction to the Old Testament*, the criticism which assigned the Pentateuch and Daniel to a later, and a part of the prophet Zechariah to an earlier time. In his principal work, the *Christology of the Old Testament*, he controverted the rationalistic method of disposing of the Messianic prophecies, and endeavoured especially to prove the doctrine of the divinity and vicarious sufferings of

the Messias in the Old Testament. In his *Commentary on the Psalms,* he brought the ascetic element of the old exegesis into honour again; and in that on the Song of Solomon, he made a new attempt at an allegorical explanation of this poem. The most distinguished Old Testament theologians who have followed Hengstenberg are Hävernick and Keil: the first with his Commentaries on Ezekiel and Daniel; the second with his works on several historical books—Joshua, Kings, Chronicles: both of them with Introductions to the Old Testament, in which there is not a little contributed against the rationalistic or rationalizing criticism. By all this, Hengstenberg and his scholars have prepared the way for the more recent view of the Old Testament as a revelation. Impartial history acknowledges this great service on the part of this much abused man. "The appearance of a decided belief in the truth of the Old Testament amid the universal doubt," says Baumgarten, "was a testimony, the wholesome power of which has touched us all; and this fact has done more to further an understanding of the Old Testament than all the results which the persevering industry of Hengstenberg in this study has brought to light." Writing to the same effect, Delitzsch ascribes to him "the imperishable merit of having reconquered for the Old Testament theology its old confidence of belief, which had almost perished in the freethinking and levity of the age."[1] With all the excellences of Hengstenberg, however, the defects of the older church exegesis cling to him, especially in an unhistorical character, and in spiritualism. He showed at the outset so little sense for historical development, that the first edition of the *Christology* was not even chronologically arranged. Hence almost nothing has been done by him or his scholars for the historico-theological view of the whole Old Testament. His spiritualism was manifest, especially in an abstract and over-refined conception of the predictions of the Messianic kingdom. In respect to the first defect, Hengstenberg has since that time,

[1] See Note P 4.

in his *Commentary on the Psalms*, and in his second edition of the *Christology*, entered upon the historical path. Biblical things he treated more freely; while, in relation to the church, he turned, in his evangelical *Kirchen-Zeitung*, which might often be called a legislative organ, more and more toward a strict organization of the church and the Lutherans. From unbiblical spiritualism, however, he has not receded; rather has he first carried it out fully in his *Commentary on the Revelation of St. John.*

We now pass from the church to the biblical party. Under this name we embrace those men whose theological characteristic is, that they regard the Scripture as a divine revelation, and seek to establish this view on deeper grounds, and to work it out to all its issues. We shall have a threefold distinction to make: the exegetical treatment of Scripture in its single parts; then the historical; and lastly, the dogmatical study of it in its entirety. In the first, Tholuck, Olshausen, and R. Stier; in the second, J. Chr. K. v. Hofmann, and his successor Baumgarten, Delitzsch, Kurtz, and also Oehler; in the third, especially J. T. Beck,—are to be named.

Among the men who have laid the foundation for a deeper understanding of Scripture, and for the completion of the theological side of exegesis, we place Tholuck in the front. He cannot, indeed, be described as a mere Scripture theologian: his peculiarity rather consists in an eclectic many-sidedness, which gathers into itself, sometimes biblical, sometimes mystical, sometimes ecclesiastical, and even rationalizing elements. These elements are not arranged into one compact system, but they are grasped by a nature of great power; and the results are felt and shed abroad by means of personal intercourse with his students and others, in various writings, and in preaching. A great part of the academic work of Tholuck is his personal intercourse with the students. He has served theological science in a literary capacity, chiefly by his exegetical and biblical theological works, beginning with his *Commentary on*

the Epistle to the Romans; on to his latest work on the *Prophets and their Predictions.* With that *Commentary on the Romans* he introduced a new element into exegesis. It was not merely the pious enthusiasm of a Lücke; it was a deep evangelical, religious life, which showed itself to be the true key to an understanding of the great apostle, and not the rationalistic treatment of the Epistle to the Romans and the Pauline doctrine, which had till then prevailed. This evangelical element, united with much suggestive thought, a sound unbiassed mind, and a very extensive reading, which enabled him to bring explanatory parallels from the most diverse sources, lend to the works of Tholuck a very stimulating influence, and have made them of great use to a wide circle of readers, though, in regard to the thorough and consistent application of principles, there is much to be desired. The valuable historical works of Tholuck on the universities, theologians, witnesses for the faith in the seventeenth century, and his more popular works on sin and the Redeemer, and on the most important religious questions of the day, are not equal in importance, or in circulation, to his Commentaries on the Epistles to the Romans and Hebrews, the Sermon on the Mount, and the Gospel of John, and also on the Psalms.

We find the more concentrated peculiar characteristics of a Scripture theologian in Hermann Olshausen. He has expressed his distinctive view of the Bible, "in opposition to the prevailing and unproductive method in which the exegesis was generally carried on not only in the rationalistic spirit, but also in the supranaturalistic," in the works, *A Word on the deeper Sense of Scripture,* Königsberg 1824; and *Biblical Exposition—a Word more on the deeper Sense of Scripture,* Hamburg 1825. Olshausen has practically carried out the spiritual or Christian-gnostic method recommended in these volumes, in his own *Commentary upon the Books of the New Testament,* which has passed through several editions since 1830. Having passed through the school of Schönherr's theosophy at Königsberg,

Olshausen knew how to bring out the deeper mystical basis of the representations of Scripture, and to give rich and new points of view for the historical and dogmatical understanding of the biblical revelation. His exegesis, however, is defective in the logical and philological explanation of particular passages. In him, as in the other representatives of the biblical tendency to be named further on, we observe an understanding of that which Rothe, with many others, has said upon the defects of ordinary exegesis, and an effort to carry scriptural science beyond these defects: "The impression which the Scriptures give me when I come to them with our commentaries, is an ever-growing consciousness of their surpassing wealth, not only in regard to the exhaustless ocean of feeling which flows through them (of the *παθη sacræ Scripturæ*, as Bengel calls it), but not less in respect to the thought that is contained in these words. I stand before them with a key which the church has put in my hand, as one that has been tested through long centuries. I cannot exactly say that it does not fit; but still less can I say that it is the right one. It opens, but only with the help of the force which I apply to the lock. Our traditional exegesis—I do not mean the neologian—does give me an understanding of Scripture; but it does not suffice to make me understand it wholly and purely. It brings out, indeed, the general contents of the thoughts; but it does not explain the peculiar form in which they are clothed. It seems to me that a thin veil has been laid over the text, even after it has been expounded. This remains behind on the word of Scripture like an irrational residuum, and brings the Bible writers, and those whose discourses they refer to, into an unfavourable position. In fact, our Lord and His apostles wished to say only, and precisely, that which the expositors let them say; and thus they have expressed themselves very unskilfully and unpleasantly, or, to speak more correctly, very strangely, and so have made the understanding of their word unnecessarily difficult to those that heard them and read them. The immense library

of our exegetical literature seems like a great complaint that they do not speak plainly and clearly, do not speak right out, and express themselves distinctly concerning matters and for an object that are so incomparably important. But who does not feel that such a complaint does not really touch them? He who reads the Bible aright receives the unmistakeable impression that the words and discourses are right as they stand; that these are no mere unmeaning ornaments, which our exegesis has always to cut away, like wild vines, from the thought of Scripture, before it can reach the essence of it; that the long-practised way of the expositors, of taking the dust from the word of Scripture, because it is so old and obsolete, before they translate it, tends directly to destroy the incomparable enamel through which it has streamed for a thousand years in the imperishable spring-like brilliance of eternal youth. The masters of biblical exposition may laugh as they will; it is still true, that there is written between the lines of their text, that which, with all their art, they are not able to read, but which we must be able to read before we *can understand the peculiar setting* in which the generally acknowledged thoughts of divinely revealed truth come before us in *the sacred Scriptures alone*, in characteristic distinction from all other representations of it. Our interpreters point out only the figures standing in the foreground of the Scripture picture: they ignore altogether the background of it, with its distant wondrously formed heights, and its shining heaven of deepest blue and cloud. And yet it is precisely from the latter that there falls upon the former that magical light which, of its kind, is quite alone, and in which they receive a transfiguration, which is the peculiarly difficult thing in them for us. The characteristic fundamental ideas and conceptions which lie beneath the way and method in which Scripture speaks, as an unexpressed presupposition, are wanting; but with these are wanting not less that band which holds organically together the separate thoughts of Scripture, the real soul, the inner and vital connection of the single elements

of the Scripture circle of thought. No wonder, then, that, in connection with a hundred things in our Bible, which therefore remain still *cruces interpretum*, we cannot arrive at a clear understanding, which recognises the details of the text to have some motive in all their smallest features. No wonder that there are so many passages, of which we have quite a host of different interpretations, which from time immemorial have been in opposition to one another, without having arrived at a settlement of the dispute. No wonder: they are false, because all inexact, all only approximations to the truth, touching the true sense only in the gross. We come before the biblical text with the alphabet of *our* ideas of God and the world, and we suppose, as if it were a matter of course, that that of the Bible writers, which stands behind, and shines through all they think and write, will be the same. This, however, is only a delusion, from which experience should long ago have saved us. Our key does not open—the right key is lost; and till we are put in possession of it again, our exposition will never succeed. The system of biblical ideas is not that of our schools; and so long as we attempt exegesis without it, the Bible will remain a half-closed book. We must enter upon it with other conceptions than those which we have been accustomed to think the only possible ones; and whatever these may be, this one thing at least is certain, from the whole tone of the melody of Scripture in its natural fulness, that they must be more realistic and massive."

As Olshausen was prevented by his early death (he was born in 1796, and died 1839) from completing his *Commentary on the New Testament*, it was afterwards continued by Wiesinger and Ebrard. The latter, who undertook the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Revelations, and the Epistles of John, has developed an activity in all departments of theology which is almost excessive. For our points of view, besides his systematic theology—in which he represents the German Reformed, the Calvinistic, Melancthonian, and the Union party—it is his scien-

tific criticism of the histories of the evangelists which is to be considered chiefly. It is one of the best and completest replies to Strauss and his followers. One could wish that the works of Ebrard were distinguished by greater thoroughness, and by an attitude of quieter dignity in regard to science; yet they are stimulating in manifold ways, through the acute and decided intelligence with which he so frequently seizes the idea, and through the open and able manner in which he admits and exhibits the ideas of progress in recent theology.

Rudolf Stier takes a prominent place among the expositors and biblical theologians of the present day. A scholar and friend of Joh. Fried. von Meyer of Frankfurt,—a mystic, yet one who has done good service in connection with the translation and explanation of Scripture,—Stier has gone further on the path that Olshausen trod, yet quite independently. He indeed, in his exegetical writings, allows his subjectivity too free play, and he becomes thereby often much too discursive, so that not seldom the grains of gold have to be gathered out of a mass of polemical references. He is deficient in philological acuteness and logical precision; he often finds several senses in the words, so that he puts in rather than brings out the meaning; he does not hold with sufficient firmness to the historical ground or the historical standard. We not seldom wish for distinct thoughts where we often find only "hints," or simply "suggestions in aid of an understanding of Scripture." The way, too, in which he takes the words of Jesus, and also of the apostles, and even the angels, out of their connection, and explains them for themselves in separate books, is somewhat arbitrary and atomistic, and opposed to the scientific method, which must ever be directed toward an organic comprehension of the biblical books. But all these defects, which have drawn upon Stier much disfavour, and caused him partly to be ignored by the representatives of "scientific" exegesis, cannot prevent us from acknowledging the great advance which has been brought about by him and his investigation of biblical truth, so free from bias

either on the side of the orthodox or the modern presuppositions. His grand aim is to reach a higher and purer exegesis than that which has become traditional, and "explains away the passages of deeper meaning, and which with all its ingenuity cannot or will not see the realities of the language of Scripture." His tendency is the opposite of that which strips the doctrines of the church of their meaning, in order to accommodate them to the unbelieving. He endeavours to "discover the true meaning and basis of the doctrines and modes of representing them from the Holy Scriptures." He defends them by placing them on their true foundation, and exhibiting their true sense. By opening up the depths of Scripture through his mystical gnosis, he makes them also much more available for edification, and also for homiletical purposes. The Scriptures in his hands thus become the book of life and of knowledge, bearing exhaustless treasures; and though we miss in him a strict adherence to scientific laws, yet he may justly lay claim to the possession of an originality congenial to the Bible, and which brings to the understanding reader more than the most sober and strictly accurate labour. Instead of attempting further to point out the characteristics of Stier, we shall quote the following words of his own, expressing his view of Scripture: "God gave the prophets and us the eternal truths of the Spirit in Jewish types, because Israel was to be and continue in little the world of type and image, the elementary lexicon of all divine speech with man, because we in this way receive the necessary help, given to abstract thinkers in vain, to the understanding of what is typical in all nature and history. Here, then, we have not pictures alongside of which something else merely stands; it is no obscuring of the thought: on the contrary, the thought is expressed more clearly than in any 'purer statements' of an abstract style, and in that language which goes through all the languages of the nations, even in the caricatures of the heathen apostasy, through which the Bible, but especially, as missionaries testify, the Old Testament, is more intelligible to the

heathen generally than to our confused learned men. In this language we perceive the way in which the Spirit of God Himself sees, comprehending the harmonies between the higher and lower. It speaks with living words, and writes in letters that are historic of the world and the kingdom. This is the language of the sanctuary which one should have learnt, before, by protesting against it, ignorance of it is displayed. The end of the days, the end of all things, will reveal how rightly the Spirit of God has spoken thus concretely, when all spiritual things are represented σωματικῶς, and the new covenant has been led back into the body of the old. Whoever has been able to obtain an insight into the view that points to this end, sees such a manifest unity of system in all the language of Scripture, that he can only pity all the vexations and complaints of the sceptics. And it is not the mere abstract oneness of a codex, but the living fulness of an organism complete in itself, of a creation in creation, which in eternity we shall have leisure to admire and investigate."[1] Stier's principal works are: *Hints in aid of a clear Understanding of the Bible*, which appeared between 1820 and 1830; then *The Words of Jesus*, seven volumes, and published in an abridged and popular form under the title, *The Words of the Word;* lately, *The Words of the Apostles*, second edition, and *The Words of the Angels;* further, *Explanatory Notes on the Epistle to the Ephesians and the Epistle of Jude; Homilies on the Epistle of James and the Epistle to the Hebrews;* then, in the Old Testament, the *Commentary on Seventy Psalms*, and *Exposition of some Passages from the Proverbs, and of Isa.* xl.–lxvi., which last bears the characteristic title, *Isaiah not pseudo-Isaiah*, with an introduction against pseudo-criticism.

While Olshausen opposed the first movements of the Lutherans in Silesia in the years 1835–36, and Stier is a leading champion of union, the representatives of the biblical-historical tendency, particularly Delitzsch and Kurtz, might

[1] See Note Q 4.

have been numbered also among the Lutheran-ecclesiastical or high church party. Yet with them the biblical stands in the first rank, the church in the second. In this lies the distinctive scientific quality of the chief of this party, Hofmann. This is the case to such a degree in Baumgarten, that because of deviations from the Lutheran creed, he was, with great injustice, removed from his position as professor of theology.

Hofmann's main principle in his two chief works is: Prophecy and fulfilment, and Scripture proof, are the history of redemption, the history transpiring between God and humanity. From this point he obtains a new and distinctive conception of Christianity and the Bible. Not merely are separate parts of the biblical books clearly estimated, not even the great central soteriological truth alone, but the entire contents of the Scripture in its signification and its organic connection. The first and the last things, the ancient history in Genesis, and the gradual accomplishment of the world's destiny, are here placed in a new light. The Old Testament also, as the successive preparation for the New, and in connection with this, Israel as the nation whose calling was associated with the history of redemption, are more profoundly understood. In this respect Hofmann has the merit of having, in respect to exegesis and history, gone beyond the standpoint of Hengstenberg, with whom in critical questions, and in faith in the divine truth of the Old Testament, he goes hand in hand. He also has seen and employed what is good in Rationalism—the historical method—so much, that it becomes essentially the history of revelation. In the New Testament new light falls, from this full recognition of the destiny of Israel, upon the distinction between Jewish and Gentile Christianity, and the transition of the kingdom of heaven from the people of God to the nations of the earth; and thus Baur's view is led back to its real scriptural foundation of truth. It is from this point also that the history of the church, in its right significance and position, standing between the first and second coming of Christ, can be understood.

Christianity has for its object not only the founding of the church: this is only the first spiritual form of the manifestation of Christianity, upon which, when the Lord comes, and Israel again stands at the head of the nations, the historical development of the kingdom of God on the earth in outward glory follows, until, finally, the last eternal fulfilment of all things takes place in the new heavens and earth. If the contents of Scripture are thus much more fully estimated dogmatically, and so better understood, a new light falls also on Scripture itself, upon the separate books as well as on the book as a whole. The books of the Bible are the records of the divine kingdom in its development. Every single part has a meaning, and is arranged according to a plan, and so forms an organic integral part of the whole. Out of these views there must arise a science of the canon which will far excel the ordinary Introductions in scientific method and historical vividness, and contribute largely to a fuller understanding of Scripture. The revival of the isagogic efforts begun by Reuss, and adopted by Guericke, forms a commencement of this work. Hofmann, in his valuable treatises on "The History of the Origin of the Bible," in the *Erlanger Magazine for Protestantism and Church*, has begun some preliminary studies in this science. The Scriptures are thus seen to be the word of God, not in the lifeless, mechanical sense of the older theory of inspiration, but in the historical living sense—that it is the complete organic record of all the revealing acts of God.

In this historical method of Hofmann's lies his strength. His contributions to exegesis and dogmatic theology may also be traced to it; and even the defects of his system are connected with the same cause. We have to differ from the conclusions of his exegesis in many details, but new impulse and help are always to be derived from his logical, historical treatment of his subject. In his dogmatical works, the most important thing, both in extent and in intrinsic significance, is not the systematic body of doctrine, but the biblical and

historical proofs he leads. These the author himself singles out as most important by the title: Scripture-proof (*Schriftbeweis*). In the statement of the details, the independent position of the words of revelation is not sufficiently recognised alongside of the history of facts; prophecy is bound too closely to the measure of each respective historic situation and its typical meaning, though the *Schriftbeweis* shows an advance in this respect compared with his *Weissagung und Erfüllung*. In his systematic theology, the speculative metaphysical and ethical elements are not found in sufficient strength. Schleiermacher sacrificed objective theology to subjective religion; Hofmann recognises and incorporates the supramundane almost only so far as it actually has part in the history of redemption on the earth. His doctrine of God is therefore relatively defective. To him God is triune in order to be the God of man. The ideas, Logos, Wisdom, Angel of Jehovah, Son of God, are more or less emptied of their transcendental meaning. His views of the atonement are also defective. He looks at the death of Christ only in its historical, and not in its inward, substantial necessity. But even here he is able, with his historical method, to reach and exhibit new and fertile points of view, which serve to supplement the one-sided dogmatic system, and may be employed to vivify it instead of setting it aside. There are, however, a considerable number of other points of doctrine—for example, the original unity of the human race, the administrative activity of angels in history, and the like—which Hofmann has set in a new light; so that here, too, the science of revelation has been greatly furthered and enriched by him.

Michael Baumgarten says, at the close of the introduction to his first greater work, the *Theological Commentary on the Pentateuch*, in which he gives a general view of the history of the exposition of the Old Testament: "The whole choir of the centuries seems to me to join in the one voice which asks for history, history, which is body and spirit; body and spirit, out

of which the miracle of all miracles, the man Christ Jesus, has become a realized fact. In spirit I salute, as my forerunner on this path, Hofmann, who, in the first part of his work on *Prophecy and Fulfilment*, has with a clear and steady eye penetrated deeply into the reality of the Old Testament history, and has found in this reality, not simply any spirit, but *the* spirit which everywhere, and by a straight path, leads to the true incarnate Christ." It is in the spirit of these words that Baumgarten has composed his principal work on the Acts of the Apostles, where, in a profound and ingenious, though not seldom also in parts a far-fetched and exaggerated way, he exhibits the plan of this book, which describes the development of the church from Jerusalem to Rome, from the capital of Israel to the capital of the world. His *Lectures on the History of Jesus*, though they cannot lay claim to scientific rigour or completeness, yet furnish many new and beautiful points of view. The *Visions of Zachariah* have too much the character of "a prophet's voice to the present day," to have much value in a wide sense for prophetic theology. What Baumgarten is, besides, as a valiant champion of evangelical freedom, as an independent theologian, fresh, self-revealing, constructive, though sometimes also passing beyond the limits of prudence,—all this lies outside of our purpose. We would mention, in addition, as the most noteworthy of his other works, his *Observations on the Law and the Gospel*, on the *Word of God and Scripture*, which he has given in his *Protestant Warning and Doctrine*.

Delitzsch, in the work which has been already quoted, *The Biblical Prophetic Theology*, has subjected the latest development of this science since the *Christology* of Hengstenberg to a searching examination, and shown the advances which have been made by Hofmann and Baumgarten, as compared with Hengstenberg. He himself unites with the fundamental ideas of Hofmann—which he, moreover, repeatedly criticises—some partly Lutheran and high church, and partly decided theosophic views; the last especially in his *Biblical Psychology* and in

his *Commentary on Genesis.* His great familiarity with the Talmud, and Jewish matters generally, gives him also an independent position as a commentator on the Old Testament. They have been most serviceable in his *Commentary on the Psalms.* The standpoint of Delitzsch, freer exegetically and critically than that especially of Hengstenberg, is apparent in his distinction between an Elohistic and Jehovistic document in the Pentateuch, and in his exposition of the Song of Solomon, which he regards as in the first instance an exaltation of the mystery of marriage. A beautiful work on the Hebrews, also, which has such close relations to the Old Testament, has been published by this energetic and able Old Testament theologian.

Kurtz also attaches himself to this circle; yet he holds an independent position. Among his numerous writings we mention chiefly here his *History of the Old Covenant,* which forms a reply, from the standpoint of belief, to Ewald's *History of the People of Israel.* The difference of the two titles is characteristic of the views of the authors. It is to be lamented that the author allows himself to be kept so long from completing his valuable work, which now reaches only to the death of Moses, through other labours, specially in the department of church history.

We must pass without mention in this connection the name of Oehler, who himself describes his standpoint "as the organico-historical or historico-genetic view of the Old Testament," and thus connects himself, though quite independently, with the theologians already named. Unfortunately he has hitherto published, in addition to his excellent articles in Herzog's *Real-Encyclopädie,* and a few other scattered writings, only two smaller works. These are, the *Prolegomena to the Theology of the Old Testament,* and a Latin treatise, entitled *Veteris Test. sententia de rebus post mortem futuris illustrata,* thus embracing the beginning and the end of Old Testament theology. We can only wish that this *Theology* itself, which he has long had in view, may soon appear.

T. T. Beck is in a still higher degree than R. Stier an original, prophetic, intuitive nature. Despising the ordinary paths of our science, he is not enough known to many, but to others he opens up with peculiar success the fountain of divine light and life. In common with Hofmann, he takes the Scriptures as they are; and without troubling himself with critical questions, seeks to dive into their sacred depths. But while acuteness is Hofmann's characteristic feature, that of Beck is depth; and while Hofmann's method of handling Scripture is ruled by his strict historic method, Beck's gift is dogmatic gnosis. He places us, without much scientific, dialectic, or historical means, in the midst of the throbbing life of the divine word, and displays to us its inner wealth, and its fulness of truth, in such a way that we, overcome by the living impressions and views which meet us, forget to ask for other proofs of the truth of the sacred records, after this demonstration of its spirit and power. He understands also how to exhibit the contents of Scripture, the kingdom of God, and the organism of the ideas that are expressed in it, in its inner reality and sovereign majesty; to show the nothingness of all human power, compared with the glory with which the divine truth, with its own means, comes and manifests itself to men. While he thus, however, energetically repels the false claims and arts of human thought and work, he on the other side unites with much wisdom and life the divine and the human, the kingdom of grace and the kingdom of nature. We thus have a comprehensive organism of the truth, which embraces the universal truths of conscience and the special truths of revelation, the departments of creation, redemption, and final perfection, logic, ethics, and physics. Beck's *Christliche Lehrwissenschaft*, for which he paved the way by his *Introduction to the System of Christian Doctrine*, breaks through the limits of ordinary systematic theology, and aims at a large and wide system of biblical gnosis or theosophy, like Rothe's *Theological Ethics* in another way. How very much Beck has this extension of systematic theology in his eye, is

shown by the circumstance, that in addition to the ordinary theological topics, he has a special treatise on anthropology, in his small but valuable work on the *Bible Doctrine of the Soul.* Because, further, he has the whole administration of God before his mind, the practical theological element is richly developed in him, as well as the most extensive knowledge; and from the picture of the kingdom of heaven which the Bible contains, he derives a number of sound and suggestive points of view, from which to judge and treat the affairs of the church in its present state. In this respect, his *Christian Discourses,* of which the fifth collection has already appeared, form a supplement to his scientific works, like that of Schleiermacher's *Sermons.* He spreads out before us rich treasures for the benefit of Christian gnosis and practice.

Beck represents his system of doctrine as being simply and purely biblical; but it has been observed, and rightly, that the whole structure of his *Lehrwissenschaft*—the division into logic, ethics, physics—is not of biblical, but of philosophical origin. There is more in this than may appear at the first glance. Whoever identifies his own system with the biblical one, is in danger, however pure his motives may be, of forgetting the historical conditions and individual limits to which his thought is subject. It is the highest task a man can have, to oppose human doctrines and principles of every sort, even if they take a Christian form, with the authority of the divine word. But he may then easily overlook the fact, that the Scriptures are given, not to the individual, but to the community of the faithful, the body of Christ, of which the individual is only one member, and the different members are placed so as to supplement and aid the others. There will be danger of not dealing quite fairly with those who are striving in the same direction. From his biblical standing-place the critic may fall into a hard style, and become suspicious of everything which in theology and the church, and even among Christian brethren, seems to mingle what is human with the divine. He may overlook the

nature of human history, and the historical life of the church, or may not rightly understand them. Yet the strength of Beck's human individuality is apparent in his view of the divine word. Not only is the historico-critical consideration of the Bible, which we are warranted and bound to exercise, kept subordinate as compared with the dogmatic; but he also, to mention only one thing, inclines more to the side of righteousness and truth, than to the other and still higher side of grace, by which alone the heart is subdued, and of love, which is the new and royal commandment for the disciples of Christ. Connected with this defect is the other, that the pardon of sin and justification are not fully recognised in their deep fundamental importance for the new life, and as distinct from renewal and sanctification. It is one of the things that remain to be done, to set the doctrines of justification and sanctification in clearer light, in their organic connection with each other, than is done by the common mode of expressing doctrine in the church; but we are not therefore to confound them together. Righteousness is not to reign through grace, as seems often to be thought by Beck; but grace shall reign through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom. v. 21). Rothe furnishes an instructive contrast to Beck. While the latter comes before us in the full authority of the word of God, like a prophet, the former emphasizes almost too strongly the individual character of his theology. "I do not pretend," he says, with childlike modesty, "that I only am right, or that I have spoken the final word; I only ask that no one will dispute my right to find satisfaction for myself in this way of thinking. Indeed, I know well that I am sometimes wrong; for at the best I can have taken but a drop out of the ocean."[1] There is connected with the peculiar organization of each individual such a diversity, that there will be still an analogon to that distinction among the primitive Christians between prophets and teachers; but, on the other hand, Beck himself knows well, that before

[1] See Note R 4.

the biblical revelation we are all only learners. "All forms of doctrine and all systematic theologies are perishable, and only half true; the word of Scripture is the unchangeably firm foundation."[1] Thus, precisely because of the majesty belonging alone to the Scriptures, as well as in the interest of the truth, and a clear understanding of that which our science can do, we must accustom ourselves to distinguish our systems from the biblical organism of the truth, and to look upon them as works of art, to which belong the right and the importance of all artistic productions, but also their limits, and which have at best the same relation to the divine picture itself that good portraits have to their original. In this lies the warrant and the duty of an independent speculative theology alongside of the biblical, such as Oetinger, going beyond Bengel, strove to form.

c. Philosophy and Theosophy.

The modern philosophy, which in its fundamental features we must regard as rationalistic, has also its aspects more favourable to Christianity. We must wait to see what the school of Herbart will produce in this connection. It has already, in its way of teaching Realism, done good service in connection with the criticism of pantheistic Idealism, and lately has turned more to the consideration of religious questions; on the other hand, starting from Hegel, a number of later writers have anew defended Theism, and taken a position more or less affirmatory in relation to the revelation of God. We may describe these men as representatives of the post-Hegelian Theism. Hegel's teacher, Schelling, himself had passed from the Pantheism of natural philosophy to the philosophy of revelation, after able men of his school, such as Steffens and Schubert, had previously come to a clear understanding of the divine revelation in nature and redemption. Franz von Baader stands uncon-

[1] See Note S 4.

nected with the modern philosophy. He has been an independent student of Jacob Bœhme; and C. A. von Schaden, J. Hamberger, as well as the indefatigable publisher of Baader's works, Franz Hoffmann, belong to his school. In theology, Rothe is the most important representative of the speculative or theosophic tendency. He distinctly professes to be a theosophist, and has given a better definition of the idea of theosophy than any other.

The representatives of post-Hegelian Theism are Chalybaeus of Kiel, Ulrici of Halle, and others, but in particular the younger Fichte in Tübingen, Karl Philipp Fischer in Erlangen, and Weisse in Leipzig. The merit of this school consists in having begun to set in their right place the fundamental ideas, which Christianity does not so much affirm as presuppose, the most universal theological and anthropological basis of a Christian view of things. Among these is, before all, the idea of divine and human personality, and in connection with this a deeper and more positive view of fundamental ethical and metaphysical truths; in one word, the establishment of a living theistic view of the affairs of men and the world, in opposition to the old rationalistic Deism of Wolf and Kant, and the new rationalistic Pantheism of Schelling and Hegel. But these philosophers have come still nearer to Christianity. For example, Fichte in his *Anthropology*, Fischer in his *Encyclopædia*, especially in the *Philosophy of Religion*, and Weisse in his speculative *Dogmatik*, sought philosophically to support the truth of divine revelation in a more or less positive sense; and in these works we see an approach to fundamental theosophic views. Though no one of these men can be called properly a thinker, who strikes out any new path, yet their services are of great importance in bringing opinion away from the modern irreligious mode of view to a Christian one; and in this capacity they have properly been recognised by theologians such as Julius Müller and others. We can welcome them as allies, taking care not to forget that, in theology

as well as in philosophy, under all circumstances, we must prove all things, and hold fast that which is good.

More definitely, and with more regard to first principles than any of the others, Schelling, in the later phases of his system, discusses the peculiarities of Christianity. After he, in his *Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Human Freedom and the related Subjects*, which appeared in 1809, had advanced from his earlier philosophical Pantheism to a mystico-theistic view of things, connecting himself in a partly verbal way with theosophists like Bœhme and Oetinger, he published up to the time of his death, in 1854, but a few smaller occasional writings. Afterwards, however, his works on the *Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation*, which he left ready for the press, were also given to the public by his son. In two prefaces to a translation of Cousin's work on *French and German Philosophy*, which appeared in 1834, and to Steffens' posthumous works, 1846, Schelling has stated more fully his relation to modern philosophy and to Protestant theology. He opposes the Idealism which has been carried to such an extreme by Hegel, and shows how Hegel "has set the mere logical idea in the place of the living and the actual, and has demonstrated by his purely rational system, which excludes all empiricism, that it is impossible to arrive at the reality by means of the purely rational;" that thus, from this standpoint, "the science of the actual course of things cannot be reached: we remain simply at the ideal and logical process." He therefore opposes to Idealism a realistic philosophy which shall secure the positive explanation of the reality. He employs this Realism, however, not only against philosophic Idealism, but also against theological formalism, as developed in scholasticism of every sort. "The difference of our age from the earlier scholastic age," he says, "is, that now the object is the matter itself (*de capite dimicatur*), and everything else has comparatively sunk in importance; now we no longer dispute about the merely formal, but about that which is really thinkable."

Hence he points out truly and profoundly, that the great scientific task of Protestantism is to prove the "absolute universality of the principles of Christianity, which is accomplished when it is acknowledged that Christianity presupposes no other relationship than those by which the world also exists; that the foundation of Christianity is laid before the foundation of the world; that Christ is thus the beginning and the end, the first and the last."

We have quoted a considerable passage from the writings of Schelling already, p. 160. He has rendered a service which cannot well be over-estimated, in having brought the investigation of the history of religion from the subjective, idealistic, and critical standpoint from which heathendom and religion generally were explained as forms of subjective consciousness, and a criticism was employed against traditional records which greatly exceeded the bounds fixed by a cautious science. If the expression "philosophy of mythology" may be questioned, the expression "philosophy of revelation" itself, compared with that hitherto common, "the philosophy of religion," and the fundamental division made thus between revelation and mythology, shows a vast advance. We said purposely, however, that Schelling *indicated* the historical path—he did not lead into it. He never could quite free himself from the shell of his first philosophy. He never quite rose from the philosophy of nature to the philosophy of spirit, of freedom, of history; the ethical never became in his thought of paramount importance. And thus, in his latest system, history, reality, tradition, never held its right position compared with speculation. The religions of heathendom, though supported by objective forces, were made a merely natural process in the consciousness; the philosophy of mythology is, as it were, the natural philosophy of the mind. It is to be observed, as already indicated, that Schelling regards heathendom simply as mythology, a onesidedness that arises from earlier modes of thought, and is like that view which regards Christianity as doctrine merely; while in reality all

religion is, more than anything else, life. When he, however, sees in the chief stages of revelation not only the turning-points of the development and destiny of the world, but also the *momenta* of a theogonic process, we clearly discern a remnant of Pantheism.

Schelling even in his later years did not altogether abandon the pantheistic idealism of his youth, but wished to unite it with the positive philosophy as the first rational half of his system. With all this, the works of Schelling will introduce a new epoch in the investigation of the history of religion. They contain even in details a number of ingenious and striking thoughts, which throw far-reaching lights on the intellectual movements and efforts of the present day. Even if we cannot agree with Schelling, we are always stimulated and richly rewarded. "The merit of an investigation," he says himself, "does not consist always in solving difficult questions: it is perhaps a greater thing to state new problems and give guiding marks for future research."[1]

A parallel involuntarily suggests itself to the reflective observer of the recent developments of mind between the two *coryphæi* of philosophy and theology, Schelling and Schleiermacher. If both failed to escape from the pantheistic errors of their youth—if, by reason of this defect of deep repentance, they did not penetrate to the innermost sanctuary of the faith,—yet it is in the highest degree significant that positive Christianity had the most powerful attraction for them, and drew their best powers into its service. It is easy to see how, in their view of it, they reciprocally supplement each other. Schleiermacher began his course with the *Discourses on Religion;* Schelling ended his with the *Philosophy of Revelation.* Schleiermacher thus developed chiefly the subjective human, Schelling the objective divine, side of Christianity; the first, faith, the second, gnosis; the first was a mystic, the second a theosophist. In this distinction there is, however, more than a mere supplementing:

[1] See Note T 4.

there is also progress—the progress which may be said to be the work of our science generally at the present day, from the mere subjectivism of religion to the system of an objective knowledge of revelation. While Schleiermacher saw salvation in the separation of faith and knowledge, of philosophy and theology, Schelling, on the contrary, leads us to a system of "positive philosophy" which rests on the foundation of belief in the facts of revelation.

Franz von Baader is one of those deep, rich, and powerful natures which cannot send out their light in quiet and regular rays, but in single bright flashes. It arises from the peculiarities of these men, that they influence first a small circle, but that circle all the more strongly; then by the medium of their disciples the light gradually spreads into wider spheres. If Baader stands far behind Schelling, whom he resembles in many ways, in formal completeness, he excels him in the clearness and Christian pureness of his fundamental ideas. He is not entangled in the errors of modern philosophy; he is independent and original. Christian speculation has to keep close watch over itself, that it may abide carefully within the lines of the truth of God, and hold no dalliance with the philosophy of the age.

How large and broad a view this catholic thinker has taken of the work of our present science, is shown by the following passage from his *Lectures on Speculative Dogmatik:* "Christianity, precisely like every single truth, is something that is given to us, and demands our co-operation, in order to be rightly understood. In connection with this effort of ours, there arises the danger of withdrawing from the foundation God has laid, to prove things by our own wisdom, and to make our own spontaneity autonomically prevail. Thus we see, in fact, the later scholastic philosophy treating religion as a means to an end,—namely, the furtherance of our own self-sufficiency. At last this self-sufficiency abandoned religion altogether, and even turned against it. We have already arrived at the greatest

distance from the sun. Doubtless we shall come nearer it again; but it is to be hoped that more will be won than was lost. Every mediate action produces a deeper union than the mere immediate state. Reconciliation without the exclusion of the irreconcilable is impossible; hence the theoretic toleration of error is weakness and folly. Faith, knowledge, love, are opposed by ignorance of the divine, mocking, hate. The first sin is the neglect of the truth; this neglect is the real source of sin: the following *momenta* are only necessary consequences; indeed, we may say that they are the punishment of sin. The free use of speculation does not endanger authority any more than genius does law, but they mutually condition each other. Authority itself is only a thing known. It can be no sin not to acknowledge authority, if it is not knowable. Just as there is a knowledge by which faith is conditioned, and as there is an ignorance which is culpable, so there is a knowledge which rewards belief, and an ignorance which punishes unbelief."

What treasures of thought are still to be drawn from Franz von Baader, may be seen from the following ideas taken from his *Metaphysics:* "Everything," says Baader, "which exists in the perfect life, always is, always has been, and always will be: it always rests in its movement, and moves in its rest; it is ever new, and yet ever the same." "From this living concrete conception of the positive eternity, or of eternal life," says J. Hamberger, summing up the ideas of Baader on these points, "the nature of the negative eternity or eternal death, and not less also the nature of the temporal, which stands between the two, and partakes of the nature of both, may be inferred. If there is in eternal life eternally present satisfaction, as there is in it unity between the past and the future, there is in eternal death a desiring that is never stilled, and a burning seeking never satisfied. As is the past, so also is the future wanting; time has no present; but closest to the past it presents a future. Quite analogous to this threefold division of the conceptions, time,

eternity, sub-temporal, is that of space, overspace, underspace, of which Baader speaks fully in the *Fermentis cognitionis.* As eternal life lies as well beyond the restriction and limit of the past and perishing, as beyond the long period of time which stretches away into the future, and moves peacefully in the blessed fulness of an all-embracing present; so in the existence above space, the distance separating the object of desire, and the no less all-burdensome and oppressive nearness, appear quite overcome, and there reigns in all the freedom of extension at the same time the closest and most intimate collected and reciprocal life. That which is united in this life in the higher world, is most decisively separated in the lower life. In it there is the directest opposition between the powers of attraction and expansion, which know not how to unite themselves, and can coalesce in no nature; but neither can they altogether escape from each other: they continue for ever opposed in stormy violence. A sort of union of these opposing principles meets us in the third region, that of space; but this union is only an incomplete one. Those elements, therefore, that in the higher life live peacefully with each other, and in the lower life stand in absolute opposition, in this sphere exist together, and must on one side contract and oppress each other, on the other must separate and divide, and repel each other."[1]

Within the limits of Protestant theology itself, speculation on the part of Christian authors has taken an upward movement lately. Among the chief we may mention J. P. Lange, who, in his *Dogmatik,* which is divided into three parts—philosophical, positive, and applied—has expounded systematically the fundamental principles on which his *Life of Jesus* rests. Placing the person of the God-man in the centre of the world's history, from this christological central point he not only reaches many new and often surprising points of view for the other dogmas, but also, by regarding the Logos as the universal light, draws lines in the direction of other departments, such as nature and

[1] See Note U 4.

art, which reveal their connection with this one central point. If this takes place with Lange, rather in ingenious and fanciful suggestions clothed with the glow of brilliant changing colour, than in strict systematic development of ideas; yet in this very peculiarity there is great freshness and interest. The able exposition of Christian *Dogmatik* by Martensen, as well as the smaller works of this Dano-German thinker, who unites mystical, church, and modern speculative elements with great breadth of view and a beautiful style, must also be named here. What we have to expect from men like Liebner and Dorner in speculative theology, can at present be gathered only from single valuable publications. The most important contribution to this department is indisputably Rothe's *Theological Ethics*. We may place this thinker as high, or even higher than Carl Schwartz has done in his work on the *History of the most Recent Theology*, and yet have quite a different opinion concerning this recent theology itself, as the preceding sketch shows.

Rothe constructs a comprehensive theosophic system, which he divides into speculative theology and cosmology, and the latter again falls into physics and ethics. The central feature of this system is the idea of the new spiritual creation, and therefore, further back, the idea of the spirit. If, indeed, these two related ideas are not on all sides accurately defined, yet we must rejoice in the essential advance which we find in the realistic view Rothe takes of them, compared with the idealism which had prevailed in philosophy, and also the spiritualism which had prevailed in theology. Spirit, according to Rothe, is not the mere ideal thinking, or the thinking subject; but it is the unity of being and thought, the real and the ideal. God, then, the absolute Spirit, is not simply personality, but has also a (spiritual) organism of nature. God creates the world necessarily and without beginning, as matter is regarded as His pure Non-ego. The successive organization of matter by the continuous creative activity of God gives us the speculative physics, which is nearly related to the philosophy of nature of Schelling

and Hegel. The ideas, space and time, extension and motion, attraction and repulsion, substance and force, unorganic and organic, vegetable and animal nature, are developed with great insight and acuteness. The result of the speculative *Physik* is the natural man, in whom there is shown to be a supermaterial, absolutely ideal being—personality. In the natural man, however, in Adam and the race of Adam, this is bound by the material nature, and sin is a necessity. It remains to translate the created being into a new sphere—into the spirit; and this takes place by the personality appropriating material nature—its own first—and thus spiritualizing it. Because, however, material nature predominates in the natural man, this spiritualizing of man, which constitutes the essence of the moral process, can take place only on the basis of a new divine creative act—the supernatural creation of the second Adam. The Redeemer, by His entire moral development up to His self-sacrifice, consecrates His whole nature to the Holy Spirit (resurrection and ascension); and thus God, the absolute Spirit, can give in Him His own cosmical being. In this sense Christ (in unity with the central individuals of the spheres of creation already spiritualized) is the God-man. By means of the Holy Ghost—that is, of His glorified natural organism—He operates upon the earthly creature, until God, who had become man, now becomes humanity. This takes place by the unfolding, ever more fully, of the moral process in art and science—in social and public life. These four elements, which are the expression of the essential moral functions of individual and universal knowledge and culture, are embraced in the state. Because the continuation of the creative process lies essentially in the moral process, the religious must by degrees resolve itself into the moral—the church must expand in the state: the restoration of a universal Christian state organism is the task of the present Æon. To the coming of Christ and His chiliastic kingdom belongs the negative task of dissolving external material nature; so that at last, after the final judgment, in which they who

have been raised from the dead shall receive the final decision of their fate, there shall exist a kingdom of pure spirits.

This system of a thinker at once so acute and so profound, characteristically as it stands in all its completeness, may yet, without difficulty, be referred to the separate elements out of which it has sprung. It rests on a combination of theosophic ideas with Schleiermacher's ethics and Hegel's dialectics. To theosophy belongs Rothe's idea of spirit, and the realistic view of the new creation. That the ethical must also be a physical and metaphysical, because it is essential, is a fundamental thought of Oetinger's; only that Oetinger calls the (spiritualized) body the end of the ways of God; while in Rothe it appears as the end of the ways of man, as the result of the moral process. In this is apparent the point at which Rothe appears to be still essentially influenced by the modern philosophy, and its exaggerated estimate of human thought and action. We have already observed (p. 194), that his view of the idea of the moral corresponds essentially to Schleiermacher's definition of the moral, as the action of the reason upon nature. Rothe does indeed give, by his idea of self-spiritualization, a deeper meaning to this thought; but still he has not escaped from the fundamental error which sets men in relation to the world first, instead of to God. He has also borrowed from Schleiermacher the division of ethics into the doctrine of property, of virtue, of duties, as well as the psychological scheme of ethics, individual and universal knowing and culture; and lastly, the starting-point of theological thought, the Christian consciousness. Rich as are the subjects and the points of view which Schleiermacher has attained for a system of ethics, yet we believe, and precisely on the ground of this work of Rothe's, in which the treatment of the three chief divisions of ethics comes out so unequally, that this division of ethics into doctrine of property, of virtue, of duty, does not correspond to the true principle of Christian theological ethics. In respect also to psychology, we must go much deeper than is done here,

and must especially assign a much more fundamental position to the idea of conscience, which is so far correctly apprehended. Rothe combines the standpoint of Schleiermacher with that of Hegel, in making the contents of the Christian consciousness, in the first place, God, as pure being, which is the first modus of the Divine Being, lying behind nature and personality. From this pure being, Rothe seeks, like Hegel, and by means of the same dialectically constructive method, to deduce his whole system. One cannot but wonder that so acute a thinker did not perceive the false step which here, at the outset, is taken in passing from pure being to the divine nature; and still more, that so humble a mind should not have remarked the exaggerated value given to human thought in this system. Hence it comes, that he must hold the two great facts of the divine and human freedom, which stand at the head of all the development of the world, namely, creation and sin, to be necessary. By this means these fundamental truths, and in them the whole system, is materially injured. The over-estimation of human action is connected with that of human thought. By an erroneous extension of the idea of spirit as *causa sui*, in connection with Schleiermacher's view of the moral which has already been pointed out, Rothe is led to ascribe to man the production of spirit. Man is to make himself spiritual, as the personality in the moral process assimilates the material nature to itself; and then in this spirit, proceeding from the creature, God takes up His abode. As to outward position at least, the religious thus always comes after the moral in Rothe's system. This idea of self-spiritualization is tenable neither speculatively nor biblically. The Scriptures do indeed enjoin upon man the control of nature as his moral work; but in this, man fulfils above all the will of God: they bring man first into relation with God, and then with nature and the world. For this point, the idea of conscience, which was neglected by Schleiermacher, and not estimated as it ought to have been by Rothe, is of great importance. So the Holy Spirit appears in Scripture not as a human pro-

duct, but as a divine gift. With Rothe, as with so many modern authors (see p. 131), in the place of the communication of the divine to man, there comes the self-exaltation (this word not in the first instance in a bad sense) of man; therefore also, in place of God becoming man, we have man becoming God. And connected with this is the circumstance, that man's moral work, even extensively, is placed much too high. The restoration of a Christian state organism—that is, of the perfected kingdom of God—is not the affair of human moral activity, but of the Lord Himself, when He comes again. This task, according to Scripture, falls to the chiliastic kingdom of Christ (see Rev. xi. 15), for which it is remarkable that, with Rothe, only a negative importance remains. Experience as well as Scripture is opposed to this too highly exalted idea of the moral, and its social form of existence, the state. The doctrine of the gradual resolution of the church into the state sets up an unreal ideal, which is met, not unjustly, by universal contradiction. Idealism, driven from the metaphysical region, appears here again in the ethical. As the over-estimate of the human is always followed by the under-estimate of it on the other side, Pantheism on one hand exalts man to the divine, and on the other degrades him to the animal; so is it with Rothe. The first and second Adam are not rightly understood, because the free acts in which the divine communicates itself to man are not properly recognised. The original nobleness of human nature is lost, because the first man is not otherwise distinguished from the animal, than the animal from the plant; while, in reality, by virtue of the divine spirit which is breathed into him, he stands over all nature as its king, and as the representative of God. In the same way, the second Adam is made only a step higher in the scale of being than the first, as the first is made only one degree higher than the animal; while, in reality, the second Adam is the Son of God, who has become man. It is self-evident that, in these views, the scriptural and church doctrine of the Trinity is quite given up.

With all these errors and defects, the system of Rothe is an admirable work, not only in regard to the formal matters, but in the matter and substance of it: it exhibits manifold and valuable elements of progress, and will more and more attain the end which the excellent author has sought in his book—"to exercise a quiet influence, amid opposition on all sides, upon the renewal and improvement of current ideas." We dare not sacrifice the fulness of the truth in the Bible and the church to a speculative system; and yet such scientific power, such energy of concentrated thought, especially when allied to such deep piety, has a higher moral value and a richer blessing in promoting Christian knowledge, than the mere refurbishing of the old, however well meant, or the unfree and piecemeal attempts to improve traditionary systems. New essays in speculative theology will always be appearing; and there is no absolute method to prescribe for them. Whoever has received the call to this work, will indeed shape his world of thought according to the universal laws of scientific study, but also will be influenced by his individual gifts and experience. Let us not undervalue the earnestness and the worth of such mental toil because it is defective, and therefore falls sometimes into views that are heterodox. The church of God will be able to bear, and also to make up for that. Let us not turn away from such efforts with mere denunciations, but let us seek to place more perfect ones in their place. Paul himself opposed the false gnosis not only with the simple faith, but with the deeper epignosis of the Epistles to the Colossians and the Ephesians. To possess the truth of the Bible, and the truth not merely as an external authority, but to gain it by earnest labour of mind, and have it as a free inward possession, is the work appointed to us theologians in the sweat of our brow. The words are true in this matter also,—

> "What thou hast inherited from thy fathers,
> Earn it, in order to possess it."

Looking back over the foregoing sketch of the development of the science relating to revelation, we will not glory in the flesh; we would rather glory in the Lord. He to whom the eye of faith has been opened, knows, even without looking to men, that he can say with the prophet, "They that are with us are more than they that are against us." God needs human aids to establish His truth so little, that He rather conceals and withdraws it, even from those who strive in its behalf, in the same measure as their best efforts are rendered impure by the mixture of their own imperfections. On the other side, it is permitted, and it is right, to rejoice in the number of our fellow-labourers, and to strengthen ourselves for the conflict, by the survey of the cloud of witnesses which encompasses us now. The preceding view has shown that we may say in this respect too, They who are with us are more than they that are with them. We are not of those who underrate the power which dwells in the rationalistic, antichristian mode of thought, in the province of general culture and the consciousness of the age. But in scientific circles, which alone are capable of pronouncing judgment in these matters, and from which, too, the apostasy proceeded, Rationalism is decidedly on the wane—is being defeated. It is a joy to see how the divine revelation is proving itself again the magnet of the minds of men, which draws to itself the most diverse gifts and tendencies, and takes them into its service.

These different tendencies do indeed take directions that not only deviate from each other: they come into contact with each other, as lies in the nature of human things; and to the outward eye there appears to be often only contention and wrangling between them. But a deeper look sees even here, in the background, the unity of the Spirit and the bond of peace: it sees in the conflicting parties a variety of tendencies, which must serve to supplement and correct each other, and to purge away excrescences, as has always been the case where spiritual life has developed itself. In one great army there are also different species of weapons, and there may be collisions

between allies, or separate divisions of the troops; but all stand united in front of the common enemy. The struggle with our opponents will also unite us more closely to one another; and the earnest events, the heavy judgments, which seem now breaking over the whole world, will place many of those subordinate differences, about which so much zeal is now expended, in their merely secondary place.

The question now is no longer whether revelation can be maintained in face of reason, or faith in face of knowledge; it is daily becoming more evident, that true science is possible only on the ground of faith. Unbelief leads to that Nihilism of Feuerbach, which, as was shown in the first part of our meditations, robs humanity of its noblest minds and treasures, and converts the whole world, and most of all in the highest respects, into a lunatic asylum. The necessary consequence is that Materialism which makes not only religion, but also art and science, and all moral, political, and social life, impossible, and reduces humanity to animalism. On the other hand, it is being ever more distinctly seen that Christianity is in alliance with all the powers of life, and "presupposes no other relations than those through which the world itself exists." The revelation of redemption is proved the crowning close of all foregoing revelations from the first beginnings of creation. To treat the science of revelation in this large and comprehensive way, from the divine central point,—to obtain a wide and full understanding of the world itself,—is the work which, as our sketch has shown, is being ever more generally acknowledged by theology and philosophy. It is the same that we have described above as the expansion of systematic theology, or *Dogmatik*, to theosophy. The world must acknowledge that it is impossible to reject Christianity in the name of nature, or reason, or conscience; that it, on the contrary, has all these powers on its side; that it indeed first leads them to their true freedom and perfection. The decision must at last become a pure question of the will, "that they may be without excuse."

This task we have indicated is not nearly fulfilled, and will not soon be accomplished; for this is indeed the deepest aim and work of human knowledge generally, before which we now stand. There is need of repeated and ever-renewed attempts at its solution; there is need of the united effort of masters, journeymen, and labourers. It is a pleasure and joy to be permitted to take part in the building, if only with the humblest contributions. In this view would the author of this book, who does not over-estimate his own power, bring to this work of Christian science the service at least of the labourer.[1] Christian gnosis does not work in the spirit of an unbridled speculation, which it imagines to be the absolute knowledge; but it strives to follow the whole of the works and thoughts of God, as they stand radiant before the soul, and then to express them in human and imperfect copy or form. "Our attempts," it says with Julius Müller, "to exhibit the truth in its entirety and connection, are only like the prattle of children, compared with that clear knowledge which awaits us; but woe would it be unto us, if, because we cannot have the perfect, we should cease to apply to the imperfect, in all truthfulness and honour, our strength and toil."

[1] In the original, the author here mentions the projected third part of this work as constituting what he hoped would be his chief contribution to Christian science. He had completed only a small part when he died.

NOTES.

NOTE A, p. 32.—*Baur*, kritische Untersuchungen über die kanonischen Evangelien, 1847, S. 530. Vgl. auch Baur, die Tübinger Schule und ihre Stellung zur Gegenwart 1859, S. 13 f. *Knobel*, der Prophetismus der Hebräer, ii. S. 401. *De Wette*, Einleitung in das Alte Testament, 6 Aufl. S. 383. Die Tübinger historische Schule in *H. v. Sybels* historischer Zeitschrift 1860, iii. S. 100 f. 90 f.

NOTE B, p. 39.—*De Wette*, kurze Erklärung des Briefs an die Römer, 3 Ausg. S. 207. *Ed. Reuss*, Geschichte der h. Schriften N. Testaments, 2 Aufl. S. 95 f. *Ewald*, die Sendschreiben des Apostels Paulus, S. 425.

NOTE C, p. 54.—*Adolph Monod*, der Apostel Paulus, fünf Reden, aus d. Französischen, 1854, S. 3, 5, 14.

NOTE D, p. 55.—*Rothe*, theolog. Ethik, § 537 ff., und in seiner Abhandlung über den Offenbarungsbegriff, Studien und Kritiken 1858, i.

NOTE E, p. 57.—Verhandlungen der schweizerisch. reformirten Predigergesellschaft in ihrer 20 Jahresversamml. d. 16 u. 17 Aug. 1859, in St. Gallen, S. 132 f.

NOTE F, p. 57.—*Baur*, d. Christenth. u. d. christl. Kirche etc., S. 47.

NOTE G, p. 58.—*Volkmar*, die Religion Jesu, 1857, S. 76.

NOTE H, p. 59.—*Baur*, das Christenthum, etc., S. 39.

NOTE I, p. 62.—Verhandlungen der schweizerischen Predigergesellschaft, S. 133.

NOTE K, p. 63.—*A. v. Humboldt*, Kosmos, iii. 1, S. 10.

NOTE L, p. 67.—*Rothe*, theologische Ethik, Bd. 1, S. xiii.

NOTE M, p. 69.—*Hase*, Leben Jesu, 4 Aufl., S. 36.

NOTE N, p. 69.—*Bleek*, Beiträge zur Evangelienkritik. *E. Reuss*, Geschichte der h. Sch. N. T., S. 213 f. *Ewald*, Jahrbücher bibl. Wissenschaft 1848, ff.

NOTE O, p. 71.—Vgl. die Artikel Kreuz und Kreuzigung in *Winers* bibl. Realwörterbuch und *Herzogs* Realencyklopädie f. protest. Theologie u. Kirche.

NOTE P, p. 73.—*Strauss*, Leben Jesu, 4 Aufl., ii. S. 468; vgl. *Baur*, das Christenthum der 3 ersten Jahrhunderte, S. 38 f.

NOTE Q, p. 73.—*J. T. Beck*, christliche Reden, 4 Sammlung, S. 868 f.

NOTE R, p. 74.—*Riggenbach*, Vorlesungen über das Leben des Herrn Jesu, Basel 1857, S. 668 f.

NOTE S, p. 75.—*B. Bauer*, Kritik der evang. Geschichte der Synoptiker, 1841 f. *Strauss*, Gespräche von U. von Hutten,

1860, S. xxiv. f. Ebenderselbe, Christian Märklin, ein Lebens- und Charakterbild aus der Gegenwart, 1851, S. 127. *Fr. Vischer*, akademische Rede z. Antritt d. Ordinariats, Tübingen 1844, S. 25 f.

NOTE T, p. 81.—*Hitzig*, der Prophet Jesaja, 1833, S. 577. *Knobel*, Jesajae, 1843, S. 365. *Ewald*, die Propheten des Alt. Bundes, ii. 1841, S. 407.

NOTES U and X, p. 84.—There are no notes at these places in the original. The references have been inserted from mistaking the figures.

NOTE Y, p. 90.—Worte *Nitzsch's* auf dem Kirchentage zu Barmen 1860, s. Neue Evangel. Kirchenzeitung 1860, Nr. 39, S. 615.

NOTE Z, p. 101.—*Ewald*, Jahrbücher der biblischen Wissensch. 1853–54, S. 192 f., 1859–60, S. 211. *Hitzig*, das Buch Daniel erklärt, S. ix.

NOTE A 2, p. 103.—*Biedermann*, Prof. d. Theologie in Zürich, die Propheten des Alten Bundes, in den Zeitstimmen aus der reformirten Kirche d. Schweiz, 1860, S. 141.

NOTE B 2, p. 112.—*Ziegler*, die historische Entwicklung der göttlichen Offenbarung in ihren Hauptmomenten spekulativ betrachtet, Nördlingen 1842, S. 219. (Ein Schüler Hamanns.)

NOTE C 2, p. 113.—*Baumgarten*, Apostelgeschichte, ii. 1, S. 266.

NOTE D 2, p. 113.—*Marcus v. Niebuhr*, Geschichte Assurs und Babels seit Phul aus der Concordanz des Alten Testam., des Berossos, des Kanons der Könige und der griechischen Schriftsteller, Berlin 1857, S. 5.

NOTE E 2, p. 116.—Worte *de Wette's* in der Einleitung in's Alte Testament, 6 Aufl., 1845, S. 189 ff.

NOTE F 2, p. 127.—*E. Renan*, Nouvelles considérations sur le caractère général des peuples semitiques et en particulier sur leur tendance au monothéisme, im Journal asiatique 1859, xiii. p. 229. *Diestel*, der Monotheismus des ältesten Heidenthums, vorzüglich bei den Semiten, in den Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie 1860, S. 709 ff. *E. Scherer*, Revue de théologie 1860, p. 361 ff.

NOTE G 2, p. 137.—*Vaihinger*, im Artikel: Pentateuch in Herzogs Realencyklop. xi. S. 363.

NOTE H 2, p. 139.—*Ewald*, neue Untersuchungen über den Gott der Erzväter, Jahrb. d. bibl. Wissensch. 1859–60, S. 21, 25, 10, 12–14.

NOTE I 2, p. 147.—*Delitzsch*, Commentar üb. d. Genesis, 3 Aufl., 1860, S. 55.

NOTE K 2, p. 148.—*W. Roth* aus Basel, Oqba Ibn Nafi el Fihri, der Eroberer Nordafrikas. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der arabischen Historiographie. Inauguraldissertation, Göttingen 1859, S. 19. (This promising young orientalist, a scholar of Ewald's, fell a prey to typhus fever in 1860, shortly after he had settled as tutor at the Upper School of Basle. With Ewald, who has placed an honourable memorial of him in the register of Göttingen scholars, we deeply regret his loss.)

NOTE L 2, p. 157.—*Baumgarten*, theol. Commentar z. Pentateuch, i. S. 134.

NOTE M 2, p. 163.—*Schelling*, Einleit. in die Philosophie d. Mythologie. Sämmtliche Werke, 2 Abthlg., i. Bd., S. 94 ff.

NOTE N 2, p. 166.—Journal asiatique 1857, ix. S. 125 ff. 490 ff.; x. S. 168 ff., namentlich 216 ff. *Ewald*, in den Göttinger gel. Anzeigen 1858, i. S. 195 ff.

NOTE O 2, p. 169.—*A. v. Humboldt*, Reisen in die Aequinoctialgegenden des neuen Continents, in deutscher Bearbeitung von H. Hauff, 1860, iii. S. 62 f.

NOTE P 2, p. 169.—*H. Lücken* a. a. O., S. 186 f. 216 ff. 223, 287 f. Vgl. *J. G. Müller*, Gesch. d. amerikan. Urreligionen, Basel 1855, S. 112 ff. 487, 458 u. ö.

NOTES Q 2, R 2, pp. 175, 188.—*Herder*, Aelteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts. Sämmtliche Werke, Religion und Theologie, Carlsruhe 1827, v. S. 187 f.; vi. S. 4 f.; v. S. xii.

NOTE S 2, p. 193.—*Thomas Wizenmann*, der Freund F. H. Jacobi's, von Alexander Freiherrn von der Goltz, i. 1859, S. 89 ff. *Ehrenfeuchter*, über den höchsten Gegensatz in der Apologie des Christenthums, Jahrbüch. für deutsche Theologie, 1857, S. 440.

NOTE T 2, p. 200.—*Ernst Sartorius*, Prof. zu Marburg, die Religion ausserhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft nach den Grundsätzen des wahren Protestantismus gegen die eines falschen Rationalismus, 1822, S. 73 ff. Von demselben: die innere Verwandtschaft des Rationalismus und Romanismus, 1825. Der deutsche Protestantismus, seine Vergangenheit und seine heutigen Lebensfragen (von *Hundeshagen*), 1847, S. 11 f. 53.

NOTE U 2, p. 205.—*Sack*, *Nitzsch* und *Lücke*, über das Ansehen der h. Schrift und ihr Verhältniss zur Glaubensregel in der protestantischen und in der alten Kirche, S. 66. *Rothe*, zur Dogmatik iii., Heilige Schrift, Studien und Kritiken 1860, S. 38. Vgl. *Klaiber*, die Lehre der altprotestantischen Dogmatiker

vom Testimonium Spiritus Sancti und ihre dogmatische Bedeutung, Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie, 1857, S. 1–54.

NOTE X 2, p. 211.—Die symbolischen Bücher der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, edid. Müller, S. 502, 661, 655, 173; Rech. p. 555 f. 744, 737, 167.

NOTE Y 2, p. 219.—Vgl. *Thomasius*, Christi Person und Werk, i. S. 28 f. 34 f. *Dorner*, Lehre von der Unveränderlichkeit Gottes, Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie, 1857, S. 461 ff.

NOTE Z 2, p. 227.—*R. Rocholl, Ph. Nicolai* von der Wiedergeburt der Dinge durch die menschliche Natur Christi, in Guerickes und Rudelbachs Zeitschrift, 1860, ii. S. 193 ff. *Thomasius* a. a. O., ii. S. 451–72; vgl. *Dorner*, Entwicklungsgeschichte d. Lehre von der Person Christi, 2 Ausg., ii. S. 779–787. Artikel *Böhme* in Herzogs Realencyklop. ii. S. 265 ff. *Oetinger*, öffentl. Denkmal der Lehrtafel der Prinzessin Antonia, neu herausgegeben von Ehmann, Stuttg. 1858, S. 227.

NOTE A 3, p. 228.—Dorpater Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1859, S. 148.

NOTE B 3, p. 230.—*G. Meinertzhagen*, Pastor am Armenhause in Bremen, die religiöse Bedeutung der biblischen Wunder, mit besonderer Beziehung auf die in neuester Zeit dagegen erhobenen Einwürfe, Bremen, Heyse, 1845, S. 12 f.

NOTE C 3, p. 239.—Aus *Schleiermachers* Leben, in Briefen, ii. S. 17 f. *Steffens*, Was ich erlebte, v. S. 146 ff. *Karl von Raumer*, die deutschen Universitäten, S. 90 f.

NOTE D 3, p. 241.—In der Anm. 53, angeführten Abhandlung, Stud. u. Krit. 1860, S. 71 ff. 270 f.

NOTE E 3, p. 243.—*R. Stier*, die Reden der Apostel, 2 Aufl., 1861, S. xvi. Vgl. *J. Köstlin*, der Glaube, 1859, S. 292 ff.

NOTE F 3, p. 245.—Glaube und Unglaube in Betreff der Bibel und ihres Inhalts; in Briefform, Bern 1859, S. 110 ff. Vgl. v. Rougemont, Christus und seine Zeugen oder Briefe über die Offenbarung und die Inspiration mit Zustimmung, Verbesserungen und Abkürtzungen des Verfassers aus d. Französischen übersetzt von F. Fabarius, Barmen, 1859, S. 339 ff. 369 ff. (An able work, which, upon the foundation of evangelical faith, unites French *esprit* with German science.)

NOTE G 3, p. 271.—Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung, 18 Sept. 1858, S. 4225 ff.

NOTES H 3, I 3, pp. 276, 279.—*Strauss*, Leben Jesu, 4 Aufl., i. S. 15 ff.—1 Aufl., i. S. 46, 75.

NOTE K 3, p. 280.—*Hase*, Leben Jesu, 4 Aufl., S. 34.

NOTE L 3, p. 283.—*B. Bauer*, Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte, etc., Bd. i., Vorrede und S. 391 ff.; iii. S. 307 ff.

NOTES M 3, N 3, O 3, pp. 285, 286, 287.—*Baur*, das Christenthum und die christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte, 2 Aufl., 1860, S. 28–38, 47, 81 f. 107, 170 ff.—S. 128–130. *Strauss*, Gespräche von U. v. Hutten, 1860, S. xxxii. f.

NOTE P 3, p. 288.—*Ewald*, Geschichte Israels, ii. S. 164 ff.

NOTE Q 3, p. 290.—*Delitzsch*, Genesis, 3 Aufl., 1860, S. 47 f.

NOTE R 3, p. 293.—Vgl. auch *Schultz*, Prof. d. Theol. in Breslau, das Deuteronomium erklärt, 1859, S. 93 f.

NOTE S 3, p. 294.—Der deutsche Protestantismus, 3 Aufl., S. xvi.

NOTE T 3, p. 299.—Vgl. *G. Fr. Oehler*, Prolegomena zur Theologie des A. Testaments, 1845, S. 19 ff.

NOTE U 3, p. 300.—*Böhner*, Pfarrer im Kanton Zürich, die freiforschende Bibel-theologie, etc., S. 116.

NOTE X 3, p. 302.—*Delitzsch*, die biblisch-prophetische Theologie, etc., S. 4.

NOTES Y 3, Z 3, pp. 304, 305.—*Phil. Matth. Hahn*, ein Pfarrer aus dem vorigen Jahrhundert, nach seinem Leben und Wirken, etc., v. E. Ph. Paulus, 1858, S. 314 ff.

NOTE A 4, p. 308.—*J. W. Petersen*, Lebensbeschreibung, 2 Edition, 1719, S. 20. *Bengels* erklärte Offenb. Joh., neue Ausg. 1834, S. 674.

NOTE B 4, p. 311.—*Dorner*, die deutsche Theologie und ihre Aufgaben in der Gegenwart, Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie, 1856, S. 19 f. 27 f. *Rothe* in seinem Vorwort zu m. Schrift: die Theosophie Oetingers, 1856, S. iii. f.

NOTE C 4, p. 312.—Vgl. hierüber *Herm. Plitt*, Inspektor des theolog. Seminars der evang. Brüderunität, die Gemeine Gottes in ihrem Geist und ihren Formen mit besonderer Beziehung auf die Brüdergemeine, 1859. (One of the most valuable scientific works which has ever proceeded from the United Brethren. It is a small book, which contains more truth in reference to the church than many which are now recommended by the representatives of union and the advocates of strictness in creed, for the reconstruction of the church.)

NOTE D 4, p. 312.—*Tholuck* in d. A. Pietismus in Herzogs Realencyklop. xi. 661. Vgl. *Römer*, kirchliche Geschichte Würtembergs, S. 347 ff. *Burk*, Bengels Leben, S. 20, 384, 233.

NOTE E 4, p. 315.—*Delitzsch*, biblisch-prophetische Theologie, S. 6 f.

NOTE F 4, p. 335.—*Delitzsch*, die biblisch-prophetische Theologie, ihre Fortbildung durch Chr. A. Crusius und ihre neueste Entwicklung seit der Christologie Hengstenbergs, 1845.

NOTE G 4, p. 347.—Vgl. die trefflichen Artikel von *Max Göbel* über Hasenkamp, Kollenbusch und Menken in Herzogs Realencykl.; Menkens Schriften, vollständige Ausg., 1858, 6 Bd., S. 34 f. x. und viii. Oetingers Leben und Briefe von Ehmann, S. 327, 778 ff. *Oehler*, Prolegomena zur Theologie des Alten Testaments, S. 73.

NOTE H 4, p. 349.—*Gildemeister*, Hamanns Leben und Schriften, iii. S. 211; i. S. 171, 262.

NOTE I 4, p. 361.—Compare with these remarks on Schleiermacher, my little book, entitled, *Schleiermacher, a Sketch*, Basle, 1859. Observe especially pp. 2, etc., 64, etc. (This small treatise, which is so harmless in its origin and character, has been assailed from all sides. Let me be permitted here to reply briefly to two of the first attacks. The notice which appeared in the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* (Sept. 1859) has already been answered in the *Neuen Ev. Kirchenzeitung* (Oct. 1860). The author of the article in my defence is unknown to me, but I beg herewith to thank him for it. I only add, that my opponent has fortunately placed the defects in Schleiermacher's views which I had commented on, along with my own words, at the beginning of his article, and I can see nothing in the paper, on the whole, but a somewhat excited discussion of the

theme which is thus stated at the beginning. Besides, it appears to display a want of sober thought and exactness of expression. I did not think that he said anything new or different on any essential point. He placed the dark side of Schleiermacher's system in the foreground, while I had placed the bright side, and acknowledged the good results of his work. But this judgment is not mine alone. It is the verdict of history itself. We in the south, where no party feeling is associated with the name of the deceased, are perhaps in the most favourable position for lending a voice to the judgment of history with justice and love. Not so much on my own account, as because of my opponent himself, whom I otherwise esteem, I have been grieved with what Dr. von Oettingen wrote in the *Dorpat Zeitschrift for Theology and Church* (1860, i. pp. 37–39). For almost the whole of his criticisms are based on the most superficial survey of the criticised book. Two examples will suffice. Dr. von Oettingen says: "That Schleiermacher, (1.) by deriving sin from the sensible, or lower self-consciousness with which man was created, and (2.) by denying man's freedom, destroys man's responsibility; that (3.) the atonement is of no importance in his estimation; that, consequently, (4.) he needs no divine-human Mediator, but merely an ideal man, who, having appeared in sinless perfection, has attested the existence of God in Him, by the absolute strength of the religious principle within Him, and (5.) communicates it to us through the Holy Ghost; that Schleiermacher, lastly, (6.) knows no God above and outside the world, and does not acknowledge the trinity of the divine nature, but would reject the doctrine of the Trinity from systematic theology altogether, and attempts to dispose of it critically *à la* Strauss:—all this has been ignored by Auberlen." The following sentences, bearing on these six points, are quoted as they stand in my book:—1. P. 13: "Since sin appears in Schleiermacher's system rather as a restraining and disturbance than perversion and transgression, we miss consequently in his *Letters* the full per-

ception and recognition of it where it might be expected." 2. Pp. 72, 74: "Had Schleiermacher perceived that religion has its roots not only in feeling, but in the conscience, he would have escaped that *Determinism* (denial of the freedom of the will) which is simply the mechanical necessity of the material world transferred to the moral." Comp. p. 22: "In seasons of sorrow Schleiermacher displayed an admirable moral energy, which we rejoice in all the more, because he denied the freedom of the will, and thus practically corrected the error of his theory." 3. P. 10: "Christianity, according to Schleiermacher, is not the creation of a new world of glory on the basis of the atonement made for sin, but only the development of the religious element of man's nature, which had hitherto been, as it were, locked up and dormant. It was only the consecration and exaltation of the earthly life." 4. P. 10: "Schleiermacher does not exhibit Christianity as a new life, in the full sense of the term, as the conclusion and crown of the revelations from above, in the incarnation of the Word." P. 6: "Schleiermacher's *Dogmatik* teaches us to recognise, in the person of the perfect and sinless man, the historical manifestation of the ideal and the divine." 5. P. 11: "With Schleiermacher, the Holy Spirit is the expression for the total historical results of the work of Jesus—the Spirit which pervades the church, and is therefore only a national spirit of a higher order." 6. P. 10: "Religion with Schleiermacher does not bring man into fellowship with a personal living God, and a real heavenly world." P. 15, etc.: "Schleiermacher did not rise above the mere earthly and human opinions of his age. In his doctrine of Christ he tore asunder the net of Pantheism; but this was not followed by the results which his system required to complete it." Compare p. 66, 70, etc.: "If Schleiermacher had allowed the religious feeling to express itself without restraint, it would assuredly have borne witness to a personal God. It is an effect of his philosophy, which here has gone beyond its proper limits, that Schleiermacher, in his *Glaubenslehre*, did not arrive at actual Theism."

After all this, Schleiermacher's denial of the doctrine of the Trinity was self-evident, and required no special notice to make it apparent. Moreover, it is expressly said in a passage already quoted, that Christ is not acknowledged as the Divine Word which has become flesh. The same applies to the mode in which Schleiermacher speaks of the Holy Spirit. In reference to the other matter, Herr von Oettingen says: "Auberlen does not shrink from saying, that in the whole history of the church, and course of theology hitherto, no man has appeared who, in elevation of mind, originality and universality, can be compared with Schleiermacher. In reply to such exaggeration, we need hardly mention such names as Augustine and Luther, whom Auberlen, contradicting himself, afterwards seems to confess to be the greater." In my book I say, p. 8, etc., after quoting the declarations of Claus Harms respecting his obligations to Schleiermacher: "Such testimony history accords to Schleiermacher, and it is foolish zeal to attempt to rob him of this honour. In the whole course of theology hitherto, no man has appeared who can be compared with him in elevation of mind, in originality and universality. On the contrary, several of the most influential and gifted of living theologians, such as Rothe of Heidelberg and Hofmann of Erlangen, have followed him very closely,—only too closely indeed. But it is most true that we cannot remain satisfied with the views of Schleiermacher, either in practical religious life or in science. We are summoned to aim at higher things. It is going far beyond the limits of sound sense when a theologian, much spoken of recently, and in other respects deservedly esteemed, M. Baumgarten, places the Apostle Paul, Luther, and Schleiermacher together." Oettingen had no need to look up pages 14 and 66 to discover that I regarded Luther as greater than Schleiermacher; he required only to read the passage which he attacked right through. Then he could have convinced himself easily, that when I said "hitherto," I meant, since Schleiermacher, and not since the existence of a church or theology. It is not quite

needless in our day to remember that there is such a thing as " scientific conscientiousness." Supported by the current of ecclesiastical opinion, and sitting securely in the teacher's chair, we are prone, feeling sure of the concurrence of our own public, to make light of the difficulties and tasks of science. There is a tendency to employ severe and stinging words, and to be unjust to men who serve under another flag.)

NOTE K 4, p. 362.—Vgl. die Verhandlungen über die Trinität zwischen *Lücke* und *Nitzsch* in den Stud. und Kritiken 1840 und 41.

NOTE L 4, p. 365.—Rudelbachs und Guericke's Zeitschrift für die gesammte lutherische Theologie und Kirche, 1860, S. 709 f.

NOTE M 4, p. 372.—*Ullmann*, in der bemerkenswerthen Abhandlung Stud. u. Krit. 1848, i.: Die Stellung der Studien und Kritiken in d. Theol. u. Kirche.

NOTE N 4, p. 375.—*Rothe*, theologische Ethik, i. S. v.

NOTE O 4, p. 379.—Vgl. *Thiersch*, Vorlesungen über Katholicismus und Protestantismus, 2 Aufl., 1848, i. S. 131, 184 ff. 293 ff., wo an der Hand der Geschichte treffend über das *necessarium* in der Kirche und den " beklagenswerthesten Missgriff, den Deklarationen des Glaubens eine bis in's Unendliche gehende theologische Vollständigkeit zu geben," geredet ist.

NOTE P 4, p. 382.—*Baumgarten*, theol. Comment. zum Pentateuch, i. S. lxxxiv. seqq. *Delitzsch*, Commentar über den Psalter, i. S. xiv.

NOTE Q 4, p. 390.—*Stier*, Epheserbrief, i. S. 345 f. Andeutungen für gläubiges Schriftverständniss, zweite Sammlung, S. 46. Jesajas, nicht Pseudojesajas, S. xviii.

NOTE R 4, p. 398.—*Rothe*, theol. Ethik, i. S. xiv.

NOTE S 4, p. 399.—Deutsche Zeitschrift für christliche Wissenschaft und christliches Leben, 1860, S. 230.

NOTE T 4, p. 403.—*Schelling*, Vorwort zu Steffens nachgelass. Schrift. S. xxxii. sq. xl. sq. Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie, S. 107. Vgl. *J. Hamberger*, Schelling und Franz Baader, in den Jahrbüch. für deutsche Theologie, 1860, iii. S. 542 ff., insbesondere, S. 567 ff. *Dorner*, über Schellings Potenzenlehre, ebendas. 1860, i.

NOTE U 4, p. 406.—*Franz v. Baader*, Vorlesungen über spekulative Dogmatik, sämmtliche Werke, Band 8, S. 51 f. *J. Hamberger*, die Cardinalpunkte der Franz Baader'schen Philosophie, 1855, S. 28 f.

INDEXES.

I.—TEXTS OF SCRIPTURE ILLUSTRATED OR EXPLAINED.

	PAGE
Gen. i.-xi.,	153-189
i. 27,	67, 185
ii. 14-25,	186
iii. 1, etc.,	180
iii. 5,	181, 184
iii. 7,	183
iii. 15,	68
iv. 1,	157
xi. 9,	159
xvii. 1,	141
xviii. 19,	147
Ex. iii. 13, 14,	120
vi. 3,	292
Deut. v. 5,	107
xxxii. 8,	163
Josh. viii. 6,	38
1 Sam. iii.,	104
Ps. xvi. 10, 11,	68
xix.,	111
xl. 7,	89
xl. 8,	111
xlix. 16,	88
li. 7,	177
li. 18, 19,	88
cx. 1, etc.,	73, 88, 89, etc.
Isa. v. 2,	108
vi.,	98, 99, 100
xxv. 8,	68
xli. 8, 9,	81
xli. 25,	81
xlii. 1, 6,	81
xlix. 1,	81
xlix. 8,	82
l. 4,	81
liii.,	79, 82, etc., 89
liii. 10,	68
Jer. i. 9, 18,	96, 100
ii. 13,	102
xx. 14, etc.,	95
Dan. ii. 44,	73
vii. 13,	73
Hos. xii. 1, etc.,	108, 112
Amos vii. 10,	95
Matt. iv. 11, 12,	238
xxii. 29-32,	141
xxii. 31, 32,	241
xxiii. 27,	97
xxvi. 63, 64,	73
Mark xv. 32,	71
Luke i. 1-4,	238
ii. 14,	165
ii. 39,	238
John vi. 27-29,	242
xii. 40,	134
Acts v. 41,	59
xiv. 16,	165
xxvi. 16,	50
Rom. iv. 9, 12,	145
iv. 25,	209
v. 12,	67, 178
vi. 2,	209
xii. 4-8,	36
1 Cor. i. 17,	71
ii. 4,	36
ii. 11, etc.,	241
ii. 16,	269
vii.,	49
ix. 1,	48, 66
xii. 1,	50
xii. 4, 5,	37
xii. 12, 29,	35
xii. 14,	35

	PAGE
1 Cor. xv. 1, 2, etc.,	56
xv. 8,	48, 50
xv. 17, 18,	65
xv. 21,	67
xv. 34,	68
xv. 45,	65
2 Cor. iii. 17,	65, 66
iv. 4,	67
iv. 6,	48, 65
xii. 12,	38, 39, 40, 41
Gal. i. 1,	46
i. 8, 9,	51
Gal. i. 11, 12,	47, 49
iii. 5,	36, 39
Eph. ii. 14,	165
iv. 4-12,	37
1 Thess. i. 5,	51
ii. 1-4,	53
ii. 13,	51
1 Tim. iv. 14,	37
2 Tim. i. 6,	37
Heb. ii. 4,	39, 40, 41
1 John iii. 4,	180
v. 6,	65

II.—PRINCIPAL MATTERS.

Abraham, his calling and obedience, 106; and Moses, 123; Ewald's view of, criticised, 138, etc.; the hero and founder of the family, 143; must leave his father's house, 143; his faith, 144, 145.

Acts of the Apostles, the "most calumniated book," 45; the harmony of, with the epistles of Paul, 45, etc.

Am and Goim, the distinction between, in the Old Testament, 142.

America, traditions in, respecting the flood, 170.

Amos, 94, 95.

Analogies in revelation, 134.

Ancient world, the, 271.

Animals and man, the difference between, according to Genesis, 186.

Anthropomorphism, 29.

Apologetics, the starting-point of, 65, 66.

Apostles, miracles of the, 38-45.

Auberlen, a memoir of, 17, etc.; origin of his work on Revelation, 24, 25; his first sickness, 26; his death, 28.

Augsburg Confession, the, 211.

Autonomic cosmic tendency, the, 265.

Baader, Franz von, his system described, 404-406.

Babel, the confusion of languages at, 159, 160; import of the name, 162; the sin of the builders of, 164, etc.; local traditions respecting the tower of, 165, 166.

Babylon, the seat of the rise of Polytheism—its symbolical import, 161.

Bacon, Lord, quoted, 31; his influence, 250.

Bahr, and his *Symbolik* of the Mosaic cultus, 369, 370.

Balbel, 162.

Βάρβαρος, 162.

Basle Confession, the, quoted on the Lord's Supper, 213.

Bauer, the books of the Old and New Testament allowed to be genuine by, 31; quoted, 57, 59; the criticism of the school of, 61.

Baumgarten, his works characterized, 394.

Beck, T. T., his works and doctrinal system described, 397-399.

Bedas, the, stolen by the giant Hajagrivah, 169.

Beginning of the world, the, we are indebted to book of Genesis for the knowledge of, 153.

Belgian Confession, the, quoted, 235.

Believing theology, the progress of, since the time of Schleiermacher, 372-375.

Belus, the tower of, traditions respecting, 165, 166; compared with the pyramid of Cholulu in Mexico, 173.
Bengel and his school, 308, etc., 312, etc.; his works, 314, etc.; his view of Scripture, 315; his *Gnomon*, 316; his chronology, 319, 320; his *Sixty Discourses on the Revelation of St. John*, quoted, 320; his view of the restoration of all things, 321; and Oetinger and Spener compared, 321-323.
Bible, the books of, acknowledged to be genuine by Bauer and his school, 31.
Bible, the, gives the right answer to our inquiries about sin, 178; how to be viewed and studied, 236, 237, 240, 385-387, 390, 391; sufficient, if non-infallible, 243, 244; the criticism of, 266-270.
Biblical criticism, the fundamental error of modern, 274; a sketch of, 275, etc.
Biblical party, the, in Germany, 283, etc.
Biederman, quoted, 103.
Birs Nimrod, 166.
Bischer, quoted, 75.
Bleek, his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, 364.
Bœhme, 226, 227.
Borsippa, 166.
Brotherhood, the, of mankind, 163.
Bruno Bauer, quoted, 74; his criticism of the Gospels, 281-283; connection between, and Strauss, 283.
Burk, P. D., son-in-law of Bengel, his *Gnomon in 12 Prophetas Minores*, and *Gnomon Psalmorum*, 316.

Calvin, his views of justification and the Lord's Supper, 211, 212; his doctrine of predestination, 232.
Canon, the historical, laid down by Knobel in reference to the Old Testament, 32.
Catastrophes, the three great, of apostasy and judgment, 158, 159.
Catholicism, 205.
Catholicizing tendency, the, 265.
Causes, sufficient, 51, 52.
Characteristics, the cosmical, pervading modern times, 193.
Charisms in the church, 35, 36.
Chassewee, the North American Noah, 171.
Chiliasm, 320.
Cholulu, the pyramid of, 171, 172.
Christ Jesus, the resurrection of, 56; crucified and risen, the foundation of the Christian church, 59; the quickening Spirit, 65.
Christian church, the rise of, 64.
Christianity, the nature of, 67; and antichristian opposition, 192; the whole question between, and antichristian opposition, 193; has had always to strive with error, 195, 196; the medicinal and juridical aspects of, 209; as understood by Protestantism, 220.
Christophanies, 134.
Church, the Christian, the rise of, 64; the apostolical, exposed to the inroads of error, 196.
Church and State, the union of the, 206.
Church party, the, in Germany, 375; causes which called it forth, 376; theological and biblical productions of, 380-382.
Classical authors, modern, their influence, 254.
Cloudy pillar, Ewald respecting, 288.
Confession, the Augsburg, quoted, 211; the Helvetic, 212; the Basle, 213; the Belgian, 235.
Confusion of languages, the, 159.
Consciousness, moral, the collision of contradictories in the, 175.
Contradictions in the Gospels, how to be viewed, 246, 247.
Cosmical characteristic, the, pervading modern times, 193.
Creation, the new, 321.
Creeds and confessions, 379.
Criticism of the Bible, 266; of the text, 266, 267; literary, 267; historical, 268; dogmatic, 268-270; of rationalistic dogmatism, 270, etc.; fundamental error of the modern, 274; sketch of, 275; Strauss', 279-281; Bruno Bauer's, 281, 282; service rendered by the representatives of the dogmatistic, in the Old Testament, 293, etc.; modern dogmatistic, 294, 295; results of, negative, 295, etc.; destructive, 297; accumulated booty

provided by, for believing science, 298.
Criticism, a fettered, 291.
Criticism of the school of Bauer, 61.
Criticism of ancient authors, 271, etc.
Crucifixion, 71.
Crusius, C. A., his works and theological system described, 335-343; his view of the soul, 337, 338; his idea of God, 338; his idea of the heaven of glory, 338; his view of the world and man, 339, 340; on the history of redemption, 340; on the place and importance of Israel, 341, 342.
Cuneiform inscription relating to the tower of Babel, translated by Oppert, 165, 166.
Cyrus, 86.

Decalogue, the, the soul of the Mosaic revelation, 119.
Defect, the doctrinal, of the elder Protestantism, 208, etc.
Deism, 192, etc.; in England, 249, etc., 302.
Delitzsch, quoted, 147; on *vaticinia post eventum*, 290; on a fettered criticism, 291; on the influence of Bengel on the interpretation of Scripture, 315, 316; his works characterized, 394, 395.
Deluge, the. *See* Flood.
Descartes referred to, 201, 250.
Development, human, sin not necessary to the true, 183.
Development, the, of opposing principles in the Christian church, 196.
Devil, the, 179, 180.
De Wette, his exegetical works, 364.
Difficulties, the, of the first three chapters of Genesis, 185, 186; in the Gospels, 337, 338.
Disciples, the eleven; the great change wrought on, after the death of Jesus, 59; proclaim the resurrection of Jesus, 60.
Discovery, modern scientific, 257, etc.
Divine, introduction of the, into created life, according to Oetinger, 329, 330.
Doctrinal defect, the, of the older Protestantism, 208, etc.
Dogmatic or dogmatistic criticism, 268-295.
Dorner, his testimony to Bengel, 309.
Δυνάμεις, 35.
Duncker, Max, quoted, 149.

Earth and heaven, the distinction between, 217, 218.
Ebrard, his writings, 387, 388.
Egoism, the, of nations, 164.
Ehrenfeuchter, quoted, 193.
Eichhorn, his mode of explaining the miracles of the Old Testament, 276, 277.
Elohim, 141.
Elohism and Jehovism, 292.
El Schaddai, 141.
Empiricism must precede theory, 62.
Errors, the church liable to the intrusion of, 196.
Eschatology, the limited, of the elder Protestantism, 214, 215.
Evangelists, the four, critical difficulties pertaining to, 238.
Evil, the origin of, in man, 180.
Ewald, quoted on the 53d chapter of Isaiah, 80; on the history of Israel, 124, 125; on the destruction of the Egyptian hosts in the Red Sea, 128-131; on the call of Abraham, criticised, 138, etc.; his Old Testament criticism, 288, etc.
Exegetical Handbook, the, on the Old Testament, characterized, 336.
Exodus, Ewald's view of the, 128-133; the object of, 135-137.

Facts of Scripture, the transmission of the, 146.
Faith, the, of Abraham, the existence of Israel depends on, 144, 145; could not be transmitted, 145.
Faith, justification by, 203.
Fall, traces of the, on humanity, 175, etc.; the origin of, 179, etc.; Herder quoted in relation to, 188.
Fathers, the, of the modern systems of philosophy, 201.
Feuerbach, his view of religion, 52.
Fichte and Kant, 251.
Flood, the, the different aspects it presented to Israel and the heathen, 152; reflected by geology, 167; Humboldt's remarks on the traditions of, among the nations, 168; traditions of, among the Brahmins, 169; traditions of, in the New

World, among the Dog-rib Indians, 171; traditions of, among the Mexicans, 171-174.
Formal principle, the, of Protestantism, 228.
Francke, 333.
Fundamental and non-fundamental articles of faith, 378, 379.

Galatians, the, Paul appeals to the miracles wrought among, 36; the epistle to, shows what Paul asserted made him a Christian, 46.
Genealogies, the, of Genesis, their importance, 154, 155.
Genealogies, the Messianic, 157.
Genesis, the first eleven chapters of, considered, 149, etc.; the importance of, to history, 153; further references to, 187.
Geology, its relation to the flood, 167.
Gerhard, Johann, 219.
Gifts, miraculous, in the Christian church, 35.
Gnomon, Bengel's, 316; Burk's, 316.
God, has He acted and spoken? is there a living personal? 29; as revealed in the prophets of the Old Testament, 103, etc.; how known to Israel, 110; of Abraham, 141, etc.; the idea of, 218, etc.; names of, in the Old Testament, 291, 292; Crusius' idea of, 338; the, of Mosaism, 369, 370.
Gods, the, Homer's description of, as cited by Plato, 114-116.
Goim and *Am*, the distinction between, in the Old Testament, 142, 159.
Golden age, the, of the Hebrews, 124, etc.
Gospel, the, of John, opposing views of, 69.
Gospels, the, the critical investigation of, 68, etc.; full of miracles, which are even involved in the words of Jesus, 70; critical difficulties in, 238; inaccuracies and contradictions in, 246, 247.
Grace, the material principle of the Reformation, 205, etc.

Hahn, J. M., his works, 334.
Hahn, P. M., his works referred to and characterized, 317, 318, 319, 334.
Hajagrivah, the giant demon, steals the sacred Bedas, 169; is compelled to restore them, 170.
Haman, 349.
Harless, 381.
Hassencamp and Kollenbush, the school of, and Menken, 343-346.
Heathen nations, the, ignorant of their origin, 142; the narrowness of their historic views, 151.
Heaven and earth, 217, 218.
Heaven, the, of glory, Crusius' conception of, 338.
Hebrews, the golden age of the, 124.
Hegel, and Schelling, 252; his *Philosophy of Religion*, 279.
Hellenes, the first great epoch of the history of, 118.
Helvetic Confession, the, 212.
Hengstenberg, and his works, 381-383.
Herbert of Cherbury, 302.
Herder, quoted respecting the Hebrew Scriptures, 174; in relation to the fall, 188.
Hereditary sin, 175, 176; universal, 176, 177; proves the descent of all men from one pair, 177, 178; and the devil, 180.
Herodotus, his mode of writing history, 150, 151.
Hess, J. J., of Zurich, his works and theological views, 347, 348.
Hezekiah, 85.
Hiller, P. F., his works referred to, 318.
Historic criticism, 268.
History, its birth, 113; and revelation, 120, 121; of the patriarchs, 146-148; modes of treating, 150; the highest view of, 151; and religion, 186, 187.
History of Israel, the earlier, confirmed by the prophets, 106-113; the whole confirmed by Christ and His apostles, 121, 122; the universal aspect of, 151.
Hofmann, characterized as an expositor and a theologian, 391-393.
Homer, his description of the gods as cited by Plato, 114-116.
Hope, the heathen without, 84.
Humanism, kept down by the Reformation, 197; before the Reformation, 199, 200.

Humanity, the idea of, its unity, 163, 164.
Humboldt, quoted, 64; on the traditions relating to a universal deluge, 168; referred to, 201; his *Cosmos*, 257, 258; letters of, to Varnhagen von Ense, quoted, 283.
Hundeshagen, quoted on Humanism before the Reformation, 199; his canon of criticism, 294.

Ibn Ishak, the life of, published by Wüstenfeld, 148, 149.
Iliad and *Odyssey*, the, the Pentateuch compared to, by some, 116, 117.
Indian traditions respecting the deluge, 169.
Inspiration, a doctrine of the older Protestantism, 204; mode of using, 233, etc.; incorrect views of, held by the elder Protestantism, 234; rigid views of, invented in the interest of dogmatic theology, 236, 245.
Inspirations, repeated, of the prophets, 97.
Intellectualism, a one-sided, 62.
Interpretation of Scripture, the, 244.
Introduction, 268.
Isaac, 145.
Isaiah, his vision of Jehovah, 98.
Isaiah, the latter portion of the prophecies of, why rejected by some, 291.
Islam, the history of, 148.
Isnad, or Sanad, what? 148, 149.
Israel, the earlier history of, confirmed by the prophets, 107-113; God's peculiar and gracious dealings with, 135, etc.; acquainted with their origin, 142; the existence of, hangs on the faith of Abraham, 144; the universality of their historic recollections, 151; their distinct views of the origin of the nations, 151; the place and importance of, according to Crusius, 341, 342.

Jacob, Hosea's reference to, 108; the type of the virtues and vices of the nation of Israel, 146.
Jehovah, the vision of the glory of, granted to Isaiah, 98; his revelation history, not a myth, 120.
Jeremiah, 95.
Jesus, the resurrection of, 56; the death and resurrection of, preached by the apostles as the foundation of the Christian church, 59; the cause of His condemnation to death, 68, etc.; the main facts of His history not denied, 71; claimed to be King of the Jews, 72; believed Himself to be the Messiah, 72, 73; declared Himself to be the Messiah, 73, 74; relation of, to the Old Testament, 76, etc.; the life of, represented in four different ways, 236, 237.
Jews, the continued existence of, 122, 123.
Jochebed, 140.
John, the Gospel of, 69; how the Gospel of, was viewed by Luther, 231.
Judaism, 121, 122.
Judges, the, 104.
Justification by faith, 203, 209, 211, 212; the principle of the Reformation, 303, 304.

Kant, referred to, 201; and Fichte, 251.
King of the Jews, Jesus claimed to be, 72.
Knobel, his Old Testament canon, 32.
Kollenbush and Hassencamp, and Menken, the school of, 344-346.
Kurtz, his *History of the Old Covenant*, 395.

Lactantius, quoted respecting the traditions of a deluge, 169.
Lange, quoted on the individuality of man, 97; on the sufficiency of Scripture, 243; characterized as a writer, 406, etc.
Language, the confusion of, at Babel, 159, etc.; the connection of religious movements with changes in, 162.
Lavater, 349.
Law, the giving of the, at Sinai, Ewald's view of, criticised, 131-138.
Leibnitz, 251; his theory of monads opposed by Oetinger, 326, 327.
Life, political and social, in Europe, 258, 259.

Literary criticism, 267.
Literature, two epochs in the history of, 114; the first great epoch in the history of, among the Hellenes, 118.
Lord's Supper, the, the Lutheran doctrine of, 210; the reformed doctrine of, 212.
Lücke, 364.
Lüken, his collection of traditions relating to an universal deluge, referred to, and cited, 169, etc.
Luther, what made him a reformer, 194; his doctrine of the Lord's Supper, 210, etc.; his views and treatment of Scripture, 230.
Lutheran and Reformed Churches, union of the, 376, etc.

Man, not productive, but receptive, in relation to God, 140; not an isolated being, 76; the difference between, and animals, according to Genesis, 186.
Manu Satjavarata, of the Indian Puranas, 169.
Martensen, 407.
Material principle, the, of Protestantism and the Reformation, 205.
Medicinal and juridical aspects of Christianity, 209.
Melancthon, quoted as to man's original state, 179; his *Loci* referred to, 207.
Menken, his theological system, 343-347.
Messianic expectations in the time of Christ, 71, 72.
Mexico, traditions in, respecting the flood, 171, 172.
Meyer, H. A. W., his *Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament*, 364, 365.
Mind-miracle, the, of Abraham's faith, 145.
Miracles, and revelation, related, 29, 30; how the question of, is to be treated, 30; the actual, the first question in relation to, 31, 32; the assumption of a modern criticism in reference to the treatment of, 32; the starting-point of inquiries respecting, 33; the existence of, in the apostolic church, 35, etc.; Paul appeals to the working of, among the Galatians, 36; the subsidence of, traced in the apostolic age, 37, 38; of the apostles, 38-45; not mere wonders, 40; the signs of an apostle, 42; Paul declares himself to be a worker of, 44; and Christianity, 60; as evidence, 78, 79; of the Old Testament, to which most objection is taken, 134; the sweeping consequences of the denial of, 190; different modes employed to get rid of, from the Bible, 275, etc.
Miraculous gifts in the apostolic church, 35.
Monod, Adolph, 54.
Monotheism, the Shemitic, Renan's view of, 126, 127.
Moses, distinguished from, and above, the prophets, 105; a mediator, 107; the father of history, 113; the soul of the revelation of, 119; and Abraham, 123; regarded as a prophet by Ewald, 127; the song of, 130.
Mysteries, 49.
Mythology, the rise of, 162.
Myths, the, of the Greeks and the Pentateuch compared, as to their respective educational fitness, 119, 120.
Myths, the formation of Christian, according to Strauss, 279, 280.

Odyssey, the, and the *Iliad*, the Pentateuch compared to, by some, 116, 117.
Oehler, the works of, 395.
Oetinger, quoted in reference to Bœhme, 227; in relation to the interpretation of Scripture, 227; commended and described, 310, 311; his views of Scripture and theology, 322, 323; opposed to Rationalism, 323; on the *sensus communis*, 324, 325, 326; opposes Idealism and the Leibnitzian theory of monads, 326, 327; his one-sidedness, 327, 328; on the idea of a divine purpose, 328, 329; on the introduction of the divine into created life, 329, 330; and Spener and Bengel, 331, 332; opposes a rational system to the rationalistic, 332; effects of his work, 334; and the Hahns, 334, 335.

Old Testament, the, the relation of, to Jesus, 76, etc.; the connection between, and the New, 84; Niebuhr's testimony to, 113; the critics of, 288, etc.; and the New, not to be mixed up, on the one hand, nor rent asunder, on the other, 299.
Olshausen, H., the works of, described and characterized, 384-387.
Oppert, his translation of a cuneiform inscription relating to the tower of Babel, 165, 166.
Organic connection of humanity, the, 176, 177.
Origin of evil, the, in man, 176, 179, 180.
Origin of nations, the, 160.
Orthodoxy, a dead, after the Reformation, 304, 305.

Pantheism, 251.
Particularism and Universalism, the, of Israel, 152, 153.
Patriarchs, the, 147.
Paul, declares himself a worker of miracles, 44; the conversion of, 45, etc.; the revelations he received, 47, 49, 50; claims equality with the other apostles, 51; inference from his conversion as to the reality of the resurrection of Christ, and the truth of Christianity, 51, 52; his important historical position, 53, 54; Monod quoted as to, 54; relation of, to the history of revelation, 55; the real historical, in opposition to the arbitrary, of the critics, 60; the Christophany he received, 134; account of the conversion of, 240.
Pauline epistles, the, in relation to the argument for Christianity, 35; harmony of, with the Acts of the Apostles, 45, etc.; should have made a phenomenon like Strauss' *Life of Jesus* an impossibility, 43.
Paulus, of Heidelberg, how he explained away the miracles of the New Testament, 276-278.
Peace, universal, and Peace Congresses, 163, 164.
Pentateuch, the, compared by some to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, 116, 117; to be received on external and internal grounds, 137; Ewald's view of the authorship of, 288, 289.
Philosophical systems, modern, 250, etc.
Philosophy, the father of modern, 201.
Philosophy and theosophy, 399, etc.
Pietism and Rationalism, 301-304; the revival produced by, 305, 306; in Wurtemberg, 312; its mode of treating Scripture, 312.
Pillar of cloud, the, Ewald's view of, 289.
Plato quoted respecting Homer's description of the gods, 114-116.
Political and social life, 258, 259.
Polytheism, the place of the rise of, 161.
Predestination, Calvin's doctrine of, 232.
Prediction, Delitzsch on the denial of, 290.
Progress, 258.
Prophecy in relation to Jesus, 79, etc.
Prophets, the, and the revelations which they received, 91; call their predictions visions, 92; the opposition of, to false prophets, 92, 93; compared with the New Testament prophets, 93; the inspiration of, compatible with human freedom, 94; representatives of God on earth, 96; the true idea of, 100; not self-deceivers, 101, 102; and the wise men of heathenism, 103; the calling of, 104; confirm the earlier history of Israel, 106, 107.
Protestantism, and Rationalism, directly opposed, 195; a protest common to both, 198; the elder, and Rationalism, 202, etc.; the two principles of, 203; two connected doctrines of, 204; the material principle of, 205; the doctrinal defect of the elder, 208, etc.; the limited eschatology of the elder, 214, 215; results of the neglect of the doctrines of the new creation by, 215, 216, etc.; its doctrine of sin, 221, etc.; the formal principle of, 228; use of Scripture by, 229; doctrine of inspiration held by, 233, etc.
Purposes of God, the eternal, Oetinger's view of, 329.
Pyramid, the remarkable, of Cholula,

compared with the tower of Belus, 171-173.

Question, the great, of the age, in the conflict of Christianity with anti-christianity, 193.
Quotations, the, from the Old Testament in the New, 240, etc., 246.

Race, the human, the unity of, 163, 164; cause of the diversities among, 165, 166.
Rationalism, and the Reformation, 192, etc.; forms the antithesis to the Reformation, 194; starts from principles the most opposite to Protestantism, and is irreligious, 195; not a development of the Reformation, 197; has more affinity with Catholicism than with Protestantism, 198, 199; and the elder Protestantism, 202, etc.; the strength and importance of, 225, 226; exhibited historically and in its nature, 248, etc.; the results of, 260, etc.; the service it has rendered, 263; the defeat of, 300, etc.; relation of, to Pietism, 301, etc.; the defeat of, in the nineteenth century, 350, etc.
Reason and Revelation, 262, 263.
Reconciliation, to God, and of men with each other, 65.
Red Sea, the, Ewald quoted on the destruction of the Egyptian hosts in, 128, etc.
Reformation, the, and Rationalism, 192, etc.; the power, influence, and mistakes of, 206; doctrinal defect of, 208; brought forth the Scriptures, 228; the great principle of, 303.
Reformed Church, the, her doctrine of justification, 211.
Reformers, the, 222, 223.
Reimarus, 276.
Religion and history, 153, 186, 187.
Religious movements, the connection of, with changes in languages, 162.
Renan quoted respecting Shemitic Monotheism, 126.
Restitution of all things, the, 321.
Resurrection of Jesus, the proofs of, 56; along with the death of Jesus, the great subject of apostolic preaching, 59; the starting-point of apologetics, 65, 66; was not made sufficiently prominent in the theology of the Reformation, 207, 208.
Revelation, divine, what? 29; and miracle, 29; of the Old Testament prophets, 91; two things notable of that of the Old Testament, 93; the consequences of denying supernatural, 101, 102; involved in the hope of the Messiah peculiar to the Jews, 102, 103; mode of, 105; the Mosaic, 119; God's revelation history, not myth, 120; Ewald quoted on, 124; and miracles, a question of consciousness on the part of the prophets, apostles, etc., 190; the denial of, connected with the denial of God, 192.
Revival, the, brought about by Spener, 305; in the nineteenth century, 350-352.
Rieger, C. H., his *Meditations on the New Testament*, 317.
Robespierre, a striking saying of, 178.
Roman history, the critical treatment of, 273.
Roose, M. F., his *Expositions*, 317, 318.
Rothe quoted on the nature of the Christian religion, 67; defect of his *Ethics*, 193, 194; quoted on the interpretation of Scripture, 385-387; his theosophic system, 407-412.

Sack, C. H., 370.
Sacraments, the, the doctrines of the Reformers respecting, 210.
Samuel, 104; as a prophet and intercessor, 107.
Sartorius, quoted on Rationalism, 199.
Sceptics, their deficiency in thoroughness of thought, 60, 61.
Schelling, 25; his *Philosophy of Mythology* quoted, 160; his system explained, 401-404; and Schleiermacher, 403, 404.
Schiller, his idea of progress, 258.
Schleiermacher, referred to, 193; his influence, 343, 353; his theology, 354; his *Summary of Theological Study*, 356; his *Glaubenslehre* and *Dogmatik*, 256, 257; his view of

the importance of history, 357; his relation to the Bible and the church, 358, 359; and Melancthon, 359, 360; his mutilated representation of Christianity, 360, 361; the disciples of, 361-363; and Schelling, 403, 404.
Schmidt, C. F., his *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, 368.
Scholasticism, 220.
Science, natural, used as a weapon against Christianity, 256; the worth and force of the results of modern, 257.
Scriptures, sacred, their educational fitness, 119; how an authority, 204; brought forth into the light of day by the Reformation, 228; the use of, 229; Luther's view of, 229, 230; controversial use of, at the time of the Reformation, 232, 233; use of, for edification, 233; views of the inspiration of, 233, etc.; give hints as to how we should regard differences found in, 239; to be studied as a whole, 237; the interpretation of, 242; the sufficiency of, 243; the design of inaccuracies found in, 246, 247.
Self-seeking and self-exaltation, 182.
Sensus communis, the, as held by Oetinger, 324-326.
Servant of Jehovah, the, 80, 81; the sufferings of, 82, etc., 97, etc.
Shem, Ham, and Japhet, 157.
Shemitic Monotheism, 126.
Sin, hereditary, 175, 176; the explanation of hereditary, 176, etc.; the first element of, 181; the second element of, 181, 182; the third element of, 182, 183; not necessary to human development, 183; the three elements of, not accidental, 384; the view of, held by the Reformers, 222.
Sinai, Ewald's view of the giving of the law at, 131.
Sinful act, and sinful condition, the difference between, 175.
Socinianism, the rise of, 248, 249.
Socrates, the words of, relative to Heraclitus, 187.
Song of Moses, the, 130.
Soul, the, Crusius' conception of, 337.
Spener, 301, 302, 383; the revival produced by, 305-307; and Bengel, and Oetinger compared, 331, 332.
Spinoza, his Pantheism, 219, 220, 251.
Spirit, in the biblical sense, 216.
Spirit, the witness of the, 204.
Spirit of Jehovah, and spirit of Elohim, 94.
Steinhoffer, his works, 317.
Stier, R., quoted, 343; considered as an expositor, 388-390; his view of Scripture, 389, 390; his principal works, 390.
Stilling, Jung, 349.
Strauss, quoted, 74, 75, 276; his *Leben Jesu*, 278; and Bruno Bauer, 281; connection between, and Bruno Bauer, 383, 384.
Study of the Bible, the right, 237, 385-387, 390, 391.
Suffering righteous man, the, 88.
Sufferings, God's servant may expect, 86, 87.

Table of nations, the, in Gen. xi., 156, etc.
Tempter, the, 180, 181.
Τέρατα, 35.
Text criticism, 266.
Theology, a believing, the progress of, since Schleiermacher, 372-375.
Theophanies, 98, 105, 134.
Tholuck, his works and influence, 384.
Thomasius quoted, 295.
Tower of Babel, a cuneiform inscription relating to, 165, 166.
Tradition, historical, 146.
Traditions, relating to the tower of Babel, 165, 166; relating to the flood, among various nations, 168-174.
Transmission, the, of Scripture facts, 146.
Tree of the knowledge of good and evil, 183.
Twesten, *Lectures on the Dogmatik of Evangelical Lutheran Church*, 371.

Umbreit, as a commentator, 365.
Union, the, of Church and State, a mistake of the Reformation, 206.
Union, the, of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, opposition to, 376, 377.
United Brethren, the, 311.
Unity, the, of mankind, a Christian

idea, 163; what disturbed and rent, 164, 165; the true, restored in God alone, 165.
Universalism and particularism, the, of Israel, 151, 152, 153.
Ustori, his view of the doctrines of Paul, 368.

Vaticinia post eventum, 291.
Vishnu, the tradition of the visit of, to the earth, 169.
Visions, the, granted to the prophets, 98, 100.

Winer, quoted, 139.
Witness of the Spirit, the, 204.
Witnesses of the resurrection of Jesus, the, 58.
Wolfenbüttel Fragments, the, 275, 276.
Words of Jesus, the, teem with testimony to His supernatural character, 70.
Words and works of God, the, 231.
World, the ideal, 217.
World, the, the knowledge of the beginning of, derived from Genesis, 153; delight in, has truth, 254; the ancient, 271; the glorified, 321.
World drama, the, 224.

Zinzendorf, 333.
Zwinglius, his idea of the sacraments, 212, 222.

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